Introduction
In this paper I review some of the understandings of
frontiers and borders in a deep global and historical perspective to shine some
light on contemporary issues. In particular I seek to sort out what is really
new in the 21st century, what is typical of the modern era – modern as in the
modern world-system – and what is a continuation of older processes that may stem
back as far as the invention of the state at Ur some five millennia ago. I must
caution, however, that this account is colored by the larger project of which
it is a part. That project is a broad comparative study of frontiers, driven by
variance maximizing strategy to begin to define the “universe” of frontiers
(for elaboration of this theme see Hall 2009). This project is a first step in
trying to extract salient characteristics of frontiers that might be useful in
a boolean analysis (Ragin 1987) of frontiers, akin to John Foran’s (2005) of
third world revolutions.
Thus, the
comparisons of the American Southwest, a frontier at least with respect to
European states since 1542 or so – and much older if one looks at inter-polity
frontiers among indigenous populations since well before European intrusion. The
Yunnan
frontier (Yang 2004, 2009, 2011) lasted much longer from at least two thousand
years ago until the present. It was shaped by evolution of various Chinese
states, and by states in Southeast, and to some extent South
Asia. This frontier, then, was relatively little impacted by
European states, and includes multiple frontiers with both state and non-state
societies. Both regions have been, and even today remain, frontier zones. In
the 21st century both are also important borderlands for two of the most
important players in the modern world-system, the U.S.
and China.
They also share a historical orientation to the areas outside of the two states
into which they were ultimately incorporated. Both also brought a great many
new practices and ideas into the incorporating states Yunnan
much moreso than the New Spain.
Indeed, the
two areas New Spain/Southwest United States and what might be called greater Yunnan are part of much
larger set of frontiers. New Spain/Southwest United States is a part of the
very large set of Spanish frontiers throughout the Americas. In a project and
following volume, Contested Ground
(Guy and Sheridan 1998a, b), many of these frontiers are compared and
contrasted to elucidate both general and regionally specific aspects of
Hispanic frontiers in the Americas.
This is avowedly not a variance maximizing strategy, but one of close
comparisons because the major outside driver of frontier formation and
transformation was the same imperial power, Spain. This type of comparison
serves to highlight local differences precisely because global differences are
minimized. Indeed, more than one observer has noted that frontier
administrators rotated not only through the Americas,
but into the Philippines,
where they referred to local indigenes as “indios”
(e.g. Hall 1998).
On the
other hand Yunnan
was one of many different frontiers. Crossley et al. (2006, p. 17) note that
“It would be advantageous to set research results side by side – on the oasis
frontier of the Northwest, the transmural steppe / sown frontiers of the North,
the intra-imperial economic and cultural frontiers of the Southwest, and the
coastal frontier of the sands in the Pearl River delta” in the introduction to
an edited collection that begins that process. As they note for China,
so too with the Spanish empires the various frontiers interacted, sometime
directly, more often indirectly through various administrative processes and
personnel.
In
comparing these two regions I underscore my own argument (Hall 1989, 1998) and
Yang’s argument (2009) that any frontier, especially these two can only be
understood in the contexts of their larger, global interactions, but equally so
analysis requires careful attention to specific, local contexts and
interactions. Indeed, a first general lesson from this – and potentially many
other – comparisons is that to neglect either the local or the global hinders
comprehension of complex social interactions.
I begin
with brief accounts of each region, then turn to a listing of similarities and
differences, then focus on comparisons among pre-modern, proto-modern, and
modern frontiers. I use these comparisons then to extract some border lessons
and questions about contemporary frontiers and borders.
Southwest
China as a Set of
Frontiers [1]
Yang 2009, Map 6.1, ca.
p. 208: Yunnan
in the Qing Empire
Southwest China, essentially what eventually became Yunnan and some
contiguous areas, was an amorphous, changing region. Manning (2005, p. 6)
summarizes its history succinctly: “from autonomous region to center of major
states to borderland of expanding Chinese dynasties to province within China.”
Yunnan, which means
approximately the land south of the clouds, is an ethnocentric Chinese
construct. The region was, and remains, home to several dozen different ethnic
groups which in total outnumbered Han Chinese immigrants until just a few
centuries ago. Yunnan’s connections to the
lands below the winds, that is, Southeast Asia were often as strong as or
stronger than its connections to China and existed for over two
millennia. Yunnan was connected to what we now know as Tibet, India, and
Southeast Asia via a Southwest Silk Road which complemented and supplemented
the northern overland Silk Road and the more southerly maritime Silk Road (see
too Liu 2011 and Liu and Shaffer 2007).
Yang, 2009, Chap 2, Maps 2.1, 2.2, 2.3: Southwest Silk Road
in the Qin-Han Period (221bce-220ce), in the Nanzhao-Dali Period (8th cent –
13th cent), and in in the Yuan-Ming-Qing Period (1271 – 1912)
The Southwest Silk Road seldom was used to transport silk,
but did carry cowries, jade, copper, Buddhist texts, horses and other goods. Yunnan was a major source of information to China about Southeast Asia, especially Burma (aka Myanmar). Two products were very
valuable to China:
horses and copper. Yunnan
is a mountainous and highly varied region, which partially accounts for its
ethnic diversity. It has extensive mineral resources. Because of its altitude
much of the region is amenable to horse breeding, unlike more tropical areas. Often
it was an alternative to the northern steppe pastoralists as a source of horses.
Thus, a dire need for horses tempered the southern Song Dynasty’s interactions
with Yunnan.
Prior to
the thirteenth century various local kingdoms were able to use geographic,
climatic, and geopolitical conditions to maintain a degree of autonomy from
other states, especially China,
and to negotiate, often favorably, the degree and type of incorporation the
region experienced. In lowland areas presence of diseases not common in the
north killed many invaders (Yang 2010). Mountainous regions presented difficult
terrain and at times extremes of cold. During the second and first centuries BCE Han attempts to conquer the region had minimal
success and were eventually abandoned because of the much more serious threats
from the Xiongnu in the north. After the northern frontier was somewhat
stabilized there were further Han forays into Yunnan, but its control was soon
weakened with the decline and finally collapse of the empire in the late
second century. Serious attempts at conquest did not begin again
until the third century during the Three
Kingdom period, followed
a few century of semi autonomy of local peoples until their unification under
the Nanzhao kingdom in the seventh century. The Nanzhao state maintained considerable
autonomy by playing Tang China
and Tubo (Tibet)
against each. Early in the tenth century Nanzhao, Tubo, and Tang China
collapsed.
As long as
those goals were met, local rule prevailed. The succeeding Ming Dynasty sought
stronger conquest of the region in order to avoid a dependency like that of the
Southern Song had experienced with Yunnan
to gain access to horses. The Ming sought “to make Yunnan
a permanent part of China”
(Yang 2009, p. 95).
Ironically,
Yunnan became a part of China as result of the Mongol
conquest in 1253 and became part of the Yuan Dynasty. The Mongol conquest was
relatively mild because Mongol interest in trade and access to trade routes was
more important than territorial expansion per se, and because they were unable to penetrate local
chieftainships. As long as those goals were met, local rule prevailed.
Up to this
time rule was primarily indirect through local, native or indigenous, leaders.
Yang argues that “Sinicization and indigenization were two sides of the process
through which a middle ground was negotiated” (2009, p. 102). Chinese had long ruled
frontier peoples based on native customs, but with the intentions of
“civilizing” (sinicizing) them eventually. This took approximately five
centuries in Yunnan.
This is a major reason why it is an excellent locale to study these processes. Attempts
to balance a need for frontier stability, continued sinicization, and use
indigenous peoples in frontier defense, while a clear goal, was often messy or
even unsuccessful in practice.
The parallel
strategies of direct and indirect administrative systems continued through the
Mongol Yuan period and extended into the Ming Dynasty. Centralized,
province-wide administration was built on governors who were appointed to
rule sub-regions. In rural areas that had a preponderance of indigenous
populations native chiefs were placed under the rule of these officials.
While local leaders were required to pay tribute and meet other obligations,
this did not eliminate continuing interactions including payments to other
states in Southeast Asia.Slowly the Ming and Qing Dynasties adopted the gaitu
guiliu policy that sought to transform native chief into a part of the
imperial administration. Gradually, the domination of ethnicity over administration
in the native chief areas changed to a system in which ethnicity became a
subdivision of administration. This was facilitated many imperial regulations
and practices such as regulating the inheritance of chieftainship and taking
sons of chief to Chinese schools (central or local) to train them in Chinese
language and administrative processes. Upon their return they became agents of
sinicization.
This
process, however was not one-sided. Yang argues that sinicization and
indigenization were sides of the same coin. They contributed to the emergence
of Yunnanese as provincial identity and in turn became an avenue for the
absorption of some Yunnanese practices into Chinese identity and culture. By
the end of the Ming Dynasty immigration, settlement of soldiers, and movement
of traders, Han people became the largest ethnic population in Yunnan. “Climate,
topography, mineral sources, and native economic practices all forced Chinese
migrants to adopt native economic structures (Yang, p. 164). The introduction
of “a Chinese agrarian production regime … was challenged by local climate and
topography” (Yang, p. 164). Thus, a hybrid society developed. Sinicization grew
through bureaucratic administration and continued education of sons of local
indigenous leaders. Indigenization entailed the introduction of many
“barbarian” customs and goods into Chinese culture such as some types of
clothes, dances, chairs, and so on. Local climatic conditions forced changes in
Han agricultural practices.
The
presence of large mining communities led to types of urbanization different
from those in the central provinces.
Coweries (shell money) continued in use longer than any other part of China
(Yang 2004, 2011). Gender imbalances in immigration led to extensive
intermarriage. But intermarriage also gave traders and others better access
into local networks. This was the main path of introduction of different sexual
practices and sexual tools from Yunnan
into Chinese culture. All of these changes contributed to the emergence of a distinctive
Yunnanese identity. Yang (2009) argues that these changes were also roots of
the minzu system (officially
recognized minority groups) which is still in operation today: “In essence, the
incorporation of Yunnan helped build China
as a multiethnic entity” (p. 182). These processes allow a special window into
changes in both the meaning and content of “ethnicity” in China.
Gradually
the economy became redirected to China, and there was slow shift
from cowries to copper as money. Silver was so abundant that it was used in many
Buddhist statues. By the end of the Ming Dynasty Yunnan
produced seventy-five per cent of China’s
silver, a scale comparable to silver imports from the New
World. China
came to depend on frontier production. Cowries remained useful for local small
scale trade and along the Southwest Silk Road
because no single state could implement a currency policy. Although cowries
began to disappear from China about two millennia ago, in Yunnan as late as the
Ming Dynasty cowries were used to pay taxes, to pay local salaries, and even
donations to monasteries. The long use of cowries was due to Southwest Silk
Road trade, but eventually disappaeared when Europeans expanded into Southeast Asia and disrupted the supply.
In the Qing
Dynasty immigration to Yunnan increased gradually,
no doubt aided by the introduction of New World
crops like tomatoes and corn which opened hilly areas to increased food production
driven by and making possible increased urbanization and industrialization,
which in turn spurred further increases in food production. Population grew from
five million in 1700 to twenty million by mid nineteenth century. These shifts
helped promote the creation of a Yunnanese identity that has remained somewhat
distinct within overall Chinese identity.[2]
Copper
mining was the primary force toward industrialization. Reduction of Japanese
copper supply heightened interest in Yunnanese copper. While Chinese
administrations generally discouraged concentration of miners as potential
sources of unrest, they were necessary in Yunnan. Increased copper mining and smelting
took a severe toll on local ecology. Decline in available charcoal eventually
slowed copper production. Yang argues that the Yunnan frontier had significant impacts on
the world-system through its various external links.
Yunnan’s many identities
contributed to the development of a Chinese multi-ethnic culture. A key shift was
from “barbarians” to imperial subjects, to “younger brothers” in larger Chinese
ethnicity. In Yunnan
ethnic groups were able to maintain a modicum of autonomy, and developed a
larger Yunnanese identity which in turn shaped the history of the minzu system (ethnic group). This is a
particularly salient example of how frontier processes and policies can shape
national policies.
Clearly, Yunnan has remained a frontier connecting multiple
civilizations – China,
Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
“The Greater
Southwest”: A Brief History [3]
Defining the “Greater Southwest,” like defining Yunnan, is difficult
because it is vague and changed through time. Meinig (1971, p. 3) says:
The Southwest is a distinctive
place to the American mind but a somewhat blurred place on American maps, which
is to say that everyone knows that there is a Southwest but there is little agreement
as to just where it is... . The term "Southwest" is of course an
ethnocentric one: what is south and west to the Anglo-American was long the
north of the Hispanic-American... .
Reed (1964:175) facetiously defined the Southwest as
reaching from Durango to Durango (Mexico
and Colorado) and from Las
Vegas to Las Vegas (New Mexico and Nevada) (The first four entries of Stoddard
et al. 1983 discuss the definition of the Southwest in detail).
Hall 1989, Map III.1,
pg. 35: The Southwest: A Context for Definition
For
approximately the first three centuries of European domination, the American
Southwest was the northwestern frontier of New Spain.
There were two waves of incorporation into world-economies: the Spanish-Mexican
from the 1530s to 1846; and the American from 1846 to the present. Spain and the United States offer an opportunity
to compare a declining mercantile power with a rising semiperipheral industrial
power. At the regional and local levels there were many indigenous societies,
each with its own trajectory of incorporation.
Spaniards
entered the area in the 1530s and colonized New Mexico under Oñate in 1598. They did not
encounter a large world-system, nor did they find a "new" Mexico as the rumors of gold and of the seven
cities of Cibola had led them to believe. Trade
and other connections between the Southwest and Mesoamerica
had attenuated severely centuries earlier. Social change at the time of Spanish
intrusion was toward decreasing social complexity.[4] Disappointed
colonists wanted to leave, but the Viceroy ordered them to stay in New Mexico to pre-empt
potential claims by Euorpean rivals and to protect the silver mines far to the
south around Zacatecas.[5] They
extracted resources from the horticultural Pueblo societies, treating them as vassal
"nations" to the Spanish king, and controlled trade with nomadic
groups.[6] Franciscan
friars sought to force Pueblo
groups to adopt the Christian faith, These efforts sometimes were supported by
local civil authorities. At other times, when the Friars interfered with
economic activities such as the sale of captives, civil authorities undermined
missionary efforts. Church and state often worked at cross purposes.
Continual lack
of state support pushed the military to supplement its pay with booty taken
during conflicts. Indeed, occasionally obtaining spoils of conflict were a
major motivator of it. The main resources available from nomadic groups were
captives to be used as domestic servants or sold to the miners in the south. Horses,
and to a lesser extent guns, gradually spread to indigenous peoples, despite
Spanish efforts to monopolize both. Again, acquiring horses and guns were a
major motivator of indigenous raids. Nomads who wanted horses or guns to defend
themselves against raids by rivals had little to trade but captives taken from their
own enemies. Raids by on indigenous group on another prompted vengeance by
kinsmen, which quickly led to a state of endemic warfare.[7] The
continuous trade in captives, the shortage of military resources, and Spanish
civil-ecclesiastic bickering reinforced engendered endemic warfare among
indigenous groups, and between them and Spanish settlers. Oppression, both
economic and religious, of Pueblos during the seventeenth century led to a
rebellion (Pueblo Revolt) in 1680 which drove the Spaniards from New Mexico for
thirteen years.
Worry about
European rivals and Church worry over the few Christianized Indians left behind
prompted reconquest and recolonization of New Mexico in 1693. Thereafter many of the
same conditions arose again. Societies with fluid social organizations, changing
leadership, and vague boundaries, do not mesh well with bureaucratic
organizations. Logistic problems exacerbated the problems generated by
competing lines of authority in New Spain. Policies
were influenced by local trade, especially in captives, and by the variations
in ecological adaptation of local groups.
The
Viceroys of New Spain needed to pacify the frontier, but had limited resources
to do so. Endemic warfare was a major obstacle and source of expense. Even after
the late eighteenth century reorganization of the frontier provinces (Bourbon
Reforms) Northern New Spain cost at least
55,000 pesos annually to administer. Efforts to economize shifted the pressures
on indigenous groups. Gradually, New Mexican administrators invented new
strategies to curtail the fighting. The small Spanish minority maintained
control through induced dependence on Spanish goods, a divide and conquer
approach toward alliances, and pressure on nomadic groups toward political centralization.
Governors
tried to settle nomadic groups into compact farming communities in imitation of
Spanish villages. This process had worked in central New
Spain, it was not effective on the northern frontiers because of
the ready opportunity to flee to hinterlands. Officials designated leaders with
whom to negotiate and frequently gave staffs of office, medals, and other
insignia to them. This worked better with sedentary groups than with nomadic
groups. Pueblos
became increasingly symbiotic with Hispanic settlers, a tendency reinforced by
the continual threat of nomadic raiders. Often, however this symbiosis was
quite shallow and native cultures went underground. This how and why in the
twenty-first century many Pueblo
religious practices and several indigenous languages persist.
Few nomads
were sedentarized effectively, but they did become somewhat more centrally
organized, that is they developed somewhat more institutionalized forms of
leadership. This pressure was strongest on Comanche bands (Kavanaugh 1996;
Hämäläinen 2008), while an opposing divide and conquer strategy promoted
fragmentation of Apache bands.
Comanches,
who occupied territory at and beyond the edge of the northern frontier, were
able to trade with Plains groups and some Europeans to obtain guns. There are
some reports, disputed by some scholars, that Comanches brought French
flintlocks to the Pecos (NM) trade fairs. Settlers eagerly sought such guns to
circumvent the official restriction of firearms to the military. Comanches obtained
horses in return and also from Apaches and other groups. Comanches quickly
became very successful mounted hunters and warriors by capitalizing on their middle
position in the horse and gun trade. They developed extensive trade networks of
their own and came to dominate the region north and west of the New Mexican
frontier (Hämäläinen 1993, 2003, 2008).
New Mexican
governor de Anza (1778-1787) repeatedly defeated Comanche bands and banned
trade with them, while Texas blocked their trade
with Louisiana.
In 1785 many Comanches sought peace. Governors de Anza (New Mexico) and Cabello
(Texas) required similar conditions: cease hostilities with Spanish subjects;
release captives Spaniards; no trade with other Europeans; conformance to Spanish
declarations of peace and war; fight against Lipan Apaches; pursuit of Apaches
in Coahuila only with Spanish permission; and that all Comanches agree in
unison. In return they would receive annuities. A treaty made in April 1787 led
to the appointment of Ecueracapa as "captain general" of all
Comanches. He was granted an annual salary of 200 pesos with another 100 pesos for
a subordinate chief.[8] New Mexico would not
grant asylum to Comanches who fled tribal law. During a drought a few years
later citizens of Santa supplied food to Comanches thereby cementing a lasting peace.
Without the
treaty New Mexico
might not have survived as a province. Comanches became a very effective
"border patrol," and informed New Mexican officials of movements of
other Europeans and buffered it from raids by other indigenous groups. Comanches
also became allies in subduing other indigenous groups, especially Apaches. They
wanted no part of an Apache peace. The Comanche bands became the most centralized
of the northern nomads, but not a permanent unitary organization. Still, there were
short-term benefits to Comanche survival: relations with New Mexican Spaniards
improved; communication and cooperation among the bands increased, which enhance
trading and raiding activities.
Initially
Apache groups gained advantage over other groups by early possession of horses.
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they had developed semi-permanent
villages on the Plains allowing organization of large war parties. However, they
had poor access to guns, because Spanish policy attempted to restrict guns to the
Spanish army. Later Apaches gave up this village living and gradually were displaced
from the Plains by Comanches who had better access to guns. Large horse herds became
necessary for fighting, and pushed toward a more nomadic life.
As Apaches
were forced southwest from the Plains their raids made trade and communications
between the far north and the interior provinces of New
Spain more difficult. This prompted Spanish officials to pursue a
divide and conquer strategy. Later there were some attempts to regroup some
Apache bands into sedentary farmers on establecimientos
de paz (peace establishments). Apache who sought peace also had to help
subdue other, hostile Apaches. This approach worked for a few years, but became
less effective because seeds, tools, and provisions for supervisory troops were
too expensive. Restrictions on movement chafed those on establecimientos de paz. Still, the peace did allow population
growth which overshot the carrying capacity of the region, prompting a return
to raiding.
Thus,
Apache social ecology differed significantly from that of Comanches. Apaches competed
directly with Spanish settlers for resources. Their trade was local and
typically played one Spanish community against others. Settled Apaches and settlers
resented the cost of help given to those recently pacified.
In late eighteenth
century peace became precarious, but differently for Apaches and Comanches.
Apache population decreased during war and increased during peace. Apaches
hindered Spanish development. Comanches thrived under the subsequent alliance
with the New Mexico
and supplied necessary goods to the local economy: buffalo hides, jerked meat,
captives and protected the borders. These differences were rooted in differential
access to horses and guns, adaptation to local ecology, and position in regional
social ecology.
Slowly the
frontier became more tightly incorporated into the Spanish Empire, and became
more fully peripheralized. The change was moderate because frontier policy needed
to balance competing goals. Still there was some development.
When
rebellions in New Spain led to Mexican
independence (1810-1821), the frontier peace began to unraveled further.
Raiding increased during the Mexican era. Yet Comanche maintained the peace
with New Mexico
though they did raid other Mexican provinces. Mexico
began to lose control of its northern
provinces due to internal political disorder and
British-American rivalry over the West.
With
independence trade along the Santa Fe Trail from St. Louis
to Santa Fe
opened. This quickly reoriented northern New Mexico
toward St. Louis, and away from Chihuahua in the south. Santa Fe became and entrepôt for American goods into Mexico.
Many traders married Mexican women in order to gain licenses to trade in Santa Fe. American traders
were attractive husbands because of their reputation of treating women better
than Mexican men. This, not surprisingly, stirred considerable resentment among
Mexican men.
The
American conquest (1846-1848) transferred much of northwest Mexico into a rising capitalist
state and unleashed the renewed raiding. The old patterns repeated: the use of
volunteer fighters with low pay supplemented by booty and captives, instigation
of hostilities by locals bent on their own advancement, continued bureaucratic
bungling, and the use of local bureaucratic positions as stepping stones to
higher office in eastern centers. It seemed like the Americans had studied the Spanish
archives in order to repeat their mistakes. Actually it was due similar structural
conditions.
There were
four major differences under American control. First, all territory became part
of the national state. Second, the United States had far greater
resources to enforce its will, even in remote areas. Third, Americans removed
the means of subsistence for nomadic groups, forcing them to on reservations.
Fourth, New Mexico and Arizona
Territories primarily were a land
bridge to California.
Once the “bridge” was open there was little need to disturb the region,
allowing “space” for indigenous groups time to adapt to the new situation.
Large
numbers of Europeans, most for the United States,
poured into Texas and California. Those two states began their
climb toward major U.S.
population centers. New Mexico
no longer was the center of European population in the American Southwest.
During the Civil War New Mexico split into two territories, New
Mexico and Arizona, as result of
complex political maneuvering designed to block the Confederacy access to California ports. These
two states remained territories until 1912 primarily because they had such
large Hispanic and Indian populations. Indeed, in New Mexico primary speakers of Spanish only
became a minority in the 1920s.
After annexation
by the United States, the
continued growth of Santa Fe Trail traffic
increased intergroup competition. Incompatible land uses – cattle grazing versis
buffalo hunting – strained ecological resources for productive technologies of
nomadic groups, leading to intensification of fighting. Many indigenous groups needed
to raid European settlements or starve. Attitudes among United States citizens toward
Indians exacerbated conditions. They rejected Apache overtures to become allies
against Mexicans. Traffic in captives again promoted fighting. The army was an
important factor in local economies. Military efforts to "pacify"
nomadic groups were helped by a thriving national economy, but slowed by the
Civil War (1861-1865). American actions reversed the trajectories of Comanche
and Apache social change.
Comanches
blocked westward expansion into Texas,
straddled the Santa Fe Trail, and occupied a narrowing no-man's-land between Texas, New Mexico, and northern
Mexico.
They prospered initially by trading and raiding among these territories,
escaping to the unmapped south Plains, but were gradually surrounded. Other
groups from the north were pushed further onto the Plains and hunted more
intensely. Europeans also hunted on the Plains, severely depleting the buffalo
herds, a major Comanche resource. Some of the "Civilized Tribes"
relocated to Indian Territory from southeastern United States and infringed eastern
Comanche territory. New Mexican livestock operations – first sheep, later
cattle – encroached on their western range. Texans blocked movement to the
southeast. Apaches blocked movement to the southwest.
The United States
attempted to ease the problem by making treaties with several Plains groups at
Medicine Lodge Creek in 1867, which defined the first Comanche reservation. The
Comanche Indian agency was poorly funded, and their small cattle herds were
raided by other Indians and by neighboring Texans. Comanches responded by raiding
in Texas and provoked
counter raids by settlers. After the final Comanche battle at Palo
Duro Canyon, Texas (1875) they were
forced onto a small Fort
Sill reservation.
Apaches lived
in a large number of small bands scattered over a diverse territory making
their final subjugation comples. That history is difficult to summarize. Unlike
Comanches, Apache had long been a barrier to trade, and had developed a very
effective raiding mode of production. They did not depend on any one food
source and could change targets frequently.
Because of competition
with new settlers military pressure grew. Arizona developed as a "mineral empire."
Both miners and Apaches depended on sedentary producers for supplies. Since the
public in the east would no longer tolerate the annihilation of Indians, the
only alternative was for the government to feed them. But there were
insufficient funds to do so. Also Indian wars became a vital part of the local
economy. This difference of opinions about Indian policy is one root of the
western opposition to “government interference” from Washington. Some local leaders initiated
conflicts to keep the federal funds flowing into their pockets. This ended with
Geronimo’s surrender in 1886.
After the
Civil War nomadic groups were forced on to reservations eliminating or severely
modifying traditional lifestyles. Nomadism, barter, raiding, and sale of
captives could not coexist with more intensive uses of natural resources.
Farming, ranching, and mining were seen to use the land “more efficiently” than
foraging or gardening. The American state did not tolerate such "inefficient"
use of resources – a thinly disguised rationale for seizing Indian territories.
Native Americans had two choices: join the lower class of a capitalist state,
or die resisting. Many chose the second option. Only where Americans had no
desire for the land did native groups get reservations where they became
"captive nations" and welfare recipients.
Again, pacification
had different effects on Comanches and Apaches. First, they had different
degrees of ecological and political flexibility. Comanches depended heavily on
the buffalo. Intentional destruction of the buffalo herds destroyed their base
of adaptation. Apaches had more diverse survival strategies. For Comanches the
slight increase in centralization and intense dependence on the buffalo made them
more vulnerable to rapid defeat. Apaches could disperse and avoid annihilation.
Over centuries they had become adept at forming new alliances, using multiple
survival strategies, and adapting to rapidly changing circumstances. Second was
geopolitical location. Comanches blocked expansion and communication across
western United States, as Apaches
had done under in New Spain. After annexation
by the United States Apaches were mainly a diplomatic nuisance along the new
international boundary. Neither group could capitalize on a middleman or buffer
role. So both groups were "pacified" and "sedentarized,"
and the Comanches all but destroyed.[9] Yet,
these changes occurred within a larger context.
In the late
nineteenth centure the Dawes Act, also knows as the General Allotment Act
[1887] “freed surplus” Indian land by forcing Indians on reservations to take
up farming, often with allotments that were far too small for the sparsely
watered west. Also during the time the government under direction of Louis
Henry Pratt sought to “kill the Indian, but save the man” with required
education in boarding schools that sought to eliminate indigenous languages and
cultures. While originally intended as a liberal, humane reform as opposed to
outright genocide, this policy was disastrous. One of it major, unintended side
effects was to facilitate organization of nationwide Native American
associations (Adams 1995; Wilkins 2006).
Incorporation
processes were episodic and sporadic, but tended to become stronger. The
introduction of horses and guns in the Spanish era made pre-contact practices
impossible. The contemporary groupings of indigenous peoples in the Southwest
were constructed during this era. The United States completed in a few
decades what the Spaniards and Mexicans could not do in centuries: permanent sedentarization
of nomadic groups.
This
example suggests that incorporation into any world-system is problematic: (a) according
to the type of system doing the incorporating; (b) with respect to social
organization of incorporated groups; (c) with respect to the conditions of the
incorporating system; and (d) with respect to a variety of local factors. The
degree to which an area or group is incorporated into a world-system defines the
context within which local changes may occur. Local actions are major factors
in the costs of incorporation. Incorporation is a matter of degree and is not
fully elastic. Sometimes changes engendered by incorporation they are difficult
or even impossible to reverse, as with the consequences of the spread of
horses.
This
account shows that incorporation begins with early contact. Second,
incorporated groups, even nonstate societies, play an active role in the
process.[10]
Third, incorporation is a variable and sporadic. Finally, more than economic
reasons prompt attempts at incorporation.
I will now
turn to comparison of the two southwests, then to some more general conclusions
about the twenty-first century.
The Two Southwests:
Comparisons and Contrasts
Some key similarities between the two regions are that both
supplied valuable goods, and avenues of trade to other areas for other goods. Both
have highly variegated topography. Both have a high density of indigenous,
non-state peoples. Both were avenues for the penetration of new ideologies in
the form of religions: Buddhism in Asia, Christianity in the Americas. Both for considerable
time, two millennia in the case of Yunnan,
four centuries in the Southwest, were nodes on important routes connecting to
other areas. Yunnan was a key node on the
Southwest Silk Road that had links with the northern, land-based Silk Road, and
the southern maritime Silk Road. New Mexico connected to New Spain/Mexico via Camino Real
to Chihuahua and Vera Cruz, later to the U.S. via the Santa Fe Trail, and to California via the Old
Spanish Trail. Both regions underwent considerable identity shifts, albeit very
different ones. These are processes that remain works in progress.
There are
some other similarities that seem to be quite common in frontier areas.
Traders intermarried with local women to gain better access
to local networks. This was also officially promoted for soldiers in Yunnan to create both a
permanent military presence and to introduce Chinese farming techniques. The
latter was often undone by local ecological conditions. All of these instances
led to the development of hybrid populations some of which, at least for some
time, became distinctive ethnic groups themselves.
For both it
was quite late in the incorporation process that local population was surpassed
by immigrants from the incorporating state. Doubly so in the American
Southwest: for Spanish populations versus indigenous populations, and under the
United States for U.S.
citizens over descendants of Spanish/Mexican populations. In Yunnan, Han did out number locals until the
Ming Dynasty. Thus, in both regions ethnic diversity has remained quite high,
indeed the highest in both China
and United States.
And in both the Southwest U.S., especially New Mexico
and Arizona (old New Mexico
province), and Yunnan
this ethnic diversity has become a tourist attraction in itself actively
promoted by local governments. In the U.S. the presence of Indian owned
casinos has added to that draw. With reservations in the U.S. and the minzu
system in China
surviving ethnic groups have maintained a modicum of autonomy. Also in both
areas some indigenous population were trained in schools run by the dominant
state as agents of assimilation and acculturation. It seems to be the case that
this was more effective and less brutal in China
than the U.S.,
but much more detailed research is needed to substantiate that claim.
There are
also key differences. Most obvious is the much greater time depth of the Yunnan
frontier/borderlands. Connections to neighboring states differ considerably. New Mexico connected to French colonies (in what became Louisiana), to the U.S.,
and after the war with Mexico,
to Mexico
itself. Yunnan, via many branches of the Southwest Silk Road
connected to states in Southeast Asia: Vietnam
(Annam), Laos, Thailand,
and Burma; to the west and
north with Tibet; and to the
west and south to South Asia: India,
Assam, Nepal.
Finally the
indigenous populations were quite different. In the U.S. Southwest the most
complex societies were the Pueblo
villages and Comanches late in the colonial era, most of the rest were nomadic
or semi-nomadic. In Yunnan,
there were few foragers or semi-foragers. More common were fairly robust
chiefdoms with sufficient military power to offer considerable resistance to
the Chinese military,
These
comparisons make clear that the concepts of nation-state and precise borders
are quintessentially modern. Setting precise borders is a continuing project
even while borderlands remain, like the frontiers that preceded them, frontier
zones.
Even though
separated by over a millennium, there were similar processes, though the
particulars varied immensely. According to Yang:
The power struggles among Han
China, the Southern Yue, and the Xiongnu
people vividly illustrate how Central
Asian frontiers and the Southwestern frontier mutually influenced one another.
Indeed, it was because of Han China's expansion into Central Asia and into
South China that the Middle Kingdom first noticed and then conquered Yunnan
(2009, p. 75, emphasis added).
Under Spain
the concerns were with French to east and southeast, the British to the
northeast, and vague other Europeans to the west and northwest. In addition to
contraband trade, blocking access to the highly productive silver mines in Zacatecas
was a major concern. Indeed, these are reasons why New Mexico was maintained as colony at
considerable expense. Under the United States
the concerns were with Russians to the far northwest (northern California, not Alaska),
French to the east and southeast, and British for control of the seaports along
the west coast of North America. Thus, the
processes along any one frontier are influenced by other frontiers.
Yang also
points out an important difference on the effects of the frontier regions on the
central or core states:
Yunnan silver in the Ming period,
copper cash replacing cowry currency during the Ming-Qing transition, and
Yunnan copper in the Qing period, collectively demonstrated the central
penetration over the frontier on the one hand and the significance of a
frontier in the Chinese world-economy on the other hand. Thus, Yunnan's case contrasted with the incorporation of
the American southwestern frontier by a modern European world-system, which, as
Thomas Hall [1989] has pointed out, greatly influenced the Southwestern
frontier but did little to affect the modern world-system (Yang 2009, p. 232;
emphasis inserted as well as date).
This is an important contrast, albeit slightly overstated.
There were effects of the Southwest on the now capitalist world-system, albeit
considerable lower and indirect. By annexing the land from Texas
to California the United
States gained secure, land routes to the California ports, which gave it a considerable advantage
in trade with Asia. Indeed, the [re]opening of
Japan to trade with Europeans by Commodore Perry in 1853 was a direct attempt
to get solid, although rather late, foothold in the trade with Asian countries.
That opening, in turn, played a role in the Meiji Restoration (1868) and the
rise of Japan
as a modern state. While significant, these effects in no matched the effects
of Yunnan, especially the copper trade, and
through Yunnan on China’s impacts on the emerging
global world-system.
However it
remains a somewhat open question whether the roots of these differences lies in
the differences between ancient and modern frontiers, or in the relative power
of the state with respect to the frontier, or in a combination, or in something
else. It is not clear whether the gap in power between China and Yunnan
was larger, about the same, or smaller than that between the United States and its Southwest. In
relative terms, though, it is clear that the Southwest United States had far
less power than Yunnan.
Bin Yang
draws the following comparisons between the Yunnan frontier and the New World Frontier
at large (2009, p. 174). In addition to the longer time span, Yunnan differed in two other aspects. First,
long persistence of the frontier Yunnan could
use its muticultural and external links, including those to China, to develop its own
mechanisms and methods to deal with Chinese colonization. These were mechanisms
were often quite effective. They illustrate the longest period of “negotiated
peripherality” (Kardulias 2007). Yang also draws attention to this being the
longest lasting instance of a “middle ground,” a concept Richard White (1991)
developed to describe the long period interaction in what is now the middle
west of the United States. Indeed, Yunnan
is an excellent place to explore further the concepts of middle ground and
negotiated peripherality.
Another
difference is the role of disease, especially tropical and sub-tropical
diseases on contact, conquest, and colonization. In the Southwest, as
throughout the Americas,
European diseases decimated indigenous populations.[11]
In Yunnan it
was quite the opposite, disease and the threat of disease slowed attempts at
conquest and colonization. Indeed, the fear of and presence of disease
eventually became a marker of Han and non-Han differences as well as a boundary
marker for the Yunnan
region (Yang 2010).
All three
incorporating states – Spain,
United States, China –
made extensive use of indirect rule and indigenous leaders in governing the
frontier regions. China
seems to have been much more successful than Spain. It is not entirely clear why
this was so. Certainly there is merit to an argument that says China was more powerful than Spain relative to the frontier
region. But how much of that difference can be attributed to direct overland
connection as opposed to transoceanic connection? It is also clear that the United States
used indirect rule minimally and for a very short time.
A clear
difference is that indirect rule was used for a much longer time, and used more
complex relations than in northwest New Spain.
The tripod system developed by the Mongols became the gaitu guiliu policy that sought to transform native chieftains into
a part of the imperial administration during the Ming-Qing transitions.
Gradually, the domination of ethnicity over administration changed into a
system in which ethnicity was a subdivision of administration. This is very
different. Part of the explanation lies in the considerably greater power of
the indigenous populations in Yunan and existence of very valuable resources
there (e.g. copper). This contrasts with Spanish New Mexico where indirect rule
was used primarily with already sedentary, village peoples, with a major
exception for Comanches. Under Spain
or the United States
indigenous leaders never became part of the national state administration.
Indeed, a major theme running through U.S.
– Indian relations is the preservation of Indian sovereignty (Wilkins 2006; Hall
and Fenelon 2009, Ch.
7).
Finally,
Yang (2009, pp. 205-6) asks “But was Yunnan
a frontier area, an independent world-system, a section of another
world-system, or an external area over which the two world-economies were
contending?” He also notes that “Yunnan belonged to the Indian Ocean
economy, at least before the Ming period.” My answer to his question would be
“all of the above,” albeit at different times and for different reasons. The
closest to that sort of complication in the Southwest are the debates about the
connections to Mesoamerica, which were gone by
the time the Spanish arrived. It seems worth contemplating how much of Yunnan’s
long lasting (partial) autonomy was due to the ability of local leaders to make
use of their position as a contested periphery between early states, China,
Southeast Asian states, and South Asia? This is a complex question, but one
worth eventually pursuing for its potential insights into how separate
world-systems keep separate and how they merge.
What then
might we learn from all this for twentieth century border issues?
Lessons for Borders
& Frontiers
So how should be make comparative studies of frontiers?[12]
Clearly, variations can be spatial, temporal, physiographic, or organizational,
different kinds of native peoples, and different sorts of settlers. These are
all factors that must be considered in comparisons. Also important are type of
cycle, phase of cycle, type of boundary, and state of the world-system(s) that
are shaping frontiers and that frontiers are influencing. It would also seem
reasonable to consider whether the frontier was on the edge of a world-system,
whether it be at the bulk goods, political-military, luxury goods or
informational edge or along some internal boundary. Internal boundaries could
be between states or groups in similar positions within the world-system (e.g.,
core, periphery, or semiperiphery) or they could be between these different
zones. A reasonable working hypothesis would be that these two broad categories
of frontiers would exhibit different dynamics. Blackhawk’s (2006) study of the
very fringes of the Southwest frontier focuses on the very edge of the system,
whereas Reséndez’s (2005) study is concerned with the processes of identity
change within the system (when what is now southwestern United States was wrested from
Mexican control).
A
subsidiary hypothesis might be that frontiers between different positions in a
world-system might also differ. Here it is useful to recall Chase-Dunn and
Hall’s (1997) argument that how many layers, and how differentiated they are in
a world-system is an empirical as well as a theoretical problem.
Many case
studies of frontiers can be [re]interpreted as “incorporated comparisons”
(McMichael 1990) which are often a series of comparisons within an historical
trajectory of a case. In Colony and
Empire William Robbins (1994) examines the American West and argues that
far from being an open or free frontier, it was highly constrained by the
demands of assorted capitalist enterprises. This, of course, makes sense within
a world-systems framework. But it also sheds a different light on the common
claim that in Canada the law
arrived before the settlers, whereas in the United
States the settlers preceded the law, and hence the
western U.S. was far more
violent than western Canada.
Rather, frontier violence served the interests of capital in the United States.
Blackhawk
(2006) shows that violence served to ‘ethnically cleanse’ the U.S. west of indigenous peoples.
This, in turn can be seen as yet another instance of ‘war in the tribal zone’
(Feguson and Whitehead 1992a, 1992b). Here it interesting that the “war in the
tribal zone” effect occurs in both tributary and capitalist world-systems.
Thus, as with ecological degradations discussed by Chew (2001), a key component
of change is the state, irrespective of the mode of accumulation.
In
analogous ways comparisons of modern and ancient frontiers show that genocide,
ethnocide, culturicide, ethnogenesis, amalgamation, hybridization, and
fractionation are common processes on many different frontiers. What remains to
be studied systematically is how various local, regional, state-level, and
world-system conditions and dynamics shape these processes. Again, states seem
to be as important as mode of accumulation and local relations of production in
shaping ethnic change.
Finally,
the study of frontiers illustrates how much can be learned by the study of
peripheral regions and peoples and their roles in system change. Indeed, some
of these processes may be visible only in peripheral and/or frontier areas.
This then becomes a method to explore how it is that actions and changes in
peripheral areas (and semiperipheral areas) play important roles in
world-system evolution. A key point here is that many if not most of these
questions can only be asked from a world-system perspective, even if they must
be answered in large part locally.
Given that humans now are facing an impending crisis, and
most likely a bifurcation point (Wallerstein 2010, 2011a,b), further spurred by
political and economic collapse. It is useful to examine past instances of
similar major changes. Since, by their nature, the processes and results of
such a bifurcation are not predictable, charting a predictable result is not
possible. But we may be able to perceive the outlines of a “possibility space” of
results which can suggest indicators of patterns and as cautionary tales. Two
other sets of recent developments play into this.
First is
Sing Chew’s work on “dark ages” (2001, 2008, 2009). Dark ages may be
intermediate between a complete bifurcation and what we might call “routine
change,” or what until now have been more or less routine cycles in
world-system processes. In his third volume (2009) Chew sketches some
insightful comparisons among the onsets of dark ages. While by no means
certain, climate change, decline of oil, rise in spills, and as the 2011 Japan
earthquake underscored, the possibility of nuclear disasters, the possibility
indeed, likelihood of the onset of a dark age can not be dismissed out of hand.
Add to this
Glen Kuecker’s (2007) analysis of a “perfect storm” of political, economic,
demographic, and ecological changes leading to global collapse. Much like
Joseph Tainter’s (1988) analyses of past collapses, and even “dark ages,” it is
very unlikely that core states will be able to continue to function and that
they will be hurt the most severely. Kuecker builds on this (Kuecker and Hall
2011) drawing on Chase-Dunn’s analyses of semiperipheral marcher states (1988;
Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, ch. 5; and Chase-Dunn et al. 2006, 2010; Hall et al.
2009 ) to argue that peoples living in semiperipheral and even especially
peripheral areas will have the highest likelihood of survival. This is both
because they are often less embedded in the current system, and have often been
able to been able to maintain lifeways that are significantly different from
the variety of lifeways found in core areas. Chief among these are indigenous
peoples, who have preserved lifeways that are the most different, and often
most challenging to the current world-system (Hall and Fenelon 2004, 2005a,
2005b, 2008, 2009). Indeed Wallerstein says:
The so-called forgotten peoples
(women, ethnic/racial/religious “minorities,” “indigenous” nations, persons of non-heterosexual sexual
orientations), as well as those concerned with ecological or peace issues
asserted their right to be considered prime actors on an equal level with the
historical subjects of the traditional antisystemic movements (2011, p. 34, emphasis
added).
It is important to underscore that they are not predictors,
nor saviors. Rather, they maintain lifeways that may be suggestive of alternatives to the current system. They cannot be
copied directly. Rather, how and why they have been able to preserve lifeways
that do not meld with the current, neoliberal, modern world-system can be
studied for clues to developing new ways of living and developing a new
world-system.
This, then
brings us, back (at last!) to the issues of borders and frontiers. These
survivors are, and have been for millennia, most common in frontier regions of
states and especially of world-systems. That is where the evidence is. For sure
we can learn from studies of the rapid changes – and the more common static
quality of repeated processes – of contemporary borders. Indeed, following the
argument above these are the areas
where survival and development of a new world-system are most likely. But we
must be cautious to not get bogged down in studying elements that are simply
repeated, albeit with their own special features, of older cycles. Here again,
comparison with past frontiers can be very useful. As already argued, such
comparison can help us identify what is actually new and what are only
permutations of old processes.
In the
comparison sketched here between the U.S. Southwest and Southwest China (Yunnan), in combination
with studies of indigenous survival (Hall and Fenelon 2009) we can see that
location of the source of troubles in the modern state, or in capitalism, or in
the capitalist, modern world-system is considerably overemphasized. The
fundamental locus of these problems is in states, qua states. To be sure capitalist organizations are able to drive
many older processes much more strongly than ever before, but capitalism per se
is not the only problem. Here one thinks of a comment from Gary Snyder: “Grandmother
wisdom suspects the men who stay too long talking in the longhouse when they
should be mending nets or something. They are up to trouble – inventing the
state, most likely (Gary Snyder, The Practice
of the Wild, 1990, p. 64).
One also
thinks of Warren Wagar’s oft discussed (1996) Short History of the Future (1999), wherein he suggests possible
forms of organization that transcend the state. Some of these processes can be studied through examination of
contemporary borders. Still, there are myriad other possibilities as yet unexplored.
The possibilities of such discoveries and understandings are a fundamental value
of continued examinations of border processes.
Acknowlegements
I thank Bin Yang for sharing many papers with me, and saving
me from at least some egregious mistakes about the history of Yunnan. As always, errors remain my
responsibility.
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