The Human Demographic Regulator*

Christopher Chase-Dunn, Peter Turchin, Robert A. Hanneman,

Hiroko Inoue and Kirk Lawrence

Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California-Riverside and Santa Fe Institute

[4687 words, v. 3-21-08]

* This work is supported by National Science Foundation grant NSF-HSD SES-0527720  Award type: HSD-AOC

 

Keywords: human socio-cultural evolution, demographic cycles, migration, population pressure, settlement growth, polity growth, modeling and forecasting global state formation

 

Institute for Research on World-Systems

University of California-Riverside

 

                                                         

To be presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, San Francisco, Friday, March 28, 2008, 10:30 am

Session FB15 on Global Forecasting: Data-Based Computational Models and Precursors: Short and Long Time-Horizon Modeling. Session Organizer: Paul Williamson, Discussants: Myron S. Karasik and Solomon W. Polachek

 

This is IROWS Working Paper #41 available at http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows41/irows41.htm


 

          This paper describes the initial construction of a dynamical model of the human population regulator as it operated during the “human state of nature” and it continues to operate when complex institutional systems fail.  This is a module within a larger model of human socio-cultural evolution and is part of a project that will examine the prospects for global state formation in the next centuries. In that larger project we use quantitative estimates of the sizes of settlements and the territorial sizes of polities to help parameterize causal models of the growth and decline of large polities. This paper focusses on the basic elements that cause human populations to grow or decline in both nomadic and early sedentary  world-systems. It is alleged that the basic human demographic regulator returns to operate when complex social systems fail – the so-called Malthusian corrections – and so the “nasty bottom” should be retained as part of the overall model even though its logic may be temporarily transcended as human institutions articulate population pressures with technological and organizational change. Collapses send us back to the “nasty bottom,” and this will continue to be the case as long as population growth is an automatic response to the availability of food and other resources. One can imagine a future transformation in which humans get off of the Malthusian treadmill entirely. The demographic transition that has occurred in the industrial societies of the core and that seems to be spreading to the non-core may signal a new day in which the demographic regulator is transcended, but this transition will not be complete until well after the human population of the Earth ceases to rise and population pressures cease to operate. Until then we need to have a good representation of how the nasty bottom of the process works and we also need this in order to explain what happened in human history and prehistory.

            This paper presents an overview of our modeling project and a new model of the human demographic regulator that incorporates insights from anthropologists and archaeologists who have sought to explain demographic processes in relatively simple human societies. As with our other work, the unit of analysis is the world-system, not single societies or polities. We employ the comparative world-systems approach developed by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) in which human interaction networks define the boundaries of world-systems [for a brief overview see Hall and Chase-Dunn (2006)]. Early world-systems were not global. They were regional affairs because of the nature of transportation and communications. We employ an anthropological scale of comparison that includes world-systems composed of small nomadic hunter-gatherer bands as well as the modern global system. We abstract from scale in order to compare the structures and processes of small and large interactive systems.

 

Human Socio-cultural Evolution

            Formal evolutionary models of the long-term and emergent causes of upward sweeps in polity sizes and settlement sizes are being developed and empirically tested with long-term estimates of settlement population sizes and the territorial sizes of states (Chase-Dunn, Anderson and Turchin 2005; Chase-Dunn et al 2008).  These models will be used to forecast future global state formation under specified ecological, technological, social and demographic conditions.

            The “human state of nature” refers to the period between the emergence of the use of symbolic language and the emergence of sedentism (Gat 2006). In this long period humans primarily lived in small nomadic hunter-gatherer bands. Sedentism and diversified foraging emerged only since the last Ice Age. So human prehistory, the paleolithic, lasted a very long time. It was during this period that humanity migrated to all the continents except Antarctica, and it was during this period that the forces we seek to model in this paper were the primary determinants of human demographic success or failure. Our effort to improve upon earlier formal models of the human demographic regulator is partly justified by the need to understand how human socio-cultural evolution worked during the “human state of nature,” but we also contend that this basic demographic regulator continues to be relevant for understanding what happens when human socio-cultural institutions fail. The phenomenon of collapse sends humans back down to the nasty bottom, and some regional systems get stuck going around and around in the vicious circle of growth and conflict (e.g. Kirch 1991).

            The first version of the iteration model of world-systems evolution was presented in Chapter 6 of Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997).  It is called an interation model because its overall structure is a positive feedback loop that explains the growing scale of human societies and world-systems since the stone age. But within the overall positive feedback loop there is a smaller negative feedback loop, the “nasty bottom” that comprises the human demographic regulator. A revised version of the overall iteration model is depicted in Figure 1.

           

Figure 1: Revised Iteration Model of World-Systems Evolution

            This version relabels some of the processes depicted in the original model and it adds trade, epidemics and non-anthropogenic climate worsening. Trade was put in because, after reading the world historians who emphasize a network node theory of innovation (e.g McNeill and McNeill 2003; Christian 2003), we realized that we had used interaction networks to bound world-systems but had left them out of the causal model that explains socio-cultural evolution. So we put trade back in. Thompson (2008), and the large literature that he reviews, convinced us that epidemics and non-anthropogenic climate change are not merely epiphenomenal and so should be included in the model. We note that anthropogenic climate change e.g. due to deforestation, etc.) has always been included under “Environmental Degradation.”

 

The Human Demographic Regulator

Figure 2: The Bottom Half of the Iteration Model : Human Demographic Regulator

 

            Figure 2 depicts the nasty bottom of the iteration model of human socio-cultural evolution, which is the part below the line in Figure 1. The nasty bottom is the demographic regulator that humans share with other animals. One of the most exciting things that has happened at the Institute for Research on World-Systems in the last few years is the discovery of animal societies and world-systems of animals. Inspired by a remark by Douglas Massey at the American Sociological Association meetings in Philadelphia in 2006 that there are about 60,000 social species[1] in addition to humans, we have been working through E.O Wilson’s (1975) old book, Sociobiology with an eye to the social structures of insects and vertebrates.[2]

What we have learned is that animal social structures can vary over relatively short periods of time in response to changing environmental conditions. We had always thought that animal societies were tightly structured by inherited instincts, which would mean that their social relations would change only slowly based on genetic changes responding to changes in the environment. Wilson makes it clear that both insects and vertebrates change their social behaviors in response to relatively short-term changes in the environment. For insects he argues that the genetic programs are somewhat flexible, allowing for different expressions that depend on environmental circumstances. For vertebrates, especially ones with bigger brains, learning allows for even more flexibility.

            We have been reading recent books on the evolution of human warfare (Thompson and Levy, forthcoming; Gat 2006) so we started paying attention to Wilson’s descriptions of aggression and warfare among animals. Gat also reviews the ethology (animal behavior) of aggression. It turns out that the levels of aggression and warfare (and cannibalism) vary with population density and the availability of food. Intraspecific aggression spaces animals out, and cannibalism and warfare reduce their numbers. In other words, part of the demographic regulator of animals is based on intra-specific conflict. Most species demonstrate more hierarchy, more aggression and more territoriality (and more cannibalism and other “abnormal” behaviors) under conditions of high population density relative to the availability of resources. Something similar also works in interspecies relations when there is competition for the same resources. The geography of animal behavior often exhibits territoriality, and this is related to how much food is available and how many individuals are competing for the food. Aggression serves to space competitors out. The ecological geography of animals is similar to the ecological geography of humans such that it makes sense to think about animal world-systems (interaction networks of allying and competing individuals and groups of the same species).  Where we want to go with this eventually is a study of world-systems ecology in which human and animal world-systems co-evolve. But for now we only make the comparison between animal and human population demographies.

            In the comparative human world-systems theory this is what we call the “nasty bottom” of the iteration model. Actually there are two vicious circles, one based on resource depletion that acts directly back on human population, and another larger negative feedback that goes through human to human conflict. As human populations rise natural resources are depleted. In the absence of other action this eventually causes shortages. Resources that are non-renewable decline and do not recover even when population goes down because people live shorter lives and have fewer babies when resources are scarce. Renewable resources recover when population goes down, though at different rates and with different time lags.[3] This is analogous to the famous Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model that causes populations to oscillate. Peter Turchin (2003:13) applies the logic of this second order non-linear dynamic model to human populations and resource use. This is the first nasty bottom. But there is a second nasty bottom that operates through migration, circumscription and conflict.

Population pressure leads to emigration unless the land is already occupied. If the land is full (circumscription) this causes higher levels of within-society and between-society conflict. This reduces population pressure by killing off users of scarce resources, which reduces population pressure. It is like flour beetles in a jar. When the food supply goes down they eat each other. Over the long run there is oscillation around an equilibrium ratio between the population and the amount of food. This works for some human world-systems that get stuck in the nasty bottom. Patrick Kirch (1991) shows this cycle as revealed in archaeological evidence for the Marquesas Islands.

            But some human systems break out of one or both of the nested nasty bottoms by developing new technologies that allow more resources to be produced in a given area (diversified foraging, gardening, agriculture, industry) or by erecting a new hierarchy that regulates access to scarce resources (chiefdoms, states).

            So animal and human patterns overlap considerably, at least at the level of the nasty bottom. It does not require complex symbolic systems to run a simple demographic regulator of this kind. This is recognized by the many computational social scientists who use predator-prey models as the beginning of the job of modeling the relationship between human population and conflict (e.g. Turchin and Korotayev 2006).

            Our new model shows what intervenes between population growth and conflict. As population grows people use more resources because there are more mouths to feed, more dwellings to build, etc. This puts pressure on resources and they become depleted. The low-hanging fruit or the deer close to the hamlet are taken and it takes more effort to get the same return. This is the general idea of “population pressure” as theorized by Ester  Boserup (1981) and many others. The cost of obtaining resources starts going up long before the population carrying capacity of the natural environment is reached. Natural resources do not need to be completely exhausted for population pressures to be working strongly on humans or other forms of life. Population pressure derives from depletion of natural resources, but also from pollution of the local environment and from anthropogenic climate worsening. A water hole may become unclean. Cutting down trees may decrease rainfall or the ability of the soil to hold water. All these elements are part of population pressure. Humans react to depletion first by increasing their efforts, but the costs of this lead to a search for alternatives, and either some or all of the members of a group are more likely to migrate to greener pastures when the local pastures have become relatively depleted. By this process did humans move to all the continents.

            Circumscription occurs when there are no good and available alternative places to move to, or rather when the cost of moving to an alternative place becomes relatively high. This occurs when only marginal environments remain unoccupied and when the current inhabitants of adjacent desireable areas resist immigration. Migrants who bring something that the current inhabitants want (e.g. new technology) are less likely to face resistance, and certain attributes make it possible to overcome resistance (e.g. military superiority based on larger numbers or better weapons or tactics). Circumscription means that population pressures cannot be lowered by migration. When this occurs the level of conflict goes up among individuals and among groups. People more often kill each other within societies and they engage in more infanticide in order to regulate population. Groups are also more likely to encounter one another and to fight over scarce resources and so more people are killed in intergroup conflict.  In both ways the population is reduced and natural resources may recover until population goes up again. Kirch (1991) shows archaelogical evidence that shows oscillation in the amount of warfare and cannibalism in the Marquesas Islands, where the local topography prevented the formation of island-wide chiefdoms. The local chiefdoms were caught in the vicious cycle of the nasty bottom.

            A number of problems need to be resolved in order to convert the model as depicted in Figure 2 into a dynamical mathematical model. The functional form of the relationships need to be specified, and the relevant time lags over which effects operate need to be estimated. It would also be desirable to include space in the model because the processes are spatial. Local resources are depleted but more distant ones are not. Depletion itself is complex because some resources are more resistant to depletion (e.g. fish) while others become depleted more quickly and take longer to recover (e.g. big game, slow-growing trees). Space is also important in migration and circumscription.

 

Modeling Methods

            We are using two different approaches to create dynamic systems models of the human demographic regulator: Stella and APL (Allied Programming Language). Stella is a systems modeling program that uses model diagrams to construct a program that will do simulations.  

We are not sure yet whether Stella will allow us to do what we would like to do with regard to spatial modeling of the demographic process. But Stella is easier for non-programmers to use, and has features that are not easily replicated with more tradition simulation methods –like the ability to construct a control panel that allows parameters to be easily manipulated so that a model user can see the results of the manipulations.

Figure 3 is a Stella diagram of the nasty bottom model.

 

 

Figure 3: The Human Demographic Regulator (Stella version)

            In Stella the boxes represent stocks -- accumulated amounts such as the human population --  and the double-lined arrows represent flows of material in and out of the stock boxes. The round symbols represent parameters such as rates that affect the amount of stocks or flows, and flow processes that affect other variables. The little clouds at the end or beginning of some of the flow arrows represent untheorized generators of flows or sinks into which things flow.

            Figure 3 is the diagramatic version of the Stella model. It includes some features that are not made visible in the diagramatic scheme in Figure 2. In order to make Figure 3 into a simulation model we need to specify units and initial levels for the stocks and rates, such as the birth rate, etc. and we need to specify the functional form of the relationships. We know that human populations tend to cycle, and so we want population to growth and decline and then grow again in our model. We think that there are two cycles in the human demographic regulator. One is produced by the direct relationship between population and natural resources and this should produce a cycle of population growth and decline.  The other cycle is produced when humans migrate and fill up available niches and then the rate of conflict goes up and people are killed off, and so the population declines. So there is a smaller and faster cycle within a larger and longer cycle. How these two affect one another is something that we are investigating, but the overall outcome should be cylical.

            The cyclical nature of the small or inner population/resource cycle is produced by the lag time that it takes for natural resources to recover.

Figure 4: Graph of simulated population and conflict values

            Figure 4 shows the simulated values when the model specified in Figure 3 is run. Population oscillates, but the oscillations are dampening. This oscillation is mainly caused by lags in the model, but we are not sure that we have put the lags in the right places. This model needs further work but we have a beginning.

 

 

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[1] A species is defined as social if it exhibits cooperative interspecific behavior in addition to sexual relations.

[2] It should be noted that Wilson himself has recently shifted away from the idea of the selfish gene as the major influence on both animal and human behavior. Wilson and Wilson (2007) argue in favor of a multilevel selection theory in which group selection can operate in conjunction with individual selection to produce altruistic behavior in both humans and animals.   We agree with Nolan and Lenski (2004) that there are important differences as well as similarities between biological and cultural evolution. Socially constructed human culture and institutions, which emerged with the use of symbolic language, produced a logic of selection and adaptation that is rather different from biological evolution based on genetic selection and adaptation, and intergroup competition and cooperation play majors role in socio-cultural evolution. It should also be noted that complex social structures can emerge in the absence of brains and culture. Ant and termite societies have a complex division of labor, farming, slave-raiding, and warfare between colonies. All this probably emerged by about 30 million years ago and then hit a ceiling that looks rather like a high level equilibrium trap.

 

 

[3] We postulate an average rate of recovery for natural resources, though this obviously differs depending on which resources are being used and across geographical locations. Forests grow much faster in the tropics and the temperate regions than they do in colder regions that are farther from the equator.  But recovery rates are not a simple matter of latitude. It is well know that soils in temperate regions are much more resistant to depletion than are soils in the rain forest, where nutrients are leached out quickly by greater rain. The notion of an average rate of recovery of natural resources that we employ includes and average of variation across both space and time. Obviously some societies rely more on non-renewable resources than do others.