TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF GENDER STRATIFICATION

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ABSTRACT: Determinants of gender stratification range through every institutional sphere and every level of sociological analysis. An integrated theory is presented which charts the connections and feedbacks among three main blocks of causal factors and two blocks of outcomes. The GENDER ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION block includes the degree of compatibility between productive and reproductive labor, and determinants of the gender segregation of productive labor (including flows from other blocks). The GENDER ORGANIZATION OF REPRODUCTION includes demographic conditions, the social control of reproductive technologies, and the class and gender organization of parenting. SEXUAL POLITICS includes historical variations in family alliance politics, erotic status markets, and violent male groups. On the outcome side, GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION centers on gender income and property, household organization, sexual coercion, and the distinctiveness of gender cultures. GENDER CONFLICTS involve the conditions for both gender movements and counter-movements, which feed back into the prior blocks of causal conditions. Despite rises in women's gender resources in recent decades, it is likely that gender conflicts will go on in new forms. An integrated theory makes it possible to examine alternative scenarios and policies of change in gender stratification of the future.

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Theories of gender stratification cover a landscape of processes and conditions, from micro situations to wide-ranging historical comparisons. The explanatory focus has included infancy, reproductive technologies, kinship organization, childcare, cultural ideologies, eroticism, violence, and the gender division of labor. For most of these conditions, some supporting evidence is available, but we are far from an empirical resolution of the relationships among the various theories.

Part of the difficulty is that evidence has come in a great variety of forms: quantitative analyses of demographic data and of surveys of attitudes, experiences, and standardized test scores; qualitative descriptions of patterns of language and interaction; historical analysis of literary sources; comparisons of economic, military, and kinship structures; studies of the dynamics of social movements. There is no simple method of reducing all this material to a comparable set of quantitative indicators which could enter into a comprehensive test of the explanatory power of the different variables. The various processes, individual characteristics, and social structures are not on the same level of analysis; the theory of gender stratification exemplifies all the problems of relating micro, meso, and macro levels, and of supplying static cross-sectional data with dynamic explanations.

Most gender theories are based on a particular range of empirical materials. Thus, many theories appear to be at least partially true. The problem is that they are not comprehensive, and they lack explanatory leverage outside of a particular context. For instance, micro theories usually are based on contemporary observations of male and female interaction, thereby taking for granted the surrounding context of a Western society in the late 20th century. Demographic analysis of career attainment similarly assumes a particular structural context. Comparative and historical analysis is essential for explaining structural variations; hence, it is not surprising that most of the attempts at a general theory of gender stratification began with anthropological materials (Friedl 1975; Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984). The restriction here is that sources such as the Human Relations Area Files and many anthropological studies tend to select pre-state societies, or to focus on peasant communities within state-dominated societies, while ignoring the structure of the aristocracy and the urban sector. Other historical approaches (e.g., Collins 1971, 1986) emphasize the structure of political domination in the period of the agrarian states and the transition to the modern bureaucratic state.

A useful step at this point is to show how the various components of a general theory of gender stratification fit together. What we cannot yet say is which processes are relatively stronger than others; it is likely that some processes come to the fore under particular historical configurations, while others recede into the background. The task of putting together a comprehensive model is a theoretical one; for the reasons given above, it does not lend itself to an empirical test by a single body of data. We are guided by available evidence in choosing the processes to highlight in the model, but we are under no illusion that this picture is more than the most plausible construction we can make at this time.
Our aim is a theory capable of explaining the entire range of possible variations in gender stratification. The theory should be able to show why particular historical periods in the past have taken various forms; also, it should alert us to the possible range of variations in the future. There is a tendency to assume that the hypothetical variation ranges from extreme male dominance to a midpoint of gender equality, but it is worth examining the question of whether particular scenarios could lead in the future, for instance, to female dominance on various dimensions or to new and more complex forms of gender conflict.

THE STRATEGY OF CONSTRUCTING A COMPLEX THEORY

Gender stratification exemplifies the problems of building a theory in which there are many factors linked by numerous causal processes and feedbacks. A good theory should provide us with a strategic simplification, an imagery to guide our way through the complications of empirical reality. It should make details accessible to us when we need them, while giving us an outline of how the major kinds of processes clump together, and how they affect each other.

Our strategy is to present the theory in the following steps. First, we overview the major blocks of ingredients which go into a comprehensive theory of gender stratification. In Figure 1, we start with FOUR blocks of fundamental causal conditions. Three of these represent major types of gender theories; the fourth comprises background conditions.\textsuperscript{1} Theories of the GENDER ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION are those which stress the economic positions of men and women. Theories of the GENDER ORGANIZATION OF REPRODUCTION have focused particularly on childbirth and mothering (and sometimes fathering), and their effects on either gender psychodynamics and culture or women’s economic activities. Theories of SEXUAL POLITICS concern erotic relationships and their connection to social power; they emphasize the ways in which sexual property and sexual exchange enter into political alliances, and the ways in which sexual violence affects other modes of gender stratification. All three of these types of theories implicitly assume that some of the processes in the other theories are taking place in the background; each theory highlights a certain portion while taking the context for granted. There is also a fourth block of fundamental conditions, the structure of POLITICAL ECONOMY; these conditions flow into various of the gender theory blocks, but we will not devote attention to its causal basis in its own right (cf. Lenski 1966).

Moving toward the right of Figure 1, we find GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION. These are the levels of male and female control of strategic resources which flow from the conditions on the left; they include economic, coercive, and organizational advantages or disadvantages. From one angle, these may be regarded as resources for further action. Looked at in another light, these may be examined as the pattern of gender inequality at any given point in time; these include both the macro distribution of male/female power and property, and the ideological evaluation of males and females. An important component here is
the degree of overt GENDER CONFLICT which is mobilized at a given time. We include also on the right secondary outcomes in the realm of male/female choices and behaviors, which may be called life options. Feedbacks also flow from the right to the left in Figure 1, from repetitive outcomes to structural conditions on the left and to the degree of mobilization in the middle. For clarity, we will focus attention on a few parts of the sequence at a time, leaving consideration of most feedback loops until we have filled in the more basic processes.

In this article, we go inside each of the three main blocks of causal conditions in turn. Each presents a complex set of connections in its own right. While inside the GENDER ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION block, for example, we ignore the other blocks except where some of their components are direct causes or consequences of the factors we are immediately concerned with. By the time we are finished, we have a comprehensive picture of the main connections among the fundamental causal conditions, a composite snapshot taken from successive vantage points. This leads us in turn to a closeup view inside the GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION block, and its connections to the outcomes of GENDER CONFLICT. Finally, we consider what the integrated theory implies for future scenarios of gender stratification.

**GENDER ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION**

It is well known that relative economic power affects many other dimensions of gender stratification. In modern households, the relative income of husbands and wives affects decision-making power (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Thompson and Walker 1989; Huber and Spitze 1983; Hood 1983); across history, women's productive labor has been related to the most striking differences in gender inequality. Hunting and gathering economies in which women contribute high proportions of subsistence are among the most gender-egalitarian societies known; societies where herding and agrarian plow cultivation are carried out by men are at the extreme of male domination. There are two kinds of theoretical complexities. One is the question of the determinants of male and female economic participation. Moreover, economic contribution is not sufficient to ensure that a person benefits from the fruits of his/her labor; the second issue is how gendered work is transformed into gendered control of economic resources. The problem is analogous to that in Marxian theory: the question is to specify when labor is exploited for the benefit of another class and when it becomes a crucial resource for mobilizing political power in its own right. Thus, women's work may be coerced or its products expropriated; it may consist of unpaid domestic labor while men's labor takes place in a market and yields monetary resources useful for exchange in a wider arena; or again, women's work in the market may be paid less than men's or may be restricted to unfavorable market sectors.

The GENDER ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION block (Figure 2) presents the major factors which structure male and female work. Flowing into this block are conditions which determine whether a particular kind of work is male or female
in the first place; flowing out of this block are the paths by which gendered work turns into economic resources, becoming part of the GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION block. A key condition is the gender segregation of productive labor, as this is what identifies particular kinds of work as "men's" or "women's".2

A major factor that has been discussed in the historical-comparative literature affecting gender labor segregation is the compatibility of reproductive and productive labor. Women who are pregnant, breast-feeding, or caring for young children adjust their productive and reproductive activities to make them mutually compatible; hence, their economic contributions tend to be greatest in food-gathering or domestic gardening modes of production, lowest in dangerous or long-distance activities of hunting, herding, fishing, or military plundering, and in agrarian plow-culture carried out far from the home. In a market economy, women may be economically segregated in a different way: insofar as childcare labor is most compatible with housework, women's most likely work sphere is spatially separated from the places where paid labor takes place. Even when women take part in the labor market, their careers are disadvantaged if they are more committed to childcare and domestic responsibilities than are men (e.g., Traweek 1988).

Productive/reproductive compatibility is affected by several kinds of conditions. Most attention has been paid to demographic and technical factors of reproduction: how much of a woman's life is spent in child-bearing and child-rearing, which in turn is the result of the birth rate and the timing of births; it is also affected by technical means of childcare such as breastfeeding versus the availability of bottle-feeding. In addition, there are social conditions affecting the distribution of reproductive labor: the class stratification of childcare labor, or its collectivization. These flow into the GENDER.PROD block from the REPROD.LABOR block.3

But even where technical and social conditions are favorable to attenuating the link between gender and childcare, women's relative independence from childcare and traditionally linked domestic labor may still not be realized. A modern dual-career couple, taking advantage of reproductive technology and commercial or collective childcare, still tends to find the mother giving more commitment to childcare and domestic responsibilities than the father (Hochschild, 1989). Thus, there seems to be an additional factor in the realm of cultural gender identities, whose antecedents need to be explained. We take up theories of this connection in the REPROD.LABOR block.4

The gender segregation of production is not determined solely by productive/reproductive compatibility. Insofar as there are other conditions which sharply distinguish male and female social identities and surround gender with an ideology of distinctive spheres, this will shape the realm of work as well. For instance, where males are military specialists, a male culture of violence and coercive domination contrasts with female culture; when erotic life is built around contrasting male and female strategies and cultures, this too shapes gender segregation of productive roles. These conditions flow from the SEXUAL POLITICS block.
Once gender segregation of production exists, its effects can be increased or mitigated by supply and demand conditions. The value of male or female labor varies with its strategic indispensability. Such bargaining power is strongest where the economy has a single basic mode of subsistence and productive labor is sharply gender segregated. In some hunting and gathering societies, gathering (typically women's work) produces up to 80% of subsistence (although the mean contribution across such societies is closer to 20-30%; Barry and Schlegel 1982); in cattle-herding societies or in rainfall agrarian plow-culture, the bulk of the economic contribution comes from male labor.

On the side of labor supply, in horticultural societies, women tend to become even more economically active when men are often away in long-distance warfare. In modern times, warfare and war casualties, by affecting the male labor supply, have had a strong effect on breaking through occupational gender segregation. These conditions are secondary to the main determinants of gender segregation, however, as we see by the post-World War II displacement of "Rosie the riveter" (Trey 1972) or by the relatively lower rewards for women who filled traditionally male occupations in the male-labor-depleted Soviet Union during the 1950s (Goldberg 1972). Here, demographic conditions affecting the gendered labor supply produce variations within the limits of an already existing structure of male domination. A parallel example may be given on the demand side: in 20th century industrial societies, the expansion of bureaucratic and salaried employee sectors increases the demand for women in clerical and professional occupations, with negative effects on relative female participation in managerial and production sectors (Charles 1992); this is a paradoxical effect in which "modern" economic structure increases occupational gender segregation.

Effects of the Gender Division of Production on Gender Resource Mobilization

We suggest several paths by which conditions in the GENDER.PROD block flow into the RES.MOBILIZ block. To the extent that work is gender segregated, it is possible to calculate the relative amount of productivity that flows from male and female labor. To turn this into a resource requires further conditions; productivity must be realized as income. Relatively indispensable female labor, and a high demand/supply ratio for it, should increase the relative value of female income; where indispensability and demand/supply favor males, women's work is relatively undervalued, and thus is exploited labor. Even these paths depend on structural conditions: that is, there must be a market through which competitive conditions turn production into income. Further, where a market exists, men and women may participate in it differentially (e.g., when women are largely in unpaid domestic production while men have money incomes).

When we reach the point at which income is realized from labor, we have a genuine resource which can be used for other forms of stratification and conflict. But we are not yet at the end of the chain of economic causes. The property system affects how males and females can control their economic resources in the long
run, multiply them, and pass them along through inheritance. In these processes, economics mingles with political conditions, which we leave for fuller analysis in the RESOURCE.MOBILIZ block.

GENDER ORGANIZATION OF REPRODUCTION

We have already discussed some of the paths from the REPROD.LABOR block to the GENDER.PROD block. We have concentrated on the ways that the compatibility of productive and reproductive labor is affected by demographic conditions and by the social organization and technologies of childbearing and childcare. These paths comprise the narrowly economic consequences of the gender organization of reproduction and have been stressed by materialist and demographically oriented theories of gender stratification. Another type of theory has emphasized the cultural consequences of reproductive arrangements, whether from neo-Freudian early childhood psychodynamics, or via social learning and negotiation of interaction styles. We will consider here the antecedents and dynamics of both the demographic and the cultural paths (see Figure 3).

Demographic Conditions

A key factor is how much time men and women spend in reproductive labor. The basic dynamic is formulated by Huber and Spitze (1983; Huber 1988). Where environmental conditions and the level of health technology results in a high death rate, there is a social demand for a high birth rate; women spend much of their lives pregnant or lactating. Under these conditions, there is an additional vicious cycle, since high rates of birth result in high rates of death of women in childbirth, driving up still further the overall death rate. This pattern is not an historical constant; even before the demographic transition, there were centuries when the environment or climate was relatively benign and disease rates were low, and birth rates fell correspondingly (Wrigley and Schofield 1981; Goldstone 1991). The modern era is historically significant because three large changes in the underlying conditions have taken place: more favorable health and medical conditions reduced the death rate; birth control technology has made it easier to reduce the birth rate; another new technology, the sterilized baby bottle, became widespread around 1910, further freeing mothers of young children for participation in the waged labor market.

These demographic and technological conditions are both enhanced and offset by social arrangements. Women in the 20th century, freed for the labor force by birth control and baby-feeding technologies, still have faced obstacles from the gender segregation of labor. Incentives to make use of these technologies vary. To the extent that women get into highly rewarding career tracks, they tend to make greater use of contraceptive technologies and other methods to delay and reduce childbirth. Conversely, where the economy is family-centered and labor-intensive, women may want many children, who add to the family budget as street
Figure 3
Gender Organization of Reproduction
venders or work helpers (Blumberg 1984), even as a high birth rate perpetuates other aspects of the cycle of poverty.

There are also conditions of social organization, such as the labor specialization of childcare. Where women are stratified by class, it becomes possible for women of the higher classes to free themselves from childcare by passing it on to wetnurses, nannies, governesses, or household servants. This specialization was most common in agrarian aristocracies and in the early industrial period; there are modern equivalents, scaled down to a part-time basis, in the form of baby-sitters, "au pair girls," and housekeepers (Rollins 1985). The technology of surrogate mothering, available in the late 20th century and likely to be expanded in future years, is an extension of this class pattern of freeing one class of women from reproductive labor by specializing a lower class of women in it. The fact that surrogate mothering has been met by a hostile legal and moral atmosphere in the 1980s and 1990s—including from the organized feminist movements whose members would benefit from it—indicates that the link from reproductive arrangements to a reproductive division of labor is not straightforward. Reproductive technologies are part of a social mode of reproduction (Gimenez 1991), affected by ideological mobilization and political conflict, which needs to be entered into the theory in its own right.

Another possible form of the social organization of childcare is collective: that is, out-of-home childcare centers, whether private for-profit, religious or other non-profit, or government-supplied. Public schools provide a version of such childcare, although typically of limited hours and beginning only in middle childhood; the range of inclusiveness could indeed extend all the way to early infancy and to around-the-clock boarding schools. Boarding schools have traditionally been used primarily by the upper classes, indicating again a way in which stratification advantages are often turned to freeing upper-class parents from childcare. Variations in the extent of collective childcare are not well explained; the causal conditions here include stratification, and political and ideological mobilization. Thus, there are feedbacks from the GENDER.PROD block and from GENDER.RES.MOBILIZ block which affect the demographic processes within the REPROD.LABOR block.

Although men's role in childbirth is limited, potentially men's involvement in childcare time could exist at any level, up to 100%. With birthrates at moderate to low levels, the gender organization of childcare could affect virtually all subsequent conditions in the model. Hypothetically, there could be a society in which men did all of the childcare. In historically known cases, male predominance in childcare is rare; the variation typically extends from zero to moderate male participation (Katz and Konner 1981). Comparisons among pre-state societies (Whiting and Whiting 1975; Coltrane 1988, 1992) give evidence that where male childcare is relatively higher, the position of women in the society is also higher. It is likely that there are causal loops in both directions: male participation frees women for greater labor force participation, with political and ideological consequences, while a relatively higher female position in the society makes men take more responsibility for childcare.
In modern American society, a modest increase in men’s childcare and other domestic labor appears to result from both material and ideological factors (Huber and Spitze 1983; Coltrane 1990). Higher earnings for wives translate into larger contributions from husbands in working-class more than middle-class families, for younger more than older parents, and for housework more than for childcare. Even with higher proportionate earnings by wives, husbands tend to perform more childcare and housework only if wives believe that husbands should help and demand assistance from them. Women’s enhanced bargaining position and willingness to initiate change appear to be precursors to change in the domestic division of labor, but men’s motivations to be involved parents can be an independent causal force. Perhaps the most important predictor of shared responsibility for domestic tasks is the willingness of married couples to accept wives as economic co-providers (Hood 1983; Coltrane and Valdez 1993; Ferree 1984). This is the path shown in Figure 3; segregated productive labor and ideologies associated with it shape reproductive labor, while household labor creates and sustains distinctive gender identities in both men and women (Berk 1985; Coltrane 1988; Ferree 1990; West and Zimmerman 1987) and affects the differential ranking of genders in the RES.MOBILIZ block.

Parenting and Gender Ideologies

A different path by which reproductive labor affects gender stratification comprises the process by which mothering or fathering can affect the personalities of children and the cultural roles of adults. Neo-Freudian theory (Chodorow 1978; Dinnerstein 1976)) argues that girls acquire a distinctive orientation toward the world because they are cared for by a person of the same sex; their development involves no sharp break in identification, and their orientation is participatory and nurturing. A boy, however, breaks his early identification with his mother and acquires an orientation toward separateness, manifested in an emphasis on cognitive objectivity, achievement, and competition rather than social participation. The evidence for long-lasting gender differences in cognitive and moral styles and interpersonal orientations is controversial. Gilligan (1982) presents evidence on gender differences in moral reasoning, and studies have consistently found small gender differences in mathematics and visual-spatial ability (Benbow 1988; Hyde and Ling 1986). Argument has centered on whether these differences are rooted in genetics, in deep-seated childhood experiences, or in more proximate and variable social experiences; the latter is supported by evidence that most differences seem to be growing smaller in recent years (Kimball 1989).

We do not know clearly the strength of the path from male and female parenting to various outcomes in the realm of GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, nor is there agreement on the mechanisms by which such influences may take place. Nevertheless, there is evidence that such a path does exist; early childhood experience is itself a variable, and we have seen some of the differences which result from relatively higher or lower participation by fathers in childrearing (Coltrane 1988, 1992).
These paths may be conceptualized as affecting gender ideology both as a global set of conceptions circulating in the macro realm and as the micro practices of gender interactions, stereotypes, and cognitive/emotional styles. Researchers have not yet sorted out the relative importance of the various paths by which this may occur; it may take place by (a) neo-Freudian psychodynamics operating in infancy; (b) socialization into currently prevailing customs, by learning gender roles in childhood; or (c) negotiation of gendered spheres and interactions during adulthood. We have already sketched the neo-Freudian pathway. The relative distinctiveness of the social roles of mother and father also provide models for social learning; in the third pathway, adults who themselves play the roles of father and mother with differing degrees and kinds of involvement are thereby shaping the rest of their lifeworld of interactions in a gendered pattern as well. All three paths suggest that the relative degree of male and female involvement in parenting will affect the ideological distinctiveness and ranking of gender cultures more widely.

Finally, we note a connection from REPROD.LABOR to the SEXUAL.POLITICS block. Women who are pregnant or childcaring are particularly vulnerable to violence. Societies with high birth rates or an otherwise sharp separation of gender spheres with women specialized in reproductive labor tend to be ones in which men regard women as objects to be protected and controlled. The intensity of violent conflict (whether wars or local violence in the form of neighbourhood crime) thus enhances male dominance and reduces male involvement in reproductive labor. There is also a domestic counterpart in peaceful conditions. Pregnancy and childbirth are times of elevated danger of marital violence (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Ferraro 1988); in part, this is due to women’s physical vulnerability at these times, together with increased strains that all marital transitions place on relationships. In addition, full-time commitment to child care reduces a woman’s domestic power; even with an ideology glorifying motherhood, the structural reality is that these experiences reduce the main sources of women’s power, their income and external social involvement. The temporal flow of women’s participation in reproductive labor is connected to shifts in the balance of power in both the economic sphere and sexual politics.

SEXUAL POLITICS

A third set of conditions centers on erotic and coercive relationships (see Figure 4). Historical comparisons are crucial in bringing out these patterns; sexual politics is prominent in tribal (kinship-based) and agrarian-patrimonial societies, and it shifts to a private form of erotic status stratification when the state monopolizes organized violence. There is also a coercive dynamic of sexual aggression which continues to be important today in such phenomena as rape, family abuse, and sexual harassment. All of these paths have effects on gender cultural differences and hence feed into gender segregation in the economic realm.

Sexual alliance politics consists in the use of sexuality as an item of exchange to make social ties. In historical periods when there is no state independent of kinship
Figure 4
Sexual Politics
structures, sexual relationships are political. The exchange of marriage partners among kin units comprises a system of alliances. Families that repeatedly intermarry according to established rules tend also to be long-term military allies, who mobilize together for war and to defend one another in blood feuds. These exchanges also determine the inheritance of economic property. Typically, all adult males are part-time soldiers; the kinship structure is the organization of coercion which upholds the property system. Sexuality is appropriated as a form of exchangable property; the kin group rather than the individual exerts control over sexual behavior.

The emphasis on sexual property depends on background economic and military conditions. In hunting-and-gathering bands and in some horticultural tribes, group control of sexuality is often minimal, and there may be free choice of sexual partners, much casual and nonmarital sex, and frequent divorce. The difference is that some of these societies exist in a situation of minimal stratification and militarization. This comes about because there is virtually no economic surplus which can be used to build stratification; or because the population is very dispersed or living in an environment with a low level of competition over resources; or because only distant wars are fought. In contrast, horticultural tribes in competitive ecologies, possessing moderate resources and incipient stratification, tend to give extreme emphasis to marital alliances and develop an elaborate culture around male and female obligations in these systems of exchange. The emphasis on sexual alliance politics reaches its peak when a specialized military aristocracy rules over a disarmed peasantry. Here, not only do marital alliances determine political connections within the ruling class, but vertical status in relation to other classes is enforced most sharply as endogamy within this aristocracy. Here we find some of the most extreme restrictions on women; they are in effect imprisoned within their families, veiled or secluded from outsiders. The honor of a family is tied to the sexual purity of its women, and violations of sexual property are violently punished. Women of the peasant and servant classes are much less restricted because of their work and their corresponding lack of status honor. By the same token, any family capable of claiming some status for itself does so by secluding or veiling its women and stressing the sexual property rights of its men over its women. In this way, the status ideal of the upper classes permeates the class structure.

Militarization and stratification give impetus to sexual alliance politics only insofar as families are the main political units. The first step in the bureaucratization of the state was its separation from tribal kinship structure; most families now become depoliticized subjects, but the state itself was ruled by families of aristocrats. The thorough separation of state from family occurred with the anti-monarchical revolutions of modern times and subsequent "civil service" reforms. These changes removed the underpinnings from sexual alliance politics.

A parallel set of conditions holds in the organization of economic property. As long as the household was the workplace, marital alliances were crucial for the transfer of property, and the authority of "head of family" coincided with that of
employer and business owner. Here, again, sexual exchanges are regulated by an organization and the status honor of the family is publicly identified with the control by the dominant males over the sexual purity of their women. This pattern is most striking in hacienda or similar structures of agriculture (e.g., in traditional Latin America or southern Italy), where the family-controlled property is also an armed household. Where the central state is weak, both military alliance politics and a family-centered economic stratification coincide in reinforcing the pattern of sexual politics. Restrictions on women lessen when there is demilitarization and the displacement of family businesses into individualistic careers.

The effects of sexual politics on gender stratification flow by several paths to the RESOURCE.MOBILIZ block. Some effects are structural, others cultural. Within tribal societies, fixed marriage and residence rules determine whether a woman will stay in her home, where her husband visits her, or move to her husband’s village. In the former case, the woman has a better power position because she is surrounded by her kin (matrilocal or avunculocal residence); in the latter, her position is especially weak because she is isolated among her husband’s relatives (patrilocal residence). In addition, inheritance through maternal lines (including the males in those lines) gives women more control over economic resources than inheritance through paternal lines (patrilineality); this is one way in which the resources generated by women’s work (in the GENDER.PROD block) are either preserved or diluted when they reach the RESOURCE.MOBILIZ block. The kinship structure, which is to a large extent the working out of alliance patterns, thus shapes the mobilization of gender resources.

The most striking effect of sexual politics is on the ideologies of gender distinctiveness and gender ranking and, thence, on the gender segregation of production. Where emphasis on sexual politics is intense, male and female spheres are sharply contrasted. When this is combined with high degrees of social stratification, males acquire status as controllers and protectors of female sexual property; women’s status honor is identified with their sexual purity. The status system upholds a dual standard; males acquire honor by the amount of sexual property they control, women acquire honor by being restricted and protected sexual property. Since status is acquired as a member of the family rather than as an individual, women (especially the older women with more family authority), as well as men, take an active role in enforcing sexual restrictions on other women. The effect of this sexually oriented status ideology is to separate “women’s sphere” from men’s. Women of high status are restricted from economically productive activities, thus curtailing this route to resources in the GENDER.PROD block.

With the shift to bureaucratic industrial society, most conditions in the SEXUAL.POLITICS block drastically change. The emphasis on alliance politics diminishes almost to zero. The kinship structure tends to become bilateral in inheritance and neolocal in residence. With the decline of family businesses, there is relatively little to inherit, except within the upper class; this group is thus most likely to maintain a version of marital alliance politics and its associated status system (the system of “debutante” rituals designed to introduce marriagable young
women to status-eligible prospective husbands; Ostrander 1984). But male specialization in organized violence (as of the late 20th century) has generally continued. Men have monopolized combat units of armed forces and, until very recently, most police duties, as well as most of the informally organized violence of the private sector. The decline in marital alliance politics has diminished the concern for controlling sexual property, but another structural source of sexual stereotyping and aggression remains.

**Sexual Coercion**

Male sexual aggressiveness, and the tendency to stereotype women as sexual objects, is one of the results of a highly competitive structure of sexual politics. The intermediating process is that violent, all-male groups tend to form their solidarity around a masculine erotic identity. Its milder manifestations are sexual bragging, swearing, and whoring; its more extreme form shows up in the tendency for rapes to go up in wartime (Brownmiller 1975). In horticultural societies where men are segregated in militarized men's houses and secret societies, gender ideologies are highly antagonistic (Murphy 1959; Divale and Harris 1976). In agrarian states dominated by military aristocracies, women of the lower classes or of the enemy are typically regarded as sexual plunder. These kinds of conditions make sexual aggressiveness a basis for a status ranking among men, caricatured at one extreme by the aggressive Don Juan, at the other extreme by the sexless eunuch.

Under modern conditions, the relative demilitarization of daily life under the centralized bureaucratic state reduces the extreme features of male sexual coercion. However, all-male groups tend to continue some version of the sexually aggressive culture; it is found in violent gangs (Thrasher 1963:156-157), in the peacetime military, and among competitive athletes and carousing fraternities (Sanday 1990). A causally prior question arises: why is it that men tend to monopolize organized violence? Here is the principal area in which the greater average male size and physical strength give a competitive advantage, especially in combat using hand-propelled weapons; in addition, the incompatibility of coercive labor with reproductive labor has traditionally diminished the military capabilities of women. These conditions are offset by social organization and technology, but only if political and social movements are directed toward eliminating the male monopoly over force.

This line of theory suggests that the gender integration of armed force (both the military and the police) is an important factor for breaking up the all-male groups which are the centers of the culture of sexual aggression. By the same token, integration of women into all-male sports teams, and the elimination of gender-segregated residential clubs such as fraternities, should also contribute to lessening this structural base of the culture of sexual aggression. The same conditions in the REPROD.LABOR block that free women for economic production also free them for military mobilization. Male monopolization of organized force in the past has been based not only on factors contributing to male fighting superiority; it has
also been buttressed by the social mobilization of men to maintain that monopoly. Many tribal societies have a taboo against women using weapons; in agrarian societies, soldiery is considered the masculine occupation par excellence. Occasional women who are personally strong enough to be effective soldiers are usually barred, or they are singled out for punishment, as in the burning of Joan of Arc.

There is a self-reinforcing circle: male monopoly of organized violence creates a culture which identifies masculinity with aggressiveness and femininity with passivity; when women break the monopoly on force, others mobilize against them for violating the cultural ideal. The circle, however, can be broken if a politically concerted effort is made to eliminate gender-segregated armed groups. Sexual politics theory also suggests that weapons are symbols of membership in all-male groups; the disarmament of civilian society to the maximal extent possible should also contribute to reducing sexual aggression.\(^{14}\)

**Erotic Status Politics**

Erotic relationships, apart from family alliances and sexual coercion, continue to play into the system of stratification. In the historical agrarian societies, situations in which political bargaining centered around the civilian activities at a royal court rather than military conquest, tended to develop an individualized status competition based on sexual affairs. Instances are the Heian court of medieval Japan and the Versailles of Louis XIV, where the position of royal mistress became politically influential. In these situations of courtly politics, upper-class women became the centers of status hierarchy and the prestige of men became tied to their affairs with high-ranking women (Morris 1964; Collins 1986:297-321). Analytically, the ingredients are a low degree of militarization at the centers of power and a large community of competitors for status as individuals rather than as members of families.

This kind of “erotic marketplace” takes place wherever closed communities of both sexes are formed in a context with low immediate salience for economic or other forms of stratification. Markets of erotic competition and ranking appear, for instance, in each cohort in a modern high school (Coleman 1961; more generally, see Zetterberg 1966). To the extent that such “erotic marketplaces” emerge where gender cultures are segregated, there is a tendency for women to dominate the culture of the erotic bargaining; there is a special stress on feminine adornment and attractiveness, and women are the cultural centers of attention. These kinds of structural situations, which became increasingly widespread with the gradual demilitarization of society and the emulation by other classes of the culture of the courtly aristocracy, have given a high status to women as long as they specialized in the erotic sphere. This status gain for some women had the side-effect of reinforcing the segregation of gender spheres, especially in production.

As women have become increasingly integrated into the labor market, erotic relationships have become potential centers for another form of conflict. Insofar as men and women work in the same place, opportunities for sexual affairs increase;
also, there is some evidence that women in higher-level careers have a higher level of extramarital affairs than homemakers or women in gender-segregated clerical or manual jobs (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). The managerial and professional stratum of large organizations also is permeated by informal networks which manoeuvre over power and career advancement (Kanter 1977); when women are integrated into this stratum, organizational politics comes to overlap with the erotic marketplace. The situation is rife for exploitation and conflict as sexual affairs become resources for organizational alliances; conversely, career favors become a bargaining chip for sexual favors. Sexual harassment issues are likely to become increasingly prominent with the continued integration of women into higher occupations. Legal regulation is not likely to eliminate these conflicts because such regulation expands the bureaucratic side of formal structures; informal networks in organizations arise precisely in order to circumvent the clumsiness of bureaucratic rules. If women achieve equality as managers, erotic politics will not disappear in the organization, although the dominant players in the game become spread among both genders. Structurally, the modern organization is likely to become more like the Versailles court as it becomes gender-integrated, while adding more overt and more multidimensional conflict over sexual politics.\(^\text{16}\)

**MOBILIZATION OF GENDER RESOURCES AND THEIR FEEDBACKS**

Each of the three blocks of conditions—REPROD.LABOR, GENDER.PROD, and SEXUAL.POLITICS—affects one or another condition of GENDER RESOURCE MOBILIZATION. Again, we have the problem of displaying a complicated set of processes without becoming lost in a fishnet of causal arrows and feedbacks. It is important to bear in mind that these gender resources can be viewed in several ways: treated simply as outcomes, they represent the distribution of male/female inequalities in economic, political, and ideological spheres; they are also resources which feed back into more fundamental processes to reproduce or change the level of gender stratification.

The GEND.RES.MOBILIZ block is made up of five main sets of conditions (economic resources, the organization of kinship and household, gender composition of elites, violence and sexual aggression, and gender ideologies). Together, these affect the micro-conditions of everyday life (household power, male/female deference, and freedom of action); they also flow into individual motivations for further action within the existing system of gender stratification (see Figure 5). Because of its importance, we will pull out for separate consideration the mobilization of gender conflicts through social movements and countermovements in Figure 6.

What have we shown so far about the accumulation of gender resources? Regarding economic resources: from the GENDER.PROD block, the value of male/female labor is enhanced to the degree that it turns into disposable income and, thence, into property; the last is jointly determined by the inheritance structure, which comes in turn from the kinship system, and from the mobilization of SEXUAL.POLITICS.
Figure 5
Gender Resource Mobilization
Figure 6
Gender Movements and Conflicts
The structure of kinship and household flows from variables in the SEXUAL POLITICS block; it is also affected by feedbacks from the gender distribution of income and property. Thus, as men and women acquire separate economic resources, the household is increasingly held together by temporary negotiations; under these modern conditions, the household is not only neolocal but often of multiple or unstable locality. One result of household organization is in determining the allies women and men have for exerting or evading power over each other. In the traditional patrilocal household, women were especially disadvantaged because of their isolation from their kin; in the matrilocal arrangement, a woman’s relatives could protect her from coercion by her husband. In the modern neolocal household, violence is unchecked by other kin members and is shaped by one-on-one lineups of resources between individual men and women. Kinship structure thus flows into the organization of sexual aggression.

The extent of male or female political/organizational elites is jointly determined: partly by the gendered control of income and property, partly by the extent to which social institutions are organized around families. Women’s chances of inheriting large-scale power or property from their husbands and fathers is greatest in a highly stratified society dominated by elite families; if, in the future, family ties further dissolve through lower marriage and higher divorce rates, this route will be further curtailed.

The effects of male or female elites have remifications throughout the chain of conditions. Male dominance at the level of the state has offset women’s resources at the level of the household or village economy; for instance, in West African colonial regimes of the early 20th century, male political elites elevated males over the female-controlled market associations which had traditionally given considerable local power to women (Blumberg 1984). Male macro-political power is a discount factor operating against meso-level female resources. Conversely, elite women are a source of female prestige, and they may exercise legal pressure for changing structural conditions. In modern times, the mobilization of feminist movements has been largely due to the accumulation of resources among elite women (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986).

The extent to which female elites have these wide-ranging effects, however, seems to depend on whether elite women accumulated their own independent resources or acquired them through inheritance from men. Women have sometimes inherited top political positions and been powerful queens, such as the Empress Wu of China (T’ang dynasty, reigned 690-705), Elizabeth I of England (reigned 1588-1603), or Catharine the Great of Russia (reigned 1762-96); in democratic politics, Indira Gandhi (Prime Minister of India 1966-1975, 1980-1985) exemplifies the effective use of power acquired via inherited family reputation (Twitchett 1979, Chambers Biographical Dictionary 1984). Wives and daughters of capitalist elites have sometimes inherited control of huge fortunes. The existence of such family-based female elites, in themselves, has not translated into changes in the structural conditions for women generally. The effectiveness of elite women in mobilizing feminist movements (e.g., in 19th-century England and the United
States, and again in the 20th century, such as the leadership of the wife of the Shah of Iran in the 1970s) appears to depend on the extent to which it occurs in conjunction with relatively high values being placed on other mobilizing conditions.

Male/female violence and sexual aggression are affected by conditions flowing from the SEXUAL POLITICS block; these include the amount of emphasis that sexual alliance politics places on controlling sexual property (e.g., relative emphasis on virginity, nonmarital sex, the inviolability of property through divorce, specific obligations of remarriage). The organization of kinship and household enhances or reduces sexual violence. In addition, the extent to which males and females are organized into solidary groups for military, work, or leisure purposes affects the extent to which there are distinctive gender ideologies; under conditions of high separateness, these ideologies stereotype gender relations as specifically sexual relations, which in turn fosters sexual aggression. These patterns are mitigated by female control of economic resources, but there appears to be a danger zone of heightened male violence at the transition point when a woman’s income first rises to challenge her husband’s (Roldan 1988).

Gender ideologies vary along two dimensions: the extent to which male and female spheres are regarded as different, and the extent to which male or female culture is regarded as superior. Belief in gender differences is a necessary but not sufficient underpinning for belief in cultural ranking. The distinctiveness of male and female cultures and surrounding ideologies (including ideological images of each other) comes from all of the causal blocks: the distinctiveness of gender positions within productive labor, the amount of emphasis on segregated reproductive labor, and the extent to which men and women have distinctive resources and strategies in the sphere of sexual politics.

Gender cultures have important feedback effects. There are self-reinforcing loops between sexual aggressiveness/violence and gender cultures; sexual aggression polarizes cultural attitudes and enhances associational separation, which in turn facilitates aggression. Cultural attitudes affect the extent to which women (and men) are motivated to pursue particular kinds of economic activities. Where cultures are polarized, occupational segregation tends to be maintained with a sense of taken-for-granted naturalness; on the other hand, the movement of increasing proportions of women into high-visibility careers tends to change cultural definitions and, thus, affects the career motivation of other women. In this way, female elites in the active labor force—rather than merely as top political elites—have a disproportionate effect on the mobilization of career ambitions (Chafetz 1990), and cultures can change with a rapid “tipping effect.”

In addition, we should note the feedback link between gender cultures and motivations to make use of reproductive technologies and child-rearing arrangements. Sharp cultural distinctions perpetuate traditional reproductive specialization and can mobilize antagonism toward innovations in reproductive methods (such as the dispute over the RU484 abortion pill); shifting gender cultures produce additional motivation to adopt reproductive innovations.
A number of life options and consequences flow from the extent of income and property under women's control. Cross-culturally, higher levels result in greater freedom of movement for women; greater control by women over their own sexuality, fertility, and choices for marriage and divorce; and higher self-esteem and educational/career ambitions (Blumberg 1991). Women who control their own income invest more than men do in their children's well-being and education; changes thus ramify into further consequences for social development.

**GENDER MOVEMENTS AND CONFLICTS**

There are several reasons to give attention to the process of gender conflict in its own right. Public, political conflict is dramatic; it builds up emotions and focuses attention in a comparatively short period of time and, thus, can lead to fairly rapid changes in cultural identities and motivations for action. One of the offshoots of periods of intense mobilization for conflict over gender issues is the publicization of cultural images of male and female spheres; this mobilizes career aspirations, changes levels of marital satisfaction, and generates pressure for legal enforcement of new rights. Times of political mobilization such as the 1970s thus have effects on the structures of occupations, families, and gender ideology over and above more slow-moving trends in these structural spheres themselves.

Conflict has further ramifications insofar as movements produce countermovements. The strongest predictor of the strength of antifeminist movements is the prior existence of a strong profeminist movement (Chafetz and Dworkin 1987). These opposing movements have distinctive social bases; antifeminist movements are anchored in the traditional roles where women specialize almost exclusively in reproductive labor and their position in the overall class structure is based on the economic success of their male relatives. The balance of movements and countermovements affects not only individual motivations and ideologies; by entering the political arena, it also affects the entire structure of other spheres (e.g., reproductive labor, by legalizing or illegalizing various kinds of reproductive technologies and control over children; sexual politics, by institutionalizing legal controls over sexual harassment and sexual violence; productive labor, by antidiscrimination laws, compensatory career channels, and targeting gender monopolistic enclaves). In the other direction, periods of heightened conflict over gender issues may mobilize male violence to protect traditional domination, as in the politicized attacks and gang rapes on liberal women in Pakistan, Iran, and Algeria in the 1980s and 1990s.

Political movements thus have ramifying effects throughout the entire structure of GENDER.PROD, REPROD.LABOR, and SEXUAL.POLITICS. Gender stratification theory has only begun to develop an explanation of the long-term dynamics of such processes. It seems likely that periods of intense mobilization of gender conflicts are intermittent; we should not expect history to move via a single, all-or-nothing struggle which ushers in a harmonious utopia of gender-neutral society. Looked at analytically through the lens of a general model, such processes have
apparently occurred in various forms in the past. In their own day, horticultural societies were not static, and many doubtless went through periods of mobilization of the warrior men's houses against the rising or falling organization of women-centered productive and household units; at periods in ancient Egypt and Rome, and in medieval Japan and Europe, there were movements which shifted patterns of inheritance, deference, and ideology more favorably to women (Collins 1986; Searle 1988). The two modern waves of women's emancipation in the industrial period are part of a longer series. To be analytically complete, we need to compare the mobilization of movements for men's privileges as well, and to chart the conditions determining the strength of backlash countermovements.

The components of gender conflict are proposed in Figure 6. These conditions flow from the GEND.RES block. Conflictual processes are explosive rather than continuous. Shifts in background conditions have nonlinear effects. We propose that gender conflict is mobilized into an overt movement when there is a combination of: (a) inequalities in economic power and ideology, but inequalities which are not the most extreme; (b) modest but increasing levels of resources for the oppressed gender, especially in the higher social classes; and (c) segregated but well-connected organization of each gender, such that relatively large numbers can form collective networks. In addition, some men become allies of rebellious women, because of ties of economic interest or common participation in a background social movement. This combination of conditions was present, for instance, for a time among upper-class Roman women during the late Republic; for the most recent wave of the women's movement (the 1970s), mobilizing conditions mushroomed from rising labor force participation, the rapid expansion of female university populations, and an extensive network of women's mass media.

For all their dramatic impact, social movements are only one feature in the overall structure of conditions which makes up the system of gender stratification. Since movements tend to provoke countermovements, it is possible that pressures for change are neutralized, at least in particular sectors. The uneven fates of abortion rights, affirmative action, and anti-sexual-harassment procedures in recent years suggest that we do not yet well understand the complexity of these processes. In addition, the mobilization and decline of mass movements interacts with more slow-moving patterns, via the pathways indicated in Figures 5 and 6. Whether such movements catalyze and accelerate deeper ground-swell, or whether the movement has relatively ephemeral effects, can only be understood in terms of the balance among the strengths of all the major factors in the comprehensive model.

Probably the safest prediction is that the mobilization of gender conflicts will go on for a long time into the future. It will likely change its intensity and its focus of contention from time to time. Looking over Figures 1–6, we can see that there are numerous points over which future gender conflicts can appear: reproductive technologies, childcare arrangements, variants of sexual politics, family structure, as well as income and property from both the labor market and from intrafamilial
transfers (such as child support and postdivorce property settlements). As long as there are distinctive gender associations and cultural identities, there will be a basis for organizing movements and political factions around such conflicting interests. In general, the conditions of advanced industrial society seem favorable to continued high mobilization of many interest groups: the continued expansion of mass education and communications technology, plus the likelihood of continued grievances, seems to ensure that the factors in Figure 6 will typically be present in some form.20

FUTURE APPLICATIONS

The history of gender stratification is not likely to come to an end in the near future. We usually envision the alternatives as lying along a continuum between past extremes of male domination and a society of complete gender equality. Do we have a realistic picture of the latter point? Would there be a complete lack of distinction in all variables listed under REPROD.LABOR, GENDER.PROD, SEXUAL.POLITICS, and GEND.RES, as well as a decline of GENDER.CONFLICT to zero? Is it not more likely that some processes may move toward equality while others may remain stable, or become more extreme? Is it not possible that male/female ratios on some factors could shift, not merely to equality but to the other side of the balance? It is doubtful that the system of feedbacks in Figures 1–6 has ever been in complete equilibrium, even leaving aside changes in the exogenous factors (e.g., death rate, technological change, overall societal productivity or stratification) that affect these chains of causes.

As sociologists, we should explore particular scenarios by which various kinds of outcomes may occur in the future. Chafetz (1990) proposes one such extrapolation, in which the effects of economic growth or downturn determine the chances of full occupational integration of U.S. women by the year 2020. The integration of women into male occupations does not mean that gender segregation of production will necessarily disappear, however. This would depend on the integration of males into female occupations such as nursing and secretaries. As long as there continue to exist essentially all-female occupational spheres, these will continue to produce gender-distinctive occupational cultures and images which in turn will reproduce the gender segregation of production. Such gender-segregated sectors are not necessarily static. The expansion of the female clerical labor force has led to the growth of hierarchies within this traditionally all-female sector. The effects of the mobilization of feminist interests in this sector has been to expand the number of ranks of women supervising women, and to institutionalize new gradations of internal structure of gender-segregated clerical labor (Marx 1992). Thus, modern bureaucratic organizations (especially in the public and medical sectors) appear to be changing, not merely by integrating women into the managerial and professional layers above but also by elaborating the gender-segregated clerical sector from within.
In the long-range future, dominant resources in some parts of our model may well shift from men to women. We should attempt to anticipate the effects of new technologies, reproductive and otherwise, as well as shifts in patterns of childcare and education, and of heterosexuality and homosexuality. The dimensions of sexual harassment and violence, conflicts over family structure and forms of reproductive organization (such as in vitro fertilization and surrogate mothering), and other variables in the integrated theory will also be important patterns in the future. The task now is to understand which configurations of processes will bring differing outcomes. One way to analyze such conditions is by using an integrated theory of gender stratification to perform computer simulations of the possible paths that may bring about new forms of social organization in the future.

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This article is a collaborative effort growing out of a meeting held in October 1991. The order of names has been assigned by lot.

NOTES

1. The names of these blocks will be referred to in the text in ALL CAPITALS and, after first mention, in abbreviated form.

2. Gender segregation may take the form of de facto stereotyping of male and female work roles, whether or not they are formally segregated into separate occupations.

3. Both reproductive labor and its compatibility with childcare may be ignored under conditions where extreme economic necessity gives production paramount importance (Friedl 1975; Blumberg 1984; Huber 1988). Examples include the yearly peak in child mortality among poor women cultivators during rice transplanting season, and Third World shacktown mothers leaving their children unattended if they must go to work to survive and have no childcare. Where women are important producers, childcare arrangements will be adjusted to accommodate their production.

4. Brinton’s (1988) model of the gendered flow of human capital introduces further complexities within the GENDER.PROD block and its inputs from the REPROD.LABOR block, especially the intergenerational relationships which differentially motivate parents to invest in training sons or daughters.

5. There is cross-historical evidence (Guttentag and Secord 1983) that when there are more men than women, women are highly valued and men control them tightly as wives and mothers; virginity is prized, and sexual morality is stressed. Under these “favorable” market conditions, women’s main countervailing power comes from their ability to choose among many suitors as husbands. On the other hand, where there are more women than men, sexual controls become lax; divorce is allowed; since it is more difficult for women to achieve economic mobility through marriage, they go into the labor market. Insofar as men control the occupational sphere, however, women’s excess labor supply enhances competition and drives down rewards; traditionally, under these conditions, one occupation that expands is prostitution.

6. In some hunting-and-gathering societies with a favorable environment, women spaced births widely and kept the birth rate relatively low (Friedl 1975; Howell 1979).
7. Birth control methods of varying degrees of effectiveness were in existence before
the invention of the rubberized condom in the late 1800s; the social demand for this
reproductive technology, however, would have been low until the death rate had fallen.
Thus, the introduction of the birth control pill in the 1960s, and subsequent contraceptive
technologies, is no doubt the result of a feedback loop from the growing pressure of women
in the labor market.

8. See Hodgson (1974:II:140-146) on the spread of the harem system downwards from
the upper classes. In periods of economic development, the working classes became able
to enforce the traditional status honor by restricting its women. An example is the Muslim
world in the late 20th century, but here, this took place at just the time that the cosmopolitan
upper classes were discarding such restrictions. This is one of the conflicts which fueled
the fundamentalist religious revolt in Iran in the late 1970s.

9. Matrilineal and matriloclal structures are most common where there is long-distance
warfare taking men away from home together with a horticultural mode of production
compatible with women’s labor (Ember and Ember 1971; Divale 1974). There is some
evidence that complex marital alliance rules are renegotiated to fit political contingencies;
in an extremely fluid military situation of mass migration and conquest, formal marriage
rules binding on the entire tribe tend to break down and be replaced by the aggressive
building of marital coalitions on an ad hoc basis, a pattern that Searle (1988) calls “predatory
kinship."

10. There is also a path from SEXUAL.POLITICS to GENDER.PROD. Where there is a
strong emphasis on warfare and/or resulting male dominance of productive activities, sons
are preferred over daughters; hence, there is a tendency to skew the sex ratio, via infanticide
or other methods.

11. To the extent that family-operated farms and other small businesses continue to exist
in modern societies, we would expect these to be the sectors in which traditionalistic gender
ideologies and male domination would remain strongest. Some suggestive evidence here
is the greater conservatism of rural areas and small towns on issues of gender equality and
abortion rights (Brady and Tedin 1976; Burris 1983; Conover and Grey 1983).

12. In small-scale societies centered around warrior coalitions, there is a tendency for
wars to take place for the purpose of capturing women or because of quarrels over women.
This is found in horticultural societies with a “male supremacist” complex and in slave-taking
societies; the literary work which depicted the masculine ideal of the ancient Greeks,
Homer’s Iliad, centered on disputes of honor over the possession of women.

13. Incidents of sexual harassment of women service personnel appear to be among the
highest in the navy (Krohn 1991); this is the peacetime military organization in which men
are most likely to be segregated from civilian life and to form all-male groups bonded by
ritual carousing.

14. The all-male conflict group has a more peaceful equivalent in the solitary work
groups found within Japanese corporations. As Brinton (1988) shows, the distinctive gender
cultures reinforced by such groups ramify through the system of gender stratification.

15. A well-publicized conflict occurred in 1980 when William Agee, CEO of Bendix Corp.,
elevated his lover, Mary Cunningham, to top executive rank; controversy inside and outside
the company led to a proxy fight over financial control. On this issue generally, see Haavio-

16. Widespread legitimation of homosexuality in the future would add another
dimension to this kind of sexual politics within organizations.
17. The greatest male violence occurs when male groups have high solidarity while women are fragmented. An example of the opposite pattern is the women’s work groups which dominate some West African horticultural economies, which punish wife beaters by shaming or trashing offenders (Blumberg 1991).

18. Changes in the absolute level of income may be more important here than income ratios. The gender gap in U.S. wages was static from the 1950s to the 1970s, but the rising absolute level contributed to women’s mobilization.

19. In Rome between 200 and 35 B.C., upper-class women acquired property rights and increasing independence from control by male family heads; their allies were men struggling against the oligarchy of ancient family heads and leaders of political factions who found it useful to transfer allegiances through divorces and remarriages (Collins 1986:315-321). Allies of the modern women’s movement include men co-participants in the student and left movements of the 1960s and 1970s as well as husbands who benefit economically from dual-career marriages.

20. Such ongoing conflicts in the future seem even more likely if we add to this picture further complexities coming from the mobilization of gay and lesbian interests. We have left this topic aside, not because of any lack of importance, but for lack of general theory based on comparative materials of the conditions governing the organization of sexual preference. A more adequate theory of gender stratification will have to be integrated with a general theory of the conditions for sexuality in all its variants.

REFERENCES


Toward an Integrated Theory of Gender Stratification


