Political Economy of World-Systems 2002 Conference

Riverside, California


Abstract

Contentious Peasants, Paternalist State and Arrested Capitalism in China's Long Eighteenth Century

Ho-fung Hung
Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
hofung@jhu.edu

    Now it is widely recognized that "the fall of the East" preceded "the rise of the West." But when and how exactly did the East, China in particular, fall? Abu-Lughod's and Mark Elvin's contention that China turned stagnant after its fifteenth-century retreat from the maritime world is recently challenged by Frank and others. It is shown that China's post-medieval economic slowdown was only temporary, and was soon followed by a resuscitation of commerce in sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Europe's global hegemony was never a reality before China's economic advance reversed again in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Notwithstanding the pertinence of this revisionist historiography, it fails to give any satisfactory explanation of why the expanding market economy in China did not give rise to capitalism as it did in Europe.

    In this paper, I argue that the mid-eighteenth-century "great divergence" between China and Europe cannot be sufficiently explained by their different geopolitical constellations (a la Bin Wong) or different ecological constraints (à la Pomeranz). The particular state ideology and specific pattern of social unrest in eighteenth-century China have to be taken into account too.

    In the long eighteenth-century of China (c. 1683-1839), the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty adopted an extreme form of Confucian paternalism to enhance their legitimacy over the Han majority. The Qing government, though encouraging commercial growth for the sake of the empire-wide circulation of essential foodstuffs, was always suspicious of the wealthy Han elite and occasionally raged against them in the name of the poor, whose livelihoods were threatened by the merchants' accumulation of wealth. Meanwhile, sweeping commercialization and demographic expansion generated a large dislocated population prone to be recruited by heterodox religious sects with radical egalitarian visions. In contrast to Europe where peasant revolts faded out after the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century China witnessed recurrent large-scale millenarian uprisings against the state and the rich.

    Subsequently, capital accumulation in China was curbed from above (by the paternalist state) and from below (through millenarian revolts). After China was incorporated into the capitalist world-system, the legacies of the eighteenth-century state and popular ideologies enabled China to continue resisting the logic of capital accumulation, and hence to become an epicenter of anti-systemic movements.


27th Annual Conference of the Political Economy of World-Systems Spring

Hosted by the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California, Riverside