The Social Foundations of Global Conflict and
Cooperation:
Waves of Globalization and Global Elite Integration, 19th to 21st
Century
Thomas E. Reifer and
Christopher Chase-Dunn
Institute for Research
on World-Systems
University of California, Riverside
(Submitted to NSF Sociology Program, August 15, 2003. v.
7-15-03)
This research studies the relationship
between the social foundations of waves of globalization, democratization,
global elite integration and global conflict and cooperation from the
nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries.
The main hypothesis is that the changing social foundations,
contours and strengths of elite integration and related forms of unequal civil,
political and social citizenship, were important contributors to fault lines of
conflict in the previous globalization backlash, and that analyzing these can
help us to predict where conflicts are most likely to emerge today.
The research will analyze and delineate
the social foundations of elites cross-nationally, the largest regional and
international organizations, and the most powerful individuals, families,
firms, states and international organizations for selected countries in the
core focusing on ten targeted years: 1840, 1860, 1880, 1913, 1929, 1950, 1970,
1980, 1995, and 2003. The links among these actors will be examined to
determine the degree of their transnational and international connections, the
nature and strength of these ties, their social foundations, and the network
patterns of connections and empty spaces. This will enable the tracking of
changes in the strength of global organization among the most powerful actors,
and the changing nature and network patterns of these ties. The project will
use structural equations modeling, network analysis and GIS mapping to compare
the patterns of ties in the late nineteenth century with the patterns of
conflict that emerged in the last globalization backlash. This will allow
assessment of the relationship between the social foundations of globalization,
democratization, global elite integration, and global conflict and cooperation.
Three inter-related research designs will
be used. The first focuses on analyzing a subset of elites selected from key
core countries, the second is cross-national and will include all the countries
and colonial regions of the world where comparable data on welfare or
warfare-welfare states, other important aspects of socioeconomic and political
structure, and links can be found, and the third focuses on the largest
regional and global international organizations, including firms, military,
political, governmental and civil society groups.
Project
Description
This
study compares waves of globalization, democratization, global elite
integration and related forms of global conflict and cooperation from 1840 to
2003. The research focuses on the social foundations of national and
transnational wealth and power groups, as well as on the national, regional and
international institutions organizing and structuring their activity and
consciousness (see Katzenstein 1996a, b, c; 1997a, b). The project will study the changing social
foundations and degree of global elite integration, including patterns of connections and alliances among the
wealthiest and most powerful people and organizations in the world over the
last 163 years.
Producing
data on the changing social foundations and contours
of global elites and the intensity of their integration over time will allow us
to determine the relationship between global elite integration and global
conflict and cooperation and to estimate future fault lines along which
conflict is likely to develop and their probabilities. Our hypothesis is that the social
foundations of elites, and related waves of globalization and elite integration
are important factors in structuring the patterns of global conflict and
cooperation. Here, we develop a
theoretical model and set of empirically testable propositions about this
relationship between elite social foundations and global conflict and
cooperation.
Background. The British hegemony of the
1800s saw a tsunami of international trade, investment and global
integration that peaked in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(Bairoch 1996; Haggard 1995; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). Yet growing inequality, intensified uneven
development, and elite reaction to the growth of democratic movements
heightened global instability and violent conflict (Arrighi 1994; Snyder 1991;
2000: ch. 3; Polanyi, 2001; James 2001).
During this period, the spread of commercialized trade disrupted
economies dependent on domestic production, vastly increasing inequalities
between the rich and the poor, and stimulating movements for self-protection
against such threats to livelihood and security (Polanyi, 2001; van der Pijl,
1984; Arrighi, 1990a, 1994; Silver and Arrighi, 2003). The structural contradictions afflicting
autocratic states with overgrown military-corporate complexes and narrow
domestic economic bases such as Germany made them fertile grounds for
reactionary ideologies such as fascism and highly vulnerable to democratic
disintegration and aggressive war (Arrighi 1990a: 38-45; Neuman, 1966: 201-202;
Elias 1996; Hobsbawm 1987; Semmel 1960; Kehr 1973; 1977; Calleo, 1978;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Newton, 1997). A premium was put on war preparedness and
modernization of military-corporate complexes requiring global resources, as
the turbulence of world market and interstate competition worked to the
temporary advantage of those power of elites that wanted to pursue aggressive
foreign policies (Snyder, 1991: ch. 3).
By
the late nineteenth century, racialized social imperialism, along with elite
ideologies and practices of war preparedness and militarized masculinity became
the order of the day (Goldstein 2001;
Theweleit, 1987; Elias, 1996; Pearlman, 1984; see Hutchinson 1996). The resultant world wars and revolutionary
waves were symptomatic of the rising politico-economic and military competition
that contributed to, the breakdown of the world-economy (Polanyi 2001; cf.
Skocpol 1979; Shanin 1985; 1986). Such
waves of globalization and global polarization have been closely associated
with the narrowing of the domestic and international social bases of declining
hegemons (Arrighi, 1994; Arrighi, Silver, et al., 1999; see also Phillips,
2002).
A
large body of literature has demonstrated the close relationship between rising
levels of proletarianization, economic development, military conflict and
democratic citizenship rights (Weber, 1961: 240; PS, Winter 1985, Seymour
Martin Lipset, Laurily Epsteinch. 2; Vanhanen, 1997; Marshall, 1973; see
Arrighi, 1990a; 1990b; Klinkner, 1999).
In terms of military participation, ruling elites have found it
necessary to extend citizenship rights to national subjects in exchange for the
latter taking on obligations of military service. This was noted long ago by Max Weber (1961: 240) and systematic
comparative research has borne him out (Andreski, 1968; Giddens, 1987: 233;
Mann, 1986; Dehio, 1962; Downing, 1992; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens,
1992). In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the growing socialization of war-making and state-making
laid the material basis for the democratization of both citizen-soldiers and
shop-floor citizens whose cooperation became increasingly important for
national elites. The expansion and generalization of civil, social and
political citizenship rights in the core countries, and to a lesser extent in
the non-core was crucial in the reconstruction of the global system on new and
enlarged social foundations under U.S. hegemony. But the forms of democratic
citizenship that emerged were stratified to varying degrees by race/ethnicity,
class, gender and nationality, with profound implications for the form and
trajectory of global elite integration.
What
is important for our purposes is the relationship between these unequal systems
of citizenship, forms of integration, and global conflict and cooperation. Elite social groups with interests in
overseas expansion or activist foreign policies have traditionally had to form
coalitions with other powerful constituencies, including subjects and citizens,
in order to pursue their aims. The
frequently tenuous nature of these political coalitions often helped prompt
aggressive foreign policies, for as many comparative historical studies have
shown, "domestic insecurity of elites is one of the most important causes
of war" (Rosecrance, 1963: 306; see also Levy, 1989; Arrighi, 1990a;
Snyder, 1991; Mayer, 1967; Newton, 1997).
Specifically, the promotion of strategic myths needed to build these
coalitions often increased the power of those groups favoring aggressive
foreign policies. Such
politico-economic dynamics played central roles in both the British and U.S.
cycles of globalization and related forms of militarization (Snyder, 1991: 17;
2003; see Freeland, 1985; Levy, 1989; 1998; 2002: 34-35; 2003; see Davis, 1986;
see Trubowtiz, 1998).
Additionally,
"quasi-states" in the periphery and semiperiphery often lack the
capacity for social inclusion. Political struggles over wealth and power in
non-core countries have thus caused violent conflict within and across often
porous borders, especially if major race/ethnic, class, national or religious
differences can be exploited (Jackson, 1990; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; also
Chau, 2003). Here, poverty and
increasing population growth, rising demand for scarce resources, the legacies
of colonialism, rapid geopolitical change and increasing intranational and
global inequalities have fueled growing conflict within and between states
(Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994; Calder 1997; Klare, 2001; Arrighi 1990a; 1991;
Murdoch 1980; Waseem, 2000; Woodward 1995).
In an age of declining resources, power elites often resort to narrow
ethno-national/religious identities and definitions of citizens and the nation,
accompanied by scapegoating of internal and/or external enemies, to achieve or
maintain power, thus contributing to increasing instability and conflict (cf.
Snyder, 2000; see Arrighi, 1990b: 34-35; see Manza and Brooks, 1999). Thus, the changing social foundations of
elites in hegemonic cycles plays a major role in global conflict and cooperation.
By
1945, many U.S. and European elites had come to understand that volatile
currency fluctuations and speculative capital flows played an important
contributing role in the breakdown of England’s liberal global economic order,
recurrent depressions, the rise of fascism, world wars and global revolutionary
waves (Gardner 1969: 75-76; Arrighi, 1990a; see Polanyi, 2001). These concerns
led these elites to create a liberal international economic order replete with
governed markets that provided tangible benefits to workers in the core and a modicum
of state-led nationalist development in the Third World. This compact was a fundamental part of the
real but uneven expansion of civil, political and social citizenship rights
across the globe (Arrighi 1990a, b, 1994).
In this vision, that of a “global New Deal,” full citizenship rights
were to be generalized to the core. At
the same time, development was to allow the world's poorer states to catch up
with standards of wealth and the full extension of citizenship rights achieved
for the largely white working classes and middle strata of this zone. However,
the U.S. hegemony's promise of full citizenship and high mass consumption in
the core and self-determination and development in non-core zones had definite
limits.
After
World War II, while many in the U.S. labor movement sought universal social
provisions, the lack of basic citizenship rights for blacks in the South and
people of color more generally posed an insurmountable obstacle to such a
vision (Davis, 1986; see Lichtenstein, 1995; see also Iton, 2000; see also Du
Bois, 1969). Moreover, the fiscal
nationalism of the conservative coalition ruled out Congressional passage of
aid necessary for the continued reconstruction of Europe and Asia after the Marshall
Plan (Borden 1984). Yet by playing upon
military nationalism, U.S. elites were able to convince Congress to vastly
increase military spending during the Korean War, though much of this money was
actually used to buy goods from Western Europe and East Asia. Military spending became a form of welfare
for corporations and upper-class constituents.
At the same time, Cold War military spending provided for the
containment of U.S. enemies and allies, the latter as semi-sovereign states and
regions, while providing the military forces to protect U.S. allies and to
implement a global policy of counterrevolutionary violence to ensure an Open
Door for U.S. and allied transnational capital in the Third World.[1] Military spending was much preferred by U.S.
elites to other forms of social expenditure as it was possible to get it from
Congress, and moreover helped to deflect a vibrant labor movement seeking
universalistic social provisions and greater race, class and gender equality at
home, by allowing for its incorporation instead as a junior partner in the
overseas expansion of U.S. state-corporate power (Lipsitz, 1994; Buhle, 1999;
Rathbun, 1996; see Lichtenstein, 1995; see Steppan-Norris and Zeitlin,
2002).
Instead
of universalistic social provisions, organized workers were forced to negotiate
private welfare provisions tied to firms, propped up by a permanent war economy
(Davis, 1986; see Hacker, 2002; see Minns, 2001). This ensured that U.S. social provision would be uniquely
stratified by race, class, gender (see Campbell, 1997: 107; see Orloff, 1993;
1996; Mettler 1998; Mink 1995; Quadagno 1994; Epsing-Anderson 1990: ch.
3). Instead of universalistic forms of
social citizenship, military-service related government transfers, notably
veterans’ benefits, the watershed GI Bill of Rights and low-interest loans,
went primarily to white male citizen-soldiers.
Entitlements such as Social Security and unemployment went to shop-floor
citizens, initially largely white males, who also benefited from military-subsidized
private welfare states tied to firms.
Second-class, means-tested benefits, stigmatized as “welfare” went to
the most oppressed—notably women, persons of color, and the white working poor
more generally.[2] These different forms of social provision
and political attitudes towards overseas intervention among national elites and
populations are arguably related. U.S.
specialization in providing core military protection subsidized U.S.’s allies
in Western Europe and Japan, leading them to provide more funds for
universalistic forms of social welfare provision.
The
rise of this U.S. New Deal warfare-welfare state—and its stratification, by
race, class, gender and nationality—has played a key role in shaping elite and
popular attitudes towards military versus social spending, based upon the real
or expected benefits different groups receive from such programs. Not surprisingly, there has long been a race
and gender gap on military versus social provisions as well as questions of
foreign policy and war and peace more generally, with women and persons of
color more supportive of social programs and the peaceful solutions towards
international conflict rather than tradition U.S. policies of postwar
interventionism. According to two
leading political sociologists, though there are gender gaps in policy
preferences among men and women cross-nationally, in terms of extent and
significance, "No similar 'gender gap' has developed in other democratic
polities" (Manza and Brooks, 1999: 128; Norris, 1988; see also Davis,
1986: 284-289).
This
seems in line with the hypothesis as to the interrelation between the social
base of elites, unequal forms of civil, political and social citizenship, and
their relationship to elite integration and related forms of conflict and
cooperation we aim to test as part of our study. US military spending plays an integral role in propping up
racialized and gendered structures of the warfare-welfare state and the
overseas expansion of US state-corporate power at one and the same time. The resulting cleavages on a variety of
social issues and restructuring of the political economy has been integral to
the development of hegemonic social blocs - as with the rise of the New Right,
right turn of the Eastern Establishment in the 1970s and 1980s - that have been
able to continue high levels of military spending and overseas intervention for
domestic and global purposes. Here,
elites saw high military spending as a way to curb greater spending on health,
education and human resources, while maintaining US military predominance and
global hegemony (Reifer 2002).
Thus,
just as the old exclusive White Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP) Establishment
reaped the fruits of the inflated capital values of a bygone era in the 1920s,
so too did the rise of a broad based U.S. New Right in the 1970s and 1980s, aim
to valorize the accumulated gains of corporate capital and the broad propertied
strata (Davis, 1986: 302, 157-255, 284-289; 2002: ch. 13; see also Jenkins and
Brents, 1989; see also Baltzell, 1987). This new hegemonic social bloc, solidified
by resentments generated in part by the stratification of U.S. social provision
by race and gender, included the more privileged segments of the white ethnic
working classes and middle strata (notably those in the U.S. South), arrayed
against workers of color, labor, the poor and the Third World (Davis, 1986;
2002: ch. 13 Gordon, 1994a, b; see also Manza and Brooks, 1999).
We
expect research on these questions to help address Jack Levy's (1998: 143)
challenge, heretofore unmet in the literature:
"Theories of patriarchy might also help answer the...question of
variations in war and peace, if they identified differences in the patriarchal
structures and gender relations in different historical contexts, and if they
incorporated differences into empirically testable hypotheses about the
outbreak of war." We aim to
compare different forms of racialized and gendered social relations, notably in
unequal welfare and warfare-welfare states, and to relate these to testable
hypothesis about forms of elite integration and global conflict and
cooperation.
Of
course, such a study has to take into account the changing functions and
unintended consequences of elite policies.
Take the following example, crucial to our conceptualization of the
broadening and narrowing of the social foundations of U.S. hegemony. Originally, U.S. military Keynesianism (a
form of welfare for the military-corporate complex and upper class
constituents) provided a stimulus to the U.S. and global economy. Military expenditures provided funding for
advanced technologies (semiconductors and so forth) (see Markusen and Yudken,
1992). Such programs thus propped up
both U.S. corporate profits and the overseas projection of US military power. Yet over time, the growing costs associated
with such policies, in the context of increased global economic competition,
led to a fiscal crisis of the New Deal warfare-welfare state and associated
world order. During World War II and
the early Cold War years, U.S. military spending was based on progressive
taxation of corporations and the rich. This was accompanied by limitations on
pecuniary accumulation, including federal regulation and anti-trust efforts
(see van der Pijl, 1984; see Davis, 1986).
Here was the social basis of the rise of the New Deal world order: reform at home and support for socioeconomic
reconstruction and limited forms of nationalist development abroad. Fixed exchange rates, by limiting large
fluctuations in currency exchange rates and speculative capital movements, had
provided the basis for forms of expansion consonant with the politico-economic
and social objectives of the New Deal (Gardner, 1969; Helliener, 1994; Ingham,
1994; Block, 1977). Yet in the early
1970s the U.S. was forced to scrap the Bretton Woods agreements on pegged
exchange rates that it had created after World War II. Increasingly, the regressive financing of
vastly expanded U.S. military expenditures through borrowing on the global
capital markets, rather than expanding the New Deal world order through
taxation on corporate profits and the rich, led instead to its ongoing demise
(see Arrighi, 1994; Broad 1988; see also Steinherr, 1998; 2000; Davis, 1986;
2002: ch. 13; Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; Eatwell 1993; Blackburn, 2002).[3] This account suggests a reciprocal causality
between changing elite social foundations, including via unequal systems of
citizenship (as in the New Deal warfare-welfare state), and related forms of
globalization, global elite integration and global conflict and cooperation.
Scholars
from the “democratic peace school” argue that interstate conflict among core
powers is a thing of the past (Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz
and Russett 1996; cf. Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1996; cf. Walt 1999). Recently, however, Jack Snyder (2000) has
argued that weakly embedded forms of democratization, in terms of the norms of
democratic procedures and governed markets, can promote extreme forms of
nationalism and hence intra and interstate conflict, as with the rise of
fascism in Germany and the escalating warfare that has gripped many formerly
Communist states of Europe. This raises
real questions about Russia, China, and the democratic stability in core powers
jettisoning governed markets that helped to embed these states within a thick web
of institutions (Snyder, 2000; UNHDP; 2002a, b; Reddaway and Glinsky 2001).
A
growing number of experts contend that the global system recurrently breaks
down not so much from rising challengers as because declining hegemons resist
adjustment and accommodation to new entrants (Calleo 1987: 142). David Calleo (2003a, b) recently raised
concerns that U.S. unilateralism is putting it on a collision course with
Europe and Asia, in a clash involving disputes about global governance, U.S.
military power and competing models of capitalism and social citizenship
provision (Minns, 2001).
Hegemonic
stability theorists hypothesize that declining hegemons attempt to use their
remaining strengths to pursue more unilateral advantages that have fewer
collective benefits for the rest of the world. This typically exacerbates
rivalry within the core, causing uncertainty, instability, and increasing
competition and conflict in the world economy and the interstate system.[4] This narrowing of the benefits that flow
from the policies of the declining hegemon is arguably what we are seeing in
the U.S. championing of neoliberal policies and military unilateralism which
some fear could spark another round of intra-core conflict and/or global chaos
(see also AJIL, 2002; see Mearshimer 2001).[5] Yet despite these dangers, many theorists
today hypothesize that global elite integration and/or related processes of
globalization represent a fundamental change in the world-system away from
great power conflict (Sklair, 2001;Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999;
Rosenau 1990).
In
particular, theorists of the globalization and “global capitalism” schools have
noted the qualitative leap in global economic integration and related processes
of global elite formation. This is alleged to be due to enhanced
intercontinental transportation and communications technologies and is
exemplified by the growing share of world production and trade carried out by
transnational corporations, a complimentary global city system, and the
emergence of other supranational organizations in a global civil society. All
this lends support to the notion that major interstate conflict is a thing of
the past (Sklair, 2001; Robinson 1996, 2001; Ross and Trachte 1990; Kowaleski
1997; Hardt and Negri, 2000; cf. Sassen, 2001; cf. Gowan 1999). In contrast, other scholars, including
world-systems analysts, put more emphasis on continued competition among rival
global centers and U.S. power (Gowan 1999, 2000 a,b, 2002 a, b; Carroll and
Carson 2002; Agnew 2001).
Today,
transnational class formation has increasingly become an option for masses and
elites, as evidenced by the annual gathering of global business and political
elites at the World Economic Forum (2000), which stimulated the birth of the
World Social Forum - a global meeting of progressive non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and political activists - and regional social forums, and
a host of related protests against transnational institutions and core
states. All this suggests the rise of
new forms of global class and identity formation by both elite and subordinate
groups (Bello, 2001; O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams, 2000; Cohen and Rai,
2000; Lubeck and Reifer, forthcoming).
There
is a growing literature on national and transnational class formation and
related processes of global conflict and cooperation.[6] And yet, there is a serious lacuna in this
literature—the absence of conceptualization and measurement of global class
formation and elite integration, including through military cooperation and unequal
systems of social citizenship.[7]
Here,
the analogies and differences in the construction of elite social bases in the
nineteenth to twentieth centuries have important implications for the likely
trajectory of global cooperation and conflict in the twenty-first. A major structural difference is the much
greater extent to which the U.S. has relied on "defense" as a mean of
generating support from domestic constituencies and regional elites for the national
and global project of U.S. hegemony. By
taking on the role of global policeman the U.S. allowed other core states to
construct political coalitions on social foundations that were substantially
demilitarized, most especially Germany and Japan. The elites in these countries have thus been in a relatively poor
position to bargain, as U.S. elites have become increasingly
unilateralist. This fact, combined with
the still great politico-economic and military power of the U.S., will likely
slow down the emergence of core challengers, as least via the old military
rivalry route. In the nineteenth
century, England had a small military based on a large navy, a small army and
foreign military forces, notably in India, but it never specialized in the
world policeman role to the extent that potential contenders abandoned their
military capability. Thus challengers
quickly turned their rapidly growing politico-economic and military capability
towards a violent confrontation with British global and regional power.
Three
alternative futures seem most likely:
1. A New
Round of U.S. hegemony.
Restoration of U.S. economic hegemony based on new lead industries -
such as information technology and biotechnology - facilitates global
leadership on the basis of a newly widened coalition of elites and workers in
world industries affected by these technologies. The returns from these profitable new industries make possible a
new global New Deal, with the restoration of multilateralism in the core and
developmentalism in the non-core.
2. Renewed
Interimperial Rivalry.
Continued U.S. relative economic decline combined with path dependency
on the military and financial power leads the U.S. to use these to pursue
increasingly narrow unilateralism aims, stimulating competing core and rising
semiperipheral powers to arm to defend their own interests. In all likelihood, this will take quite some
time due to the extent to which other core powers have relied on the U.S. world
policemen role. Eventually, though,
competing core powers such as Germany and Japan (perhaps as part of larger
regional or supranational structures such as the European Union) build up their
military capabilities and a renewed situation of multicentricity emerges in the
core that eventually results in hegemonic rivalry and world war among core
states.
3. Global
elite formation.
A narrow group of elites supports the U.S. in its use of military and
financial power to sustain global dominance against the protests of rival
elites and populations that are increasingly exploited or excluded from the
benefits of an unequal and asymmetrical form of globalization. The U.S., including through U.S.-dominated
supranational institutions, becomes a de factor world state representing
large-scale corporations, a large military and perhaps a civil service
bureaucracy. As the global system
becomes reconstituted on increasingly narrow and militarized social
foundations, transnational social movements rooted in global civil society and
working in conjunction with elite contenders from select states and regions,
challenge top down globalization through a combination of mass protest and the
putting forward of alternative frameworks for global governance based on broad
social foundations, across lines of race, class, gender, nationality and
civilizations.
We will use the results of our research to estimate which of these
future scenarios are more likely to actually occur, specifying what our study
of the changing social foundations of global elites over a long-historical
period has to say about the future trajectory of the global system. The above narrative explains the pressing
need to study the changing social foundation of global elite integration and
its relationship to global conflict and cooperation.
Prior
NSF-supported Research on Globalization
Christopher Chase-Dunn SES-0077975 "Trajectories and Causes of
Structural Globalization: 1800-2000" Amount: $129,898 PERIOD: September 1,
2000 through August 31, 2002.
This proposed study builds
upon our earlier research on the trends and trajectories of global integration
at the Institute for Research on World-Systems (IROWS) at the University of
California-Riverside. This earlier project studied the trajectories of economic
and political integration in the whole world-system since 1800. The research
proposed here expands upon this work by studying transnational and
international relations and by examining the changing contours of ties as well
as trends in their overall density. Our research on the trajectories of trade
and investment globalization has found strong empirical support for the
contention that globalization occurred in waves that have been interrupted by
periods of deglobalization (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000; also Doyle
2003).
Research Plan
This
project will conceptualize, operationalize and measure global elite formation
and its changing social foundations over the last 163 years, analyzing changes
in the extent and spatial distribution of economic and political/military power
among families, firms, and national states, as well as among supra-national and
truly global proto-state organizations (the Concert of Europe, League of
Nations, U.N., World Bank, IMF, OECD, Organization of American States, NATO,
NAFTA, European Community, European Union, ASEAN, APEC, Group of 8, Warsaw
Treaty Organization, World Trade Organization and so forth). We will study the geographical dimensions of
these structural changes, including links and divides occurring along
core/semiperiphery/periphery, regions, and across civilizational, race/ethnic,
class and gender lines. We will also
draw on comparative typologies of welfare and warfare-welfare states,
stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender and nationality, and examine what
relationship if any, they have to political dynamics related to global conflict
and cooperation (see Epsing-Anderson, 1990; see Minns, 2001; see Williams,
1995; Blackburn, 2002).
The
main theoretical approach that motivates this research proposal is the
world-systems perspective, an institutional materialist and historically
informed structural approach. The
world-systems perspective supplies an alternative approach to the globalization
and global capitalism schools on the origin and character of the global wealth
and power elite (Wallerstein 1979; 1991; Arrighi 1994; Chase-Dunn and Hall
1997; Chase-Dunn 1998). In this view,
the modern world has been integrated by a set of international and
transnational institutions and relations for centuries, not mere decades. National development and national class
formation have occurred within a larger arena of global geopolitical and
geoeconomic competition, in which transnational elite alliances have been
crucial. Moreover, inequalities of
race/ethnicity, class, gender, nationality and related forms of citizenship
have been central to global dynamics, as world-system analysts and a host of
scholars from a variety of differing theoretical perspectives have long argued.[8] There has been something akin to a global
capitalist class and class structure, albeit one rooted in national locales and
often exclusivist identities of race/ethnicity, gender, civilizational beliefs
and practices, for centuries in the an sich (objective) sense. This global capitalist class is undoubtedly
more integrated now than it has ever been during previous phases of
globalization, but the question remains:
how much more is the global wealth and power elite integrated today than
in times past? Moreover, is the
transnational capital class integrated enough and are its social foundation
broad enough (including along the crucial regional, civilizational axes, as
well as divides of race/ethnicity, class, gender and nationality) to prevent
growing global instability and conflict? This project addresses these questions
by studying the degree and trajectory of global elite integration.
Both
a comparative historical and formal quantitative approach to the problem of
global elite formation and its changing social foundations over the centuries
will be used. Our close study of the
top elites in the core will allow us to use the methods of quantitative social
network analysis for those elites that we study and their ties elsewhere. We will also read the socioeconomic and
political histories of these countries so as to place our findings on ties in a
relevant comparative historical framework.
We
will analyze all three networks—elite, cross-national and
international—separately and compare the results, examining how closely the
structure of elite links reproduces or deviates from the structure of
cross-national links. And we will also
compare the network of international organizations and their ties with the
cross-national and elite networks to locate convergences and divergences.
This
project will also determine whether a principal claim among many theorists of
globalization—i.e., that a bona fide global wealth and power elite
did not really take shape until sometime in the last half-century—has merit on
its own terms. The world-systems
perspective does not deny that the recent wave of transnational integration (and
global elite and class formation) has likely attained a greater level than
earlier waves. But the question of the
slope of the upward trend is an important one, as is the issue of whether or
not the level of integration attained will be great enough to prevent the
escalating chaos that has been a recurrent feature of global backlashes
(Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000).[9]
Here,
we need to add a complicating factor—the distinction between symmetrical
(equal) and asymmetrical (unequal) ties.
The hypothesis about the pacifying effects of elite ties is really
about symmetrical ties of interdependence. Power-dependence relations may not
have the same kinds of pacific effects, and indeed sometimes they may
exacerbate conflict. So we need to
distinguish in our study of transnational ties between those that are
horizontal and those that are hierarchical.
We
hypothesize that symmetrical forms of international economic integration based
on broad social foundations and relative equality and interdependence within
and across nations lowers the probability of conflict. It is analytically
and empirically possible to distinguish transnational linkages of elite
individuals and international economic ties among states. International economic integration refers to
the density of international trade and investment relative to the overall size
of the world economy. This is the world-system level variable that has been the
main focus of the NSF-sponsored project that we are now just completing (See
Prior NSF-Sponsored Research above). A more integrated and interdependent
international system based on broad social foundations, creates a peace
interest when the integration is symmetrical and crosscuts potential axes of
conflict. We will be able to determine
the degree of consonance between the social foundations of elites, the
structure of elite transnational ties and the structure of international ties,
and if the latter two are somewhat different we may be able to see how they
separately are related to the patterns of international and intranational
conflict.
International
political integration refers to the density of international (regional and
global) political and organizational ties among national societies. When such
ties crosscut international axes of political and economic conflict they reduce
the probability of conflict. The destructiveness of military technology creates
incentives for peace between powers in the core, other things being equal.
The
factors that are hypothesized to increase the probability of conflict work
through the intervening variable of economic instability and increasing
inequality, which we posit are related to the changing social foundations of
world hegemonies and related forms of unequal forms of citizenship and elite
competition (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000; Davis 2001; Klare 2001).
Our
research plan is to examine the cross-temporal relationships among world-system
indicators at each of our targeted time points, and to study the relationships
between the patterns of global elite integration, their social foundations, and
the conflicts that emerged during periods of globalization backlash. Thus we
need to measure both world-level and national level indicators. Though our main research effort will focus
on delineation of top actors, the measurement of transnational and
international ties and their relationship to elite social foundations,
including unequal forms of citizenship, we will operationalize other factors
hypothesized to cause conflict or cooperation, as testing our hypothesis
requires that we control for changes in these variables.
The
very different social base of U.S. hegemony and related forms of integration
leads us to expect continued sustained conflict between semiperipheral,
peripheral and core states and related supranational institutions such as the
IMF implementing austerity programs, with the U.S. playing a leading role,
including through military support for local elites. The crucial elite linkages to scrutinize are between
transnational and local capital and related networks of elites between the
core, semiperiphery and periphery (Evans 1979; 1995). Given the combination of growing inequality and the related
path-dependent centrality of post World War II U.S. military expenditures in
the changing domestic and global foundations of its hegemony, high levels of
global instability and conflict will likely continue. Asymmetrical integration is likely to result in continued high
level of rebellion and social conflict in dependent states in the periphery and
semiperiphery, due to the negative effects of politico-economic and military
dependency in terms of equality/inequality, democracy, state capacity and
highly unequal class structures, though increased inequality in the core is
likely to generate increased conflict as well (Boswell and Dixon, 1990; see
also Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Arrighi 1990a).
Our
model also makes sense of the observed decline in overseas intervention by the
rest of the core powers over time and continued high levels for the U.S. We hypothesize there will be growing
non-military conflict in the core over unilateralism in military, financial and
trade matters, as U.S. leadership is transformed into a more exploitative form
of domination (see Minns 2001; Silver and Arrighi 2003; Blackburn 2002). In
terms of elite ties, we expect to see extensive business ties between core
multinationals, and those in the periphery and semiperiphery, along with close
military and related elite ties, with periodic core interventions to stop
nationalist, leftist or extremist political movements seeking greater control
over resources (Klare, 2001; Nitzan and Bichler, 1995; Bichler and Nitzan,
1996; Borden 1984). Generally speaking,
in areas that have high levels of foreign direct investment and trade, crucial
resources, and/or those areas integral to the U.S. program of rebuilding
regional cores and ensuring an Open Door for their peripheral and
semiperipheral areas) should see high levels of internal conflict and
core-semiperipheral conflict (Borden, 1984; see also Bornschier and Chase-Dunn,
1985).
Conceptualization and Measurement of Global Elite
Integration
For
reasons of feasibility we will propose three inter-related research designs.
The first focuses on a subset of elites despite our wish to study the whole
world. Realistically, we cannot complete an in-depth study of the elites of
every country of the world in a two-year project. So we have selected key
countries, though our unit of analysis remains the whole world-system. The
second research design is cross-national and includes all the countries and
colonial regions where there are comparable data on welfare or warfare-welfare
states, as well as other important aspects of socioeconomic and political
structure, and links (see Epsing-Anderson, 1990; see Minns, 2001). Because of the long tradition of
cross-national research and efforts to create comparable indicators, the study
of the attributes of and links between national societies will not be as
difficult as is the study of individual elite persons. Our third research design analyzes the largest
regional and global international organizations, including firms, military,
political, governmental and civil organizations.
There
are many difficult conceptual and theoretical problems that are raised by the
analysis of the global class structure: the definition of transnational
relationships, the meanings of class when the analysis is focused on the
world-system as a whole rather than on national societies, the relationships
between class structure and consciousness as they intersect and interweave with
ethnicity, religion, civilizational cultures and the core/periphery hierarchy;
the question of class formation, and the issue of the boundaries between
different classes. For now this proposal develops a frankly empiricist and
theoretically eclectic approach that will allow research on global elite
integration to proceed. But we intend to confront and address these conceptual
issues as we digest the results of our research.
As
with other efforts to measure globalization (e.g. Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer
2000), the estimation of a global characteristic needs to take into account the
changing size of the whole system. There are more transnational interactions
now than in the nineteenth century. There are also more within-nation
interactions because the world population and the world economy have become
larger. It is the relationships between
types of interaction and the size of the whole system that must be studied.
The
boundaries between classes are usually fuzzy and so an effort to study the
whole global capitalist class would quickly encounter the sticky problem of
where to draw the line between the capitalist class and other classes. We will avoid this conundrum by focusing on
only a stratified sample of the very top segment of the global elite and the
most powerful organizations in the system.
Delineating Top Actors
The project will study individuals, families and organizations
(including firms, states and international organizations) in the core societies
of the world-system. Ideally we would like to study the whole world-system
because that is the theoretical framework of our analysis. But for reasons of
feasibility will need to restrict our study of elite ties to selected
countries. We will sample both individuals and firms in the core, while looking
at a larger share in the two hegemonic powers during the relevant periods. This
is necessary, because we want to capture the most powerful and wealthy persons
and institutions in the hegemonic core states (U.K. and U.S.), whose trajectory
conditions much of the evolution of the global system, while capturing other
relevant actors and institutions in the rest of the core. We will study both the wealthiest and most
powerful individuals as determined by the modified reputational method (see
below). This is because it is often the case that individuals such as attorneys
play crucial roles despite that they may not occupy formal positions in firms
or states. Studying international organizations is particular critical for
looking at the evolution of forms of global integration in the world-system,
their relationship with elites at the national and regional level and their
impact on broad patterns of conflict and cooperation.
Hence, we will study the transnational
linkages of the top 20 a) wealthiest individuals or families, b) most powerful
private individuals, c) public organizations, and d) private organizations and
firms for the hegemons (Britain from 1840 to 1945, the U.S. from 1880 to the
present). For the rest of selected core we will examine—France, Germany (later
the European Union), Italy and Japan—we will study the top ten of these same
groups in each country. Then we will
study how transnationally linked these actors were with one another and
with elites in all other countries in ten targeted years: 1840, 1860, 1880,
1913, 1929, 1950, 1970, 1980, 1995, and 2003 and the top ten international
organizations during these periods.
We
would like to also closely study elites in the noncore because challengers to
the power of core states frequently come from the semiperiphery and alliances
with semiperipheral elites are important components of cooperation and
competition within the core. For reasons of feasibility limitations we will not
be able to target the most powerful individuals and organizations within
non-core societies. But we will study the links between core elites with
individuals and organizations in the non-core and those features of national
social structure plausibility related to conflict. We will thus include all the
transnational ties of the elite individuals and organizations that we target
within the core countries we are studying regardless of where in the
world-system these ties lead. In that way we will include ties to the
semiperiphery and periphery without examining directly the most powerful and
wealthy individuals in each non-core country.
We will be able to ascertain the most important alliances and enmities
that structure emerging global conflicts by focusing on the core societies. We will begin our investigation in 1840 because
we need a base line from which to appreciate the rise of transnational linkages
during the nineteenth century. It would be desirable to start earlier, but
again the limits of feasibility impinge.
Determining
the identities of the wealthiest persons is not a simple process. Forbes
magazine lists the world’s billionaires yearly since 1985. The methodology employed by Forbes
for valuing the assets of people is as follows: for billionaires with publicly traded fortunes, net worth is
calculated using share prices and exchange rates; for privately held fortunes
they estimate what companies would be worth if they were public. They also
include, when possible, the value of art collections and real estate. Fortunes are measured in U.S. dollars. For earlier periods, we will gather data
from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Once a plausibly complete list of the wealthiest individuals has
been assembled, the task of studying transnational and international
connections can begin.
We
will employ a variant of Floyd Hunter’s (1980) reputational technique to help
us delineate both the most powerful and the wealthiest individuals. We will
utilize specialized Internet list-serves to identify prominent historians for
particular periods and regions, and these we will ask to designate and rank the
ten most powerful individuals and the ten wealthiest individuals in the state
we are studying. When there are disagreements we will revisit our informants
and reread the relevant specialized historical literature to resolve the
inconsistencies.
We
will examine the most powerful individuals. This will include private
individuals deemed by historical specialists to have wielded great power and
also those who hold top authoritative positions in each of three kinds of
organizations:
§
Firms (public and private, industrial and
financial) and private organizations (think-tanks, foundations);
§
National states; and
§
International organizations (all kinds,
regional and global).
Because
power is more difficult to measure than wealth our decisions about which
institutions (and individuals) to include will necessarily be less reliable
than designating top-wealth actors (above). The project will study four groups
in the core and semiperiphery (possibly with overlaps), respectively
§
The 20
(hegemon) and 10 (other core) wealthiest;
§
The 20 and 10
most powerful private individuals as judged by historical specialists;
§
The 20 and 10
in top positions in the world’s largest firms and private organizations;
§
The 20 and 10
in top positions in the most powerful states;
§
The 20 and 10
in top positions in the most powerful public organizations.
Determining
which organizations to include will be a matter of combining different
indicators of financial, political, military and reputational power. Indicators
for firms will include number of employees, yearly gross revenues and other
indicators of financial size. To determine the top firms in the global economy
in the most recent decades, we will employ Fortune
magazine’s annually published data on the size (determined by revenues),
industry, and headquarter country of the 500 largest global corporations. Recently, researchers have employed these
lists as sources for studying changes in the distribution of economic sectors
across countries (Bergesen and Sonnett 2001). These data were first made
available from Fortune magazine in
the mid 1950’s. For periods prior to
this we will utilize other sources of information on large corporations such as
the Moody’s directories and Dun and Bradstreet.
For
states we will include all sovereign states and colonial regions for which we
can find relevant information, coding the firms and states according to their
place in the hierarchy of the world-system (Kentor, 2000a, b). The long
tradition of cross-national comparison means that we need not be so concerned
about feasibility when we turn to the study of national societies and their
states. We will utilize available datasets that indicate demographic, political
and economic importance such as total population, level of urbanization, total
government revenues and budgeted expenditures, sovereign territorial size, size
of armed forces, total military expenditures, total GDP and GDP per capita
(Banks 1997; Maddison 1995; 2001). Due to the comparability of its indicators
Mitchell’s International Historical
Statistics 1750-1988 will be a valuable source for data from 1840 to 1988.
For international organizations indicators of importance will include number of
employees, size of armed forces, total military expenditures, yearly gross
revenues, total budgeted expenditures, other indicators of financial size and
estimations of their broad impact in the global system (Murphy 1994).
We
will geocode all the actors that we study so that we can use methods of
spatiotemporal analysis that explicitly take account of spatial distances among
actors. We will also produce Geographical Information System (GIS) global maps
based on our linkage and conflict data, and will utilize interoperable TimeMap®
software (Johnson, 2000)[10]
to produce animated maps that show changes over time. These will be published
on a project web site and made available to the entire world, and will be
incorporated into other web-accessible digital libraries such as the Alexandria
Digital Library and the Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative.
Delineating Transnational and
International Ties
Having delimited our targeted elite and organizational actors as
indicated above, the project will study the transnational
and within-nation linkages among these actors and their other international
links. Transnational linkages of
individuals include family ties such as international marriages, educational
ties such as studying abroad by individuals or their immediate families,
business ties such as investments abroad, political ties such as memberships in
international organizations.
Intermarriage between groups is an important form of intergroup
integration in nearly all world-systems (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 135). In kin-based systems kin groups create
political and economic alliances primarily by means of intermarriage. In modern
complex systems family structures complement other institutional arrangements,
but they still remain an important aspect of the informal linkages that create
trust among both elites and masses (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988). And we may find interesting differences in
the forms of linkages that are related to civilizational, linguistic and racial
differences among elites. The institutions of informal association have long
been examined as an important aspect of national class formation (e.g. Domhoff
1998; Baltzell 1979, 1987), but this kind of analysis is also important to the
examination of transnational class linkages. For example we hypothesize that
trans-civilizational and trans-racial alliances are primarily bureaucratic
rather than kin-based.
For
firms, transnational connections will be ascertained by studying the number and
location of foreign and domestic subsidiaries, the nationality of members of
control boards, international joint ventures or strategic alliances, and
international mergers. Dun and
Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom and
Moody’s annual corporate directories will provide the necessary information to
determine these transnational connections. Carroll and Fennema (2002) study
interlocking directorates of global firms and Carroll and Carson (2002) study
their connections with global policy groups. We will study interlocking
directorates of the world’s largest firms using the techniques of quantitative
network analysis. For states and international
organizations, transnational linkages will be ascertained by studying the value
and distribution of investments abroad, the amount of imports and exports, as
well as centrality and density in international transportation and
communications networks. Information on international trade links will be
provided by the European Historical
Statistics 1750-1970, by the Foreign
Commerce Yearbook for 1930-1950, and by the World Bank’s World Tables for 1970-1990. The IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Financial Statistics are
two additional sources that will be used for studying international financial
links during the post WWII era. For the
targeted years between Word Wars I-II, the League of Nations’ annual
statistical publications will be useful. For international organizations the
relative strength of transnational connections will be indicated by the scope
and distribution of operations (regional or global) and by the extent of
membership.
As
mentioned above, we need to make the distinction between symmetrical and
asymmetrical transnational ties and related forms of integration, as these are
likely to have profound impacts on patterns of elite conflict and cooperation
(Simmel 1950, 1955; Coser 1956; Levy, 1989).
Our study of the behavior, cultural milieu, policy currents, social
foundations and trajectories of elites in comparative historical perspective
will complement the structural and quantitative aspects of our research.
We
will also study the structure of interstate and colonial linkages among the
core and non-core regions using data on exchanges of diplomats, material on
signatories and participants in international treaties and related regimes,
imports and exports, international investments, and memberships in
international regional and global organizations. Here we also need to be cognizant of the possibility that some
ties may be hierarchical rather than interdependent. The Treaty of Versailles
is a classic example of an asymmetrical relationship among core states (see
Newton 1997). Any tie that follows a
conflict in which one side defeated another should be scrutinized for elements
of hierarchy.
Research Questions
and Analyses
The first kind of analysis will involve the study of changes over time
in the social foundations and strength
of transnational ties between and among members and blocs of the global wealth
and power elite. A central question to
address is whether these ties of integration between and among the global elite
exhibit waves of connectivity similar to the waves of economic globalization
found in our parallel studies (which track pulsations of transnational trade
and investment over time). This will require the construction of comparable
estimates of the degree of elite integration for each of our targeted time points
and the analysis of change over time for the whole system. Answers to
these questions will have implications for the probabilities of future
political tensions and military conflict.
The
second analysis will examine changes in the strength of different kinds of
ties. For example, is intermarriage a
more important mechanism of global elite integration in the nineteenth century
than in the twentieth? What are the
temporal trajectories of different means of global class formation such as
intermarriage, educational links, transnational investment partnerships,
interlocking directorates, and so on?
Our data sets will enable us to track the temporal trends of different
kinds of links. And we will be able to see if linguistic, racial and
civilizational differences between elite individuals are related to the types
of links and the structural holes in which elite links do not occur.
A
third kind of data analysis will compare the different groups of actors to see
if there are differences in their trajectories of transnationalization. For example, do wealthy individuals and
families, the leaders of big private firms, and the heads of powerful political
organizations display synchronous trajectories of global integration, or are
there leads, lags or counter cycles?
For
each individual (in our four classifications), firm, or national state and
international organization, we will devise scores registering the strength of
their global connectivity. This will
make it possible to study the causes of variation in the strength of
transnational ties using characteristics of individuals and the larger entities
with which they are linked. This will
allow us to explore questions such as, do wealthier individuals have more or fewer
transnational ties, and does this relationship change over time? How are transnational ties related to
varying firm size and business sectors?
How is core/semiperipheral status (wealth and military power of states)
related to transnational integration?
Not
only will the project examine the intensity
of transnational ties between the units of analysis included in our study, but
also it will crucially examine changing network
patterns (i.e., spatial contours)
of individuals, economic and political organizations. Waves of integration are not likely to be homogenous across
regions. Analysis of the directionality
of transnational ties will enable us to probe questions such as, along which
geographical axes do the stronger ties prevail? Where do the families, firms, and states of core regions have
more exclusive ties and where are there significant overlaps in the ties of
core countries with semiperipheral regions?
What about the configuration of connections between the leading families
and firms of the core and the territorial jurisdictions of the core countries
themselves? Critically, our project will ascertain the changing terrain of bloc
formation among the world’s wealthiest and most powerful individuals, firms and
political units.
The
project will also study the changes in the network patterns linking our several
targeted groups of actors to one another. What are the relationships among the
largest firms and states and how does this change over time? Is there a shift of centralized power and
wealth away from Europe to the Americas and to Asia over the last 160
years? Does this shift work the same
way for the wealthy and powerful individuals, firms and states, or are there
important exceptions among these? Do
these changes indicate that the basic nature of the world-system is undergoing fundamental
change or are these changes just another phase of the modern world-system? What has been and will be the impact of
global elite formation and integration on regions, nations and world-system
zones? We will employ our geocoded data
to produce GIS global maps for each targeted time point, and link these using
interoperable TimeMap® standards (Johnson 2000) for web presentation
of animated maps, showing changing transnational and international links and
conflicts over time.
The
final part of the analysis will examine the hypothesis that changing social
foundations of elites and related forms of global elite integration affect
conflict and cooperation. We will do this by examining the relationship between
the densities and patterning of elite ties with the outbreaks of interstate
conflict and by examining the relationships over time between changes in the
overall intensity of elite integration and the level of global conflict. Do the
patterns of transnational and international linkages formed during the great
wave of nineteenth century globalization predict the topography of interstate
and intrastate conflict that emerged during the globalization backlash? To
determine this we will utilize our network datasets to construct rectangular
data matrices using national societies as the unit of analysis. Then we will
employ structural equations modeling to test the hypothesis that transnational
and international ties are related to patterns of conflict.
Our
geocoded network patterns of transnational and international ties will enable
us to control for distance in examining the relationships between elite ties
and emergent conflict. Arguably individuals and countries close to one another
are both more likely to develop ties and to come into conflict because of
border disputes. By taking into account the actual geographical locations of
individuals, organizational headquarters and countries we can see how
propinquity alters (or does not alter) the relationships between networks and
conflict and inferences about causal relationships among these.
Our
hypothesis that the social foundations, contours and strengths of elite ties
was an important contributor to conflict in the previous globalization backlash
will be evaluated by examining the degrees of fit and taking into account other
alleged causes of conflict. If the elite ties hypothesis is borne out we will
use the contours of contemporary national and transnational elite connections
to suggest where conflicts are most likely to emerge during the backlash against
globalization.
As
noted above, we hypothesize that there has been a major transformation in the
structure of militarism and patriarchal relations in the transition from
British to U.S. hegemony. In the nineteenth century all the contending core
elites and their social bases were organized as military powers. In the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries this role has been taken up
increasingly exclusively by the U.S.
Many other core powers have become organized around economic competition
in the absence of strong military structures and concomitant gender ideologies,
though this could change. The U.S.,
with its very different trajectory, is likely to continue to employ its
comparative military advantage in the global system. A violent reaction to this within contending core powers will be
delayed by the fact that some core powers have to varying degrees
institutionalized relatively anti-military political cultures (notably Germany
and Japan). Yet over time, upwardly mobile semiperipheral powers such as China
or core rivals threatened by U.S. unilateralism may emerge as politico-military
and socioeconomic rivals (Calleo, 2003b).
Such a possibility will be examined based on our collected data and
assessment of the likely future alternatives for the trajectory of the global
system. The datasets we construct for
this project will be widely disseminated for use by other scholars through the
Institute for Research on World-Systems (IROWS) project website and the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
Network Link Datasets
The
project will construct datasets for each targeted year on five groups of
individuals in the core and semiperiphery, respectively.
1)
The 20 (hegemons) and 10 (other core)
wealthiest individuals and/or families
2)
The 20 and 10 most powerful private
individuals as determined by historical specialists;
3)
The CEO’s of the top 20 and 10 private
firms or organizations
4)
The heads of states in the core
5)
The directors of 10 most powerful
international organizations
We will also construct datasets
for each targeted decade on
1)
The top 20 and 10 most powerful firms
2)
All the states in the core
3)
The 10 most powerful international
organizations
We will analyze these data to
study the nested and overlapping networks of the most wealthy and powerful
individuals, organizations, and territorial jurisdictions in the world-system.
We will use SPSS version 10 (statistical analysis software) and UCINET (network
analysis software) to (1) construct and organize our datasets, and (2) perform
the analyses and answer the questions described below.
Operationalizing Conflict
The project will compare the structure of ties among individuals,
organizations, states and colonies in the nineteenth century with the conflicts
that emerged in the globalization backlash. Our main source of data on conflict
will be the “correlates of war” project’s datasets on intra- and interstate
conflicts (Singer n.d.). As noted,
democratic movements can have mixed effects on conflict. Elites often undertake
military adventures abroad to deflect domestic conflict at home. We will thus
also examine the relationship between global elite integration and patterns of
labor unrest as operationalized by Silver (1995, 2003). We will also code core and non-core countries,
demarcating differences between weakly and thickly institutionalized
democracies and study their relationship to global conflict. We will study the
relationship between transnational and international ties and peaceful or
conflictive relations.
Operationalizing Intranational and International
Inequalities and Democracy
Distributions of household income inequality are available for many
countries in the last few decades, enough to make possible crossnational
comparative research on trends of intranational inequalities. For earlier years
we intend to utilize the approach to estimating intranational inequality
developed by economic historians O’Rourke and Williamson (2000:175), which
makes a ratio of estimates of the wages of unskilled urban workers with the GDP
per worker hour. This will allow us to estimate changes in within-country
inequality for many countries since at least 1880. International inequality will be studied by examining the
coefficient of variation of national GDP per capita, using the most recent
estimates of GDP and population produced by Angus Maddison (1995; 2001).
In
order to study the democratization of states we will utilize the coding of Tatu
Vanhanen (1997: Appendix 5), who estimates the level of democratization since
1850 for many states, recoding them according to whether they are thoroughly or
weakly embedded.
Operationalization of Global Economic Instability
To examine the effects of changing elite social foundations on global
economic instability, and the degree to which this is an intervening variable
in transmitting the effects of other variables to conflict we will
operationalize economic growth rates using the GDP and population estimates of
Maddison (1995; 2001). We will also gather
data on exchange and interest rates fluctuations and financial crises, as well
as the proportion of world economic activity devoted to trade and production
versus finance.
Research Project
Time Line: Start April 1,
2004 Finish March 31, 2006
Year 1: Acquire data and construct datasets that identify links for each
targeted decade. Build bibliographies on elites for each world region studied.
Set
up a Global Elite Integration Research Internet Collaboratory to facilitate
communication, bibliography and data sharing among IROWS team members and with
researchers at other universities.
Year 2: Collect linkage
international linkage data for each targeted decade.
Analyze
the networks of international and transnational organizations, and territorial
jurisdictions in the world-system. Formulate tentative answers to research
questions.
Begin
production of interoperable project web site based on TimeMap®
standards for presenting global animated maps show changes in transnational and
international linkages over time.
Researchers
present conference papers, incorporating feedback and begin final analysis.
Finish
analysis, present papers, write journal articles and start book on global elite
integration.
Make
the datasets available for distribution on the IROWS website
(www.irows.ucr.edu) and contributed to the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
Announce the availability of the final version of the project web site,
Global Integration and Conflict since 1840.
The resulting databases,
interoperable project web site and publications will provide learning
opportunities for students and be disseminated to academics, NGO's and makers
of public policy interested in issues of global conflict and cooperation, with
a view towards improving understanding and initiatives to promote greater
equality, democracy and global cooperation.
References Cited
Agnew, John. 2001. “The New Global Economy: Time-Space Compression,
Geopolitics, and Global Uneven Development.” Journal of World-Systems
Research 7, 2 (Fall).
Aldrich, Richard J. 1995 "European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection."
Pp. 159-179 in Building Postwar
Europe: National Decision-Makers and
European Institutions, 1948-63, edited by Anne Deighton. London, Great Britain: St. Martins Press.
_____. 1997. "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe,
1948-60." Diplomacy and Statecraft
Vol. 18, No. 1: 184-227.
_____. 2001. The Hidden Hand:
Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John
Murray.
American Journal of International Law 2002. “Beyond the Charter
Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium?”
Tom J. Farer, Volume 96, No. 2: 359-64.
Anderson, Perry. January 4, 1996a.
"Under the Sign of the Interim," Times Literary Supplement, Volume 18, #1: 13-17.
_____. January 25, 1996b.
"The Europe to Come." Times
Literary Supplement, Volume 18, #2: 3-8.
Andreski, Stanislav. 1968. Military
Organization and Society. Berkeley:
University of California.
Arkin, William. July 14, 2002. “The Best Defense: A Classified Planning Document Describes
Bold New Weapons and Preemptive Strategic Offensives.” Los Angeles Times:
M1, 6.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1990a. "Marxist Century, American Century: The Making and Remaking of the World Labour
Movement," New Left Review,
Number 179, January/February: 29-64.
_____. 1990b. "The
Developmentalist Illusion: A
Reconceptualization of the Semiperiphery." Pp. 11-42 in Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy.
edited by William G. Martin. New York:
Greenwood Press.
_____. 1991. "World Income
Inequalities and the Future of Socialism." New Left Review, # 189: 39-68.
_____. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times.
New York: Verso.
_____.
Beverly J. Silver, et al. 1999. Chaos
and Governance in the Modern World System. Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press.
_____.
Po-Keung Hui, Krishnendu Ray, Thomas Ehrlich Reifer. 1999. “High Finance and
Geopolitics,” in Giovanni Arrighi & Beverly J. Silver, et al, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World
System, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 37-96.
Balibar, Etienne & Immanuel Wallerstein. 1991. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous
Identities, New York: Verso.
Baltzell, E. Digby. 1953. “”Who’s Who in America” and “The Social
Register” Elite and Upper Class Indexes in Metropolitan America,” Pp. 266-75 in
Class, Status, and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative
Perspective, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset. New York:
Free Press.
_____. 1979. Philadelphia
Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper
Class. University of Pennsylvania Press.
_____. 1987. The Protestant
Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in
America. New Haven: Yale University Press.
_____. 1995. Sporting Gentlemen.
New York: Free Press.
_____. 1996. Puritan Boston and
Quaker Philadelphia: Two Protestant
Ethics and the Spirit of Class Authority and Leadership. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publications.
Banks,
Arthur S. 1997. Cross-national Time
Series Data Archive. Binghamton, NY: Center for Comparative Political
Research, Binghamton University. (ICPSR
7412)
Bairoch, Paul 1996.
"Globalization Myths and Realities: One Century of External Trade
and Foreign Investment", in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache (eds.), States Against Markets: The Limits of
Globalization, London and New York: Routledge.
Barkey, Karen. Forthcoming. Declining Empires, Enduring Elites:
Legacies of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.
Barron’s Financial Guides. 1998. Dictionary of Finance &
Investment Terms. John Downes &
Jordan Elliot Goodman, eds. Barron’s.
Bello, Walden. 2001. The Future in the Balance:
Essays on Globalization and Resistance, edited with a preface by
Anuradha Mittal, Food First, co-published with Focus on the Global South.
Bergesen, Albert J. and John Sonnett 2001 “The Global 500: Mapping the
world economy at century’s end,” American Behavioral Scientist
44,10:1602-1615 (June).
Bichler,
Shimshon & Jonathan Nitzan. 1996. “Putting the State Back In its
Place: US Foreign Policy &
Differential Capital Accumulation in Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts’,” Review of International Political Economy,
Volume 3, #4, pp. 608-661.
Blackburn, Robin. 2002. Banking on Death, or, Investing in
Life: The History and Future of
Pensions. London, New York: Verso.
Block, Fred. 1977. The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A
Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the
Present. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Borden,
William S. 1984. The Pacific
Alliance: United States Foreign
Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955. Wisconsin:
University of Wisconsin Press.
Bourdieu,
Pierre. 1996. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power.
Stanford University Press.
Bornschier,
Volker and Christopher Chase-Dunn, eds. 1999. The Future of Global Conflict. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
International Sociological Association.
Boswell, Terry and William Dixon. 1990. "Dependency and
Rebellion: A Cross-National
Analysis." 55:540-559.
_____. Christopher Chase-Dunn 2000. The Spiral of Capitalism and
Socialism: Toward Global Democracy.
Boulder, London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2000.
Boyle, Francis Anthony. 1999. Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International
Relations (1898-1922). Durham: Duke University Press.
Broad, Robin. 1988. Unequal
Alliance: The World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the Philippines. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Brown, Michael, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller. 1996. Debating the
Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Brown, Michael. 1999. Race, Money
& the American Welfare State, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest, Howard Tamashiro. 1996. Understanding Attitudes About War: Modeling Moral Judgements. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The
Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and
its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Buhle, Paul. 1999. Taking Care of
Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany,
Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor, New York: Monthly Review Press.
Burrows, William E. and Robert Windrem. 1994. Critical Mass: The Dangerous
Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Calder, Kent E. 1997. Asia’s
Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and
Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific. London: Nicholas Brealey.
Calleo, David P. and Benjamin M. Rowland. 1973. America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National
Realities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Calleo, David. 1978. The German
Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the
World Order, 1870 to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 1987. Beyond American
Hegemony: The Future of the Western
Alliance. New York: Basic Books, A Twentieth Century Fund Book.
_____. 2003a. Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press.
_____. 2003b. "Power,
Wealth and Wisdom: The United States
and Europe After Iraq." The National Interest: 5-15.
Campbell, Alec Duncan. 1997. The
Invisible Welfare State: Class
Struggles, the American Legion & the Development of Veteran’s Benefits in
the Twentieth Century United States, Dissertation, UCLA, Ann Arbor: MI.
Cannadine, David. 1990. The
Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. Great Britain: Macmillan
Press.
_____. 1994. Aspects of Aristocracy: Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Canterbery, E. Ray. 2000. Wall
Street Capitalism: The Theory of the
Bondholding Class. Singapore: World
Scientific Publications.
Carroll, William K. 2002. “The Network of Global Corporations and Elite Policy Groups: A Structure for Transnational Capitalist Class Formation?” Paper Presented at the XV World Congress of Sociology, July, Brisbane, Australia.
_____. Colin Carson.
"Forging a New Hegemony?
The Role of Transnational Policy Groups in the Network and Discourses of
Global Corporate Governance. Journal of World-Systems Research 7.
_____ and Meindert Fennema. Forthcoming. “Is there a transnational
business community?” International Sociology.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1998. Global
Formation: Structures of the World-Economy. 2nd edition, Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
_____ and
Thomas D. Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise:
Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
_____, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin Brewer. 2000. “Trade globalization
since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system.” American Sociological Review 65: 77-95.
Chau, Amy. 2003. World on
Fire. World on Fire. New York:
Doubleday.
Chernow, Ron. 1990. The House of
Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and
the Rise of Modern Finance. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Cohen, Lizabeth. 2003. A Consumers Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar
America. New York. Alfred P. Knopf.
Cohen, Robin and Shirin M. Rai. 2000. Global Social Movements. London:
The Athlone Press.
Cookson, Jr., Peter W. and Caroline Hodges Persell. 1985. Preparing for Power: America’s Elite Boarding Schools. New
York: Basic Books.
Coser, Lewis. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. Free Press.
Cumings, Bruce. 1990. The Origins
of the Korean War, Volume II: The
Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Davis, Mike. 1986. Prisoners of
the American Dream: Politics and
Economy in the History of the US Working Class, New York: Verso.
_____. 2001. Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World. London:
Verso.
_____. 2002. Dead Cities. New Press.
Dehio, Ludwig. 1962. The
Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of
the European Power Struggle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs,
and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.
New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Dodwell Management Consultants. 1996. Industrial Groupings in Japan: The Anatomy of the “Kieretsu”. 12th edition,
Dodwell.
Domhoff, G. William. 1967. Who
Rules America? New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
_____. 1970. Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America, An
Investigation of the Men and Women Who Govern Our Country. New York:
Vintage Books.
_____. 1975. “Social Clubs, Policy-Planning Groups, and
Corporations: A Network Study of
Ruling-Class Cohesiveness.” Insurgent
Sociologist: Special Issue on New
Directions in Power Structure Research V., Number III: 173-84.
Domhoff, G. William. 1990. The
Power Elite and the State: How Policy
is Made in America, New York:
Aldine De Gruyter.
_____. 1998. Who Rules
America? Power and Politics in the Year
2000. Mayfield Publishing.
Downing, Brian. 1992. The Military
Revolution and Political Change:
Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe, Princeton,
NH: Princeton University Press.
Doyle, Rodger 2003 “Trade globalization” Scientific American
(June) http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?colID=19&articleID=00007A0F-1596-1EB7-BDC0809EC588EEDF
Du Bois, W.E.B.. 1969. [1935]. Black Reconstruction in America: An
Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to
Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1960-1880. New York: Atheneum.
Duchene, Francois. 1994. Jean
Monnet: The First Statesman of
Interdependence. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.
Dunaway, Wilma. 2001. "The Double Register of History: Situating the Forgotten Woman and Her
Household in Capitalist Commodity Chains." Journal of World-Systems Research 7:2-31.
Dunaway, Wilma. 2002. "Commodity Chains and Gendered
Exploitation: Rescuing Women from the
Periphery of World-System Thought."
Pp. 127-146 in The Modern/Colonial
Capitalist World-System in the 20th Century edited by Ramon
Grosfoguel and Margarita Rodriguez.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Duus, Peter. 1995. The Abacus and
the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of
Korea, 1895-1910. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Eatwell, John. 1993. "The Global Money Trap: Can Clinton Master the Markets?" The American Prospect, 12: 118-26.
Eatwell, John and Lance Taylor. 2000. Global Finance at Risk. New York: New Press.
Elias, Norbert. 1996. The Germans.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Epsing-Anderson, Gosta.
1990. The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Evans, Peter. 1979. Dependent
Development: The Alliance of
Multinational, State, & Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
_____.
1995. Embedded Autonomy. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency,
and Civil War." 97:75-90.
Fredrickson, George M. 1981. White
Supremacy: A Comparative Study in
American and South African History. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freeland, Richard M. 1985. The
Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security,
1946-1948. New York: New York
University Press.
Gardner, Richard N. 1969. Sterling-Dollar
Diplomacy: The Origins and the
Prospects of Our International Economic Order. New York: McGraw Hill.
Giddens, Anthony. 1987. The
Nation-State & Violence: Volume II
of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Gissinger, Ranveig and Peter Gleditsch.
1999. “Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution, and Political
Unrest,” Journal of World-Systems Research 5, 2: 327-65.
Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 2002. Unequal
Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped
American Citizenship and Labor.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Goldstein, Joushua. 2001. Gender
and War: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge University Press.
Gordon, Linda. 1994a.
"Welfare Reform: A History Lesson,"
Dissent, Summer, pp. 323-328.
Gordon, Linda. 1994b. Pitied But
Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the
History of Welfare. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gowan, Peter. 1999. The Global
Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for
World Dominance. New York: Verso.
_____. 2000a. “Contemporary Intra-Core Relations and World
Systems Theory,” International Seminar held in Kharkiv.
_____. 2000b. “The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO’s Attack on
Yugoslavia.” Pp. 3-45 in Masters of the Universe: NATO’s Balkan Crusade. edited by Tariq Ali. London: Verso.
_____.2002a. “After America?” New Left Review 13: 136-45.
Gowan,
Peter. 2002b. “The New American Century?,” The Spokesman, 76:5-22.
Grosfoguel,
Ramon. 2003. Colonial Subjects: Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hacker,
Jacob S. 2002. The Divided Welfare State:
The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States,
Cambridge University Press.
Haggard,
Stephan. 1995. Developing Nations and the
Politics of Global Integration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Hale, David. 2001. “New Giant on Wall Street,” The International Economy.
Hamashita, Takeshi. 1984. "Foreign Trade Finance in China,
1810-50," Pp. 387-435 in State and
Society in China: Japanese Perspectives
on Ming-Qing Social and Economic History. edited by Linda Grove and
Christian Daniels. Tokyo: University of
Tokyo Press.
_____.
1988. "The Tribute Trade System
and Modern Asia," The Memoirs of the
Toyo Bunko, 46: 7-25.
_____.
1993. "Tribute and Emigration:
Japan and the Chinese Administration of Foreign Affairs", Senri Ethnological Studies: 69-86.
_____. 1997. “The
Intra-regional System in East Asia in Modern Times,” in Network Power: Japan and Asia. edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi
Shiraishi. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Harvard
University Press.
Held,
David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics
and Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Helleiner,
Eric. 1994. States and the Reemergence of
Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to
the 1990s. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1968. Industry
and Empire, New York: Penguin
Books.
_____. 1987. The Age of Empire,
1875-1914. New York: Vintage.
Hunter, Floyd. 1980. Community
Power Succession: Atlanta's policy-makers revisited. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Hutchinson, John F. 1996. Champions
of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red
Cross. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Huttenback, Robert A. 1976. Racism & Empire: White Settlers & Colored Immigrants in
the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ingham, Geoffrey. 1994. “States and Markets in the Production of World
Money: Sterling and the Dollar.” Pp.
29-48 in Stuart Corbridge, Ron Martin and Nigel Thrift, Money, Power and Space. New York:
Basil Blackwell.
Iton, Richard. 2000. Solidarity Blues: Race, Culture, and the American Left, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
Jackson, Robert H.. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jaher, Frederic Cople. 1982. The
Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in
Boston. New York, Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, Urbana, Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
James, Harold. 2001. The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression.
Harvard University Press.
Jenkins, J. Craig and Barbara G. Brents. 1989. "Social Protest,
Hegemonic Competition, and Social Reform:
A Political Struggle Interpretation of the Origins of the American
Welfare State." American Sociological Review 54: 891-909.
Johnson, Ian. 2000. "A step-by-step guide to setting up a TimeMap®
dataset," Archaeological Computing Laboratory, University of Sydney.
http://www.archaeology.usyd.edu.au/timemap/index2.html
Jones, Christopher D. 1981. Soviet
Influence in Eastern Europe: Political
Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. New York: Praeger.
_____. 1992. “Protection From
One’s Friends: The Disintegration of
the Warsaw Pact.” Pp. 100-127 in Soviet
Strategy and New Military Thinking. New York: Cambridge University Press,
edited by Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996a. Cultural
Norms and National Security: Police and
Military in Postwar Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
_____. ed. 1996b. The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
_____. 1996c. "Introduction:
Alternative Perspectives on National Security." Pp. 1-32 in The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter Katzenstein. New York: Columbia
University Press.
_____. ed. 1997a. Tamed
Power: Germany in Europe. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
_____. 1997b. "Conclusion:
Regions in World Politics: Japan
and Asia -- Germany in Europe." Pp. 341-81 in Network Power: Japan and Asia.
edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Cornell University Press.
Kehr, Eckart. 1973. Battleship
Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894-1901: A Cross Section of the Political, Social, and Ideological
Preconditions of German Imperialism. Pauline R. and Eugene N. Anderson,
eds, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1977. Economic Interest,
Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays
on German History. ed., Gordon A. Craig, Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Kennedy, Paul. 1980. The Rise of
the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914. London: Ashfield Press.
_____. 1987. The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books.
Kentor, Jeffrey. 2000a. “Shifting Patterns of Organizational Control in
the World-Economy 1800 1990.” Funded Grant Proposal to World Society
Foundation: Zurich, Switzerland.
_____. 2000b. Capital and
Coercion: The Economic and Military Processes That Have Shaped the World
Economy 1800-1990. New York: Garland Publishing.
Kerbo, Harold R. and John A. McKinstry. 1995. Who Rules Japan: The Inner Circles of Economic and Political Power.
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
Klare, Michael. 2001. Resource
Wars: The New Landscape of Global
Conflict. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Klinker, Philip. A. With Rogers
M. Smith. 1999. The Unsteady
March: The Rise and Decline of Racial
Equality in America. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kowalewski, David. 1997. Global
Establishment: The Political Economy of North/Asian Networks. New York,
Macmillan Press.
Kuczynski, Robert R. 1927. American
Loans to Germany. New York: Macmillan Company.
_____. 1932. Banker’s Profits from
German Loans. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Krugman, Paul. 1999. “The Return of Depression Economics,” Foreign
Affairs 78, 1: 56-74.
Lichtenstein, Nelson. 1995. The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American
Labor. New York: Basic Books.
Levy, Jack S. 1989. "The
Diversionary Theory of War: A
Critique." Pp. 259-288 in Handbook of War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky.
_____. 1998. "The Causes of
War and the Conditions of Peace." American Review of Political Science.
1:139-165.
_____. 2002. "The Study of
War and Peace." March 2001 Draft.
Forthcoming in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons,
eds., Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage.
_____. 2003. Theories of War
and Peace. Unpublished Syllabus.
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jacklevy/522SyllabusSp2003.pdf
Lipsitz, George. 1994. Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s,
Urbana: University of Illinois.
Lubeck, Paul M. and Thomas E.
Reifer. Forthcoming. “The Politics of
Global Islam: U.S. Hegemony,
Globalization and Islamist Social Movements.”
Globalization, Hegemony & Power: Antisystemic Movements and the
Global System, edited by Thomas E. Reifer. Colorado: Paradigm
Publishers.
Maddison,
Angus. 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
_____.
2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Magubane,
Bernard Makhosezwe. 1979. The Political
Economy of Race and Class in South Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press.
_____. 1996. The Making of a
Racist State: British Imperialism and
the Union of South Africa, 1875-1910. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
Mamdani,
Mahmood. 1996. Citizen &
Subject: Decentralized Despotism &
the Legacy of Late Colonialism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Mann,
Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social
Power, Volume I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Manza,
Jeff and Clem Brooks. 1999. Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions,
Oxford University Press.
Manza,
Jeff. 2000a. "Race and the Underdevelopment of the American Welfare
State." Theory and Society
29:819-832.
_____.
2000b. "Political Sociological
Models of the New Deal." Annual Review of Sociology. 26: 297-322.
Markusen,
Ann. 1998. “The Post-Cold War Persistence of Defense Specialized Firms.” Pp.
121- 46 in The Defense Industry in the Post-Cold War Era. edited by
Gerald I. Susman and Sean O’Keefe.
Amsterdam: Permagon.
Markusen,
Ann. Forthcoming. “The Arms Trade as
Illiberal Trade.” Defence and Peace Economics.
Markusen,
Ann & Joel Yudken. 1992. Dismantling
the Cold War Economy. New
York: Basic Books.
Marshall,
T.H. 1973. Class, Citizenship and Social
Development, Westport: Greenwood
Press.
Mayer,
Arno J. 1967. Politics & Diplomacy of
Peacemaking: Containment &
Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
_____.
1981. The Perspective of the Old
Regime: Europe to the Great War.
New York: Pantheon.
Mearsheimer,
John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton
and Co.
Mettler,
Suzanne. 1998. Dividing Citizens:
Gender & Federalism in New Deal Public Policy, Ithaca: Cornell University.
Mies,
Maria. 1998. Patriarchy and Accumulation
on a World Scale: Women in the
International Division of Labor. London:
Zed Press.
Middlemas,
Keith. 1995. Orchestrating Europe:
The informal politics of the European Union, 1973-95. London: Fontana Press.
Millman,
Gregory J. 1995. The Vandals’ Crown: How Rebel Currency Traders Overthrew the
World’s Central Banks, New York: Free Press.
Mills, C.
Wright. 1956. The Power Elite, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Minns,
Richard. 2001. The Cold War in
Welfare: Stock Markets Versus Pensions. London:
Verso.
Mink,
Gwendolyn. 1995. The Wages of
Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare
State, 1917 1942. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mitchell,
B.R. 1992. International Historical
Statistics: Europe 1750-1988. 3rd ed. New York: Stockton.
_____. 1993. International
Historical Statistics: The Americas
1750-1988. 2nd ed. NY: Stockton.
_____
1995. International Historical
Statistics: Africa, Asia, and Oceania
1750-1988. 2nd ed. NY:Stockton.
Modelski,
George and William R. Thompson. 1996. Leading
Sectors and World Powers: The
Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics. Columbia, South Carolina:
University of South Carolina Press.
Murdoch,
William M. 1980. The Poverty of Nations:
The Political Economy of Hunger and Population. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Murphy, Craig N. 1994. International Organization and Industrial
Change: Global Governance Since 1850.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Joane. 2003. Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Neumann, Franz. 1966. Behemoth:
The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933 1944. New York:
Harper and Row.
Newton, Douglas. 1997. British
Policy & the Weimar Republic, 1918-1919, Oxford: Clarendon.
Nitzan,
Jonathan and Shimshon Bichler. 1995. "Bringing Capital Accumulation Back
In: The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition-Military Contractors, Oil
Companies and Middle East 'Energy Conflicts'," Review of International Political Economy, Volume II, # III,
pp. 446-515.
Norris, Pippa. 1988. "The
Gender Gap: A Cross-National
Trend?" Pp. 217-234 in The
Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social
Construction of Political Influence, edited by Carol M. Mueller. Sage.
O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams.
2000. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and
Global Social Movements. Cambridge University Press.
Oneal, R. John, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. 1996. “The
Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict,
1950-85.” Journal of Peace Research 33,1L 11-28
Orloff, Ann. S. 1993.
"Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of State Policies
and Gender Relations." American
Sociological Review 58, Nu. 3, June: 303-328.
Orloff, Ann. S. 1996.
"Gender in the Welfare State."
Annual Review of Sociology. 22: 51-78.
O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1999. Globalization and
History: The Evolution of a
Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Paige, Jeffrey M. 1997. Coffee and
Power: Revolution and the Rise of
Democracy in Central America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Partnoy, Frank. 2002. “Enron and the Use of Derivatives,” Testimony
Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies. http://www.stimson.org/pubs.cfm?ID=32
Pearlman, Michael. 1984. To Make
Democracy Safe for America: Patricians
and Preparedness in the Progressive Era, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Pfister, Ulrich and Christian Suter. 1987. "International Financial
Relations as Part of the World System", International Studies Quarterly, 31: 239-272.
Phillips, Kevin. 2002. Wealth and Democracy. New York: Broadway
Books.
Polanyi,
Karl. 2001 [1944]. The Great
Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1976. The Comparative Study of Political Elites.
New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Quadagno, Jill. 1994. The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Quijano, Anibal & Immanuel Wallerstein. 1992.“Americanity as a
Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System,” International Social Science Journal.
Rasler, Karen A. and William Thompson. 1994. The Great Powers and Global Struggle: 1490 1990. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky.
Rathbun, Ben. 1996. The Point
Man.. London: Minerva Press.
Reddaway, Peter and Dimitri Glinski. 2001. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms:
Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, Washington, DC: US Institute of
Peace.
Reifer, Thomas E. 2002. “Globalization and the National Security State
Corporate Complex (NSSCC) in the Long Twentieth Century.” Pp. 3-20 in The Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System
in the 20th Century. edited by Ramon Grosfoguel and Margarita
Rodriguez. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Robinson, William I. 1996. Promoting
Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention and Hegemony. Cambridge
University Press.
_____. 2001. “Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State,” Theory and Society
30:157-200.
Rosecrance, R. 1963. Action and Reaction in World Politics.
Boston: Little Brown.
Rosenau, James N. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Ross,Robert and Kent Trachte. 1990. Global
Capitalism: The New Leviathan. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens & John D. Stephens.
1992. Capitalist Development and
Democracy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Sassen, Saskia. 2001. The Global
City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1945. The
Age of Jackson, Boston: Little,
Brown & Co.
Schmitz, David F. 1988. The United
States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press.
Schmitz, David F. 1999. Thank God They’re on Our Side: The U.S. and Right-Wing Dictatorships,
1921-1965. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Scott, John. 1997. Corporate
Business and Capitalist Classes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sellers, Charles. 1991. The Market
Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846. New York: Oxford University Press.
Semmel, Bernard. 1960. Imperialism
and Social Reform: English Social
Imperial Thought, 1895-1914. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shanin,
Teodor. 1985, 1986. The Roots of
Otherness: Russia’s Turn of Century,
Volumes I and II: Russia as a
‘Developing’ Society’, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Silver,
Beverly. 1995. “World Scale Patterns of Labor-Capital Conflict: Labor Unrest, Long Waves and Cycles of
Hegemony.” Review 18, 1: 155-192.
_____.
2003. Forces of Labor. Cambridge
University Press.
_____. and Giovanni Arrighi. 2003.
"Polanyi's "Double Movement": The Belle Epoques of British and U.S. Hegemony
Compared." Theory and Society
31, No. 2:325-355.
Simmel,
George. 1950. The Sociology of George Simmel.
edited and translated by Kurt Wolf, New York: Free Press.
_____.
1955. Conflict and the Web of Group
Affiliations. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
Singer, J. David. n.d. “Correlates of War Project” http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/
Sklair, Leslie. 2001. The
Transnational Capitalist Class. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and
Social Revolutions: A Comparative
Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 1992. Protecting
Soldiers and Mothers : The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Smith, Joan Jane Collins, Terence K. Hopkins, and Akbar Muhammed. 1988. Racism,
Sexism, and the World-System. Colorado:
Greenwood.
Smith, Roy C. 1993. Comeback: The Restoration of American Banking Power in
the New World Economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
Snyder, Jack 1991. Myths of
Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
_____. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W.W.
Norton and Co.
_____.2003."Imperial Temptations." The National Interest.
71:29-40.
Soffer, Reba N. 1994. Discipline
and Power: The University, History, and
the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Spiro, David E. 1999. The Hidden
Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar
Recycling and International Markets, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Steinbruner, John D. and William W. Kaufmann. 1997. "International
Security Reconsidered." Pp. 155-96, in Setting
National Priorities: Budget Choices for
the Next Century, edited by Robert D. Reischauer. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997.
Steinherr, Alfred. 1998 and 2000. Derivatives: The Wild Beast of Finance, Chichester,
England: John Wiley and Sons.
Stephan-Norris, Judith and Maurice Zeitlin. 2002. Left Out. Cambridge University Press.
Stone, Lawrence and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone. 1984. An Open Elite? England, 1540-1880. Oxford University Press.
Stone, Samuel Z. 1990. The Heritage of the Conquistadors: Ruling Classes in Central America from the
Conquest to the Sandinistas. University of Nebraska Press.
Su, Tieting. 1995. “Changes in world trade networks: 1938, 1960, 1990.” Review
18, 3: 431-59.
Swartz, David. 1997. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. University of Chicago.
Theweleit, Klaus. 1987. Male Fantasies, Volume I: Women, Floods, Bodies, History, foreword by Barbara Ehrenreich. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press.
Theweleit, Klaus. 1987. Male
Fantasies, Volume II: Male Bodies:
Psychoanalyzing the White Terror, foreword by Anson Rabinbach and
Jessica Benjamin, Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minneapolis Press.
Thompson, William R. 1988. On
Global War: Historical-Structural
Approaches to World Politics. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South
Carolina.
_____. 2000. The Emergence of the Global Political Economy,
London and New York: Routledge.
_____. 1992. "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of
Structural Transition." World
Politics, 45, 1: 127-152.
Trubowitz, Peter. 1998. Defining
the National Interest: Conflict and
Change in American Foreign Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
United Nations Human Development Program (UNDP). Human Development
Report, various issues.
United Nations Human Development Program (UNDP). 2002a. Human
Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. http://www.undp.org/hdr2002/complete.pdf
United Nations Human Development Program (UNHDP). 2002b. Arab Human
Development Report. http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/CompleteEnglish.pdf
Useem, Michael. 1984. The Inner
Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise
of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Van Der Pijl, Kees. 1984. The
Making of An Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso.
_____. 1998. Transnational Classes
and International Relations. New York: Routledge.
Vanhanen,
Tatu. 1997. Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, London:
Routledge.
Wade,
Robert. 2000. “Out of the Box:
Rethinking the Governance of International Financial Markets,” Journal
of Human Development 1, 1: 145-158.
Wallerstein,
Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
_____.1988.
"The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism:
Universalism versus Racism and Sexism." Pp. 3-9 in Joan Smith, Jane
Collins, Terence K. Hopkins, and Akbar Muhammed, Racism, Sexism, and the
World-System. Colorado: Greenwood.
_____.
1991. Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System. New
York: Cambridge University Press, Editions de La Maison Des Sciences De
L'Homme.
Walt,
Stephen M. 1999. “Never Say Never:
Wishful Thinking on Democracy and War,” Foreign Affairs 78, #1:
146-151.
Waseem, Mohammad. 2000. “Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan.” Pp. 19-90 in Conflict and Violence in South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
edited by K.M. De Silva, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri
Lanka, in association with The Netherlands Institute of International
Relations, Clingendael, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000.
Watt, D.C. 1965. “America and the British Foreign-Policy Making Elite,
from Joseph Chamberlain to Anthony Eden, 1895-1956,” in D.C. Watt, Personalities and Politics: Studies in the Formulation of British
Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Weber, Max. 1961. General Economic
History, New York: Collier Books.
Wilkins,
Mira. 1974. The Emergence of
Multinational Enterprise, Volume II:
American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Williams,
Fiona. 1995. "Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Class in Welfare States: A Framework for Comparative Analysis." Social
Politics: 127-159.
Williams,
Robert G. 1994. States and Social
Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of
National Governments in Central America, Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press.
Woodward,
Susan L. 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War,
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
World
Economic Forum. 2000. Annual Meeting 2000 Participants, Davos,
Switzerland, 27 January-1 February, World Economic Forum.
Wright,
Eric Olin. 1997. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
_____.
2000. “Metatheoretical Foundations of Charles Tilly’s Durable Inequality,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 42, 3: 458-474.
Young,
Crawford. 1994. The African Colonial
State in Comparative Perspective.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Zeitlin,
Maurice and Richard Earl Ratcliff. 1988. Landlords
and Capitalists: The Dominant Class of
Chile, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Zweigenhaft,
Richard L. and G. William Domhoff. 1998. Diversity
in the Power Elite: Have Women and
Minorities Reached the Top, New Haven: Yale University Press.
[1] As William
Borden (1984: 16) puts it in his fundamental study: "The American policy to integrate Third World primary
producing economies within the capitalist industrial economies dictated the
pattern of postwar American intervention in South and Central America, the
Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and, most noticeably, in Southeast Asia.
[2] Key works
here are Campbell, 1997; Gordon, 1994a, b; Brown, 1999; Cohen, 2003; Metter,
1998; see Orloff, 1993; 1996; Manza, 2000a; 2000b; Mink, 1995; Epsing-Anderson,
1990: ch. 3). Though Civil War pensions
(Skocpol 1992) have been investigated, later social programs for veterans -- a
form of welfare for service in warfare -- have been "invisible"
within the literature on the New Deal (Campbell, 1997). Importantly, from a comparative vantage point,
it appears that the U.S. is unique in this regard, for according to Campbell,
(1997: 68-69), no other core country has such large provisions for veterans.
[3] Capital
markets are where capital funds, namely debt and equity securities, are traded.
This includes those in private placements and organized market exchanges
(paraphrasing Barron’s, 1998: 82). On
the resurgence of high finance, see Smith, 1993: 87; Reifer, 2002; Canterberry,
2000; Hale 2001; Krugman, 1999; Millman 1995; Partony 2002; cf. Pfister and
Suter 1987).
[4] See Calleo
1987: 142; 2003; Arrighi, Silver, et al. 1999; Spiro 1999; Gowan 1999;
Steinbruner and Kaufmann 1987; see also Markusen, 1998; forthcoming; cf.
Brzezinski, 1997.
[5] In terms
of geopolitics, there is a wide body of literature analyzing cycles of
hegemony, military alliance systems, bloc formation and rivalry and global war
in the world-system (Dehio 1962; Thompson 1988; 1992; Rasler and Thompson 1994:
Modelski and Thompson 1996; Arrighi 1994; Arrighi, Silver, et al. 1999; Chase-Dunn
1998; Kennedy 1987; Su, 1995).
[6] See van
der Pijl 1984: 1998; Stone 1984; Cannadine 1990; 1994; Soffer, 1994; Mayer
1981; Baltzell 1953; 1979; 1987; 1995: 1996; Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967; 1970;
1975; 1998; Putnam 1976; Jaher 1982; Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988; Bourdieu 1996;
Swartz 1997; Middlemas 1995; Kerbo and McKinstry 1995; Dodwell 1996; Scott
1997;Duus 1995; Hamashita 1984; 1988; 1993; 1997; Barkey forthcoming; Stone
1990; Paige 1997; Williams 1994; Cookson, Jr. and Persell 1985; Zwiegenhaft and
Domhoff 1998; Useem 1984; Wright, 1997; 2000; Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro,
1996.
[7] See Held,
McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999; Jones 1981; 1992; see Watt 1965; see also
Calleo and Rowland, 1973; see Duchene 1994; Anderson 1996a, b; Aldrich 1995;
1997; 2001).
[8] The literature here is extensive.
For a sampling, see Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Wallerstein, 1991;
1988; Smith, Collins, Hopkins, Muhammad, 1988; Dunaway, 2001; 2002; Grosfoguel,
2003; Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992; Magubane, 1979; 1996; Diamond, 1999; Mies,
1998; Williams, 1995; Nagel, 2003; Huttenback, 1976; Frederickson, 1981; Glenn,
2002; Sellers, 1991; Schlesinger 1945.
[9] This
assumes that there is a sufficiently pronounced causal link between
transnational class formation based on relative interdependence and equality
and the attenuation of inter-core conflict. Several theoretical perspectives (e.g. hegemonic
stability theory, democratic peace) support this contention generally. See the
review and discussion in Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer (2000).
[10]
The TimeMap® Project (http://www.TimeMap.net) provides an interoperable
standardized methodological approach for recording data in time and space that
allows for the easy production of animated maps that show changes over time
(Johnson 2000).