Global Formation:
Structures of the World-Economy
Dedicated to my daughters
Cori, Mae and Frances
First edition published by Basil Blackwell, 1989.
Second Edition published by Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998.
ABSTRACT
This book develops a structural approach to the
study of the modern world-system. The stress is on systemic patterns and deep
structural logic rather than on conjunctural situations or particular areas or
periods.
A new introduction to the second edition discusses
recent world events (such as the demise of the
My approach differs from the work of most other
scholars utilizing the world-systems perspective in several ways. I believe
that concept formation and theory construction are essential pieces of the
effort to build a cumulative social science. This commitment to theory has led
me to utilize the interpretive works of other world-system scholars to formulate
theoretical models with empirical implications, and to explicitly confront the
conceptual problems raised by critics of the world-system perspective. Also, I
have a fondness for quantitative empirical analysis as a method for testing
theoretical propositions, although this does not prevent me from asking
questions which are difficult to quantify. This predilection has urged me to
review the growing corpus of comparative research which is relevant to our
understanding of world-system processes, and to approach the problems of theory
construction and concept formation with an eye to matters of operationalization
and proposition testing.
Part I outlines the main structures of the
world-economy. Major theoretical debates about world-systems and modes of
production are addressed, and a new formulation is proposed. Then I describe a
set of processes which are hypothesized to operate at the level of the
world-system as a whole. Various approaches to the periodization of the
development of the modern world-system are compared, and recent developments
since World War II are examined from the perspective long run systemic cycles
and trends. Finally I discuss world culture and the role of normative
integration and cultural domination in the reproduction of the global system.
Part II examines the relationships between states
and the capitalist world-economy. Issues raised in the current literature on
the political economy of capitalist states are considered, and explanations of
differences in state strength and regime form between core and peripheral
states are formulated. The multicentric interstate system of unequally powerful
and competing states is conceived as the main political structure behind the
reproduction of capitalist relations of production. Geopolitics, warfare, and
commodity production are interdependent forms of competition which reproduce
one another. Chapter 9 formulates an explanation for the hegemonic cycle--the
rise and decline of hegemonic core powers--and reviews related research.
Part III focuses on the nature of the
core/periphery hierarchy in the modern world-system. The analytic definition of
core production is specified as relatively capital intensive commodity
production, and contending conceptualizations are discussed. The definitions of
semiperipheral areas are considered, and the notion of discrete boundaries
between core, peripheral and semiperipheral zones is critiqued. Various
mechanisms which are alleged to reproduce the core/periphery hierarchy are
described and the crossnational research which examines the effects of these
mechanisms on national development is reviewed. The question of the necessity
of the core/periphery hierarchy for capitalism is confronted. Studies of recent
changes in the structural characteristics of core and peripheral countries are
summarized, and the questions of absolute immiseration of the periphery and the
growing gap between core and periphery are examined empirically. Chapter 13
proposes a causal model of the relationship between certain world-system cycles
and reorganizations of the core/periphery hierarchy, and reviews research which
is relevant to these models.
Part IV considers problems of metatheoretical
stance and methodological approach in the study of world-systems. I locate my
own historical/structural theorizing further toward the nomothetic end of the
idiographic/nomothetic continuum relative to the position of the
My position on method contends that the faults of
mainstream American social science are mainly problems of theoretical substance
rather than research methods. While I abhor raw empiricism as much as the next
fellow, I see the comparative and quantitative methods developed by modern
social science as important tools for studying world-systems and for evaluating
world-system theories.
The last chapter discusses the implications of the
theoretical conclusions reached and the gaps in existing empirical research.
Though the theorization is incomplete, and much more empirical work needs to be
done, I permit myself to comment on possible implications of the world-system
perspective for policy and political action. This is justified by the grave
implications of some of the findings, especially the apparent tendency of the
capitalist world-economy to regularly produce wars among core states, a
systemic feature which, in combination with the proliferation of nuclear
arsenals, portends world-wide tragedy.
Table of Contents
Page
Preface
Introduction to the Updated Edition
Introduction
Part I The Whole System
1 The Deep Structure: Real Capitalism
2 Constants, Cycles and Trends
3 Stages of Capitalism or WorldSystem Cycles?
4 The World-System Since 1945: What Has Changed?
5 World Culture, Normative Integration and
Community
Part II States and the Interstate
System
6 States and Capitalism
7 Geopolitics and Capitalism: One Logic or Two?
8 Warfare and WorldSystems
9 Rise and Decline of Hegemonic Core States
Part III Zones of the WorldSystem
10 Core and Periphery
11 Reproduction of the Core/Periphery Hierarchy
12 Recent Trends
13 Cycles and the Core/Periphery Relationship
Part IV Metatheory and Research
Methods
14 Theory Construction
15 Research Methods
Part V Implications
Glossary
Notes
References
Preface
The structuralist theoretical approach to world-systems analysis
developed in this book owes much to my professors at Stanford University,
especially John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, but also Morris Zelditch, Jr.
and Joseph P. Berger. The ideas emerged
in proximate interaction with Walter Goldfrank, Volker Bornschier, Albert
Bergesen, Albert Szymanski, Joan Sokolovsky, Stephen Bunker, Alejandro Portes,
Craig Murphy, Katherine Verdery, Peter Evans, Michael Timberlake, Richard
Rubinson, David Harvey, and Neil Smith.
They have been presented at meetings of the American Sociological
Association, the Society for the Study of Social Problems and the International
Studies Association. Earlier versions of
several chapters have appeared in the International Studies Quarterly,
Comparative Political Studies, Politics and Society, the Humboldt
Journal of Social Relations, Anthro-Tech and various of the
Political Economy of the World-System Annuals.
An earlier version of chapter 8 was co-authored with Joan Sokolovsky,
part of chapter 11 with Richard Rubinson and part of chapter 15 with Aaron
Pallas and Jeffrey Kentor. I have also
received helpful commentary and critique on various chapters from Giovanni
Arrighi, Robert Wuthnow, Kathleen Schwartzman, William R. Thompson, Christian
Suter, Ulrich Pfister, Pat McGowan, David A. Smith, Patrick Nolan, Terry
Boswell, Patrick Bond, Michael Johns, Phil Vilardo, Linda Pinkow, Roland
Robertson, Richard G. Fox, Phil McMichael, Peter Grimes, and Ken O'Reilly.
I would like to thank
Immanuel Wallerstein, Terence Hopkins, Giovanni Arrighi and the other scholars
and staff of the
collective project to develop a cumulative social science is
often undermined by the pressure to individualize one's theoretical
stance. I have followed Kent Flannery's
(1982) advice against relieving yourself while standing on the shoulders of
giants.
Also I am indebted to
Shirley Sult for her help in typing and retyping the manuscript. My wife, Carolyn Hock, has provided support
and inspiration while prodding me to exercise the body as well as the mind.
Christopher Chase-Dunn
Introduction
This book proposes and begins to implement a structural approach
to the study of the modern world-system.
The stress is on the systemic patterns and the deep structural logic
rather than on the conjunctural situations of particular areas or periods. My approach differs from the work of most
other scholars utilizing the world-systems perspective in several ways. In contrast to the stated position of the
Before outlining the intent and contents of
this book I provide a short summary of the intellectual history of the
world-system perspective for the general
reader. Those unfamiliar with
world-system terms are referred to the glossary. The world-system perspective seeks to analyze
longrun/largescale social change by combining the study of societal-level
processes with the study of intersocietal and transsocietal relations. It challenges the assumption that national
societies (or tribes or city-states) constitute independent units whose
development can be understood without taking into account the systematic
ways in which societies are linked to one another in the
context of a larger network of material exchanges. These inter-societal and trans-societal networks of material
exchanges are termed world-systems.
World-systems
themselves have boundaries. Our modern
world-system is global in the sense that
all, or almost all, of the human beings on earth are strongly linked to it by
virtue of their participation in economic and
political networks which connect every continent. But world-systems of the past were not
global. There have been intersocietal
material interaction networks in small regions,
unconnected with other regions by any sustained material exchange. The processes by which primitive and ancient
world-
systems developed and merged to become the contemporary global
world-system are beyond the scope of this book.2 Suffice it to say that the myriad of smaller
systems became joined into a single
large network by the end of the nineteenth century.
The shift of empirical
focus from single societies to the world-system as a whole constitutes the most
influential aspect of the world-system perspective as it has emerged from the
scholars of the
An important structure
of the modern world-system is the core/periphery hierarchy
a historically constructed stratification system composed of dominant
core states, dependent peripheral areas and intermediate semi
peripheral states. In
Wallerstein's formulation the basic logic of the modern world-system is
capitalism, a mode of production which is defined as a central feature of the
system as a whole. The modern world-system
is a capitalist "world-economy" which emerged in Europe and
Wallerstein defines capitalism as commodity
production in which there are different sorts of class relations wage labor in the core and more politically coerced forms of labor control in
the periphery. Commodity production is
defined in the Marxist sense the
production of commodities for profitable
sale in a price-setting market.
Wallerstein understands all areas within the contemporary global political
economy to be within the bounds of the
capitalist world-economy, including the socialist states.
This perspective on
social change derives from, and is a modification of, Marx's effort to understand modern
society. It focuses on capitalism as a
mode of production, although it denies that capitalism can be understood by looking only at the "advanced"
countries. At the beginning of the
twentieth century many Marxists turned their attention to imperialism. V. I. Lenin [1916] saw imperialism as a stage
of capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg [1913] saw
imperialism as a necessary consequence of the operation of Marx's model of
capitalist development. Nikolai
Bukharin's [1915] Imperialism and World Economy is the most
important early precursor of the world-system
perspective.
Mainstream American
sociologists after World War II used Talcott Parson's digestion of Durkheim,
Weber, and Pareto to construct modernization theory, which was applied to the
"less developed" societies. This
approach saw traditional institutions as
blocking the development of modern economic and political institutions in the
"backward" countries. Karl
Polanyi's work (1944, 1977) during the
postWorld War II years carried on the project of the turn-of-the-century
Marxists in analyzing capitalism on a global scale. Polanyi, a Hungarian non-Marxist socialist,
emphasized the historicity of modes of integration, especially the market
system. This perspective, combined with the Marxist legacy, was to
shape the theoretical approach of the
In
national economic and political institutions. Dependency theory evolved in many different
directions, but some of the scholars who applied and synthesized this approach
moved toward the formulation of a theory of global capitalism, especially Andre Gunder Frank and
Samir Amin. They, and Immanuel
Wallerstein, developed the world-system perspective which this book seeks to theorize, although the
Wallersteinian version will be the one most intensively considered here.
The main intent of
this book is to formulate a structural theory of the capitalist world-economy, and to address the
major theoretical debates which have arisen in the social science literature
about world-systems. As
Sidney Mintz (1985) has written, an explanation should not be
"just one more chorus of the bone song." We must be explicit about which are the
key relationships which compose the
structures of the world-economy, the mechanisms which reproduce these structures,
and the contradictions which create
pressures for structural change. The theory
I develop extends Marx's accumulation model to the world-system as a
whole. It focuses on the world class structure and the core/periphery
hierarchy as the main contradictions around which conflict and competition in
the global political economy turn, and
it reconceptualizes capital as a relational institution of domination and
exploitation which includes states and the interstate system as part
of capitalist relations of production.
The main structures of
the world-economy are:
1the world class system;
2the core/periphery
hierarchy;
3the interstate
system, and
4the world market.
These are defined and interrelated in the chapters that follow.
A second intent of
this book is to summarize the recent empirical research which is germane to our
knowledge of the modern world-system.
This burgeoning corpus is already
large, and any effort to be complete becomes quickly obsolete. Since I am more sympathetic with formal
comparative and quantitative studies than many of the other world-system
scholars, I have tried to pay
special attention to these.
And I have also included many
studies which do not explicitly use world-system concepts, but which
nevertheless examine phenomena which I deem to be relevant to world-system
theoretical questions.
Part I argues that we
can best understand the global system in which we live by defining capitalism
in a way which builds on Marx but which modifies his conceptualization to some
extent. Once we have redefined
capitalism, the continuities of recent centuries become more visible. The major theoretical debates about
world-systems and modes of production are addressed, and a new formulation is
proposed. Then I describe a set of
processes which are hypothesized to operate at the level of the world-system as
a whole. This is presented as a schema
of world-system constants, cycles, and trends, and this schema is then compared
with the idea of stages of capitalism.
Finally I discuss world culture and the role of normative integration
and cultural domination in the reproduction of the global system.
Part II examines the
relationships between states and the capitalist world-economy. The nature of the capitalist state in the
context of the world-system, and the relative internal and external strength of
core and peripheral states are considered.
The multicentric interstate system of unequally powerful and competing
states is analyzed as the main political structure behind the reproduction of
capitalist relations of production.
Geopolitics and commodity production are interdependent forms of
competition which reproduce one another.
Chapter 9 formulates an explanation for the hegemonic sequence the rise and decline of hegemonic core powers and reviews related research.
Part III focuses on the core/periphery hierarchy. The analytic definition of core production is
specified as relatively capital intensive commodity production. Definitions of the semiperiphery and the idea
of boundaries between core, peripheral and semiperipheral zones are
examined. The
mechanisms which reproduce the core/periphery hierarchy are
described and the cross-national research which examines the effects of these
mechanisms on national development is reviewed.
I argue that the core/periphery hierarchy is necessary to the survival
of capitalism. The problems of absolute
immiseration of the periphery and the growing gap between core and periphery
are considered. Chapter 13 proposes a
hypothetical causal model of the relationships among several worldsystem
fluctuations and reviews research which is relevant to this model.
Part IV considers
metatheoretical stance and methodological problems. I locate my own historical/structural
theorizing further toward the nomothetic end of the idiographic/nomothetic
continuum relative to the position of the
On method I hold that
the faults of mainstream social science are mostly problems of theoretical
substance rather than research methods.
While I abhor raw empiricism as much as the next fellow, I see the
comparative and quantitative methods developed by modern social science as
important tools for studying world-systems and for evaluating world-system
theories.
The last chapter
examines the implications of the theoretical conclusions in this book and the
gaps in existing empirical research.
Though this book is only the first step toward specifying and testing
theories of the world-system,
I cannot refrain from making a few remarks about the possibilities
for transforming the capitalist world-economy into a more humane and peaceful
world society, though these statements are not
entirely deduceable from the earlier chapters. This is justified by the grave implications
of some of the findings, especially the apparent tendency of the capitalist world-economy to regularly
produce wars among core states, a systemic feature which, in combination with
the nuclear arsenal, portends world-wide
tragedy.
Here is a more
detailed summary of the main conclusions reached in each chapter:
Part I addresses the substantive theoretical
problems raised by a structural approach to the world-system perspective. It is an effort to go beyond the use of the
world-system as a new empirical frame of reference to an explicit theory of
world-system structures and processes.
Chapter l presents a reformulation of Marx's accumulation model of
capitalist development which utilizes
concepts produced by the
hierarchy.
The world-system is objectively stratified
into social classes (e.g. world bourgeoisie, world proletariat, intermediate
strata) but the political activities of
these classes tend to be oriented toward particular "national" state
apparatuses. This is the reason why many
Marxists argue that the relevant
perspective on class struggle is a national (or "internal") one, but
it is also an important structural basis for the reproduction of divisions
within the world working class. The
core/periphery hierarchy and nationalism crosscut and disorganize workingclass
solidarity, and perpetuate the reproduction of capitalist accumulation.
Chapter 1 stakes out a
position on the mode of production issue which differs from both: (a) orthodox
Marxists (i.e. capitalism = the wage system); and (b) Immanuel Wallerstein's
assumption that a mode of production is a feature of a whole world-system (the
"totality assumption"), and thus there can only be one mode of
production in a world-system.
While I claim that it
is advantageous to include both core and peripheral forms of capitalist
exploitation within the capitalist mode of
production, the identification of the mode of production with the whole
world-system creates grievous problems when we try to analyze the transformation of modes of production. Therefore I introduce the distinction between
the spatial boundaries of a world-system and the logical boundaries of modes of
production. This enables us to study how
a mode of production becomes dominant within a world-system and how modes
of production may be articulated with
one another within a single world-system.
I employ a typology of modes of production suggested by Amin (1980a) and
Wolf (1982), except that capitalism is redefined to include both core and
peripheral forms of labor exploitation for profit.
Chapter 2 describes a
schema of the dynamics of systemic constants, cycles, and trends which are
characteristic of the whole world-system.
The systemic constants are those basic features of the capitalist mode
of production described in chapter 1.
The system cycles include the long business cycle (i.e. the Kondratieff
wave), the hegemonic sequence of the rise and decline of core states, the cycle
of core war severity, and the cycle of core/periphery trade and control. The systemic trends include the expansion to
new populations and territories, the expansion and deepening of commodity relations,
state formation, growth of firms, the transnationalization of capital, the
increasing capitalintensity of production, and
proletarianization.
Chapter 3 compares the
above schema of cycles and trends to the periodizations of capitalist
development advanced by other Marxists.
It is concluded that the various
hypothesized stages of capitalism are more elegantly explained as periodic
combinations of world-system cycles and
trends.
In chapter 4 the
schema outlined in chapter 2 is used to consider the significance of developments which have
occurred in the world-system since World War II, such as the decolonization of
almost the whole periphery, the growth
of transnational corporations, industrialization in the periphery and the
semiperiphery, the growth of international organizations, and the
increasing number of socialist states. It is concluded that no really qualitative
changes have occurred. Rather the
seemingly new institutional and organizational forms which are observed are
functional equivalents of older forms which correspond to long-standing (but
not ahistorical) patterns.
Chapter 5 discusses
the cultural aspects of integration and domination in the contemporary
world-system. It compares the
contemporary capitalist world-economy with earlier world-systems in terms of
the centrality of cultural consensus and
ideological hegemony in maintaining cohesion and order. The particular mix of normative, economic,
and coercive integration which characterizes the contemporary system relies
most heavily on market interdependence and political-military domination,
although cultural hegemony plays a supporting role. The cultural hegemony of the core powers is
systematically undermined by the reproduction of nations and states, and by the uneven development of capitalist
commodity production which sometimes raises nonWestern nations (e.g.
legitimated to some extent by the multicentric interstate system
and its associated support for national identities. The world market and the interstate system
themselves require a substratum of cultural consensus without which
cross-cultural trade is problematic. But
this culturally-based "trade
ecumene" is a minimal level of agreement about media of exchange,
contract, and diplomatic protocol. It
does not constitute a normative order in which Durkheimian processes of moral
boundary maintenance operate.
Part II focuses more
directly on states and the interstate system.
Contrary to the popular notion that capitalism is an economic subsystem
of private firms producing for markets,
and contrary to the characterization of the world-system perspective as
"economistic," I emphasize the importance of states in the capitalist world-system. Chapter 6 discusses the contention
that core states are strong, while peripheral states are
weak. A distinction is made between
internal and external state strength.
With regard to external strength
all parties agree that core states are generally stronger. With regard to internal state strength there
is considerable controversy, but
empirical evidence is presented which supports the idea that peripheral states
are weaker internally than are core states.
I also discuss research on the relationship between regime form and the
position of states in the core
periphery hierarchy.
The structural processes which
sustain relatively democratic states in the core and relatively authoritarian
states in the periphery are examined.
The oscillation between authoritarian and populist regimes in many
semiperipheral states is also considered.
Chapter 7 focuses on
the multicentric interstate system of unequally
powerful states. This is
conceptualized as the main political structure of the capitalist world-economy. It is argued that political-military
competition and competition for shares of world markets are
complementary and interdependent aspects of the struggle to appropriate world
surplus value. These types of competition should be analyzed
as composing a single
systemic logic rather than as two different modes of
interaction. The reproduction of a competitive world market of
capitalist commodity producers is argued to be dependent on the structure of
the interstate system, and conversely,
the reproduction of the interstate system is dependent on the dynamics of
competition among capitals. Chapter 7
also examines certain features of the
interstate system which are rarely discussed in international relations
theory. In addition to the rarity of
attempts to impose imperium over the core and the consistent failure of those
attempts which have been made, we must wonder why hegemonic core powers never
even propose such a
policy. It is argued that
a world-system in which the capitalist mode ofproduction is dominant is a
fertile context for the success of core states which pursue a strategy
combining military control of trade routes with accumulation through
profit-taking, rather than geopolitical
territorial conquest and tribute-gathering.
Thus it is not the hegemons, but rather challenging core powers who set
off on the road of world imperium. But
these challenges do not succeed because they are incapable of obtaining
sufficient support in a system in which expanding and deepening commodity production
and the continuation of the multicentric interstate system hold greater promise
for national ruling classes than the presentiment of shares within a world
imperium.
Chapter 8 further
considers these same problems, arguing that it is not a matter of
"economic versus political-military" power, but rather the
particular institutional features of the capitalist mode of
production which explain the processes of the interstate system. The centrality of markets and capitalist
accumulation undercuts the tendency to empire-formation. This chapter also compares the modern
interstate system with earlier world-empires and interstate systems, and
discusses the functions of world wars in
restructuring the distribution of international power in
response to the uneven development of national economies. It is argued that world wars are a necessary,
cyclical and structural component of the expansion and deepening of capitalism.
Chapter 9 focuses on
the causes of the rise and decline of hegemonic core powers. Contrary to many characterizations, the
modern world-system is not a monolithic
structure of domination with a single center.
Not only is there continual resistance from peripheral areas, but the
core itself is multicentric and is characterized by uneven development
resulting in upward and downward
mobility. Empirical
studies of the hegemonic sequence are reviewed, including Joshua Goldstein's
demonstration of a strong link between Kondratieff economic cycles and
fluctuations in war severity.
Goldstein's research provides the most convincing empirical
demonstration of the existence of world-system processes to date, as well as
chilling support for the notion that world war is a "normal" outcome
of the operation of these processes.
Efforts to measure the rise and decline of hegemons are reviewed, and
the implications of hegemonic sequence studies for the current era of declining
Part III examines the
core/periphery hierarchy as a structural feature of the world-system. This hierarchy is understood as an
institution of socially structured inequality which is reproduced rather than
eliminated by "development."
The whole worldsystem develops but the core/periphery hierarchy, despite
a certain amount of upward and downward mobility, remains a structural feature
of the larger system. Chapter 10 reviews
different terminologies and contending analytic definitions of the
core/periphery hierarchy. An argument is
made in favor of the notion of core production as relatively capitalintensive
production. The spatial nature of the
core/periphery dimension is described as a nested hierarchy of multilevel and
overlapping regional and organizational
boundaries. The notion that core,
periphery and semiperiphery are distinct zones with measureably distinct
boundaries is described as a useful simplifying metaphor for analytic
purposes. But I suggest that the
empirical core/periphery hierarchy more probably corresponds to a
multidimensional set of continuous distributions.
The concept of the semiperiphery
is understood as a designation for two types of intermediate positions. The various efforts which have been made to
measure the position of countries in the core/periphery hierarchy are described
and critiqued. I review research which
reveals important structural
differences among peripheral areas due to differences in the
nature of the indigenous societies before incorporation into the modern
world-system. And I describe important
long-term reorganizations of the institutional and structural nature of the
core/periphery hierarchy which have occurred over the past centuries. I then dispute recent arguments by economic
historians which deny that exploitation of the periphery was an important
factor in the emergence of capitalist industrialization in the core.
Chapter 11 examines
various mechanisms which are argued to reproduce the core/periphery hierarchy such as wage
differentials, trade composition, different forms of core versus peripheral
class formation, the disarticulation of
economic structures in the periphery, transnational corporate exploitation, and
state-centric explanations which focus on differential processes of state
formation and political class struggle.
My own argument is a political theory of differential outcomes of class
struggle which explains why the core/
periphery hierarchy is necessary for the reproduction of
capitalism and how capitalism reproduces the core/periphery hierarchy. Then I review the crossnational research
which has been done on the various proposed mechanisms which reproduce
international inequalities.
Chapter 12 examines
recent trends in characteristics of core and
peripheral countries and the empirical research which documents these
trends. It also discusses the idea of
absolute immiseration as it is applied to the
capitalist world-system.
Research reveals that the magnitude of relative
core/periphery inequalities has not diminished in recent
decades, but there is little evidence to support the claim of periphery-wide
absolute immiseration. The consequences
of world-system inequalities thus stem primarily from relative differences in a
world-economy in which most of the periphery is in fact "developing"
relative to itself over time, but the differences between core and periphery
are not diminishing.
Chapter 13 describes a hypothetical model of
cyclical changes in the core/periphery hierarchy and the temporal and causal
relations between this and the hegemonic
sequence of the rise and decline of core powers and changes in the level of
competition/conflict among core powers.
The chapter describes research which is germane to this model, including
evidence of the existence of cyclical international debt crises.
Part IV confronts metatheoretical and
methodological problems which surround the effort to construct and test
world-system theories. Chapter 14 describes a continuum of metatheoretical
orientations in the social sciences which extends from completely historicist
description at one end to completely ahistorical generalization at the
other. Various intermediate points on
this continuum are discussed, and a case is made in favor of a more structural
(less historicist) approach to world-system theory. The attack on structural Marxism is reviewed
and a defense of theory is proposed. My
own critique of Althusser et al. is both substantive (the failure to use a
worldsystem frame of reference) and methodological (the substitution of
rationalist critique and political debate for systematic empirical research). Nevertheless I find the
distinctions between mode of production and social
formation, and between structural causation and conjunctural events, to be
useful for world-system theory.
The ontological status
of world-systems and other objects of social scientific study are compared and
the frequently made erroneous assumption that there is a necessary relationship
between spatial scale and level of
abstraction is contested.
The potential relevance of
structural world-system theory for political practice is also considered.
Chapter 15 examines
the question of appropriate research methods for studying world-systems. Those who have argued that comparative and
quantitative methods are inappropriate are confronted with arguments about the
assumptions behind formal modeling and comparative data analysis. I contend that we can make good use of the
generalized logic of time series analysis to study processes which operate at
the level of the whole world-system. Several
problems arising from the application of time series analysis are discussed. It is also argued that the quantitative
comparison of smaller units of analysis (e.g. nationstates) is indeed relevant
for our understanding of some world-
system processes. But
findings about relationships among characteristics of e.g. nation-states cannot
be used as evidence for relationships among analogous features of the
world-system as a whole the socalled
aggregation problem. On the other hand,
knowledge of the causality of processes occurring within and between
nation-states is indeed relevant for our understanding of some world-system
processes because not all these operate at the level of the whole.
The existence of
strong worldsystem processes implies a problem for crossnational comparisons:
the nonindependence of cases Galton's
problem. I propose a solution to
Galton's problem which builds worldsystem processes
and interstate relations into the causal model for crossnational
analysis. Several different research
designs for world-system analysis are described and compared, and a new design
for testing multilevel models of causality is proposed. The chapter ends with a consideration of the
possibility of systematic comparative research on a large number of
world-systems, a research design which has conceptual and feasibility problems
but which may nevertheless be quite useful for testing propositions about the
relationship between world-systems and modes of production.
Chapter 16 examines
the implications of this book for future studies of world-systems and discusses the matter of contemporary
political practice. The motivation
behind this work is the feeling that we don't really understand the nature of
the social system in which we are living, a world of our own creation and yet
beyond our control. It was a similar
uneasiness that motivated Marx and the
other social scientists of the nineteenth century. The efforts to synthesize the theories of the
classical sociologists have not produced
a theory which adequately explains the social phenomena we see in the twentieth
century, especially the contradictory
nature of our world-system.
Talcott Parsons performed such a synthesis and the outcome was
modernization theory, a poor vehicle now largely discredited.
And yet simply returning to Marx, as many critics of modernization theory
have done, is not really adequate either.
The twentieth century needs its own Marx before we can have a new
Gramsci or a Lenin.
Many Marxists (e.g. E.
P. Thompson, 1978), have abandoned theory for
historical studies, arguing that theory has been used badly by the
Stalinists. Theory is like
technology. Good theory may be used for
bad ends. And yet
theory is both potentially useful for humane ends, and, I would
contend, an end in itself. I find no
massive contradiction between
scholarship and political practice, although they are certainly not the
same activity. The immediate intent of
this book is theoretical. The
ultimate goal, however, is to help us
understand the world in order to change it.
PART I
The Whole System
This section addresses some basic explanatory problems which
have emerged from the effort to theorize about the capitalist
world-economy. Criticisms of the
world-system perspective by other Marxists are addressed, an explication of the
Wallersteinian version is performed, and certain of its assumptions are critiqued and
reformulated. I will outline a
perspective on modes of production in general, and an argument for modifying Marx's definition of capitalism. The question of world-system boundaries will
be considered, as will the relationship between classes and the core/periphery hierarchy insofar as they are
related to our understanding of capitalism as a mode of production. The Wallersteinian "totality
assumption," which implies that each world-system has only one mode of
production, is criticized and replaced with an analysis of logical boundaries between modes of production within
historical world-systems.
The intent of this
section is to move our analysis of world-systems from an orienting perspective which is used to
interpret history toward a new theory of the underlying tendencies of
development. I do this by explicating
a strongly theoretical
interpretation of the literature produced by the scholars of the
There is a continuum between two polar types
of explanation in the social sciences: at one extreme is ideographic
historicism (the claim that each event, village, country, period, etc. is
unique); while at the other extreme is completely nomothetic ahistoricism (the
attempt to specify one theory which
explains all social systems, small and large, simple and complex).
Immanuel Wallerstein's work is consciously located on this
continuum at a midpoint which is more historical than that of the structural
Marxists, and yet which is more generalizing than that of most historians. Wallerstein interprets the history of
"historical systems," inventing
theoretical concepts that seem to be helpful along the way. By a "strongly theoretical" reading
of Wallerstein I mean to formulate a causal and
structuralist theory out of the insights and loosely defined concepts
which he has produced.
Wallerstein's usage of the term
"historical systems" demonstrates his dialectical view that whole
socio-economic systems are both systemic and
indeterminant to a certain extent.
The real question is: exactly how systemic is the world-system? Fernand Braudel (1984:70) suggests that
Wallerstein's approach is "a little too systematic." My position is that it may be possible to
determine just how systemic the world-system is by clearly formulating models and testing them
against empirical data.
There are those who
argue that a science of society is impossible; that we cannot explain and predict social
change. Human beings, the objects of
analysis, are ostensibly intelligent and have free will and so, it is argued,
attempts to predict their behavior are doomed.
In addition, sociological theorizing is reflexive we are trying to understand ourselves and
therefore objectivity is impossible.
Also once a prediction is known the object of the prediction may
intentionally (and obstinately!) choose to disconfirm it.
The attainments of
social science do not yet completely discredit these claims, although I would
contend that we are not nearly as ignorant as some critics of social science
seem to think. Marx and Weber provide us
giant
shoulders on which to stand, and we ought not underestimate
their value. But no one would dispute
that social science is yet young. Our
paradigms seem more reactive than cumulative, and we haven't yet attained
sufficient consensus to constitute "normal science" in the Kuhnian
sense. This might be because human
behavior is impossible to explain and predict, or simply because we haven't yet penetrated its deep
structure. My effort to theorize about
world-systems posits the usefulness of models of deep social structure and begins to specify one.1
The search for a
social "genetic code" can procede in a number of directions, as Marx
pointed out in his short discussion of the "method of political economy" (Marx,
1973:100-8). The Althusserian
structuralists tend to become encompassed by their own sanitized logical world
of textual interpretation and rational
argument. They never, or rarely, allow
the messy empirical world to penetrate.
Marx pointed out that political economy must alternately move from the
concrete to the abstract, and then back again.
Deduction and induction are both necessary operations.
Why would it be
helpful if we had a formal theory of world-system development?
In addition to all the usual scientific desiderata simplicity, explanation, prediction such a theory might help us to avoid self-
destruction, and to construct a more humane, less exploitative
world society. A theory of social
change, instead of implying a philosophy of fatalistic determinism, can itself
be an aid in our effort to control our own collective future.
This last goal of theorizing should be an intended consequence which
is kept in mind in the course of the theory-building project, although we
must avoid letting political criteria
determine our theoretical decisions. The
right combination of progressive intent and scientific open-mindedness is
difficult to specify, but it is clear that these two should interact
without either dominating the other.
Modes of Production in General
In this introductory section I will discuss some general
theoretical questions which provide a framework for the effort to come to grips
with what is unique to the logic of the modern world-system. What is the general relationship between
historical world-systems and modes of production? And what is the best way to conceptualize the
boundaries of world-systems? These
questions are related, and some of the simplifying assumptions made by
Wallerstein have caused unnecessary confusion and disputation.
By mode of production
we mean the basic underlying logic which any
social system exhibits. For Marx
this was necessarily related to the problem of material production. He focused on the social relations and
institutions which organize production and distribution of the material goods
required for the reproduction of a society and its members. In class societies a very fundamental set of
institutions which are the center of modes of production are those social
relations of production which allow a
class of exploiters to appropriate surplus product from a class of
direct producers. These
institutions forms of
labor control vary across different
modes of production.
A related but somewhat
different way of conceptualizing social logics was developed by Karl
Polanyi. Polanyi (1977) designated three
modes of societal integration which are said to characterize exchange in very
different types of
societies: normative, political and market. Reciprocity, the normative
distribution of resources according to culturally agreed upon rules of justice,
exists in all societies, but is the most important mode of integration in
"communal" or kin-based classless, stateless societies. Redistribution, or the politically
determined distribution of goods becomes more important once specialized
coercive organizations (states) have emerged to monopolize legitimate
violence. States and empires use
political organization and formally organized coercion to extract surplus
product from direct producers.
State-formation proceeds in tandem with class-formation, such that
privileged positions with respect to basic resources become associated with
life-long (not age-based) statuses. The
emergence of hereditary aristocratic lineages usually precedes primary
state-formation. Reciprocity does not
cease to exist within class/state societies, but it becomes articulated with,
and dominated by, the logic of "redistributive" or better, tributary modes of production
and distribution. There are many types
and varieties of the tributary modes of production, some very centralized, some very decentralized (i.e.
feudalism). And the institutional forms
of class relations vary greatly within the tributary modes. But the logic of politically coercive
organizations dominates both class struggle and intersocietal competition.
The third type of
integration proposed by Polanyi is the price-setting market. A market is not identical with all
exchange. Exchange may be regulated
according to custom (reciprocity), according to law (redistribution), or by
competitive buying and selling. The
gathering of people in a village square to exchange goods does not necessarily
constitute a market in Polanyi's sense.
The rates of exchange (prices) must be determined (or greatly
affected)by the buying and selling decisions of a large number of separate
actors trying to maximize their individual returns. A price-setting market is, of course, an
ideal type, the same one which is at the center of classical and neo-classical
economic theory. But Polanyi was at
pains to point out that this form of interaction is not a natural and universal
way in which all people exchange with one another. Rather it is an historical creation which
emerges under certain conditions and which becomes the dominant form of
exchange in a certain type of society.
The process of commodification, the transformation of land, labor and
wealth into commodities which are exchanged in price-setting markets, becomes
the object of analysis rather than a background assumption about human nature
and the propensity to truck, barter, and maximize profit.
A major theoretical
problem has been how to combine Marx's modes of production with Polanyi's modes
of integration. Samir Amin (1980a) and
Eric Wolf (1982) have found similar
solutions regarding the conceptualization of precapitalist modes of
production.2 They agree with Polanyi
that stateless, classless societies have
a mode of production in which normative obligations, usually defined in terms
of kinship ties, regulate production and
exchange. Amin terms these
"communal," while Wolf calls them "kin-based" modes of
production. Ethnographic studies (e.g.
Sahlins, 1972) support the notion that reciprocity is the dominant form of
exchange and that true market relations are rarely found in such societies.
With regard to
Polanyi's redistributive mode of integration, other theorists have pointed out that the term
"redistributive" is somewhat unfortunate. It was derived from the study of chiefdoms,
societies which are somewhat more stratified than most stateless societies, but
not so stratified
as societies in which true states and social classes have
emerged. Neil Smelser (1959) suggests
that the kind of appropriation of resources which occurs with the emergence of
states and empires should rather be
termed "mobilization."
Amin and Wolf propose that social systems in
which political coercion is the dominant relation of production and distribution
should generally be termed
"tributary modes of production."
Feudalism is one such mode of production, and so are the so-called
"asiatic" and "slave" modes designated by other
Marxists. The tributary modes differ
from one another in terms of class relations (i.e. serfdom, clientalism,
slavery, tenantry, corve, helotry, etc.)3 and also in terms of the degree of
centralization of state power feudalism versus absolutism. But they all share the feature that political
power and coercion are the main determinants of outcomes in competition among
classes, states, and empires.
Robert Brenner (1977)
rightly located Wallerstein's theoretical perspective on the terrain of a
dispute about the transition to capitalism in
A second issue which
threaded through the Brenner critique was the matter of "internal"
versus "external" determinants.
The many Marxists who have accepted Brenner's critique of the
world-system perspective associate the alleged emphasis on exchange with the
discussion of international trade. This
is thought to depreciate the importance of internal class relations and class
struggle. The problem of "internal
to what" is usually unexamined.
Some emphasize the firm or the plantation or the village. Others are thinking about the nation-state or
the region.
The Wallersteinian
perspective was misperceived by Brenner and the others who have adopted the
"exchange versus class struggle" criticism. Wallerstein was not arguing that exchange or
trade is a more important aspect of a mode of production than class
relations. Rather he was pointing to the
multilevel character of systems of exploitation and emphasizing the mystifying
consequences of characterizing all international trade as equal
exchange. Class relations and relations
of coercion and exploitation exist at several levels; within firms [as the
important work of Braverman (1974), Burawoy (1979) and Edwards (1979) has
recently illuminated], but also at the level of localities, regions,
nation-states, and the core/periphery hierarchy. These relations can all be understood broadly
as class relations, or production relations in the Marxist sense. And the internal/external distinction is as
mystifying as the idea that international trade (or wage labor) is always equal
exchange. Wallerstein contends that it
is the boundaries between organizations, and nation-states, as well as the
core/periphery hierarchy which divide those oppositional forces which would
challenge the logic of capitalism.
Following Polanyi,
Wallerstein points out that exchange is not simply exchange.
Each material exchange has an institutional underpinning which we must
investigate in order to understand the logic of the system we are studying.
Some exchanges are customary, some are politically determined and some
are in the context of a price-setting market.
And, as Marx clearly believed,
much of the logic of capitalism is contained in the institution of commodity
production for the market.
Commodification is the process by which
formerly non-marketmediated activities come to take the commodity form. It is important to understand that
commodification is not an either/or
matter. There may be more or less of it
in different realms or activities within a social system. We know from studying the historical
development of commodity production that archaic wealth (prestige goods) was
first commodified in the sense of becoming a generalized medium of
exchange money. Land slowly became something which was
alienable and saleable. And the
commodification of food, raw materials, services, and labor occurred in spurts, in interstitial
areas, and to varying degrees within the tributary modes of production. Precapitalist empires, themselves still dominated by the logic of the tributary
mode of production, became more and more commercialized. Wealth, land and labor increasingly became
commodified, but the logic of market integration still played only a
subordinate role.
Labor is never a
perfect commodity. Neither is wealth or
land. We must speak of degrees of labor
commodification. Customary work relations
are the least commodified because obligations are usually personal and
dependent on normative consensus and internalized values. Politically-structured labor
relations based on coercion may become partially
commodified. Thus slave labor is more
commodified than serfdom, and is more manipulablely and congruent with
the logic of profitable commodity production. Consideration of costs and profits, the price
of slaves, and the ability to buy more slaves or sell them off, lent plantation
and latifundium enterprises a rather capitalistic nature even within
precapitalist world-systems.
Wage-labor is the most
perfectly commodified form of labor control
because the price tends to be regulated by the cost of the reproduction
of labor-power; the capitalist can buy only the labor time he needs, and
so wage-labor is even more flexible for
the cost-conscious capitalist commodity producer than is slave labor. Labor-time, rather than the laborer, has become a commodity. And there is the additional benefit that
exploitation is more opaque, because the exchange of wages for labor time is
defined as an equal exchange. Slavery is less easily legitimated.
Both Marx and
Wallerstein see commodity production as necessary to capitalism, but Marx
argued that "fully formed" capitalism can only be based on wage labor, while Wallerstein argues that
peripheral capitalism can be based on less commodified forms of labor
control. Two points should be made about
this definitional disagreement. The
first is that it can be agreed that wage labor is important to capitalism,
because it is the most commodified form of labor control. But it may be unwise to define other types of
labor control as necessarily non-capitalist for two reasons. The first is that
there may be different levels of capitalism. Marx acknowledges this when he discusses
merchant capitalism and simple commodity
production. And secondly these allegedly
less capitalist forms of capitalism may be articulated or integrated in
systematic ways with "full"
capitalism.
Even more importantly,
as I shall argue in chapter 1, the survival of capitalism may depend on the
articulation of different forms of labor control. In chapter 2 I build upon earlier work to
hypothesize a schema of empirically observable cycles and trends which are thought
to be characteristics of the
contemporary world-system as a whole.
Chapter 3 compares the stages of capitalism suggested by some Marxists
with the idea of cycles of world-system
development. In chapter 4 the schema
developed in chapter 2 is employed in a consideration of structural changes in
the world-system which have occurred
since World War II. Chapter 5 examines
the nature of global culture and the role it plays in the reproduction and transformation of the contemporary
world-system. Let us now examine further
the question of how capitalism is most usefully defined.
Chapter 1
The Deep Structure: Real Capitalism
The goal of this chapter is to reformulate Marx's theory of
capitalist accumulation using insights provided by the analysis of the modern
world-system. We begin by exploring
three approaches to theorizing about the deep structural dynamics of the
world-system: (a) a purely formal approach to the specification of logical
boundaries between modes of production;
(b) the process of commodification and its limits; and (c) the problem
of world classes. The epistemological
assumptions behind this effort to theorize the world-system are described and
defended in chapter 14. After
reformulating Marx's theory we will critically evaluate one of Wallerstein's
simplifying assumptions, the idea that the mode of production is necessarily a
feature of a whole world-system, and the corollary that each world-system has
only one mode of production.
My ultimate goal is to
reformulate Marx's theory to take into account those systematic aspects of
capitalist development which Marx neglected.
This requires:
1 a clear specification of Marx's model;
2a critique of its
inadequacies in the light of our knowledge of world-system processes;
3a reformulation of
the concepts and basic axioms, and
4testing the new
formulation against contemporary and historical social reality.
This book begins these tasks, but it certainly does not finish
them.
Marx's Model of Capitalist Accumulation
Marx began his explication of the laws of capitalist development
with a dialectical analysis of a fundamental institution of capitalism the
commodity. From this
institutional form, which allegedly contains the secrets of the deep structure
of capitalism, he derives the law of value, the roles of capital and labor, and
the accumulation of capital through the production and appropriation of surplus
value. This theoretical formulation has
several advantages. It is elegant. It focuses on what are indubitably essential
features of the capitalist mode of production
market exchange, commodified labor, the concentration of means of
production in private hands, and the accumulation of capital by means of the
production of commodities and the exploitation of commodified labor.
There are two main
issues which divide Marxists over the definition of the basic characteristics
of the capitalist mode of production: (a) the nature of class relations in
capitalism, and (b) the importance of the state and the interstate system for
capitalism. Marx's most abstract model
of the capitalist accumulation process, as presented in volume 1 of Capital
(1967a), assumed a closed system in which there is a single laissez-faire
state standing behind property relations, but not directly engaging in the
accumulation process. The model also
assumed only two classes: capitalists
owning and controlling the major means of production, and proletarians selling
their labor-power for wages in a competitive labor market.
Marx defined
capitalism as a system in which ownership and control of the major means of
production are in the hands of private (not state) entrepreneurs who produce
commodities for a competitive market.
For Marx the commodification of labor is primarily through a competitive
labor market the wage system in which proletarians who own no means of
production are "free" to sell their labor-power to capitalists. He developed his model on the basis of his
observations of nineteenth-century British capitalism. He assumed that
Thus, according to
Marx, the basic characteristics of fully developed capitalism are:
1 Generalized
commodity production: The production of commodities for profitable sale on
a price-setting (competitive) market.
2 Private ownership
of the major means of production: Private capitalists accumulate capital by
making investment decisions within a logic of profit maximization. This implies that the capitalist state does
not directly interfere in investment decisions or in the market, but rather
provides legitimation and order, using its power primarily to guarantee
external defense and internal peace consistent with the institutions of private
property.
3 The wage system:
Labor-power is a commodity sold by proletarians (who do not own means of
production) to capitalist owners of the means of production in a competitive
labor market.
The problem with
Marx's formulation is not so much what it includes as what it leaves out. Marx seeks to overcome the vacuities of
classical political economy by conceptualizing capitalism as an historical
system which
came into existence through the use of force (see Part 8, volume
1 of Capital)and which will pass out of existence through the
development of its own internal contradictions.
But, in seeking analytical elegance in his specification, Marx abstracts
from a number of processes which should be included within the specification of
the capitalist mode of production. For
example in volume 1 of Capital Marx assumes:
1 the existence of an
English-type caretaker state which does not directly interfere in the process
of development;
2 no international
trade a closed system;
3 a completely
competitive relationship among capitals; and
4 the complete
commodification of labor-power such that there exists only a class of workers
with no institutional power to obtain more than the subsistence wage, and a
class of capitalists who own and control all means of production.
Certainly simplifying
assumptions are required in any theory which attempts to specify the essential
tendencies of a mode of production. We
should not include sun spots or climate change in our theory. Some processes must be designated as
exogenous, while others, hopefully, capture the kernel of the social system we
are studying. The problem I am raising
is that Marx may have distorted the kernel somewhat by his choice of
simplifying assumptions.
My reading of the
world-system literature leads me to question the wisdom of several of Marx's
theoretical decisions. It is not a
matter of the simplifying assumptions being incorrect in one or another
concrete empirical situation. This is
true of every theoretical abstraction.
It is rather that
the essential processes of capitalist development may be
distorted by the
particular assumptions made by Marx. Marx attributed a great deal to
historical specificity, as have many Marxists since. But his theory was an abstraction from the
complications of history. The approach I
will outline here will do the same thing, except that it will draw the
boundaries between the essential endogenous process of capitalism and the
historical excrescences in a different way.
The hard task is to
reformulate a new theory of the essential kernel of capitalism. Bertell Ollman (1976) has convincingly argued
that Marx held to a philosophy of "internal relations" in which an
essential part (termed a "monad" by Leibnitz) contains relations that
express the basic nature of the whole system under analysis. This consists in identifying the crucial or
kernel set of relations. Some Marxists
(Dobb, 1947; Brenner, 1977) have argued that the key social relation for
capitalist society is the relationship between capital and labor as it occurs
within the firm, or as Marxists say, at the point of production. This is undoubtedly an important relationship
and a spate of excellent studies have focussed on the labor process as it has
developed in contemporary core capitalism (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979;
Burawoy, 1979). The world-system
perspective encourages us, however, to notice how control institutions
(relations of production) are structured beyond the point of production, in
states, and, indeed, are institutionalized in the core/periphery hierarchy.
Additions to Marx's Model
The conceptualization of the world-system as a multilayered
system of competing groups has been very helpful in accounting for the
historical development of
capitalism. Here I would
suggest that the processes of state formation, nation-building, class
formation, and the reproduction of the core/periphery hierarchy can be
theorized as fundamental to the capitalist mode of production itself. Obviously these processes are beyond the
scope of a narrowly economic view of capitalism, but it is precisely the
transcendence of such an
economistic theory which is necessary if we are to theorize the
development of capitalism as a whole system.
The disadvantage of
this inclusion of processes formerly thought to be historical into the basic
model of capitalist development is that it
complicates the model greatly.
Instead of a kernel social relation located at the point of production
we have a much more complicated set of organizational, political, market,
interstate and world class relations.
What is needed is a new synthesis of these processes which has the
virtues of Marx's original theory: simplicity and the identification of a
relational kernel.
One of the key
insights into capitalist development stimulated by Wallerstein's (1979a)
theoretical writings is that commodity production regularly takes place in an
arena that is importantly structured by noneconomic relationships. There has never been an empirically existing
perfect market within the capitalist system.
Instead capitalism is structured as a set of power relations, sometimes
taking the form of price-setting markets, but just as often constituted as
institutionalized power or authority relations
among classes and states.
Thus capitalism is a competitive system in which no single organization
exercises monopoly control over production and consumption, but within certain
organizational realms monopoly power is temporarily
exercised. This
organizational power is most often institutionalized within state structures or
guaranteed by property laws which are backed up by states. Thus mercantilism is not a stage of
capitalist development, but, with some variations in form and extent, is a
constant feature of capitalism. In
thelong run, however, these extra-economic sources of control are themselves
subjected to competition in the arena of the world-system.
Thus the
organizational structures of states and firms, and the structured relations
among classes are subjected to a competing-down process which occurs in the
interstate system and the world market (see chapters 7 and 8). This accounts for certain regularities which
can be observed in the world-economy.
Not only are peripheries underdeveloped, but the uneven development of
core countries results in the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers. This is because the correct combination for
success in the capitalist system depends, not only on efficient production for
the market, but also on the right mix of state investment in infrastructure,
regulation of classes, and the exercise of military power and diplomacy in the
interstate system.
Marx's simplifying
assumption that workers in a purely capitalist system receive only the wages
necessary for the reproduction of the labor force does not accurately reflect
the process of class struggle which occurs within the capitalist system. Many core workers undoubtedly receive wages
beyond reproductive necessity, and many peripheral workers receive wages which
are below what they need to reproduce themselves and thus must rely on other
resources. Marx assumed
that trade union movements would more or less automatically develop into
socialist challenges to the logic of capitalism.
By now it is obvious that trade unions by themselves do not
challenge the basic logic of capitalism, although they do raise the wage bill
paid by capital. This suggests that the
process by which workers resist their perfect commodification should be seen as
a normal part of capitalist development itself.
Their differential success in this is known to be mediated primarily by
the extent to which they are able to gain access to state power, and toutilize
this access to guarantee their right to bargain collectively with capital.
While the forms of the
welfare state and the political legitimation of labor unions exist not only in
the core but in the periphery, and while the real level of protection which
workers are able to receive from their own unions and their states varies over
time in all states, it is still the case that there is a significant
differential between the core and periphery in terms of the political
protection versus the use of political coercion in class relations. These systematic variations must be taken
into account in any theory of accumulation, uneven development, and crisis. Erik Wright's (1978:147-54) explication of
the different theories of crisis refers to one cause of the decline of the rate
of profit as the "profit-squeeze" model, in which workers are
effective in maintaining a wage level which discourages new capital
investment. This is an example of the
inclusion of the consequences of class struggle into the model of accumulation
itself.
Another consequence of
the systematic inclusion of extra-economic determinants of class position is
that it enables us to better understand exploitation in the periphery. A great debate has emerged among Marxists
about the definition of the capitalist mode of production. Many reassert Marx's claim that the fully
developed capitalist mode of production can only exist in the context of the
wage system. Thus the slavery and
serfdom which were
created in peripheral areas during the expansion of the European
world-
system are classified as precapitalist modes of production which
were
articulated with capitalism.
This debate about the
articulation of modes of production has been reviewed and clarified by Aidan
Foster-Carter (1978). He suggests
thattheorization of the capitalist mode of production at the world-system level
may bring about a synthesis of the currently somewhat Balkanized discussions of
particular theoretical questions by Marxists concerned with problems of
development. Foster-Carter recommends
that the theorization of capitalism should go beyond an economistic approach to
include political dimensions. I think he
is mistaken, however, as were Brenner (1977) and Frank (1979a), to suggest that
world-system articulation ought to be conceptualized as
"exchange."
Certainly the form of exchange (commodity production versus gift-
giving or tribute payments) is important, but international
trade and the core/periphery hierarchy should be analyzed in terms of
production relations as well. As Albert
Bergesen (1983) has strongly argued, it is institu
tionalized power (in the form of private property, colonialism
and neo-colonial geomilitary influence) which stands behind the fictively equal
trade between core and periphery.
When we include
noneconomic dimensions of class into our definition of capitalist production
relations we must abandon the assumption of a perfect price-setting labor
market. Intraclass stratification into
"segmented labor
markets" is often structured by extra-economic institutions
e.g. nationalism, racism, sexism, ethnic solidarities, or trade unions, and
immigration laws.
In the periphery
extra-economic coercion plays a much greater part in production relations. Even so, the cost of slave or serf labor and
their relative efficiencies or inefficiencies entered into the calculation of
profitability and investment decisions.
The elimination of these extreme forms of labor coercion in the
periphery has by no means equalized the levels of coercion exercised over core
and peripheral workers. The wage
differential beyond the difference in productivity analyzed by Arghiri Emmanuel
(1972) isbased on the exercise of coercion in the world-system. Peripheral states generally exercise more
repressive controls over worker organizations.
If legal protections for workers exist, they are usually not
enforced. And the core/periphery
division of labor itself (differences in productivity as well as wages)
contributes to the great income inequalities which exist between core and
peripheral workers. These differences,
which may be partly conceptualized as stratification within the world
proletariat, are produced both by the direct exercise of core power through
state action and transnational corporate politics, and as the indirect
consequence of the core/periphery division of labor.
The Wallersteinian
world-system perspective contends that the core/
periphery hierarchy and the exploitation of the periphery by the
core are necessary to the reproduction of capitalism as a system. Thus, rather than a temporary stage on the
road to fully developed core capitalism, the "primary accumulation"
(Frank, 1979a) by which the core exploits the periphery is one of the main
mechanisms which allow the continuation of expanded reproduction in
the core. The relative
harmony of capitalists and workers in the core (which can be observed in the
interclass alliances typified by social democratic regimes or the
"business unionism" form of class struggle in the
It is undeniable that
the greater proportion of surplus value produced in the world-economy is, and
has long been, produced in the core, but the exploitation of the periphery both
creates extra amounts of surplus value which can be redistributed in many
indirect forms to core workers, and also rein
forces the ideologies of nationalism and "national
development" which facilitate class alliances in the core. Albert Szymanski (1981:chapter 5) shows
evidence against several propositions which support the "necessity of
imperialism" argument. He does not,
however, contradict the claim that the core/periphery hierarchy allows
capitalist accumulation to proceed as a result of its effects on class peace in
the core. Szymanski's critical
evaluation of the "aristocracy of labor" thesis (1981:chapter 14)
does not disprove that core workers benefit from the core/periphery hierarchy,
and in fact Szymanski admits that the concentration of cleaner, betterpaid jobs
in the core is an important contributor to the depolarization of class conflict
within core countries. This suggests
that decreases in the exploitation of the periphery by the core may have
potentially revolutionary consequences for core countries, and thus for the
capitalist world-system as a whole.
Logical Boundaries Between Modes of Production
The discussion of structures often proceeds at a metatheoretical
level in which great paradigms clash but little is accomplished for cumulative
social science. A theoretical holism
which simply asserts that the essential features of a
social system (the monad or kernel) exist at the level of the
whole system, is such a metatheoretical claim.
As an heuristic device it has the same
scientific status as the claim that the point of production is
the spatial location of the systemic monad.
Both of these metatheoretical points of departure try to conceptualize
the deep structure spatially, and they do so in order to help us sort out the
central qualities from which the more complicated world of appearances and
concrete realities can be explained.
But the attempt to
identify the qualities of modes of production with spatial entities may produce
more confusion than clarification. If we
assume that each world-system has one and only one mode of production, as
Wallersteindoes, how do world-systems change?
It is more useful to conceptualize modes of production in terms of logical
boundaries rather than spatial boundaries.
This allows for the articulation between different modes, and for the
competition between modes within a single socio-economic system. It may be the case that most spatially
designated socio-economic systems have one mode of production which is
dominant, but if we eliminate the possibility of the coexistence of modes, we
cannot discuss situations in which modes of production may be vying with each
other for domination, and thus our ability to analyze transformation is
accordingly limited.
A clear specification
of the underlying structural tendencies of
capitalist development is necessary to distinguish institutional
forms and social movements which reproduce capitalism (or allow it to intensify
or to expand to a larger scale) from those forms and movements which may act to
transform the capitalist system into a qualitatively different system. Here Althusser (Althusser and Balibar, 1970)
has given us a useful distinction
that between the mode of production (the basic essence of
capitalism as a system) and the social formation (the concretely existing set
of social institutions which contain historical survivals of earlier modes of
production and nascent elements of modes of production of the future). The idea of "social formation" will
here apply to the whole world-system rather than to separate national
societies. Thus the book is titled Global
Formation.
The above posits the
existence of a systemic essence the
basic
tendential laws of capitalist development. My discussion focuses on the logical "boundaries"
between different modes. It is argued
that these boundaries must be specified clearly in order to understand how
fundamental social change the
qualitative transformation of social systems
occurs. We must consider the
possibility that two or more modes of production may coexist within a single
world-system. Foster-Carter's (1978)
review of the mode of production controversy discusses several important
conceptual distinctions. He points out
that both articulation (in the sense of the complementary interpenetration of
two modes), and contradiction (in the sense of conflict and competition among
modes) are necessary in order to understand the interactions among modes of
production. As Foster-Carter puts it,
"Each concept needs the other: articulation without contradiction would
indeed be static and anti-Marxist; but contradiction without
articulation...fallaciously implies that the waxing and waning of modes of
production are quite separate activities, each internally determined, whereas
in fact they are linked as are wrestlers in a clinch" (1978:73).
An Analytic Narrative
Here follows a rather abstract and brief sketch of the history
of the
capitalist world-system which will be helpful in sorting out the
relationship between modes of production and world-systems. Wallerstein contends that the transition to
capitalism occurred for the first time in the European world-
economy during the "long sixteenth century"
(14501640). This system was
imperialistic from the beginning in that it was composed of a hierarchical
division of labor between core and peripheral areas. It emerged from European feudalism, a
somewhat unique social system which was itself a devolved combination of the
Roman Empire and the Germanic tribal societies (
Fernand Braudel's
(1984) narrative of the European world-economy differs from Wallerstein's in
theoretically relevant ways. Though he
avoids committing himself to formal definitions, Braudel makes a distinction
between capitalism and the market economy.
For him capitalism is haute finance and mercantile monopoly
spreading over the top of market exchange like a parasite, able to influence
the development of states and economies by subtle manipulations. Braudel differs from Wallerstein by
conceiving of the European world-economy as a set of layered modes of
production with capitalism at the top and precapitalist modes such as slavery
and serfdom in the periphery. This
layered approach leads him to include the city-state Mediterranean
world-economy of the twelfth century in his narrative of the development of the
capitalist world-system. He also
contends that a world-economy necessarily has a single city at its center, and
he describes the see-sawing hegemonies of
What we have here are
two different notions of the transition to
capitalism. For Braudel
just the top layer was capitalist, and it was merchant or commercial
capitalism, not industrial capitalism.
For Wallerstein each world-system has only one mode of production, so
the entire European world-
economy (both core and periphery) experienced the transition
from feudalism to capitalism during the "long sixteenth century"
(Wallerstein, 1974:chapter 8).
Braudel's notion of a
layered world-system with capitalism at the top and precapitalist modes in the
periphery is similar to the formulations of many other theorists (e.g. LaClau,
1977). But unlike LaClau, Braudel
implies notonly that capitalism creates and sustains peripheral exploitation,
but that capitalism is dependent on the existence of a periphery. In this he follows the lead of Rosa Luxemburg
(1968). Here is where Wallerstein's
formulation is superior. The idea of a
mode of production as a self-sustaining logic of reproduction would seem to
require that sectors or layers which are necessary to the reproduction of the
logic be defined as part of that logic.
According to
Wallerstein the period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a period of
transition in which the logic of capitalism came to dominate European
feudalism. The key struggle was the
defeat of the Habsburg attempt to convert the nascent capitalist world-economy
into a tributary world-empire.
The peripheralization
of Eastern Europe was possible in part because the timing of the process of
infeudation there was delayed due to the weaker influence of the
From its base in
Europe and
economy. In the core this
meant the more thorough subjugation of the labor process to the logic of
efficient and profitable commodity production (Marx 1976:1025-38) and in the
periphery it meant the partial decline of the directly coercive aspects of
labor control and the rise of more opaque market-mediated wage labor relations.
Capitalist slavery and
serfdom were eventually replaced by less directly repressive forms of labor
control. The process of proletarianization
deepened in both the core and the periphery as subsistence production and home
production (worker's gardens, nonmonetized family labor, etc.)
became
commodified, making workers more and more exclusively dependent
on the sale of their labor power. In the
periphery at times "precapitalist" forms of labor control were either
created anew or revitalized to produce commodities for export to the core. In addition, many "part-time
proletarians" received low wages made possible by their partial dependence
on village communities which served as labor reserves for the sector of the
economy producing peripheral commodities (
Thus the expansion of
capitalism during some phases reproduced "precapitalist" forms of
production, while during other phases it broke these forms down and replaced
them with production relations more similar to those of the core. Proletarianization and the commodification of
life has therefore increased in both the core and the periphery, with a certain
lag in the periphery, and the retention in the periphery of more coercive types
of labor control. These are more
coercive relative to the core but less coercive relative to the earlier
periphery.
At the level
of the core/periphery hierarchy capitalist production relations have similarly
become less directly coercive and more formally organized as market relations
between equals, even though the unequal power of core and peripheral states in
the interstate system, and the "market
advantages" of core capitalism (employing capital-intensive
technology and skilled highly paid labor) remain great. Nevertheless, neo-colonialism is
not colonialism. The
sovereignty of contemporary peripheral nation-states may often be in question,
but it is undoubtedly greater than when colonial empires carved up Asia,
Africa, and the
of economic domination by the core, but they certainly involve
more core-like capitalist relations of production than did the purely
extractive peripheral industries of earlier centuries.
In this brief
description of the spread and deepening of capitalist relations of production
we can see the importance of specifying both the spatial and logical boundaries
of capitalism. The intensification of
commodified relations within both the core and the periphery of
the capitalist system is an important process which has consequences for the
ability of capitalism to reproduce itself.
An exclusively spatial metaphor for conceptualizing production relations
blurs the distinction between the logics of different modes of production. I am arguing that, though articulation of
wage-labor production with non-wage forms of commodified labor is an endogenous
feature of capitalism, we must analyze the logical boundaries of modes of
production without relying too heavily on the spatial dimension.
Socialism is a mode of
production which subjects investment decisions and distribution to a logic of
collective use value, and as such, socialistmovements reintroduce
non-commodified relations into the interstices of capitalist relations. But the complete institutionalization of a
socialist mode of production awaits the day when this qualitatively different
logic becomes dominant in the world-system.
Thus the question of logical boundaries is important for allowing us to
see how a particular organizational form may reproduce capitalist relations or
contribute to the transformation of
capitalism.
A particular
institution may, of course, do both at the same time. Thus labor unions have forced capital to
expand mechanization at the same time as they have placed constraints on
capitalist control of a certain share of
surplus value. Similarly,
"socialist" states may reproduce the logic of commodity production on
a national scale (state capitalism) while at the same time creating a more
socialist logic of distribution, at least within their own political boundaries
(Chase-Dunn, 1982b). Thus logical
boundaries must be specified which enable us to understand the qualitative
distinction between capitalism and socialism even when these are not
differentiated spatially.
We can borrow a
metaphor from biological systems in order to begin this task. Alker (1982) and Lenski and Lenski (1982)
have argued that social systems are reproduced by "genetic"
codes. These theorists share a
cybernetic conception of systemic structure in which social information becomes
coded in cultural and symbolic systems.
Materialists may utilize the imagery of the genetic theory of deep
structure and reproduction without adopting an idealist philosophy. For Marx the "genetic structure" of
social systems was inherent in the institutions by which material life was
reproduced. He posited a tension between
the technical and social forces of production (technology, labor process) and
the relations of production (those political institutions whichallow
exploitation to take place). Cultural
institutions were thought to be reflections of the more basic struggle over
material production. Thus the essential
nature of a particular mode of production could be understood from an analysis
of the typical institutions of production and class exploitation. A deep structure theory which follows the
materialist approach will start with an analysis of class relations. These are conceptualized in various ways by
different Marxists and these differences have profound effects on the
understanding of modes of production and their transformation.
A Purely Formal Approach
What is a model of deep structure? We have various formal alternatives which may
be useful. A theory may be specified
axiomatically as a series of propositions and derived hypotheses. Nowak (1971) has thus formalized parts of
Marx's accumulation model of capitalist development. Such an axiomatic theory could employ the
kind of dialectical causal logic suggested by Wright (1978:
15-26). Or a theory may
posit the existence of a set of basic processes in terms of causal relations
among a number of variables. The
equations which describe this kind of model may be written, and alternative
specifications are easily posited. Let
us take this second form and imagine that we have decided upon a set of key
variables for representing the underlying model of capitalist development. We then have a number of equations which
posit causal relations among basic variables under specified scope
conditions. If we want to use
dialectical logic we may model complicated non-Aristotelian relations among
variables (see Alker, 1982).2
Let us think about
what it would mean to formally specify the logical boundaries of
such a formalization of the basic processes of the capitalist system. We can ask what would have to change to
constitute a qualitativelydifferent system.
If we could somehow actually know the exact specification which
corresponds to the actual capitalist mode of production at a single point in
time we would likely find out that the historicists are partly right. Even ignoring those aspects of social reality
which are largely conjunctural, the most appropriate structural model is likely
to be always changing to a certain extent. Let us assume that this
"background" change is fairly constant over time and that it is
relatively small. If, indeed, the basic
structure changes rapidly, then generalizations about modes of production are
inappropriate, and the best we can do is to write history.
The problem of
"stages of capitalism" might be understood in such a formalistic
approach by focusing on larger changes in the parameters
specifying relations among variables. Qualitative transformation in such a
formalistic approach could be designated as more fundamental change in the
model such that wholly different processes with different variables are created
and become dominant in the overall determination of development. This would correspond to transformation of
structural "constants" which are then seen not as constant relative
to all socio-economic systems, but only with regard to a particular mode of
production.
Many problems are
raised by such a purely formal approach to system transformation. How can we distinguish between changes in the
model which are unimportant for the basic structure, or which reproduce the
same system logic using new organizational forms (perhaps on a greater spatial
scale), from changes which truly transform the system logic? The distinctions between background, stage,
and transformative change suggested above are based on formal distinctions within
mathematically or logically specified models.
Certainly such an approach would need to combine these formal
distinctions withsubstantive considerations about the nature of modes of
production. If we want to be able not
only to say that fundamental change has occurred, but also to say in what
direction change is occurring, we need to have substantive models of the
various possible modes of production: kinbased, tributary, capitalist,
and socialist. Here we
will work mainly on the specification of the
capitalist mode, although it should be remembered that the
problem of logical boundaries implies the necessity of specifying the other
modes as well.
We require a
substantive core of assertions on which to base our theory of world-system
development. It might be possible to
work inductively from empirically observable cycles and trends (see chapter
2). It should be recognized that quite
different deep structure theories might account for any particular set of
empirical patterns, though an inductive approach would probably rule out some
theories. At this point I will proceed
in the other direction, from prior theorizing, although it should be emphasized
that this deductive kind of theoretical development should not remain a
selfcontained universe. Different
formulations must eventually contend with one another to account for empirical
evidence. We are a long way from
sufficient clarity, however, and the first task is to think through some
general theoretical problems.
A question which poses
nicely the problem I wish to confront is "what is capital?" Marx understood capital to be a social
relationship, an institutionalization of control through property ownership of
the means of production. For Marx
capital contained within itself the relationship with labor, a relationship in
which property-less workers must sell their labor time to capital-owners. How might we modify this definition in the
light of the insights provided by viewing capitalism as a world-system? I will approachthis problem from two
directions. The first uses insights about
the state and the interstate system to reformulate the definition of
capital. This involves the analysis of
the process of commodification and its limits.
The second
approaches the problem of domination more directly by analyzing
the relationship between classes and the core/periphery hierarchy. Let us consider these in turn.
Commodification and its Limits
Marx began with the commodity.
The commodity is a standardized product produced for exchange in a
price-setting market, in which the conditions of production are subject to
reorganization as a result of changes in input
costs. A work of art is
not a commodity because it is not (by definition) standardized or
reproducible. Your mother is not a
commodity because she is not replaceable in the market. There are no perfect commodities, but many
social objects approximate commodities.
It is uncontestably the case that the deepening of capitalist relations
involves the commodification of ever more areas of human life. Production for use in the home becomes
replaced by the purchase of commodities.
Economists commonly project the character of commodities onto
everything. Children become consumer
durables. Some socio
logists carry on in the same manner, although they sometimes
differentiate purely economic from "social" exchange (Blau,
1964). The "market mentality"
tends to analyze all interaction as commodified exchange.
All of human life is
not organized in the commodity form.
Some things represent collective "goods" or transcendent
values which have no calculable market price.
Many relationships, even in "advanced" countries, involve real
transcendent solidarity which is not reducible to a business deal. Friendship, love, patriotism are often
described in the language of "rational choice," butpart of the nature
of these relationships involves a merging of the individual interests (the
constitution of a corporate entity) such that the terms of exchange among parts
are undefined, and undefinable.
Marx observed that the
market, especially the market for labor, while it formally represents an
exchange among equals, is actually an institutional mystification of the main
type of exploitation which typifies capitalist society: the appropriation of
surplus value. One of his great
contributions was to show how the formal equality of the market could produce
socially structured inequality. I have
mentioned above that Marx's model of capitalist
accumulation assumes a perfectly operating system of markets for
labor and other commodified objects.
This assumption has led to the narrow view, held by both Marxists and
non-Marxists, that capitalism is limited to a market system in which
"private" owners of the means of production employ commodified labor
to accumulate capital.
The public/private
distinction is fundamental to Marx's definition of "independent
producers," and thus also to his distinction between production for use
and production for exchange. It is
assumed that, in a market economy, independent producers seeking to maximize
their own returns exchange
commodities with one another.
The production of use values, on the other hand, assumes some unity of
interests, either because an individual or family is producing for itself,
rather than for the market, or because the unit producing use values does it
according to a calculus which includes other principles in addition to strict
economic efficiency. Thus use-values may
be produced by a traditional division of labor in an Indian village in which
"prices" are customary (Mandel, 1970), by a state within a tributary
mode of production according to a logic of political domination, or by a
socialist society inwhich investment decisions and exchange terms are
democratically determined using a calculus of social need.
A historicalstructural
perspective on capitalism suggests that we should seek its kernel in the main
specific types of competition and integration which operate in the whole
terrain of interaction. Since the market
principle is historically only part of the determination of success and failure
in the worldsystem, we should incorporate the dynamics of those non-market
processes which are important to successful accumulation into our
conceptualization of the kernel relations.
It has been argued by some critics of Wallerstein that states and the
interstate system (which form the political basis of world capitalism) operate
according to somewhat different principles than do firms and classes struggling
to survive and succeed in the arena of the world market (Skocpol, 1977;
Zolberg, 1981). In chapter 7 I argue
that the logic of competition and conflict in the interstate system
(geopolitics) and the logic of competition in the world market should be
understood as inter-dependent determinants of the dynamics of capitalist
development. The present task is to
ground this idea in an analysis of the process of commodification and its
limits.3
The expansion of
capitalism has largely consisted of a deepening and widening of commodified
relations. More and more aspects of life
become commercialized. More and more
interactions are mediated by markets.
And the spatial scale of market integration grows. But there are clearly limits to the degree of
commodification which is possible for capitalism to survive as a social
system. Capitalists themselves, workers'
organizations and especially states sometimes resist market forces and act to
erect institutional barriers to the commodification of certain relations. Much of politics in capitalistsociety is a
seesawing struggle among different groups over the process of commodification
and its limits. This struggle is a
normal part of capitalism itself, although the resistance to commodification
holds the possibility of challenging the basic logic of capitalism.
Some of the limits on
commodification are erected by political groups operating explicitly in their
own interests. Thus cartels, guilds, and
trade unions are organizations which resist market forces in the name of
"special interests." But the
most extensive efforts to regulate market forces are carried out by states in
the name of "society." Public
health regulations, minimum wage legislation, national parks and many other
institutional features of capitalist societies are legitimated in terms of
state provision of "public goods" which market forces either would
not provide or which must be protected from commercialization in the name of
those "universal interests" represented by the State.
Karl Polanyi's (1944)
sweeping portrayal of the "great transformation" outlined the growth
of markets and the commodification of wealth, labor, and land in
Polanyi's depiction of
the transition to socialism is more historical and openended than the
functionalist notion of an equilibrium between differen
tiation and integration or an automatic dialectic which
mechanically produces social transformation.
Obviously the political tussle over the extension and limitation of
commodification involves class struggles, ideological hegemony, complicated
matters of consciousness formation, etc. and is anything but automatic. But Polanyi's analysis falters because he
fails to consider the importance of the fact that these struggles take place
within a larger terrain formed by the world economy and the interstate
system. Despite his focus on many
international aspects of capitalist development, Polanyi does not see that the
structure of the interstate system itself poses a major difficulty for his
theory of the transition to socialism.
The limits on commodification, and also the limits on collective
rationality are set in a competitive struggle in which firms, classes, and most
importantly states are the players against one another.
The myth of the Nation
as a transcendent solidarity is an important determinant of success or failure
in this struggle. States must be able to
legitimate their actions and to mobilize participation (taxpaying and warfare)
in order to survive or prevail in the worldeconomy. Those that do this less efficiently or less
effectively are likely to lose out in the competitive struggle. Thus both political mobilization and
comparative advantage in the world market are important to the logic of
capitalism.
The ideological
mystification which holds that the State represents the "general
will" or the "universal" interest is not false only because
states are controlled more by capitalists than by workers. It is also false because states represent
only the interests of their own citizens.
Thus the State is only one more political organization in a larger arena
of competing political organizations.
Even if a state did represent all of its citizens these would
not be universal interests from the point of view of the
socioeconomic systemas a whole. The
"society" represented by each state is a national society, a subgroup
in a larger whole. And there is no world
state to aggregate the interests of all participants in the worldsystem.
The political
structure of capitalism is not the
The expansion and
deepening of commodification has always created reactions and stimulated the
formation of political structures to protect people from market forces. Capitalists themselves organize political
institutions which limit market forces.
Contrary to much ideology most real living capitalists usually prefer
monopolistic certainty to the vagaries and risks of market competition. Thus capitalist states have always tried to
protect the capitalists who control them.
States act to expand markets or to destroy barriers to market
competition when their own capitalists will benefit because they enjoy a
competitive advantage. And workers and
peasants have tried to protect themselves from market forces through guild
organizations, community structures, workers' coops, labor unions and political
parties. Marx's (1967a) discussion of
the struggle over the length of the working day shows how middlestratum
professionals sometimes become involved in welfareoriented regulation of market
forces. The abolition of child labor and
slavery are additional examples of limits to commodification created by
movements with complex class identities.
The constraints on
market forces imposed in one region, state or industry are often one of the
most important driving forces of the expansion of commodification to new
areas. Successful labor organizing
causes capital to look elsewhere for labor.
Monopolies organized locally or nationally encourage consumers to try to
gain access to outside markets where goods may be cheaper, and cheaper
production in these outside markets is also encouraged. Thus commercialization and regulation
interact in a spiral which drives a number of the longrun trends visible in the
worldsystem. Commodification causes
political organizations to emerge, which then result in incentives for the
further extension of commodification.
This may undermine earlier, smallerscale political organizations by
pricing them out of competition or by causing them to internally impose new
conditions of "market efficiency."
So far the scale of market forces has always been able to escape
political regulation, now even encompassing the "socialist" states
and encouraging their movement toward deregulation and levels of allocation
more typical in the larger worldeconomy.
The size of firms, the
spatial scale of markets and the depth of market integration increase partly in
reaction to political efforts to regulate market forces. The "internationalization of
capital" is partly explained by escape from political regulation and labor
unions and a good portion of the trend
toward evergreater stateformation the arrogation of powers over more and more
areas of life can be attributed to state
action vis a vis market forces.
Increasingly states not only react to market forces with regulation but
theyintervene to create market forces.
As firm size and the spatial scale of markets has grown, state
responsibility for economic development has increased. The state not only serves private
entrepreneurs and tries to attract capital, sometimes it itself is the
entrepreneur. This occurred first in
several second tier core and semiperipheral countries trying to catch up with
British industrialization, but now peripheral capitalists regularly use the
only organization they have access to which is large enough to compete in the
global economy the State. State capitalism is thus a trend, not of
socialism, but of the increasing scale of production and market integration in
the capitalist worldeconomy.
What are the
implications of the above for our effort to redefine capital in the light of
the historical patterns of capitalist development in the worldsystem? For one thing we need to reconsider the question
of forms of property and capitalism. The
emphasis on commodification and the importance of markets in the context of
multiple competing and unequally powerful political organizations leads us to
question a narrow interpretation of "private" property as the only
appropriate form of ownership for capitalism.
General Motors would still be a capitalist firm competing in the world
automobile market even if it were to become owned and controlled by its
employees. Even stateowned firms are
subject to constraints based on the ability of the state which owns them to
compete in the larger global political economy.
Capital is that sort of power which is able to combine the operation of
profitable commodity production with the relatively efficient provision of
those "public goods" which are necessary or advantageous to
profitability. Thus capitalists, in this
sense, are neither private owners of productive wealth nor state managers, but
rather the combined operations which produce success or failure in the capitalist
worldsystem. Iam not suggesting that we
should abandon the distinction between privately held capital and the state,
nor am I suggesting that these do not often have contradictory interests. What I mean is that "success" in
the capitalist system requires both of these and their cooperation whether or
not the jobs be differentiated to separate organizations or more integrated, as
when states directly control commodity producing firms. Thus states are part of the relations of
production in capitalism, and capitalism cannot be understood as separate from
the logic of nationbuilding, stateformation and geopolitics as they typically
operate in the context of an expanding and deepening process of
commodification.
In order to understand
how geopolitics and the competition among states in the interstate system is
integrated with capitalist commodity production we
must analyze the form and content of interstate competition
within the
capitalist world-economy.
This subject is taken up in the second part of this book.
World Classes and the Core/periphery Relationship
Let us now turn to the way in which exploitation and domination
are
structured the
interaction of interclass and intraclass conflict in the
world-system. Albert
Bergesen (1983) has argued that the core/periphery relationship can be
conceptualized as a kind of class relationship.
He shows
convincingly that the relationship between the core and the
periphery is not simply an exchange between equal partners. Structured power has created and sustained
the hierarchical division of labor between the core and the
periphery, and continues to do so. Bergesen's argument is an important response
to Brenner's (1977) characterization of the world-system perspective as
"circulationist." Nevertheless, rather than collapsing the
categories of class and core/
periphery, it may be more helpful to use them both and to study
their inter-
action. First, what is
the difference between the two?
According to Marx, the capitalist/proletarian relationship is based on
ownership and/or control of productive property versus a class of workers who
do not own means of production and must sell their labor-power. This institutional situation is understood to
have come into existence through the use of extra-economic coercion, and to be
largely sustained by the normal processes of capitalist economic
competition. The core/periphery
relationship is analytically understood as a territorial division of labor in
which core areas specialize in capital intensive production using skilled
highly paid labor, and peripheral areas specialize in labor intensive
production using low wage (or coerced) and relatively unskilled labor.4
The world economy is
composed of "commodity chains," forward and backward linkages of
processes of production (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986). These commodity chains link raw materials,
labor, the sustenance of labor, intermediate processing, final processing,
transport, and final consumption. The
great bulk of consumption in the capitalist world-economy is of products whose
commodity chains cross national boundaries, and a large portion of these link
the core and the periphery.
Wallerstein contends that core activities take place at those
"nodes" on commodity chains where capital-intensive technology and
skilled highly paid labor are used, and where relatively greater surplus value
is appropriated (see chapter 10).
The core/periphery
relationship was brought into existence by extra-
economic plunder, conquest, and colonialism, and is sustained by
the normal
operation of politicalmilitary and economic competition
in the capitalist world-economy.
The world class
structure is primarily composed of capitalists (owners and controllers of means
of production) and property-less workers.
This class system also includes small commodity producers who control
their own means of production but do not employ the labor of others,5 and a
growing middle class of skilled and/or professionally certified workers.
The territorial
core/periphery hierarchy cross-cuts this world class structure and interacts
with it in important ways. Thus the
categories of core capitalist/peripheral capitalist, and core worker/peripheral
worker are useful for an analysis of the dynamics of world capitalism. Core labor is usually conceived as organized
by the wage-system in which competition in a labor market determines
wages. But at least some core workers
have long been in the category of protected labor in the sense that
trade unions, welfare legislation and/or other politically articulated
institutions (such as immigration controls) give them some protection from
competition in the world labor market and some advantages in the struggle with
capital. Guilds protected workers and
producers from competition within medieval cities,
encouraging the development of capitalist production outside
city walls. Core states, and other
states as well, develop politically-mediated mechanisms for
protecting workers, but the uneven process of capitalist
accumulation manages to find ways around many of these protections. The point is that the world class system may
be best understood as a continuum from protected labor through wage labor to
coerced labor which roughly corresponds to the core/periphery
hierarchy.
It is
important to realize that labor may be commodified without receiving a formal
wage. The serfs and slaves who produced
surplus value for peripheral capitalists in earlier centuries were treated as
commodities in the sense that their labor process was directed by a logic of
capital accumulation, even though they did not have the juridical freedom to
sell their labor-time to capital. There
are many degrees and forms of the commodification of labor.
Sidney Mintz (1977)
addresses the question, "was the plantation slave a proletarian?" and
his answer, after examining the interconnections between industrial capitalism
in
Marx clearly
distinguishes proletarian from slave labor in his model of fully-developed
capitalist accumulation. In volume 1 of Capital
Marx (1967a: 168) outlines his definition of commodified labor as the buying
and selling of labor-power. The
proletarian is defined as one who is free to sell his labor time, but is not
himself a commodity in the sense that a slave is. He is also "free" of the ownership
of the means of production and so is institutionally compelled to sell his
labor-power because he cannot produce for subsistence. We would expect to find
an argument by Marx as to why this narrow definition of commodified labor is
important in his theory of capitalism, but instead we find a kind of
circularity in his definition of a commodity.
He declares that "the exchange of commodities of itself implies no
other relations of dependence than those which result from its own nature"
(Marx, 1967a:168).
It is implied by Marx
that slave labor is not itself a commodity because slaves are not specifically
produced for sale. Actually
slave-breeding in mid-nineteenth century
system. He says,
"Otherwise with capital, the historical conditions of its existence are by
no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life only when the owner
of the means of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free
labourer selling his labour-power. And this
one historical condition comprises a world's
history" (Marx, 1967a:170). Actually it comprises the
history of the core zone, which is itself not comprehensible without
consideration of the
accumulation carried out in the periphery through forms of labor
which were partly commodified while also containing a large dose of politically-mediated
coercion.
Coercion beyond the
operation of free labor markets remains an important condition for reproducing
wage differentials in the contemporary world.
After all, if there were no extra-economic barriers to labor migration,
day laborersin the
The combination of
capital/labor relations and core/periphery relations produces many of the
consequences which are fundamental to the capitalist development process. The dynamics of the interstate system and the
process of uneven development are the result of interclass and intraclass
conflict and competition as well as international competition. Class alliances or "relative
harmonies" between capital and sectors of labor within core countries
cause, and are caused by, the internationally strong states and internally
relatively well-integrated nations of the core.
The more coercive and exploitative interclass relations of the periphery
are partly the result of alliances between peripheral and core capitalists, as are
the relatively weaker states and less integrated nations of the periphery. State socialism, the most important of the
anti-capitalist movements which have emerged within the capitalist
world-system, was possible because of the "combined and uneven
development" which occurred in semiperipheral areas
(Trotsky, 1932), where cross-cutting contradictions (conflicts among
capitalists and between
capitalists and workers) were exacerbated by an intermediate
position in the core/periphery hierarchy.
The interstate system,
centered on powerful core states which contend with one another for hegemony,
is an important structural basis of the continued competition within the world
capitalist class. No state represents
the "general" interests of the capitalist class as a whole. Rather subgroups of the world capitalist
class control particular states. This multicentricstructure of the world
capitalist class allows the process of competitive capitalist uneven
development to continue. The rise and
fall of hegemonic core states and changes in the structure of international
alliances allow for flexibility in the world polity and accommodate changes in
the distribution of comparative advantages in commodity production. A single world capitalist state would be much
more likely to politically sustain the interests of those capitalist subgroups
which controlled it, and thus to impede the shift in productive advantage from
less to more "efficient" producers.
Similarly such a state would become the single object of orientation of
anti-capitalist movements. Thus, unlike
the present interstate system, in which successful social constraints on
capital often lead to the state's loss of centrality in the world market and
capital flight, in a world capitalist state the
aggregation of workers' interests would likely be more effective
in actually transforming the logic of the political economy toward a more
democratic and collectively rational system.
The world-system
perspective contends that the core/periphery hierarchy, rather than being a
passing phase in the transition of "backward" areas toward core-type
capitalism, is a permanent, necessary and reproduced feature of the capitalist
mode of production. This contention is
supported by historical studies and crossnational comparative research (see
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985) which have substantiated the continuation of
mechanisms that reproduce core/periphery inequalities. The periphery of the world-economy has
certainly "developed" and changed greatly since the incorporation of
Latin America, Asia, and
hierarchical relationship between the core and the periphery
remains.
What is the
function of this territorial hierarchy for capitalism as a system? It has probably never been the case, even in
the heyday of pure plunder, that more surplus value was extracted from the
periphery than was produced in the core.
Most of the surplus value accumulated in the core is produced by core
workers using relatively more productive technology. Never-
theless, the surplus value extracted from the periphery has
played a crucial role in allowing the relatively peaceful process of expanded
reproduction in the core to proceed.
This has occurred in three ways: a) by reducing the level of conflict
and competition among core capitalists within core states; b) by allowing
adjustments to power relations among core states to be settled without
destroying the interstate system; and c) by promoting a relative harmony
between capital and important sectors of labor in the core.
This last point is
politically sensitive because it is contrary to much Marxist class
analysis. It also raises the admittedly
difficult question of longrun versus shortterm class interests. There has been much discussion
about whether or not core workers exploit peripheral workers, or
benefit from their exploitation (Emmanuel, 1972:271-342). It is clear that many core workers do benefit
from the exploitation of the periphery in a number of different ways. They are able to buy peripheral products
cheaply. The territorial division of
labor between the core and the periphery enables a larger proportion of core
workers to have cleaner and more skilled jobs.
The profits from imperialism enable some core capitalists to respond
more flexibly to worker demands for higher wages. The greater affluence of the core allows core
states to devote more resources to welfare, and to maintain a relatively
greater degree of pluralism and democracy.
Thus the
Marxists who have maintained that lack of socialist militancy among core
workers is entirely due to "false consciousness" based on
nationalism and anti-socialist propaganda are wrong, although
the status-based mechanisms of ideological hegemony are also important in
maintaining class harmony in the core.
The objective structuring of interests based on the cross-cutting nature
of class and core/periphery exploitation has stabilized the capitalist
world-economy. This structural basis of
capitalism implies that constraints on the ability of core capitalists to keep
on exploiting the periphery may have revolutionary consequences for class
relations within core countries. If
core/periphery wage differentials were to decrease, core workers would be less
subject to the "job blackmail" backed up by the threat (and reality)
of capital flight.
What is Real Capitalism?
Let us combine the above discussions of commodification and
class-core/
periphery together to postulate a new specification of the
capitalist mode of production. Real capitalism
can be defined as:
1 Generalized
commodity production in which land, labor, and wealth are substantially
commodified.
2 Private ownership
and/or control of the means of production, which may be exercised by
individuals or organizations, including single states, which are themselves
players in the larger competitive arena of commodity production and
geopolitics. This allows for "state
capitalism."
3 Accumulation of
capital based on a mix of both competitive production of commodities and politicalmilitary
power, in which commodity
production has
the greater weight in the determination of outcomes in the system as a whole.
4 Exploitation of
commodified labor which is, however, not always paid a wage.
5 The combination of
class exploitation with core/periphery exploitation such that the former is
more important quantitatively in the accumulation of capital, but the latter is
nevertheless essential because of its political effects on the mobility of
capital and in reducing class conflict and weakening anti-capitalist movements
in the core.
This adds considerably
to Marx's more elegant formulation, but the elements added allow us to account
for many of the structural features of the contemporary world-system by
referring to its mode of production.
Samir Amin
(1974) has suggested a slightly different formulation which
defines core capitalism the way Marx did, except that it is articulated with
and reliant on peripheral capitalism.
Core capitalism is defined by Amin as "autocentric"
self-expansion of capital, while peripheral capitalism is externally determined
(by the core) and uses an extra dose of coercion in its class relations. The definition suggested above is intended to
analytically combine the interstate system and the core/periphery hierarchy
into our definition of capitalism in order to explain certain features of the
modern world-system which are quite problematic when Marx's definition is used
in its unmodified form.
Now we have an
explanation, based on the capitalist mode of production itself, for why
socialism has not emerged in the "most developed" (core) areas. The core/periphery hierarchy operates to
reduce class antagonisms or to suppress class conflict in both the core and, to
some extent, in the periphery. In
peripheral areas a comprador bourgeoisie often rules with coresupport, but when
anti-imperialist movements emerge they are most often broad
anti-core class alliances.
But in the semiperiphery class antagonisms are not cross-cut by the
core/periphery hierarchy, and it is there that the strongest attempts to create
socialism have been made.
The above definition
also allows us to theoretically account for the general features which many
different peripheral areas have in common.
We do not mean to contend that all peripheral areas are the same. The original social structural
characteristics and cultures of the societies which were incorporated into the
expanding European world-economy undoubtedly affected the particular
institutional forms which emerged in different areas (see chapter 10). Yet the process of peripheralization and
exploitation, with its
phases of alternately sustaining and destroying
"precapitalist" institutions and forms of labor control (depending on
changing opportunities in the world market) has a certain unity which the
world-system definition of capitalism captures.
The processes of
uneven development, the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, and the upward
and downward mobility of areas in the core/periphery hierarchy, are more
clearly understood when we incorporate the interstate system and the
core/periphery hierarchy into our notion of capitalism. All these advantages are strong reasons to
adopt the above definition of the capitalist mode of production which is
suggested by Wallerstein. But some of
Wallerstein's simplifying assumptions, like those of Marx, may have created
more problems than they solved.
World-System Boundaries and Modes of Production
As has been mentioned above, Wallerstein's totality assumption
holds that the mode of production is a feature of a whole world-system, and by
extension theneach world-system has only one mode of production. This simplifying assumption has allowed us to
examine the systematic ways in which capitalism and imperialism are linked, and
to reconceptualize the capitalist mode of
production as including both core and peripheral types of
capitalist
exploitation. Now that
this is accomplished we can reexamine the totality assumption in order to
resolve certain problems which it causes.
Many critics of the
world-system perspective have pointed out that the equation of a mode of
production with a whole world-system makes problematic the understanding of the
transformation of modes of production.
If each
world-system can have only one mode of production, how do modes
change? The simplifying assumption which
equates spatial boundaries with logical boundaries runs into difficulties when
we try to understand how modes of production have been transformed in the past
and how they might be transformed in the future.
The simplest
Wallersteinian definition of a world-system focuses on a network of material
exchange, the exchange of fundamental or necessary goods food and raw materials. In order to use this definition we need not
consider the question of the mode of production or the institutional forms of
the exchanges. We only need to know the
extent of direct and indirect material flow densities. This is a convenient and empirically useful
definition which allows us to investigate the relationships between worldsystems
and modes of production rather than assuming that each worldsystem has only one
mode of production. Its application to
the idea of a European world-economy raises difficulties.
The idea of
Wallerstein
substitutes the mode of production criteria for the network of bulk goods criteria
when he analyzes the interaction between Europe and
(Wallerstein, 1979c).
These are alleged to be separate world-systems because Europe is
capitalist while
To be fair
Wallerstein's (1974:59-63) analysis of why capitalism did not emerge in
discussions of articulation which have led to the proliferation
of modes of production (Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Taylor, 1979; Wolpe, 1980).
The main
thrust of Wallerstein's analysis has been to demonstrate the
connectedness ofcore and peripheral kinds of exploitation. Once this is accomplished by
reconceptualizing the capitalist mode of production as above we no longer need
the totality assumption.
This assumption also
creates difficulties when we attempt to understand the transition to socialism
in the twentieth century. Although I
have argued that existing socialist states have not yet developed an autonomous
socialist
mode of production (Chase-Dunn, 1982b), I would not want this to
be true by definition. As difficult as
it may be in practice for a city or a nation-state to develop an autonomous and
self-sustaining socialist mode of production in the context of the contemporary
capitalist world-system, I would not argue that it is impossible in principle.
In conclusion let me
summarize. I have redefined the
capitalist mode of production to allow the explanation of systemic features
which are not easily explained using Marx's definition. Incorporating the interstate system and the
core/periphery hierarchy as central features of capitalism allows us to
understand the general patterns of development in the global political economy
and the general features of class struggle and international uneven
development. It also allows us to
understand the general features of development in peripheral areas. By redefining capitalism as I have, it
becomes possible to drop Wallerstein's totality assumption while retaining the
above explanatory advantages. It also
allows us to separately analyze the logical boundaries of modes of production
and the spatial boundaries of world-systems.
Does this suggest that
the articulation of modes of production is "moved out" to the
boundary between peripheral capitalism and other modes of production? This spatial analogy is improper if it
implies that other modes of
production can exist only on the perimeter of the
world-system. It is possiblethat
elements of socialism, or the tributary mode of production, exist in the
core or the semiperiphery as well as in the periphery and
beyond. Ernest Mandel (1977) has
contended that street lights, which are free, non-commodified
"public" goods produced for the use of everyone, are socialist
institutions even within the heart of capitalism.
As has been mentioned,
however, the general analytic framework which allows us to have more than one
mode of production within a concrete social system does not by itself tell us
how these may be in interaction, or in contradiction, with each other. For this we must have a substantive theory of
the nature of each, and knowledge of their compatibilities and
contradictions. I have surmised
elsewhere that socialism, a holistic mode of production in its very nature, may
have a more difficult time emerging and growing in the interstices of capitalism
than capitalism did within the terrain of the tributary mode of
production. This is because capitalism
thrives on competition and conflict, and only grudgingly constructs collective
rationality, whereas socialism requires cooperation, and has difficulty
sustaining it in the context of a still strong and fiercely competitive
capitalist arena.
Let us now turn to a
consideration of certain observable cycles and secular trends which are
characteristics of the whole capitalist world-system.
Chapter 2: Constants, Cycles and Trends
This chapter describes a number of features of the capitalist
world-system as a whole which are, in principle, more directly observable than
its deep structural essence. In fact,
however, much of the operationalization and evidence-gathering which needs to
be done in order to verify these hypothesized surface level patterns has not
been done. I will discuss those studies
which have been carried out, and their implications for the schema I am
proposing in later sections, especially chapter 13.
I will argue in chapter
4 that a proper understanding of the structural features, systemic logic and
normal cycles of the capitalist world-economy reveals that the global system
has not undergone any important transformative change in the period since the
Second World War. The rapid changes of
scale and apparently new institutional forms are interpreted as continuations
of processes long in operation. This
argument requires that we have a fairly clear idea of the deep structural logic
of capitalism, and an accurate specification of the processes which maintain
the systemic features of the modern world-system and drive forward its cycles
and trends.
What follows is a list
of structural constants, cycles, and trends which are asserted to be features
of the whole world-system. The constants
are those deep structural features of the capitalist mode of production adduced
from our discussion in chapter 1. The
cycles and trends are suggested by our empirical knowledge of the modern
world-system, although only some of these have been quantitatively studied over
long periods of time. The present list
is a revised version of that presented in Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1977),
modified by consideration of the similar discussions contained in Hopkins and
Wallerstein (1982: chapters 2 and 5) and the empirical studies cited below.
The term
"cycle" as utilized in worldsystem studies does not imply a perfect
sine wave with unvarying amplitude, symmetry and period. Joshua Goldstein (1988:chapter 8) contends
that social cycles typically involve processes which are sufficiently
indeterminant to preclude exact mathematical specification, and thus we analyze
sequential changes with only approximately specified periods. Robert Philip Weber (1987) maintains that
sequences with "quite irregular" periodicity should rather be termed
"fluctuations" and the word "cycle" should be saved for
more rigorous occasions. I will not
worry about these matters for now since most of the "cycles"
discussed in this chapter are hypothetical.1
Systemic Constants, Cycles, and Trends
In order to study change we must have a clear idea of the
structural constants, cycles and trends operating in the capitalist
world-economy. For the moment particular
historical contingencies will be ignored.
Structural Constants
As explained in chapter 1, the capitalist world-economy is a
worldsystem in which the capitalist mode of production has become
dominant. Thus this historical system
has a deep structural logic of capitalist capital
accumulation which drives it to expand and which contains
systemic contradictions which will provoke its transformation to a different
logic once expansion and deepening of capitalist social relations have
approached their limits.
The constant
structural features of the capitalist world-system are:
1 The interstate system a system of unequally powerful nationstates
which compete for resources by supporting profitable commodity production and
by engaging in geopolitical and military competition.
2 A core/periphery hierarchy in which the
countries which occupy a core position specialize in core production relatively capitalintensive production
utilizing skilled, high-wage labor.
Peripheral areas contain mostly peripheral production laborintensive, low-wage, unskilled labor
which has historically been subjected to extra-economic coercion.
3 Production relations in the capitalist
world-economy are more complex than Marx (1967a) assumed in his basic model of
capitalist accumulation. The direct
producers differ in their access to political organizations, most importantly,
states. Thus there is a reproduced
differentiation between core labor and peripheral labor. Labor is commodified, but it is not a perfect
commodity. Direct producers (workers)
vary in terms of the degree to which their interests are protected or coerced
by political organizations. Core workers
often enjoy the protection of state-legalized labor unions and welfare laws,
although many remain in the condition of "free" laborers more subject
to the vicissitudes of the labor market.
At the other extreme are those peripheral workers who are directly
subjected to extra-economic coercion
historically: serfs, slaves, and contract laborers as well as workers in
countries where independent trade unions and labor parties are suppressed by the
state. Thus the continuum from protected
to coerced labor is a constant differentiation within the world work force
although, as we shall see below, the trend toward proletarianization moves a
greater proportion of the work force toward full-time dependence on capitalist
commodity production.
4
Commodity production for
the world market (which includes both national and international markets) is
the central form of competition and source of surplus value in the capitalist
mode of production. This form of
competition is fundamentally interwoven with the competitive political
processes of state-formation, nation-building and geopolitics in the context of
the interstate system. The world market
is not a perfect price-setting market, although it has long been, and remains,
a very competitive arena. Monopolies are
politically guaranteed within subunits (single states or the colonial
empires of individual core states), and super-profits deriving from these
monopolies are subjected to a longrun competition as the political conditions
for maintenance of monopolies are themselves subjected to the forces of
economic and geopolitical competition.
Systemic Cycles
1 The long business
cycle (Kwave). This is a world-wide
economic cycle (see VanDuijn, 1983) in which the relative rate of capital
accumulation and overall economic activity increases and then decreases toward
stagnation in a 40 to 60 year period.
This cycle was first discovered through the analysis of price series by
N. D. Kondratieff (1979). The causes of
the Kwave are explained within a Marxist framework by Mandel (1980). Goldstein (1988) shows how the long wave is
composed of two cycles, a price cycle of inflation and deflation, and a
production cycle of growth and stagnation.
According to Goldstein (1988:chapter 10) the price cycle lags behind the
production cycle by about ten to fifteen years.
Suter (1987) has recently presented an analysis of world-system debt
cycles which integrates the Kwave with the shorter (15-25 year) Kuznets cycle
as they have interacted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2 The hegemonic sequence. This refers to a fluctuation of hegemony
versus multi-centricity in the distribution of military power and economic
competitive advantage in production among core states. Hegemonic periods are those in which power
and competitive advantage are relatively concentrated in a single hegemonic
core state. Multicentric periods are
those in which there is a more equal distribution of power and competitive
advantage among core states. In only a
very rough sense is this a cycle because its periodicity is very uneven. It should rather be termed a sequence or
fluctuation. There have been three
hegemonic core states since the sixteenth century: the United Provinces of the
3 The cycle of core war
severity. Recent research by Goldstein
(1985, 1986) confirms that the severity of world wars wars among core states contending for
dominance in the world-system is
periodic in a 40 to 60 year cycle which is strongly related in time to the
Kondratieff wave. There have been
several peaks of severity (battle deaths per year) of core war since 1500, but
the three most severe periods of world war
the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World Wars I and II were followed by the emergence of a new
hegemonic core power. These processes
are discussed in more detail in Part II of this book.
Samir Amin (1980a) has
suggested that world wars represent normal forms of competition within
capitalism as a system. The political
structure within which peaceful capitalist accumulation proceeds becomes unable
to provide stable support after a period of uneven economic growth, and world
wars establish a new power framework for continued capitalist
accumulation. Albert Bergesen (1985) discusses
this idea in an analysis of the relations among several world-system cycles.
4
The structure of
core/periphery trade and control. A
periodic change in the pattern of control and exchange between the core and the
periphery has characterized the world-system since 1450. Periods of relatively free market
multilateral exchange have been followed by periods in which trade was more
politically controlled and tended to be contained within colonial empires
(Krasner, 1976). Bergesen and Schoenberg
(1980) have also demonstrated that waves of expansion of colonial empires are
correlated in time with the existence of warfare among core states. Models of the relationships between these
cycles are formulated in chapter 13.
Systemic Trends
A number of systemic trends increase in waves which roughly correspond
in time with some of the cycles described above.
1 Expansion to new populations and
territories. The capitalist world-
system has expanded to incorporate and (usually) peripheralize
formerly external arenas in a series of waves since the sixteenth century. These waves have been documented in terms of
the expansion of formal colonial administration by Bergesen and Schoenberg
(1980). The limits of this type of
expansion were reached at the end of the nineteenth century when nearly the
whole globe became integrated into a single hierarchical division of labor.
2 The expansion and deepening of commodity
relations. Land, labor, and wealth have
been increasingly commodified in both the core and the periphery. More spheres
of life have become mediated by markets in the core than in the
periphery, but all areas have experienced a secular increase in
every epoch ofthe modern world-system.
This trend, like others, is somewhat cyclical in that during periods of
economic stagnation commodification slows down, or even reverses as some people
fall back on subsistence production and/or reinvent mutual aid forms of
support.
3 State formation. The power of states over their populations
has increased in every period in both the core and the periphery (Boli,
1980). States have increasingly
expropriated the authority and resources of other societal actors and
organizations, although this trend has been uneven, and there have been periods
when state control temporarily decreased or became more decentralized in
particular areas.
4 Increased size of economic enterprises. The average size in terms of assets and
employees controlled by economic enterprises has increased in every epoch. Agricultural enterprises and industrial
enterprises have gone through periods when this trend has slowed or even
temporarily reversed. The causes of this
concentration of capital are different in upward and downward phases of the
Kwave (Bergesen, 1981).
5 The transnationalization of capital. Much contemporary literature discusses the
"internationalization" of capital (Lapple, 1985; Hymer, 1979). This usage is incorrect, because the agents
of exchange are never nations, and neither are they usually states. Rather capital flows across the borders of
states, and is thus transnational (or trans-state). Capital has been trans
national at least since the long sixteenth century, when
substantial direct investments by productive and merchant capital were made
across core states (Barbour, 1963) and by core capitalists in peripheral areas
(Frank, 1979b). Since then capital has
become increasingly transnational in the sense that the proportion of total
world investment which crosses state boundaries has risen. The most recent
expansion of transnational corporations is thus a continuation of a trend long
in operation (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985:chapter 3).
6 Increasing capital intensity of production
and mechanization. Several
"industrial revolutions" in both agriculture and manufacturing since
the long sixteenth century have increased the productivity of labor in both the
core and the periphery, although the core retains its relatively higher level
of productivity. Capitalist relations of
production have deepened across the system, subjecting the labor process to
greater amounts of direct control, although decentralization in the form of
small commodity production, subcontracting (putting-out), or bureaucratization
of labor control (Edwards, 1979) reproduces a "competitive sector" of
independent producers and forms of autonomy.
The longrun trend among transnational firms has been toward more direct
control over production and the expansion of the scale of coordination of
production, but some industries and sectors remain decentralized, and in
certain periods centralization slows or even reverses in some regions.
7 Proletarianization. The process of class formation has increased
the dependence of the world work force on participation in labor markets. Subsistence redoubts, urban informal sectors,
and domestic economies have
functioned to sustain a substantial semi-proletarianized sector
of the world work force,3 but the
longrun trend has been to move a greater and greater proportion of direct
producers into full-time dependence on commodity production. This has been true of both the core and the
periphery, with a greater lag in the periphery.
Similarly, the extent of extra-economic coercion used to compel labor in
the periphery has decreased somewhat over time, as the alternatives to labor market
participation have been reduced. Capitalist
slavery, serfdom, and contract labor have been largely
eliminated, although therelative degree to which political coercion is applied
in class relations
remains greater in the periphery than in the core. This includes the
suppression of trade unions and peasant and/or labor parties by
authoritarian peripheral states, often supported by core states.
8 The growing gap. There has long been a trend toward a growing
gap in average incomes between core and peripheral areas. Within core areas the middle strata of cadres
necessary to capitalist core production has expanded its relative size as a
proportion of the labor force, and the wages of important sectors of the
working class have increased relative to incomes and levels of living in peripheral
areas. Mandel (1975) and Amin (1975)
contend that both core and peripheral workers received only subsistence wages
until the 1880's when, they allege, the gap between these incomes first
emerged. But if we are sensitive to
smaller differences and include middle strata in our estimates of average
income, we are likely to find that the trend toward a growing gap has been in
operation since the sixteenth century.
The above schema of
structural cycles and trends has been combined into a "descriptive model"
which depicts relations in time among the different features (see ChaseDunn,
1978:170). A causal model of the
relationship between the hegemonic sequence and the core/periphery hierarchy is
specified in chapter 13 (see figure 13.2).
In chapter 4 we use the above schema to examine claims that fundamental
changes have occurred in the world-system since World War II. Now let us compare the idea of stages of
capitalism with the above schema of world-system cycles.
Chapter 3: Stages of Capitalism or World-System Cycles?
The periodization
of capitalist development has proven to be a controversial topic in both
classical and contemporary theories. The
conceptualization of stages of development is important because whatever
position one adopts has implications for our understanding of both the past and
the possible futures of systemic transformation. Most stage theories, including those of some
Marxists and the modernization school, focus on national societies as the unit
of analysis. National societies are
thought to evolve through historical stages, being relatively
"advanced" or "underdeveloped." Other Marxists and dependency theorists have
focused our attention on the fact that national societies interact with one
another in systematic ways and form together a larger system which itself
evolves. This reconceptualization solves
many of the problems created by the assumption that national societies are
independent, but it raises a number of new issues. How are we to conceptualize this larger
system and what is the best way to periodize its development? When has it simply adjusted to its own
contradictions and when has it become a fundamentally different type of
system?
I would like to
dismiss outright the notions which entertain a unilinear development of
national societies and discuss different approaches to stages of world-system
development. Here I will contrast
two contemporary views. The first focuses on a series of stages in
which the relations between the core and the periphery are thought to be
qualitatively different, based on the
predominance of different kinds of capital in the core. The second
acknowledges
these differences but focuses instead on characteristics of the system as a
whole which vary over time. It argues
that some system
characteristics
are cyclical in nature, while others are secular trends, and thereby our
attention is focused on the similarities of the different periods rather than
their differences. Neither of these
approaches is "historicist" in the sense of emphasizing what is
entirely unique about a particular period.
Rather they both focus on the way in which systematic laws of motion of
capital accumulation produce different institutional forms in different
periods.
Stages of
Capitalism and Dependency
A number of
recent Marxist works focusing on the world-system argue a periodization of
capitalist development which distinguishes between three (or four) stages in
which the characteristics of core capital and its relationship to peripheral
areas vary. I will review and compare
these periodizations, and then outline a
different approach.
Albert Szymanski
(1981:95) summarizes his version of periodization as follows:
Imperialism has gone through four qualitatively distinct stages: first, noncapitalist mercantile
imperialism from around 1500 to around 1800; second, competitive capitalist
imperialism from around 1840 to around 1880; third, early monopoly capitalist
imperialism from around 1890 to around 1960; and fourth, late monopoly
capitalist imperialism since the 1960s.
In another
version Andre Gunder Frank (1979a:9) approvingly quotes Samir Amin as follows:
I distinguish 3 periods: (1) mercantilist, (2) developed (achevé) capitalist (post industrial
revolution, pre-monopolist) and (3) imperialism. To each of these periods there correspond
specific functions of the periphery at the service of the essential needs of
accumulation at the center. In stage (1)
the essential function of the
periphery (principally American, supplementarily African which
supplied the former with slaves) is to permit the accumulation of money wealth
by the Atlantic merchant bourgeoisie, wealth which transforms itself in real (achevé)
capitalism after the industrial revolution. Hence the system of plantations
(after the pillage of mines) around which all of
Amin's position
on periodization is further explained in his Imperialism and Unequal
Development (1977:229-35).Let us focus on the characteristics attributed to
each stage and the differences which are
alleged to exist between stages. The
first transition is that between mercantile (or merchant) capitalism and
industrial (competitive, developed)
capitalism. The distinctions made here
involve assertions about class relations, exchange relations, and the
relationship between the state and the
economy. Much of this follows from
Marx's discussion of merchant capitalism in volume 3 of Capital
(1967b:323-37) and his distinction between merchant capitalism and the fully
developed capitalist mode of production ─ industrial capitalism. Marx's abstract model of capitalist dynamics
as presented in volume 1 of Capital assumes a system in which there is
competition between capitals, sale of commodities at their labor value,
non-interference by the state in the economy, and a closed system in which
there is no international trade. Of
course Marx did not claim that this model directly
represented any
concrete society. It is rather an
abstraction employing simplifying assumptions which is intended to explicate
the underlying developmental tendencies of the capitalist mode of
production. British national society in
the nineteenth century was Marx's inspiration and is probably the case which
closest approximates the abstract model.
Marx believed that he had teased out the underlying nature of capitalism
by examining what he considered to be its purest and most highly developed
concrete case, and that other countries would follow Britain's path of
development.1 It was argued
in chapter 1 that some of his simplifying assumptions were mistaken, not
because they were empirically inaccurate, but because they missed much of that
which is fundamental to capitalism as a system.
Marx's model of
capitalist accumulation was not intended to apply to the stage of mercantile
capitalism. In this stage commercial
capital (involving the buying and selling of commodities produced by
independent producers) is the most prevalent and important form of
enterprise. Merchant capital does not
directly coordinate production and sales.
Production is left to independent producers. Thus merchant capital does not directly
subject production to the logic of capitalism.
Merchants make profit by buying cheap and selling dear, often by exploiting
price differentials between areas which are not integrated into a single market
economy. Production capital, on the
other hand, directly combines raw materials and labor purchased from
proletarians to produce commodities for sale.
This integrates the value relations between different types of production such that "abstract
labor" comes to exist. This means
that market integration is complete and the division of labor is subjected to
a single price system. Qualitatively different types of work come to
be related to one another in a single quantitative dimension, that of
labor value. The commodification of labor is necessary for
this to occur, and most Marxists believe that this is only accomplished under
the wage system.
Thus merchant capital (before the existence of integrated
markets) exchanges "unequals" in the sense that goods are produced in
economies in which a single standard of value has not been formed. Merchants make profit by moving commodities
from areas in which they have low prices to areas in which they have high prices. It is only within fully developed industrial
capitalism that commercial capital (operating within a single price
system) makes profit by receiving part of the surplus value produced in the
production process, not by exchanging unequals.
Merchant capital operates solely in the "sphere of
circulation," although Marx asserted that it acted as a solvent on
pre-capitalist relations of production under some conditions.
It is similarly
asserted that proletarianization is only rudimentary during the period of
mercantile capitalism, that is, the wage-earning class is small and there are
many extra-market constraints which prevent labor (and other "factors of
production") from taking the commodity form. Marx's
(1967a:717-33) discussion of primitive accumulation describes how
English and Scottish peasants were forcibly separated from the means of
production and turned into sellers of labor-power from the last part of the
fifteenth century on.
The stage of
mercantile capitalism is also characterized as a period in which political relations were much more
determinant of the terms of exchange and the conditions of production than in
later industrial capitalism. The guilds,
municipal monopolies, noble privileges, and state policies of
mercantilist
"armed" trade (Parry, 1966) are understood as proof that market
mechanisms were as yet only weakly operating.
States operated as "violence-
controlling"
organizations providing protection for economic operations enabling their
benefactors to realize what
Primitive
accumulation in the periphery (plunder, forced labor, monopoly trade) is
understood by many Marxists, including Marx himself, as one of the main
processes which created the capitalist mode of production, but which is not in
itself part of that mode of production.
In the emergence
of industrial capitalism a number of important changes are alleged to have
occurred. For one thing the
"bourgeois revolutions" in
within the
national markets of the core countries.
And in the middle of the
nineteenth century there was a temporary reduction of political
constraints on international trade with the lowering of European and American
tariff barriers. According to many histories of capitalist development this is
the period when industrial (or productive) capital came to dominate the economy
for the first time. The wage system and
the process of expanded accumulation
became self-reproducing. Industry became
organized as a competitive interaction of small firms, and the rate of
technological change increased dramatically.
The factory system in which labor was brought together with machinery
was created in the English Midlands.
The
core/periphery relationship is alleged to have been predominantly a matter of
commodity trade during this period, and Ernest Mandel (quoted in Frank,
1979a:8) asserts that this constituted the "equal exchange of
equals." A single measure of world
value was constituted by the integration of the world division of labor into a
single interactive market. It is alleged
that trade between the core and the periphery contained equal amounts of labor
value in the period of competitive capitalism.
And Mandel (1975:49-61) argues that competitive industrial capitalism
encouraged indigenous capital formation in the periphery.
There is some
disagreement about the effects of core/periphery trade during the period of competitive capitalism
on the periphery. Some Marxist scholars
argue that merchant capital tended to dissolve precapitalist relations of production by drawing people
into commodity production for the world market.
On the other hand, Geoffrey Kay (1975) argues that merchant
capital tended to
underdevelop the periphery by perpetuating precapitalist forms of production,
shoring up traditional rulers, and extracting surplus product. He contrasts this to what he sees as the
developmental effects of industrial
capital, which directly subjects labor in the periphery to capitalist
production, creating the potential for autonomous capitalist growth in the
periphery. A similar argument is made by
Bill Warren (1980).
Most stage
theories envision an important new period of capitalism emerging in the late nineteenth century with
the formation of the "monopolies."
Since Lenin (1965) this allegedly new development in the core has been
causally linked with "imperialism," i.e. the exploitation of
peripheral areas by the monopoly capitals of the core. Amin (1977) reserves the term imperialism for
this kind of exploitation, and calls earlier capitalist exploitation of the
periphery "expansionism." The
emergence of "monopoly capitalism" is thought to involve a change in
the operation of the process of accumulation.
Monopoly pricing within national markets and the extraction of surplus
profits by large firms has been understood as a new departure in which the
distribution of surplus value is distorted.
The so-called "monopoly
sector," the sector in which the largest firms dominate the most
profitable types of production, is thought to obtain a larger share of the total surplus value by draining
surplus value from the "competitive sector."
In addition, the
growth of state expenditures and increases in the social wage are understood as
subsidizing the costs of reproducing labor
power, and thus lowering the wage bill of "monopoly capital." State spending, especially on military
forces, is thought to provide a necessary outlet for "economic
surplus" (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) and to help resolve the irrationalities
of capitalist production by providing employment and investment opportunities
not generated in the private sector. The
domination of "finance capital" (a coalition of banking and
industrial capital) (Hilferding, 1981) in combination with the much more
direct involvement of states in
sponsoring economic development (Poulantzas, 1973) is alleged to have had
important effects on the tendencies of the accumulation process. Arguing the direct opposite position from
that of Kay (1975) discussed above, Mandel contends that the emergence of
monopoly capitalist imperialism and the export of investment capital to the
periphery put a brake on the indigenous capitalist development of the periphery
which had begun during the period of competitive capitalism. The declining rate of profit in the core led
to the massive export of investment capital to the periphery, but the monopoly
nature of this capital and the use of state power in formal colonialism led to
the exploitation and underdevelopment of the periphery according to Mandel.
Mandel, Amin, and
Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) contend that the core/periphery relationship altered during
the late nineteenth century due to the
emergence in the 1880s of a wage differential between core workers and
peripheral workers. Previous to that,
workers in both the core and the
periphery had received subsistance wages, but in the late nineteenth
century, due to the diminishing reserve army of labor in
equalization are
greater than the frictions encountered by exports of investment capital.
Many Marxists
argue that the middle of the twentieth century brought the emergence of yet
another stage of capitalist development.
This has been termed "late capitalism" by Mandel and is
thought to be characterized by the
increased
importance of "technological rents" and the further institution-
alization of
science in the profit-making process (see also Habermas, 1970). This period is also characterized by the
great expansion of the transnational corporations that coordinate production
and profit-making on a global scale.
The alleged
consequences of this new stage for core/periphery relations are described in
chapter 4. Whereas Kay (1975) argued
that production capital of any kind involving direct investment and control of
peripheral production caused autonomous capitalist accumulation in the periphery,
The thesis that
the latest stage of capitalism is less detrimental to the economic growth of
the periphery is shared to a certain extent by some dependency theorists (e.g.
Dos Santos, 1963; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
Peter Evans (1979) discusses the emergence of "dependent
development" in the Latin American
periphery based on the production of manufactured goods for the home markets of
Latin American countries by transnational corporations. While these authors agree that the "new
dependency" (or "associated-dependent development") perpetuates
the core/periphery structure of power in many ways, they also believe that
overall economic growth is increased by this new form of core penetration. This contention is disputed by Frank, Amin,
and Mandel, who believe that real economic development in the periphery is only
possible in the context of a socialist revolution.
As discussed in
chapter 4, Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye (1980) have argued
that a "new international division of labor" has been created by
transnational corporations using free production zones in the periphery to
employ cheap labor to produce manufactured goods for the world market. John Borrego (1982) contends that the core/periphery
hierarchy itself is disappearing with the emergence of a new stage of
"meta-national"
capitalism. This kind of emerging stage of global
capitalism is also described by Robert Ross and Kent Trachte (forthcoming).
Cycles of World-system Development
Another view of
the stages of development of the capitalist world-system is that proposed in
chapter 2. This view periodizes
development in terms of characteristics of the system as a whole: constant
features, cyclical processes, and secular trends. It suggests a modified model of the capitalist
mode of production which is true to the spirit, but not the letter, of Marx's
accumulation model. The capitalist mode
of production is understood as commodity production for profit on the world
market in which labor is a commodity but is not always paid a wage. Capitalist production relations are
understood as the articulation between wage labor in the core and coerced labor
in the periphery. The interaction
between core and periphery is understood as fundamental to capitalism as a
system. Thus imperialism (generally
understood, including colonialism,
direct investment, core/periphery trade, and neocolonialism) are conceived to
be integral to the functioning of the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism thus includes both expanded
reproduction in the core and primary accumulation in the periphery. Primary accumulation is not merely a process
of creating capitalist production relations, but is rather a permanent and
necessary feature of capitalism as a mode of production. The state and the interstate system are not
separate from capitalism, but are rather the main institutional supports of
capitalist production relations. The
system of unequally powerful and competing nation-states is part of the competitive
struggle of capitalism, and thus wars and geopolitics are a systematic part of
capitalist dynamics, not exogenous forces.
According to
Wallerstein (1974), the first epoch of capitalist development, from 1450 to
1640, was the period of the transition from feudalism and the somewhat precarious
emergence of the institutions and class relations of the capitalist mode of
production in
The second epoch,
from 1640 to 1815, is understood as one in which the European capitalist
world-economy stagnated somewhat and then was stabilized (Wallerstein, 1980a). This was the period of Dutch hegemony and the
fierce competition between the Dutch, English, and French for the colonial
profits of the older Portuguese and Spanish empires. The competition between the English and the
French for hegemony was finally resolved after the failure of
Napoleon's bid
for world empire (or earlier, see Braudel ─ 1977:102).
The third epoch,
from 1815 to 1917, is understood as the period of the final expansion of the capitalist system to
the whole globe and its consolidation.
This period saw another economic reorganization known as the
industrial revolution, which was actually just another expansion of capital
intensity in industrial and agriculture production. The "factory system" further
extended the trend toward rapid urbanization of the work force in the
core. The Pax Britannica was
followed by the "new imperialism" in which the newly rising core and
semiperipheral powers ─ the
The fourth epoch,
from 1917 to the present, is understood as the final consolidation of the
system and the beginning of the period of its crisis and transformation to a
fundamentally different kind of system.
This is the period of the Pax Americana, the decolonization of
almost all of the periphery, the increased integration of global production by
capitalist firms (public and private), and the emergence of anticapitalist
forces which increasingly limit the manuevering room for capitalist
accumulation. The period since 1945 is
scrutinized more closely in the next chapter.
The four epochs
outlined above can be understood analytically as involving three kinds of structural elements:
(1) those underlying institu-
tional features
and developmental laws that are basic to capitalism as a system; (2) cyclical
processes which repeat themselves in each of the epochs; and (3) secular trends
which increase at a varying rate across all of the epochs. These elements and some of their interrelations
have been described in chapter 2.
The cycles and
trends listed in chapter 2 must be applied to each epoch with some
qualifications. The first epoch
(1450-1640), due to the as yet poorly formed and unstable institutional basis
of capitalist development, did not exhibit all the features characteristic of
later epochs. Thus
During the first
epoch the center of economic hegemony moved from
The third epoch
(1815-1917) may be understood as the "classic" period in terms of the
trends and cycles described above. The
British came into both politico-military and economic hegemony after the defeat
of the French in a series of wars from 1756 to 1815. Napoleon's failure to impose imperium on the
world-economy allowed the British hegemony in production to expand into the
markets of the continent and the newly independent Latin American states.
The fourth epoch
(1917 to the present) is confusing insofar as it is a period in which the
contradictions of capitalist development meet certain "ceiling effects"
or obstacles which constrain readjustment of the capitalist accumulation
process (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979).
For example, a number of the
secular trends described have run up against limits. There are no more human societies for the
capitalist mode of production to invade and conquer. There is no more territory to be grabbed by
colonizing core states. As Lenin pointed
out, further expansion by competing core states must involve the redivision of
territory already conquered. This
constraint on expansion has been further exacerbated by the achievement of formal sovereignty in almost
the whole periphery. Thus competing core
states must often vie with one another for access to the periphery by offering
better terms. This is a far cry from the
1885 Berlin Congress on
These ceiling
effects which limit the further expansion of the capitalist system to new
populations and territories do not, of course, preclude its deepening. They do, however, tend to limit the degrees
of freedom available to capital in its attempt to adjust to the contradictions
created by its own development. As well,
the "socialist" revolutions which have taken state power in the
semiperiphery and the periphery create obstacles to the maneuverability of
capital. If the present period is one of
transformation we should expect a combination of the old cycles characteristic
of previous epochs with newly emerging institutions and forms of struggle. One of the most important tasks is to sort
out the processes of the old system from
the harbingers of a new one.
For example, the
schema in chapter 2 would predict that the decline of
With the above
qualifications to the cyclical schema in mind let us now compare the
world-system approach to periodizing capitalist development with the
"stages of capitalism" approach outlined in the first part of this
chapter. Differences Between the Two Types of Periodization
Broadly speaking,
the world cycles approach emphasizes the continuity of the basic capitalist
processes in each of the periods, while the "stages of capitalism"
approach emphasizes differences of form and consequence. Wallerstein's approach implies that
production capital (both agricultural and industrial) has always been the
driving force of development and thus
"industrial
revolutions" have occurred in every epoch.
In the sixteenth century it was not merchant capital but production
capital in agriculture and town manufactures which, with revolutionized class
relations, created the basis for increased productivity, and a strengthened set
of states in the core. In the
seventeenth century it was Amsterdam's productive advantage in the herring
industry, dairy farming, and shipbuilding which was the basis of its hegemony,
not only mercantile "armed trade" (Wallerstein, 1980:chapter 2). Similarly, investment in the periphery by the
great chartered companies, the establishment of plantations worked by slaves,
and the extensive export of capital from
Sidney Mintz's
(1985) analysis of the place of sugar production and consumption in the development of the modern
world-system describes sugar cane plantations in the
Some authors have
contended that the slave-based plantation system was a form of merchant
capitalism, a contention which would seemingly be contradicted by the fact
that plantations involved the direct investment of core capital to produce
commodities. For Marx merchant
capitalism was defined as the purchasing of goods which are resold for a
profit. The idea of merchant capital has
been extended beyond this definition, especially by Fox-Genovese and Genovese
(1983). They link their idea of merchant
capital with slave production and stress the anti-capitalist world view of the
slave─holders as evidence that they were not capitalists. Eugene Genovese's earlier work (1971, 1974)
demonstrates fascinating linkages between consciousness, ideology, resistance,
and economic structures, but the contention that the aristocratic ideals of the
slave-holders proves that they were not capitalists equates ideological and
structural positions too simply. The
critiques by slaveowners of industrial slums and the crass cash nexus of the
impersonal wage system (in contrast to their own paternal concern for their
slaves) may rather be interpreted as the fruit of political competition between
two groups of capitalists with
conflicting
interests. It would not have been the
first time (nor the last) that a group of capitalists with investments sunk in
a certain form or scale of production employed the ideology of paternalism (or
nationalism) against a newer competing
group.
The tendency for states to interfere with trade, to regulate
production, the establishment of guilds and associations attempting to protect
the positions of certain producers, are not seen as characteristics unique to a
period of "mercantilism."
Rather, these attempts to use political organizations to guarantee
market advantages are understood as normally recurring moments of capitalist
development itself. Every capital is
anxious to obtain political protection of its own markets and resources. Arguments in favor of free trade are employed
by those who fear the political controls of others. In such a light the similarities of
"mercantilism" with "monopoly capitalism" are most
apparent. Braudel (1977:95) makes this
point, but argues that the creation of a protected home market only became
crucial in the nineteenth century.
Previous to this, according to Braudel, it was city-states rather than
nation-states that performed the role of hegemonic core power. It may rather be that certain processes
create a fairly constant ratio between the size of the home market of the
hegemonic core power and the total size of the
system. Thus
The argument has
been made by some of the proponents of the "stages of capitalism"
view of periodization that the form and consequences of the core/periphery
relationship have changed from period to period. Plunder was followed by trade, and that by
direct production for export, and then trans-
national corporate control of production for the peripheral market
itself. While it is clear that the forms
of labor exploitation in the periphery have
changed, the basic underlying process of "primary
accumulation" (in the sense of politically coercive labor control) have
been a reproduced feature of the core/periphery relationship clear up to the
present.2
Clearly, the form
of primary accumulation has changed from epoch to epoch, and in some sense it has become less
"primitive" ─ that is, closer in form to the "free"
labor of the core. Thus the direct
plunder of treasure and slaves was
replaced by the establishment of "coerced cash crop" labor
(capitalist slavery and serfdom) ─ which was then later replaced by
colonial trade economies in which labor
was either paid a below-subsistence wage or else small commodity producers were
exploited through a politically controlled unequal market exchange. Neo-colonial forms of labor exploitation are
undoubtedly closer in form to the "free" labor of the core, but they
are still more determined by direct political coercion.
Giovanni Arrighi
(1978) argues that the different forms of core/periphery relations are used at
all times, with varying weights depending on the period and the historical
situation of the particular core power.
It is most probably the case that "economic" penetration of
the periphery by merchants, settlers, and direct investment is more prevalent
during periods of rapid growth in the world-economy, while more politically
coercive forms of penetration (formal
colonialism, monopoly trade, and forced labor) are employed more frequently
when the world-economy is in contraction and competing producers rely more on
state power to protect or extend their share of world surplus value.
It may be true
that the gap between the degree of coercion of core labor versus peripheral
labor has narrowed, but it has most certainly not been eliminated. What is clear from a long-run perspective is
that the juridical form of labor control, that is whether or not labor is
formally paid a wage, is not the only determinant of the commodity nature of
labor. Nor is it the only dimension of
the core/periphery hierarchy. Even if
the entire world-economy were to be composed of capitalists and wage laborers,
the interstate system would tend to reproduce the core/periphery
hierarchy. The size of the relative gap
between the incomes of core and peripheral workers has greatly increased over
the long run, while absolute levels of living have risen, albeit unevenly, in
the periphery. Thus immiseration has
tended to be relative rather than absolute (see chapter 12), while exploitation
(in the formal Marxist sense) has everywhere increased.
The
Wallersteinian world-system perspective implies that there has always been a
core/periphery wage differential, contrary to the arguments of Emmanuel, Amin,
and Mandel that this developed only in the late nineteenth century. This differential has certainly increased
over the long run operation of the system, but core workers and middle strata
have always had political advantages as well as an involvement in more
profitable and more skilled types of production, and these factors resulted in
higher average incomes for core workers from the sixteenth century on. This problem is considered further in chapter
10.
Brenner (1977)
has made an important critique of Wallerstein's contention that the
"second serfdom" in
Contrary to what
Brenner implies, Wallerstein has never said that coerced labor is the most
efficient or productive form from the point of view of the whole system. Serf labor, although not very productive, was
partially commodified in the sense that it was subjected to exploitation for
the purpose of profitable commodity production, and its "price"
(costs of political coercion) influenced the costs of production and the
profitability of the operation. Brenner
claims that the juridical nature of serfdom prevented it from responding to
market forces, but the enserfment of Polish peasants in the sixteenth century
was driven forward in response to the Western European demand for grain. And the further coercive exploitation of East
European serfs in the seventeenth century was a response to declining world
wheat prices (Wallerstein, 1980a:129-44).
Another point of
contention between the two types of periodization is whether or not the consequences of
core penetration of the periphery have changed with the reorganizations of
dominant capital and core/periphery relations.
As stated above, Kay (1975), and others (Warren, 1980; Szymanski, 1981)
have argued that contemporary transnational investment in peripheral countries
creates the possibility for autonomous capitalist economic development in
these countries. On the other hand, many
dependency theorists have argued that the consequence of transnational
investment is to continue to underdevelop peripheral countries relative to
those other peripheral countries which are less dependent on foreign investment. Cross-national comparative research on the
post-World War II period reveals that countries with higher levels of
penetration by foreign capital grow more slowly (other things equal) than
countries with lower levels of transnational corporate penetration (Bornschier
and Chase-Dunn, 1985). In addition, it
has been shown that, contrary to Szymanski's argument, it is transnational
investment in
manufacturing that has the largest negative effects on aggregate
national economic growth. These studies
reveal that foreign capital investment inflows have immediate positive effects
on GNP growth, but long-run negative consequences as the effects of structural
distortions and repatriation of profits spread to the national economy as a
whole. The implication of these findings
is that core capital continues to have the effect of recreating the gap between
core and periphery. Changes in the form and structure of
core/periphery relations which have occurred in the twentieth century have not
operated to eliminate the development of
underdevelopment.
It may be the
case that, just as the terms of trade between core and periphery are known to
alternate cyclically in favor of, or against, the periphery (Barrat-Brown, 1974), the wage gap
also exhibits a cyclical as well
as a secular
increase. If this is true the increase
noted by Mandel (1975) and Amin (1975) in the 1880s may have been part of a
cyclical shift rather than a completely new trend in core/periphery relations
as they allege. Research on recent
trends in the core/periphery wage differential is reported in chapter 12.
One explanation
for uneven development is the effect which class struggle has on the
concentration of capital in a particular area.
Successful accumulation is usually accompanied by rising wages due to
demand for skilled labor, exhaustion of the reserve army of the unemployed, and
the growth of trade unions which allow workers to influence access to jobs and
the level of wages. This process of class
struggle eventually causes capital to flow to areas where labor is cheaper to
obtain a competitive advantage. This is
part of the explanation for the flow of capital to the periphery. But the continued cheapening of constant
capital inputs by technological development can also cause cheap labor in the
periphery to lose its competitive advantage.
Thus, as Mandel points out, capital-intensive agricultural production
within core countries in the twentieth century has replaced much
labor-intensive peripheral agricultural
production. This "see-sawing"
process of uneven development, the alternating concentration and spread of
capitalist production techniques and investment, creates a cycle in which the
gap between core wages and peripheral wages may become alternately larger or
smaller. Though the gap has definitely
increased over the last hundred years (chapter 12), it remains to be empirically
demonstrated whether or not this trend also contains a cycle.
In discussing
differences between the twentieth century and earlier epochs it is important to
distinguish that which is superficially different from that which reveals a
fundamental crisis of capitalism. One
reason to carefully consider the problem of periodization within the
capitalist mode of production is so that we may be able to distinguish those
new forms which reproduce capitalism from those forms which might transform
it. The mere scale of phenomena in the
twentieth century, the rate of change, the size of organizations, the global
nature of production and consumption, are often seen as qualitative differences
from earlier epochs. The world cycles
approach emphasizes the continuity with the earlier epochs in terms of the
underlying processes at work, but also alerts us to those key features which
should be watched to detect signs of structural transformation.
The discussion of the growth of monopoly or oligopoly power, or
of the emergence of a new stage of
"monopoly capitalism," often assumes that the use of politically
organized price distortions alters the underlying rules of capitalist
development. On this basis some Marxists
have argued that volume 1 of Marx's Capital is no longer relevant for
the analysis of development because it assumes equilibrium prices and
competition among capitals. I argue in
chapter 4 that this is not the case. The
world-economy remains a very competitive arena in which there are no long-run
monopolies. The profit rate which
equalizes over the long run is the "surplus" profit rate, that which
includes profits due to the exercise of monopoly power. In this light Capital, with some
revisions (the addition of the interstate system and class struggle) remains
relevant for understanding contemporary capitalist development.
Also, in the
twentieth century we have "state capitalism" in which states themselves act like firms which are
competing in the world market. Here the
use of political mobilization, coercion, and productive advantage are combined in a very direct way. This is not, however, a completely new
feature. Political power has always been
used to distort market processes in
favor of certain
groups. What remains the case in this
epoch is that there is no single overarching political authority which can
control the whole arena of economic competition, and so the process of
capitalist accumulation continues. Let
us now look more closely at the period since
World War II.
Chapter 4: The
World-System Since 1945: What Has Changed?
To answer
completely the question posed in the title of this chapter we would need a
clear formulation of the deep structural logic of the capitalist
world-economy, and a way of determining the extent to which new developments
have altered its logic. The level of
specification obtained regarding the nature of the capitalist mode of
production in chapter 1 is somewhat crude.
Yet we can employ it and the schema presented in chapter 2 to make some
guesses about the extent of change. Of
interest in such an exercise is the problem of when quantitative change becomes
qualitative change.
A New Stage of
Capitalism?
Several recent
analysts claim that capitalism has entered a new stage since World War II. This contention utilizes the notion that
capitalism goes through stages which differ from one another in systemically
important ways.1 In chapter 3
I have argued that a theory of cycles and trends can account for most of the
changes across epochs which are claimed to be stages of capitalism. Here I want to focus on the changes alleged
to have occurred since World War II, or to be occurring now.
Albert Szymanski
(1981:95) contends that a transition from "early monopoly capitalist
imperialism" to "late monopoly capitalist imperialism" occurred
around 1960. John Borrego (1982) speaks
of the recent transition from national to metanational capitalist
accumulation. Robert Ross and Kent
Trachte (forthcoming) speak of the transition from monopoly capitalism to
global capitalism.
The substantive
observations on which claims of a qualitative
transition are
based differ among the different authors.
Szymanski argues that the most recent stage is based on the
decolonization and industrialization of the periphery. Borrego, and Ross and Trachte focus on the
increased importance of globally operating firms. These contentions and others will be analyzed
below.
This discussion
of the various claims about qualitative change will be organized into the
following topics:
1 the
transnationalization of capital;
2 technological
rents;
3 the new
international division of labor;
4 world classes
and world state formation; and
5 a socialist
world-system.
The
Transnationalization of Capital
Some social
scientists, on first perceiving the reality of the world-
economy, have
assumed that its importance as a systemic logic which has major effects on the
development of subunits is of quite recent origin (e.g. Michalet, 1976), or
that it has just recently become transnational2 (Hymer, 1979). These claims may be broken down into their
constituent arguments, which involve the logic of investment decisions,
monopolization, effects on states, and effects on prices and value. Arguments about the effects of the growth and
reorganization of transnational firms on the peripheral countries will be
discussed below in the section on the "new international division of labor."
It is undeniable
that transnational firms have grown in size and importance since 1945. Their expansion and operations in particular
countries have been the subject of many excellent studies (Biersteker, 1978;
Evans, 1979; Gereffi, 1983; Bennett and Sharpe, 1985) as have various aspects
of economic and political institutions within core states that have affected
the growth of transnational investment (Krasner, 1978; Hawley, 1983; Lipson,
1985). The fact of this growth is
presented by some analysts as evidence that the logic of the world-system must
have changed. This connection needs to
be examined.
The great
chartered companies were the first transnational corporations, engaging in both
merchant capitalism (buying cheap and selling dear) and productive capitalism
(the direct organization of commodity production). They were joint stock companies which were
allocated monopoly rights and political─ military protection by the
individual core states that chartered them.
These "monopolies," however, were usually incomplete and
often short-lived because competition among the chartered companies of
different core states was rife.
Some authors have
alleged that the contemporary transnational corporations are controlled by
international groups of capitalists not aligned with any particular core state
(e.g. M. Dixon, 1982). In terms of the
ownership of stock, it has been shown that almost all of the modern
transnational firms are, in fact, owned and controlled by capitalists from a
single core state (Mandel, 1975).
Nevertheless there is some co-participation in ownership across national
boundaries. This feature, however, is
not new. Barbour (1963) reports that
disgruntled seventeenth-century
The fact that
some capital was transnational in the seventeenth century does not contradict
the contention that it is more transnational now. The question is, what difference does that
make for the logic of investment decisions and capital accumulation? The great chartered companies, along
with peripheral
plantations and mines, were primarily operated according to the logic of
productive capital rather than merely merchant capital (Barr, 1981). But it is undoubtedly the case that the
direct organization of production by capital has become much more firmly
entrenched since the seventeenth century.
Merchant capital, buying products from independent producers, has been
increasingly replaced by productive capital directly controlling the production
of commodities. Transport and
communications costs have declined in a geometric fashion, facilitating the
expansion of the spatial extent of investment strategies. Thus the world-economy is more integrated by
global investment decisions and international sourcing than ever before. But does this constitute a change in logic or
merely a change in scale?
The schema
presented in chapter 2 accounts rather well for most of the recent changes,
especially as it designates trends toward transnationalization, capital
intensity, and the increasing size of firms.
It could be argued however that these quantitative trends have led to
qualitative changes in the nature of the game.
One undeniable
consequence of the increasing integration of the world-
economy by
transnational corporations and the shift away from merchant
capitalism is to
increase the systemness of the system.
Merchant capitalism trades commodities between regions that have not
become fully integrated as systems of production. Marx (1967b) describes how merchant capital
eventually creates "abstract labor" by subjecting qualitatively
different kinds of production to an equivalent standard ─ "socially
necessary labor time." Unintegrated
systems have price structures which vary according to their social structural
uniquenesses, differences in natural endowments, and techniques of production.
Merchant capital moves goods from areas where they are cheap to
areas where they are dear in the "exchange of unequals" (Amin,
1980a). But the long-run consequence of
such exchanges is to alter the allocation of labor time in both areas such that
they move toward the formation of a single equilibrated system in terms of the
"efficient" allocation of labor and other scarce resources.
No market system
is ever in perfect equilibrium in the above sense, and indeed a certain
inequality of labor values is part of the institutional nature of the
capitalist world-economy ─ the unequal exchange between the core and the
periphery (Emmanuel, 1972). The long-run
consequence of the action of market exchange is to produce a single
interactional set of prices which reflect the competitive rationality of a
market system. Most of the remaining
structural barriers to the equalization of wages and other prices are generated
by the structure of capitalism itself.
They are generally not "survivals" from the past, but are
themselves produced by competition and conflict among classes and states in the
context of the capitalist mode of production.
The trends toward
the transnationalization of capital, the further integration of the
world-economy, and the growing importance of production decisions on a global
scale, reduce the importance of the remnants of pre-
capitalist
systems. The capitalist mode of production became dominant in the European
world-economy of the long sixteenth century, but it still interacted with
precapitalist modes of production which continued to have some influence on the
historical development of the system. As
it expanded it incorporated other socio-economic systems into itself and these
too have left some institutional remnants which have influenced the particular
configurations of develop-ment in different areas (Wolf, 1982; Nolan and
Lenski, 1985). Some
institutional
aspects of these precapitalist modes of production undoubtedly remain, but
their importance has certainly decreased with the growing
integration of
the system.
Some analysts
have argued that the increasing importance of the trans-
national
corporations has altered the logic of capitalism toward a less competitive,
more monopolized and monolithic system.
It is true that a large and growing component of international trade is
made up of intrafirm transfers.
The affect of this, it is alleged, is to decrease the overall amount of
competition in the system.
This argument is
analogous to the discussion of the transition from competitive to monopoly
capitalism (see chapter 3). It is
alleged that there was once a stage of capitalism in which the state did not
interfere in production decisions or markets, but merely provided the
institutional support for the operation of free markets in land, labor, and
capital. Firms were small, start-up
costs were low, and thus the competitive market system forced firms to produce
as cheaply as possible and to sell their products at the lowest possible
prices.
This version is
alleged to describe
Once we focus on
the world-economy rather than national economies a number of things become
clear. First, most states most of the
time have attempted to influence production and market forces in favor of some
group of capitalists. The laissez-faire
state is merely a special case, in which one set of comparatively advantaged
capitalists has succeeded in reducing the political favoritism formerly offered
to another set. Second, although
monopolies are granted by states and enforced within municipalities and by
other political organizations, cartels, guilds, unions, etc., there are no
long run monopolies in the capitalist world-economy. The political organizations which grant
monopolies are themselves in competition with one another, and, since no one
can really escape interaction in the larger arena for long, protectionist
measures and monopoly rights are themselves subjected to a logic of
competition.
These
observations are no less true in the 1980s than they were in previous centuries,
except that the size of the largest firms has increased relative to the size of
states. It is this last development
which has caused some authors to argue that competitive capitalism has changed
into monopoly capitalism.
Monopoly pricing
allows firms to pass on costs to those consumers over whom they have some
direct or indirect political influence.
If the world-
system had a
single overarching state apparatus, true and complete monopolies could be
maintained. But in a world-economy with
a competitive interstate system, monopolies are partial and temporary.
At the global
level there are no industries that could be described as uncompetitive, despite
the growth of transnational firms. The
recent glut of steel, cars, oil, ships, and other world commodities reminds us
of the continuing "anarchy of production decisions" which has always
been a feature of capitalism (Strange and Tooze, 1981). Ross and Trachte
(forthcoming) argue the opposite: that the emergence of global capitalism increases
the competitiveness of the system as market shares are no longer guaranteed
within national boundaries. The relevant
market for leading edge, core industries has always been the world market (both
national and international markets). The rise of oligopoly within national
markets enabled core firms to compete in terms of product development instead
of price competition within their "own" national markets, while the
international markets have been and continue to be more price competitive. The product cycle, in which new products are
developed in the core countries and older products move on to the price
competition of second tier core and semiperipheral countries, is not new. Joint ventures between Japanese and American
auto and electronics firms may be somewhat novel, but they do not constitute
oligopoly at the global level.
Ross and Trachte
also claim that capital flight has taken on new significance as a key lever of
domination in the relationship between capital and labor. It is clearly true
that the spatial scale of production location has expanded beyond the
organizational capacity of contemporary trade unions, but this also happened in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as textile production moved
out of New England to the Southern states of the
Several analysts
have suggested that the increased importance of trans-
national
corporations has diminished the power of nation-states. Raymond Vernon stated this thesis most
strongly in his Sovereignty at Bay (1971). A modified version has been discussed by
Marlene Dixon (1982) in her essay on "dual power." It is clearly the case that transnational
corporations have increased their power vis-à-vis small peripheral
states. And, simply as a function of
their size, the largest firms may have increased their influence over core
states as well. It should be remembered,
however, that states have also increased their powers. The question is, whether or not the changing
relationship between the size of firms and the power of states has altered the
logic of the game.
Above it was
pointed out that, contrary to the contentions of some authors, most of the
world's largest firms continue to be primarily controlled by capitalists from
one or another of the core states. Thus
there are no truly multinational firms from the point of view of
ownership. Among the 50 largest transnational
firms in the world only Unilever and Royal Dutch Shell could be considered
"binational" in terms of ownership (Bergesen and Sahoo, 1985). The extent to which these firms may
constitute an integrated world bourgeoisie is discussed below in the section on
world class formation. Here I wish to
address the relationship between firms and states.
It is obvious
that transnational firms do not control their own armies, nor do they have
powers of taxation. The usual
distinction between "private" firms and public organizations becomes
very problematic when we consider the case of state capitalism. But, even considering the growth of direct
state control of production, there remains an important differentiation between
economic and political sources of power in the capitalist world-economy.
Firms continue to
rely on states for the provision of "order."
Transnational
corporations have contradictory interests vis-à-vis states. On the one hand they need world order,
not merely order within national boundaries, and this requires a fairly stable
set of alliances among the strongest core states. On the other hand, they make great profits
from their ability to play off states against one another. States compete to offer the best deals to
attract the capital investments of the transnationals. And transnationals desire to maintain the
maneuverability which the multistate system guarantees.
The power of the
transnational firms should not be overestimated, however. Their dependence on individual states is
still very great. They cannot suppress
strikes, political challenges, or nationalizations without being able to
mobilize the police forces and armies controlled by states, and so they must
maintain influence and control over states.
This cannot be done solely by threat of capital flight. It must also be done by supporting friendly
politicians, paying taxes, and demonstrating "good citizenship" shown
by public affairs campaigns and "social" activities. This is most true of their relations with
core states, of course. But even in
peripheral states they must coopt some support, even if this only means bribing
a few generals.
The
"sovereignty at bay" thesis was most believable when it was first put
forth in the 1960s. At that time the
world economy was still growing.
Stagnation had not yet raised the banner of protectionism and the use of
political power to maintain access to markets and profit-making
opportunities. When the pie is shrinking
the world-system turns toward a much more statecentric system, which provides
the basis for neo-mercantilist "realist" interpretations (e.g.
Krasner, 1978). M. Dixon's (1982) dual
power thesis is correct. The complicated
game of competition in the capitalist world-economy is a combination of
profitable commodity production with efficient use of geopolitical power. But this is not a new development. Rather we have experienced in recent years a
shift which has occurred many times before, from capitalist profit-making in an
expanding market to equally capitalist geo-
political
competition involving mercantilism, austerity, and the threat of world war.
"Creative
financing" and the casino quality of international financial transactions
(Strange, 1986) have certainly become more salient in the current period partly
because of the geometric leap in the turnover time of finance capital which is
associated with faster communications and the further trans- nationalization of
capital and commodity and money markets.
But it was in the 1920's that Hilferding (1981) first proclaimed that
finance capital had created a new stage of capitalism because the banks had
taken control of capitalist production.
The struggle between money capital and production capital has see-sawed
back and forth for centuries. The
seemingly magic quality of funny money has always eventually returned to some
more stable relationship to use values, and I expect that the current wild
period will lead to a period of
"devalorization"
by one means or another.
Technological
Rents
Mandel (1975) and
Habermas (1970) argue that post World War II capitalism is different in
important ways because the largest firms compete with one another for
technological rents derived from the application of science and engineering to
production. Rather than competing for markets
for the same product by cutting costs and prices, the largest firms compete by
developing new products. A version of
this argument has been used by Arrighi (1982) in his description of the
important differences between the last decades and earlier periods of
world-system development. Arrighi argues
that the emphasis on competition through the engineering of new products is the
major explanation for
"stagflation,"
the allegely peculiar combination of slower economic growth and higher
unemployment with price inflation. The
uniqueness of stagflation is in some doubt however. Goldstein (1986) argues that there has always
been a lag between the long cycle of production and the long cycle of
prices. This would imply a
"normal" interval of stagflation within the K-wave (see Goldstein,
1988: chapter 10). Nevertheless Arrighi
may be right that the operation of trends toward the larger size of firms,
transnationalization, and competition through product differentiation have made
stagflation a more salient feature of the most recent downturn.
The New
International Division of Labor
Several versions
of the "new international division of labor thesis" have been
offered. The most extreme version of the
thesis claims that the core/periphery territorial division of labor has been
eliminated, with metanational capitalist accumulation taking place globally
irrespective of territorial location.
Another version contends that peripheral capitalism (based on
"primary" accumulation using coerced labor to produce cheap,
labor-intensive raw material inputs) has been eliminated as a consequence of
the industrialization of peripheral countries.
Yet another version emphasizes the political autonomy of former
peripheral areas following decolonization and the demise of the colonial
empires. We shall examine these
arguments in turn.
First let us
describe the core/periphery hierarchy as it has been conceptualized in the
world-system perspective. The underlying
analytic basis of this territorial hierarchy is the distinction between core
production and peripheral production.
Core production is relatively capital intensive and employs skilled,
high wage labor; peripheral production is labor intensive and employs cheap,
often politically coerced labor. In core
areas there is a predominance of core production, and the obverse condition
exists in peripheral areas. This means
that there may be backwaters of peripheral production within core states. Wallerstein defines semiperipheral states as
areas containing a relatively equal mix of core and peripheral types of production.
One of the main
structural features which reproduce this territorial hierarchy is the exercise
of political─military power by core states. It is not simply a matter of original
differences among areas in terms of wage levels and "historical"
standards of living, as Emmanuel (1972) implies. The wage differential between core and
peripheral workers is a dynamic and reproduced feature of the system. Core states (the most powerful political
organizations in the system) are induced to provide some protection for the
wages of their citizens, as well as supplemental benefits composing the social
wage. The core/periphery wage
differential is greater than that which would be due to differences in
productivity alone, and this differential is maintained by restrictions on
international labor migration from the periphery to the core. The great differences in capital-intensity
between the core and the periphery also account for a good portion of the wage
differential.
This territorial
division of labor is not static. It has
expanded along with the expansion of the whole system, and there has been some
upward and downward mobility within the structure. The whole system moves toward greater capital
intensity, so production processes which were core activities in the past have
become peripheral activities at a later time.
The international
division of labor has been reorganized several times before in the history of
the capitalist world-economy (Walton, 1985).
The original plunder by core states of external arenas (extremely
primitive accumulation) was replaced by the production of raw materials using
coerced labor. Core investments in
plantations and mines were followed by investments in utilities, communications
and transportation infrastructure. As
domestic markets in the periphery developed, local and core capital took up
profitable opportunities in manufacturing, and, in the most recent phase,
industrial production for export has emerged in the periphery. Throughout these reorganizations the whole
world-economy has developed more capital-intensive production, but the gap
between the core and the periphery has been reproduced.
Ulrich Pfister
and Christian Suter (1987) have demonstrated that, despite the particular forms
of reorganization which the core/periphery hierarchy experiences, there are
recurring cycles in the core/periphery relationship as well. Their study, and another study by Suter
(1987), demonstrate the existence of waves of capital exports from the core to
the periphery followed by periods of debt crisis and default by peripheral
borrowers. The experience of the 1970s
and 1980s is similar in many ways to three earlier periods of massive debt
crisis which have occurred in the world economy since 1800.
The
core/periphery hierarchy has been reinforced by an unequal distribution of
political─military power among core states and peripheral areas. Historically this was organized as a system
of colonial empires in which core states exercised direct political domination
over peripheral areas. Chirot (1977:map
2) and Szymanski (1981) have argued that the nearly complete decolonization of
the periphery has reduced the power differential between core and peripheral
states. Contrary to most discussions of
neo-colonialism, Chirot claims that formal sovereignty has eliminated the
periphery, and that Asia, Africa and
Chirot's claim
that decolonization has created a world-system with no periphery is undoubtedly
a mistake. Was Latin America then
semiperipheral immediately upon attaining independence from
Clearly some
formerly peripheral countries have become semiperipheral, and the
Another
contention about the new international division of labor focuses on the growth
of industrial production in the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICS)
(Caporaso, 1981). Sometimes this
phenomenon is interpreted as the end of a core/periphery system. Deindustrialization in the core,
industrialization in the periphery, and a shift toward control by global
transnational corporations are portrayed as the beginning of a new era of
metanational capitalism (Borrego, 1982).
The notion of
upwardly mobile semiperipheral countries has been convincingly utilized to
understand the recent developmental paths of
Cardoso's (1973)
analysis of the shift from classical dependence (production of raw materials
for export to the core) to dependent development (Brazilian production of
manufactured goods for the domestic market by transnational corporations)
claimed that a change had occurred in the effects of dependence on overall
economic development. Cardoso argued
that the trans-
national firms
would now have an interest in the expansion of the domestic market and so they
would act economically and politically to foster the growth of the national
economy, albeit in a way which might exacerbate inequalities among classes, and
this was allegedly demonstrated by the Brazilian "miracle."
Cross-national research on the effects of dependence on foreign investments in
manufacturing does not support Cardoso's claim.
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985:chapter 7) find that dependence on
manufacturing transnationals has a large long-run retardant effect on GNP
growth in a cross-national comparison, although short-run effects of inflows of
foreign capital are positive, accounting, at least in part, for the short-lived
miracle in
Fröbel,
Heinrichs, and Kreye (1980) have emphasized the importance of manufacturing in
the periphery for export to the core.
They document the growth of so-called free production zones, areas
juridically outside the tariff and labor regulations of peripheral countries
which allow transnational firms to have "export platforms" for the
utilization of cheap peripheral, often female, labor. The industrial exports of the Asian
"Gang of Four" (
production
overseas. Ross and Trachte (1983) have
argued that the recent growth of sweatshops employing undocumented immigrant
workers in
The problem is
whether or not these developments are the first stages of a shift toward
metanational capitalism, or are simply the continuation of uneven capitalist
development in a period of economic stagnation, with upward and downward
mobility occurring in a structural hierarchy which is still intact. The decline of the economic hegemony of the
of the sequence
of core competition, with uneven development occurring within countries (the
decline of the older industrial Northeast "rust bowl" and the rise of
the
No one could
seriously claim that the core/periphery hierarchy has already been eliminated.
Immense differences still exist in the level of living and the capital
intensity of production. The
transnational corporations have their headquarters in the great world cities of
the core countries. Industrial
production in the periphery has certainly grown, but it remains a very small
proportion of world industry (Petras et al., 1981:chapter 6). The heavy intermediate industries (e.g.
steel, chemicals) which have grown in the semiperiphery are no longer the
leading sectors of the world economy. In
chapter 12 I review studies which estimate recent trends in the magnitude of
core/periphery inequalities. There is no
evidence in favor of the notion that the core/periphery hierarchy is moving
toward greater equality.
Neither the
industrialization of the periphery nor the deindustrialization of the core have
reduced the magnitude of core/periphery inequalities. To claim that core countries have become
peripheralized because some areas within the core have experienced economic
decline is certainly an exaggeration.
Similarly, discussions of the arrival of "post-industrial"
society in the core are certainly premature.
The proportion of the work force in services and non-manual labor has undoubtedly
grown in core countries. But, at least
for the
consumer goods,
followed by the export of capital goods, and finally lived out the twilight or
their golden ages as centers of world finance and services. The
While it is true
that industrialization has occurred in some areas of the periphery and in most
of the semiperiphery, it should be remembered that industrialization is the
application of greater amounts of fixed capital, machinery, and non-human
energy to production. It is an increase
in capital intensity. This increase has
continued in the core at the same time that it has occurred in the periphery,
and thus the relative distribution of capital intensity may not have changed. Indeed, much of the peripheral industrialization
has been quite labor-intensive. The free
production zones exist primarily to exploit cheap labor. And even capital-intensive production in
semiperipheral areas generally uses technology which has become obsolete in
the core.
Very little
quantitative empirical work has been done on changes in the magnitude of
inequalities in the world-system as a whole.
In chapter 12 this matter is discussed in detail and new evidence is
presented. Here I would like to refer to
a table which calculated the distribution of world resources in 1950, 1960, and
1970 which was presented in a review of theories and trends of convergence and
divergence among national societies by Meyer, et al., (1975). An updated version of the table is presented
in chapter 12 but it does not contain data on educational enrollments, and it
is these which I wish to compare to other attributes and resources here.
Table 2 in Meyer,
et al. (1975:232) showed that the poorest countries did not increase their
share of world GNP between 1950 and 1970, while they did increase very slightly
their proportion of world electrical energy consumed.
Between 1950 and
1960 they increased their share of the world's nonagricultural work force from
7.3% to 9.5% These figures confirm the
impression that the economic structure of the peripheral countries has indeed
changed, but that they have not, as a result, increased their share of world
output.
The largest
increases for the least developed countries are in the areas of educational
enrollments and urbanization. These institutional features (which are often
associated with "modernization" of national societies) have grown
rapidly. These changes, however, are only superficially similar to the
educational expansion and urbanization processes which occurred during earlier
times in core countries.
Education does
not expand only as a function of the growth of domestic demand for skilled
labor in industry and services. Between
1950 and 1970 educational enrollments expanded everywhere in the periphery and
semi-periphery of the world-system (Meyer and Hannan, 1979) regardless of the
level or rate of economic development.
It is much easier for peripheral states to create the trappings of
modernization than to change their relative position in the core/periphery
division of labor.
Similarly, the
urbanization explosion in the periphery and semiperiphery has been dubbed
"overurbanization" by some observers because it has occurred in the
absence of a similar growth rate of industrial employment. The gigantic cities of the periphery most often
import capital-intensive technology from the core, which does not create a
large demand for workers in industry.
Squatter settlements and the teeming "informal sector" of
peddlers, domestic servants, and small commodity producers swell the urban population. This informal sector provides cheap inputs to
large-scale enterprises and government by subsidizing the costs of reproducing
labor power, and by producing products for sale which are cheap because of the
exploitation of unpaid family labor, or subminimum wage labor (Portes, 1981).
The urban informal sector, then, is the functional equivalent of rural labor
reserves, village economies, and the "domestic mode of production"
which cheapened the wage bill in classical dependent economies by reproducing
part-life-time proletarians (semiproletarians).
In addition, the
city systems which have grown up in
World Classes and
Although it has
been difficult to maintain in the recent period of international squabbles,
warmongering, and neo-mercantilism, some have made the argument that the world
bourgeoisie is becoming more integrated as a class (Sklar, 1980; Borrego,
1982). International organizations such
as the Trilateral Commission are alleged to form the core of an emergent
monolithic world bourgeoisie based on the global transnational
corporations. This is a new formulation
of the old debate which started at the end of the last century among members of
the Second International about superimperialism versus continued
imperimperialist rivalry. Many of the
issues discussed above in the section on the internationalization of capital
are relevant, but here we shall focus on changes in the interstate system.
There has been a
world bourgeoisie since the beginning of the modern world-system, but it has
been a very differentiated, competitive, and conflictive class. Peripheral capitalists employing coerced
labor have produced for export to the core.
Core capitalists, divided by nation-state, sector, and access to state
power, have made alliances and fought wars among themselves. Often these alliances have crossed the boundaries
of core states. It is undeniable that
the frequency and importance of intracore capitalist alliances has increased as
the scale of transnational firms has grown.
The question is,
does this lower the competitiveness of the system (addressed above) and does it
alter the operation of the interstate system?
Recent attempts to forge a core-wide common policy against OPEC
(spearheaded by the internationally-oriented portion of the
Some may discern
a trend toward international political integration in the emergence of the
United Nations. Indeed, international
organizations have proliferated as the world-economy has become more
integrated. The Concert of Europe fell apart to be reorganized as the
The effect of the
spread of nuclear weapons must be discussed here. Do these weapons make
continued competition among subgroups of world capital by means of war
obsolete? Clearly a world war involving
nuclear weapons would disrupt the operations of the capitalist system, hardly
the most tragic of its consequences.
Such a war would lead to social devolution, if not the end of our
species. This outcome is a real
possibility because the separate contenders who are risking nuclear holocaust
are not in control of the outcomes of their combined interaction. Is the world-system a headless horseman, or
rather a horse with many heads, galloping toward the edge of an abyss?
State managers,
world bankers, and transnational firms create war machines as a mechanism to
provide investment opportunities, to be sure, but the weapons also have a
potential "use value" as threats to maintain or extend political
hegemony. These threats involve the risk of a holocaust even though none of the
major actors desire this outcome.
The presence of
nuclear weapons does not, in itself, change the basic logic of system
interaction. Commodity production and geopolitical competition remain the main
forms of competition. But the existence
of these weapons does imply that the normal operation of the system, with the
usual sequence of hegemonic decline followed by world war, followed by the
emergence of a new hegemonic core power, cannot continue. A real world war among core powers would
undoubtedly bring the final holocaust.
Thus the mechanism which has formerly resolved the contradictions of
uneven development can no longer operate.
Or rather, if it does operate, the game is over.
The combined
effects of increases in the ability of international organizations to mediate
conflicts and the increasing destructiveness of weaponry have decreased the
probability of the outbreak of war among core states to some extent. But it should be remembered that both
international organization and increasing destructiveness are not unique to the
post-World War Two era. Many turn-of-the
century observers believed that the "Great War" was unthinkable
because of the brutal destructiveness of industrial warfare technology. My point is that, while the probability of
war among core states may have decreased somewhat, the basic logic of
competition and conflict in the world-system has not changed and there are no
existing institutions which are strong enough to guarantee the peace.
In a purely
mechanistic system doom would be the most certain prediction. But we are dealing with a human system, a
somewhat intelligent set of actors who can surely see the way out of such a
dilemma. Perhaps a sufficiently large,
but not entirely devastating, nuclear conflagration will jar the peoples and
leaders of the world into consciousness and create the political will necessary
to outlaw warfare. The existence of such
a threat to the survival of the human species could provide the motivation for
the mobilization of a movement to create a real basis for collective security,
a world federation capable of preventing warfare among nation-states. The current manifestations of this potential
are, however, a long way from that goal.
A socialist
world-system.
Another version
of the claim that the current world-system has undergone or is now experiencing
transformation focuses on the emergence of the socialist states. I have elsewhere presented an interpretation
of these states as territories in which intentionally socialist movements have
come to state power, but have not yet successfully introduced a
self-reproducing socialist mode of production (Chase-Dunn, ed., 1982b).
Polanyi (1944)
discussed the dialectical interaction between the market principle and the
needs of society for protections against certain of the consequences of market
rationality, but his analysis focused primarily on national societies. At the level of the world-system and its
anti-systemic movements we see that the attempts to create non-commodified
relations of cooperation become encapsulated politically within organizations:
co-ops, unions, socialist parties, and socialist states. The market principle has, so far, been able
to expand its scale to reincorporate these collectivities into the logic of
competition within the larger world-system.
Thus the
contemporary socialist states are important experiments in the construction of
socialist institutions which have been perverted to some extent by the
necessities of survival and development in the context of the capitalist world
market and the interstate system.
The large
proportion of the world population now living in avowedly socialist states, and
victories within recent decades of socialist national liberation movements in
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the
My own
interpretation disputes this contention.
I see the socialist states (including
Frank (1980:chapter
4) draws the same conclusion from recent trends in which the socialist states
have increased their exports for sale on the world market, imports from the
avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for
investments within their borders.
National economic
planning, which is most highly developed in the socialist states, may be simply
the most complete expression of the trend toward state capitalism which is
occurring in most core and peripheral countries. And while distribution is more equal within
socialist states, this does not change the competitive logic with which they
interact with other states. Thus one
possible world is composed of states which are internally socialist but which
compete with one another in international markets and geopolitics.
The increasing
number of socialist states does not seem to have weakened the logic of world
capitalism. Rather the political constraints on the free mobility of capital
which these states have created push the logic of
capitalist
organization to expand its scale. States
become firms, and transnational corporations deal with all players in a
competitive world which remains subject to the anarchy of investment decisions.
Discussion and
Conclusions
To argue that the
world-system's logic has not fundamentally altered does not imply that this is
impossible or even unlikely. Nor is it
to argue that the massive expansions, emergent institutions, and shifts of
capital from place to place have not had drastic effects on the lives of
people. I would like to revisit some of
the questions raised in the earlier sections to speculate about the possible
consequences of changes which have not yet occurred, but which might occur in
the future.
What if it were
true that recent trends were the beginning of the end of the core/periphery
hierarchy. World-system theory has
claimed that peripheral capitalism is a normal and necessary part of the
capitalist mode of production, and that the reproduction of expanded
accumulation in the core requires the existence of primary accumulation in the
periphery.
This idea is not
based on the claim that peripheral production creates the bulk of surplus value
in the system, but rather on the insight that the relative harmony of classes
in the core, the somewhat peaceful accommodation between capital and labor
which exists as social democracy, corporatism, or "business
unionism," is based on the ability of core capital to emphasize
nationalist bases of solidarity.
Nationalism in the core is sustained by competition among core states
and by the ability of core capital to pay off an important segment of core
workers with higher wages, better working conditions, more welfare provisions,
and greater access to political power through democratic processes. This is possible, at least in part, because
core exploitation of the periphery provides a measure of additional surplus
value through unequal exchange (e.g. cheap bananas for core workers), profits
derived from investments in the periphery, and the status-based affects of
comparison with "less developed" countries.
In a pregnant
sentence Wallerstein predicts that "When labor is everywhere free we shall
have socialism" (Wallerstein, 1974:127).
This implies that, if the core/periphery division of labor disappears,
capitalism will no longer be able to overcome its own contradictions, and the
political structures maintained by the core/periphery hierarchy will
crumble. Socialist transformation, which
Marx predicted would occur first in the core nations, will finally visit them.
If the above
analysis is correct the imminent approach of metanational capitalism would be
good news for the world socialist movement as Borrego (1982) contends. But the formal proletarianization of the
world work force (the end of coerced labor and the decreasing availability of
alternatives to dependence on the world market) does not necessarily mean the
end of "segmented labor markets."
Political and ethnic stratification have proven effective in maintaining
wage differentials among formally "free" proletarians. The core/ periphery hierarchy could become
increasingly based on inequality between politically protected labor and
"free" labor.
If a contraction
in the magnitude of the core/periphery hierarchy were to occur, this would
exacerbate the contradictions of capitalism, which have been softened in the
past by what David Harvey (1982) has called the "spatial fix," the
ability of capital to find fresh room for accumulation by moving to where
opposition and constraints are fewer.
The expansion of the capitalist world-system has been driven by the
search for new markets, cheap inputs, and profitable investment
opportunities. Lenin (1965) pointed out
that by the end of the nineteenth century the core states could no longer find
new worlds to conquer and were forced to divide and redivide the
already-conquered world. This extensive
expansion has been supplemented by intensive expansion, the conversion of more
and more aspects of life to the commodity form, and thus expansion of
profit-making opportunities in the provision of fast food breakfasts, etc. The potential for further commodification is
great, especially in the periphery, where a substantial terrain of production
and consumption for use remains.
Increases in the
extent and depth of commodification must eventually reach limits. Only so much of human activity can be
commodified and the ability of markets and capital to expand beyond political
regulation must decline as the density and scale of political regulation begins
to catch up. Antisystemic movements
create obstacles to the manueverability of capital and place claims on
profits. The see-sawing back and forth
motion of capital must eventually generate consciousness and coordination among
groups who have an interest in collective rationality at the world-system
level. Capital flight has pitted workers
against one another for 500 years, but the growing scale and density of
political claims must eventually decrease the incentive to move and the level
of profit. The systemic crisis of
capitalism will involve the creation of democratic and collectively rational
control over investment decisions in a context in which "private"
wealth no longer has the power or the motivation to continue directing the
production process.
The growth of welfare
states, decolonization of the periphery, and the emergence of states in which
socialist parties control state power should be understood in this light. Despite the failure of these to change the
logic of the world-system so far, developments of this kind which manage to
coordinate their efforts on a global scale can indeed transform that
logic. These questions are addressed in
more detail in chapter 16.
Chapter 5 : World Culture, Normative
Integration and Community
A structural approach to the modern
world-system necessarily raises questions about the role of culture and of
normative integration. This chapter
discusses the extent to which world culture exists, and the role that
ideologies,consciousness, and collective solidarities play in the reproduction
and transformation of the contemporary world-system. Critics
of the world-system perspective have complained that cultural factors are
treated as epiphenomenal, and a number of recent efforts have been made to
remedy that situation (e.g. Wallerstein, 1984b:chapters 15 and 16; Robertson
and Lechner, 1985). My own theorizing
rests on historical
material¬ism, but I do not accept a general model in which the "base"
mechanically determines the "super-structure." This chapter argues that world culture and
normative integration play secondary rather than primary roles in the
reproduction of contemporary world order because of the nature of the
capitalist mode of production as it
operates on a global scale. But I am not
arguing that culture and normative integration are secondary in all systems, nor
that they will always be so in the future.
In this discussion of the structure,
functions, and content of contemporary world culture I will argue that
consciousness, ideology, and consensual definitions of reality and the good are
not the primary institutions which integrate the modern world-system. Rather, in comparison with earlier whole socio-economic
systems and with contemporary subunits such as families and national societies,
the capitalist world-economy is integrated more by
political/military power and market interdependence
than by normative consen¬sus. This is
not to contend that there is no such thing as world culture, but rather to
argue that its nature and structure depend on more potent economic and
political institutions. After consideration of the role played by normative
integration in the contemporary world-system I will discuss
the structure of the emerging consensual
world culture and the resistance to core cultural domination by peripheral
groups. A culture is defined broadly by
many anthropologists as a constellation of socially constructed practices (e.g.
Fox, 1985). I will use the term more
narrowly to refer to consciousness and
symbolic systems of belief and knowledge.
In this sense culture is composed of collectively held definitions of reality
and understandings of what constitutes good and evil. Thus we are talking about ideology, although
this is understood broadly to include all belief systems and religion, but also
science and secular economic and political ideas. The construction and sharing of complex symbolic systems is the most
important feature which distinguishes
human beings from other forms of life.
Symbolic systems allow us to collectively
accumulate knowledge. The relatively great
capacity for learned behavior (as opposed to instinctual behavior), which is
based on the unpreprogrammed cortex of the human brain, allows individuals to
internalize some of the accumulated cultural heritage of past social development. As Marx says in ”The Eighteenth
Brumaire• (Marx, 1978:9), this happy possibility has a dark side as well:
"the tradition of all the generations of the dead weighs like a nightmare
on the brain of the living." The institutions
and ideologies we inherit not only empower us, they also constrain us and
reinforce structures of domination.
Structures of power mold the cultural heritages which individuals
receive.
This is not the whole story of
course. If individuals only received
heritages nothing would ever change. The very process by which individuals
are confronted with competing and
contradictory cultural elements, and the
decisions between alternative
possibilities, builds an element of freedom into
the daily reconstitution of
consciousness. Large-scale processes may
carry on
according to a systemic logic which seems
to steam roll across individuals, but
individuals and groups of people
nevertheless choose their actions.
Structural
change, especially the transformation of
systemic logic, occurs at least in
part because people become aware of
alternatives and struggle in their behalf.Solidarity, the conscious
identification of individuals with one another and with larger collectivities,
is an important aspect of all social systems. Solidarity is based on
identification and the sharing of cultural agreements,of definitions, of values
and norms. It is this aspect of culture,
its
integrational function, which is the main
focus of the following discussion.
How does normative solidarity, which
unites people into families, communities,and nations, function in the modern
world-system? A recurring issue which
differentiates theories of social systems is the causal weight they attach to
ideological versus infrastructural institutions.
The shift in focus from national societies
to the whole world-system has been accompanied by a new set of debates about
this issue. Wallerstein (1979a) and Braudel
(1984) have emphasized the importance of political and economic institutions at
the world-system level which produce and reproduce material life, while others
have stressed the cultural and normative bases of world-
sys¬tem integration (e.g. Parsons, 1971; Heintz, 1973; Inkeles, 1975;
Meyer,
1987). This chapter will place the
characterization of the importance of cultural institutions in a comparative
context which employs a broad typology of whole socio-economic systems
developed by Polanyi (1977).
Talcott Parsons was perhaps the most
well-known exponent of the idea that
there exists a global social system which
is normatively integrated. In his
1961 article, "Order and community in
the international system," he argued that international law, shared
assumptions about the desirability of economic development, rational
bureaucratic organization, and political democracy form the basis of a world
normative order. Parsons did not
directly address the question of the role of the normative order in the larger
system,
because for Parsons all social systems
are, by definition, normatively based.
Social structures are defined in terms of
shared assumptions about proper rules
of behavior, and the value system is the
most fundamental feature of a social
system.
In his short book, ”The System of Modern Societies• (1971),
Parsons
applies his AGIL schema to the
"international system," arguing that core states
are differentiated in terms of their
functions within the larger international
system.
The French specialize in fine arts and diplomacy, the British in democracy,
and the
Types of Integration
But other students of comparative society
differ with Parsons's emphasis on the
role of normative integration in all
social systems. As discussed in the introduction to Part I above, Karl Polanyi
(1977) and Eric Wolf (1982) distinguish between social systems in terms of the
main type of glue which integrates them:
”Normative social systems”: Polanyi discussed reciprocal systems in
which
production and exchange are based on
consensually held norms of reciprocal obligation [Wolf's (1982) kin-based mode
of production; Wallerstein's (1979a:155) mini-systems]. While most contemporary families are
reciprocal subunits within a larger socio-economic entity,
that larger entity, the modern
world-system is, I will argue below,held together by a different kind of glue.
”Politically coercive social systems: Polanyi also discussed “redistributive"
systems which are integrated by political institutions which gather goods by
means of taxation or tribute-payment.¼2
States which organize threats and coercion are the main institutions in
such systems.
”Market-based social systems: A socio-economic system is integrated by markets
when a considerable share of its interactions, and the direction and nature of
its development, are conditioned by the buying and selling of commodities on
price-setting markets. A price-setting market
is one in which the exchange rates áÄá prices áÄá are determined by competitive
buying and selling by a large number of independent agents seeking to maximize
their individual resources.ÞZÞ
In reciprocal systems a consensual moral
order defines reciprocal role obligations and mobilizes social labor. Distribution is controlled by a set of rights
and obligations and social integration is guaranteed by socializing individuals
into the belief systems which define their roles and regulate interaction. Internalized definitions of self and the peer
pressures of a
face-to-face community are the main glue
which guarantees social order.
Redistributional activity in such systems may confer prestige on benefactors, but
authority structures are not very hierarchical.
These societies are classless in the sense that kinship groups are not
ranked and superior position is usually not inherited. And they are stateless in the sense that they
do not
contain a differentiated organization which exercises a monopoly of legitimate violence. Cultural integration based on consensus about
what is real and what is good is the main basis of social order. In politically coercive systems there are
classes and states. Surplus product is
gathered and redistributed by a political/military ruling class which utilizes
institutionalized authority backed up by force to accomplish appropriation. There are many institutional means used to
reinforce the appropriation of surplus product in these "tributary modes
of production"
(Amin, 1980a:46-70) and they vary in the
degree to which they are centralized (Wolf, 1982). European or Japanese feudalism represent a
rather decentralized, so-called "stateless," type in which each manor
is, in fact, a mini-state.
More typically we think of the great
agrarian empires in which a centralized state extracts resources from a wide
territorial division of labor. In such
socio-economic systems the political organization of force is the main
determinant of societal dynamics, but normative integration continues to play
a role. Religion is used to legitimate
the rule of the temple and the palace.
Codified law is created to centrally
define correct behavior and deviance across local communities which have
formerly relied on unwritten moral tradition.
Such "world-empires" (Wallerstein, 1979a:156) are primarily integrated
by the political competition which is articulated in a single state apparatus. The three types of integration -- normative,
political and market -- exist
in most world-systems, but world-systems
differ in the extent to which these are dominant and in the particular ways in
which they are combined. Normative integration
has changed its locus and function over the long history of human social
development. In the classless, pre-state
societies, clans and tribal groupings based on notions of kinship used
normative integration (Durkheim's mechanical solidarity) to produce social
order. Conformity was ensured by
informal social censure; the deviant was
often shamed into self-punishment (Malinowski, 1961).
When states emerged, societies became
integrated predominantly by the coercive power of political institutions of
various kinds. Military ruling classes
monopolized the means of violence and "protected" peasants from other
competing military centers in exchange for obedience and peasant produced surplus
product. The first urbanized
civilizations may have been theocracies, integrated largely on the basis of
normative legitimacy, but soon states,
competing with one another in warfare, became
integrated by political/military
institutions. Normative integration through religious and
ideological institutions continued as an important, but not central, adjunct to
military organization. Subunits such as
families, lineages, and peripheral communities remained integrated by normative
means, but these were articulated within a dominant tributary mode of
production. It was the imposition of
rule across normatively-defined communities which created the need for the law
codified rules. Normative integration in
a consensual culture does not require codification because everyone knows what is
right and what is wrong, just as the incest taboo in modern society does not
primarily rely on legal enforcement. But when an imperial state seeks to impose a
uniform set of rules across a set of normative communities which it has
conquered, the written law becomes necessary.
In market systems integration stems
primarily from the specialization of
independent producers and their resulting
objective reliance on one another
(interdepen¬dence). Polanyi (1944) argued that pure market
systems are unstable
and tend to generate new political institutions to protect societal desiderata
from the negative consequences of
unbridled competition and narrow market rationality. In the Wallersteinian version
"world-economies" are systems in which there are multiple cultures,
multiple polities, and a single integrated division of labor. The ”capitalist• world-economy
combines commodity production
for markets with political-military
competition among unequally powerful nation-states. Integration is due to interdependence and the
dynamic interaction between uneven capitalist accumulation and the balance of
power mechanism of the interstate system.
The institutions of international capital investments and the interstate
system are reciprocally interdependent on one
another and provide the structural center
of what is an extremely expansionist and intensifying socio-economic system
(see chapter 7). Thus the glue which
holds together the modern world-system is a combination of market-generated
interdependence in the world division of labor and the
political-military power of core
states. Our global political economy is called
a capitalist one because the market-based logic of accumulation constitutes a
greater part of the dynamics of the whole system than in earlier (precapitalist)
world-empires and world-economies. We
know that markets and wage labor existed in the
determine, or even much influence, the dynamic of imperial expansion and contraction. Rather it was political competition within
the arena of a single state apparatus and the extraction of resources (tribute,
slaves) by conquest which was the structural kernel of the Roman system (T.
Hopkins, 1978).
The above characterization of the modern
world-system does not imply that
normative solidarities play no role in
integrating our global system.
Normatively integrated subunits such as
families are important components of
capitalist production because they operate as income-pooling units which allow
people to combine different sorts of
resources, and thus they play a crucial
role in the reproduction of the labor force
(Smith et al., 1984). Families,
neighborhoods, village communities, and
other face-to-face primary groups
continue to play an important part in the
generation and maintenance of
individual personalities. Social psychological research shows that the
cognitive relationships of individuals to
larger solidarities such as ethnic
groups or nations are crucially mediated
by such primary groups (Shils and
Janowitz, 1948).
Thus it is incorrect to see contemporary
solidarities like the family as
merely vestigial remnants of earlier modes
of integration. Their functional
importance in the modern world-system does
not, however, mean that we ought to
understand the larger system to be
normatively integrated in the same sense
that earlier socio-economic systems were. The system as a whole is not held
together by consensual
understandings. Most exchange in the
capitalist
world-economy is not specified by
agreed-upon reciprocal obligations.
Rather
exchange is primarily organized as market
trade of commodities and as inter-organizational and interstate political
bargaining. Normative Solidarities in
the World-system
Normative integration plays an important but subservient role in the modern world-system. Normatively integrated subunits such as the
family, the local community, ethnicities, and nations (national communities)
serve important functions for the operation of the capitalist mode of
production.¼4 I already
mentioned the importance of the household
as an income©pooling group which
bears the cost of child-bearing,
child-rearing, care of the elderly, and psychological sustenance of the
self. Probably
the most important resource-pooling solidarity in the modern
world-system is the nation, not because of
the direct effects of such pooling,
but because of its linkage with the state.
Most modern states are nation-states in
which the functions of formal political organization,
authority,interest-aggregation, etc. are blended with the ideology of national
interests.
Successful competition within the world
market requires a strong and integrated
state standing behind a strategy of
competitive commodity production. Such a
state must be able and willing to use
force to guarantee the market share interests of its national investors (which
may be state bureaucrats or "private" capitalists). The use of international force requires a
certain degree of legitimacy, as does the maintenance of peace and order at
home.
Class conflicts and domestic resistance to
the use of military power are often softened by the ideology of nationalism. The viability of nationalism as a solidarity
is, of course, reinforced by its frequent correspondence with the
nation-state. But nationalism is also
reinforced by the core/periphery
hierarchy, the structured inequality between
"developed" and
"underdeveloped" nations.
Unlike class solidarity, which is
usually crosscut by the core/periphery hierarchy, nationalism in both the core and
the periphery is reinforced by the inequalities among "advanced" and "developing"
countries.¼5 Class solidarity within
core countries is reinforced by the perception by core workers that they share
national interests with their "own" capitalists in exploiting
peripheral countries and competing with other core countries. An example of
this is presented in Sidney Mintz's (1985) recent study of the place of sugar
consumption in the emergence of industrial capitalism in
Mintz's anthropology of food consumption emphasizes the social symbolism of
what and how we eat, and its connections
with power. He notes that cheap sugar
provided fast calories for core workers at
the same time that it enabled them
to consume an item which, along with tea,
had in the past been an imperial
luxury available only to the rich.
Cultural Presuppositions of the World
Market
As the above indicates, there are various
forms of community (solidarity)which are institutionally embedded in the
operation of the modern world-system. Normative integration is important for
families, neighborhoods, villages,cities, subnational regions, ethnicities,
tribal groupings, clans, class and occupational groupings, political parties,
and most importantly, nations.
These various forms of community are not,
however, the main type of glue which holds the contemporary world-system
together. Neither is political
organization, although this plays an important role in mediating
competition. The main glue of our global
system is the interdependence produced by a market-mediated network of economic
differentiation, a division of labor which Durkheim called "organic
solidarity." This form of
integration is not a solidarity in the normative sense, because it does not
require identification with a larger collective interest or the sharing of
consensual definitions of proper behavior or the good. Markets are constituted by the buying and selling activities of
large numbers of individuals (or firms) operating on their own account to
maximize returns. Normative evaluations
of different persons are ideal-typically irrelevant. But, as Durkheim (1964) pointed out,
contractual market exchange
does require a certain level of normative
consensus, as well as a certain kind
of law.
Actors must come to agreement on prices and on a generalized medium of
exchange (money) and they should agree that one exchange partner is as good as
another, or rather is as good as his/her
ability to pay. The institutionalization
of a price-setting market is problematic within a normatively integrated group,
and it is even more problematic between different culturally-¬bounded groups. Phillip Curtin (1984) has studied the world
historical development of market exchange across cultural boundaries. Curtin observes that trade between culturally
distinct groups is most often carried out by a separate
normatively integrated group which
specializes in cross-cultural trade.
Curtin terms these specialized trading
ethnicities "trade diasporas"
because they usually set up enclaves within the boundaries of the cultural
groups that they link through trade.
Curtin's work on sub-Saharan Africa led him to the idea of a trade
diaspora, which he then used in a broader investigation of cross-cultural trade
ranging from ancient
of the European colonial powers. Without trust and credit long-term,
long-distance trade is difficult to sustain, and trade between different
cultural groups requires consensus about
notions of fairness and equivalent
values. A specialized trading group
which is integrated on a kinship or ethnic basis provides the social
organization which can sustain cross-cultural market exchange. Curtin observes that trade diasporas decline
as the separate cultures whose exchanges they mediate develop sufficient common
understandings to allow direct trade, a situation he
terms the emergence of a "trade
ecumene." A certain level of
cultural understanding facilitates the linkage of different cultural regions by
market interdependence.
Of course, the emergence of a trade
ecumene does not imply that a "perfect" market mechanism operates in
international exchange. For one thing, much
international exchange (even within a capitalist world-economy) is conditioned
by political agreements similar in form to the "state-administered trade"
which was typical in world-systems dominated by the tributary mode of
production. And the "market universalism"
assumption of the equivalence of all buyers and sellers is also violated by the
fact that the capitalist world-system remains divided into separate normatively
integrated groups -- primarily nations.
Also the universal equivalent, money, is imperfectly formed in international
trade, as the history of international monetary institutions
attests (Vilar, 1976). Nevertheless, the depth of the trade ecumene
and the relatively strong operation of price-setting international markets is
undoubtedly greater in the modern world-system than in earlier world-systems
in which capitalism and commodified relations were less prevalent. The normative relations which emerge among
nation-states and transnational
actors in a market-integrated
world-economy are primarily composed of expectations about fair trade and the
protocols of diplomatic interaction. The
analysis of these normative structures has been carried out under the rubric of
"international regimes" (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Charles Lipson's study of the protection of
private property in the periphery by core states describes well the limits of
such international normative structures:
“...stable property rights and contractual relations are exceedingly
difficult to establish across national boundaries. Although collective evaluations and expectations
are an important feature of international relations, these normative properties
are weaker because political, social, and cultural communities are constituted
primarily at the domestic level, where they typically overlap and reinforce one
another (as the term ”nation-state” suggests). Thus, while it is difficult
to establish the meaning and value of property rights domestically, it is far
harder
internationally.” (Lipson, 1985:4,
emphasis in the original)
Despite the limitations of
international normative structures, the study
of international regimes has revealed important
things about the contemporary
world order and the ideological premises
and disputes which accompany world
politics.
The studies by Stephen Krasner (1985) and Craig Murphy (1984)
demonstrate how arguments over world
distributive justice in many respects
parallel ideologies of inequality and
inequity at the level of national societies.Ideological support for socially
structured inequalities also plays a role in justifying and rationalizing
core/periphery differences. Some of the non-market barriers to wage
equalization between core and peripheral workers are ideological, as is also
the case with wage differences among men and
women, or blacks and whites. Michael
Hechter (1975) has shown that
cultural¬ly-based definitions of in-group and out-group (e.g. English versus Irish)
played an important role in maintaining the structure of "internal colonial¬ism"
within the
a supportive role in structures of
domination, these are largely reinforced by
economic and political institutions. And this is even more the case when the
object of analysis is international
inequalities. The political structure of
migration control is a complex function of
popular attitudes, the economic
demand for labor, and the political power
of competing organizations and states
(Portes and Bach, 1985). And migration control is certainly one of the
most
potent institutions which reproduce core/periphery
wage differentials.The Structure of Contemporary World Culture
Both the content and the level of consensus among participants vary across cultures. Consensus is never complete and it tends to
decrease with complexity. As discussed
above, Durkheim (1964) argued that there is a normative basis to contractual
exchange in market society, although it differs greatly from the customary
obligations prevalent in societies with a less complex division of labor. In societies with a complex division of labor
in which
individual producers exchange their
products for the products of impersonal
others through the medium of money,
consensus still exists on some matters.
But an elaborate division of labor tends
to create an objective dependence of
individuals and groups of producers on
market exchange such that ”broad
consensual agreement is no longer required
for” social order”. People
may
believe anything they want to about
religion or aesthetics. Market exchange only
requires certain social agreements about the formally equal status of buyers
and sellers, the legal obligations of contract, and the terms and content of
exchange value. This necessary consensus is somewhat minimal in comparison with the degree
of consensus about ontology and sacredness which exists in simple societies,
and this minimal consensus is backed up by law and formal sanctions.
Complex societies are characterized by
relatively individuated and voluntary
forms of consciousness in the sense that
individuals exercise many options in
choosing among culturally available
identities and ideologies. Marx's
(1967a:71-83) discussion of the "fetishism of commodities" implies that
the institutionalized opaqueness by which market relations obscure the concrete
relationships among producers is functional for the operation of
capitalism because producers and consumers
are alienated from the knowledge of their real interdependencies. More recent critics (Zaretsky 1976; Bellah et
al, 1986) argue that the consumerism and privatism which are associated with individuated
identity in capitalist society alienate the individual from meaningful social
action. It is clear however that modern
national societies continue to be integrated, at least in part, through
collective consciousness. Durkheimian processes
of moral boundary maintenance, as well as strong sentiments of
solidarity are evident with regard to the
"national community." The
nation is
probably the most important collective solidarity
in the modern world-system. Ideological
hegemony, as analyzed by Antonio Gramsci (1971), certainly plays an important
part in legitimating political and economic hierarchies within national
societies. To make this point, however,
is also to recognize that consensus and cultural agreement are primarily
organized along national
lines in the contemporary world-system, and ”not• at the level of
the whole
system. The
organization of consciousness and identity along national lines is,
in fact, an important characteristic of
the capitalist world-economy. It is
not only the multicentric character of the
interstate system which allows
capital to maintain its mobility and the
capability of outmaneuvering oppositional movements. In addition, the tendency of world culture to
be fragmented into national cultures, and for collective solidarities to be
organized nationally, reinforces the structural mobility of capitalist
accumulation. The poor record of
proletarian internationalism and the bloody conflict among contemporary
socialist states have resulted primarily from the institutional
structuring of political power in the
interstate system, but they have also
resulted from virulent nationalism.
The point here is that nation-building,
the formation of national solidarities out of formerly separate collective identities,
is itself
product of the long-run operation of the interstate system and the commodity
economy.
That nations are better integrated in terms of collective identity
in the core than in the periphery is
largely a consequence of colonialism and
economic exploitation which developed the
core and underdeveloped the periphery.
Colonialism often employed a divide and conquer policy which pitted
peripheral ethnic groups against one another, while effective nation-building
in core countries was facilitated by exploitation of the periphery. The most salient feature of world culture is
its multinational character.
Natural language is the most important
bearer of cultural meaning, and ”there
is no global language•. Language remains differentiated at the level
of the
world-system. And thus collective
identity as expressed through intimately understood symbolic systems remains
multinational. This is not to claim that
consensual symbolic systems are not emerging at the global level. Cultural imperialism and the ideological
hegemony of European religion, politics,
economics, and science have produced
obvious isomorphisms among the national cultures of the world-system. Robert Wuthnow (1980) has convincingly argued
that the institutionalization of science and the emergence of different types of
religious movements have been strongly conditioned by world-system
proces¬ses. Economic development,
political equality, and nationally delimited
collective rationality compose an
underlying set of consensual themes for world
culture (Heintz, 1973). Each nation expresses its own identity in
terms of
some "uniqueness" which is
nevertheless consistent with one or another version
of these basic themes.
On the other hand the civilizational
values which constitute European
culture, and thus the culture of
domination in the Euro-centered world-
system, are by no means universally accepted despite the trend toward morphological
similarities among national cultures.
Important aspects of non-Western civilizational traditions with very
different presuppositions
about the universe are still strongly held
by large numbers of the world's peoples (Galtung, 1981; Wallerstein,
1984b:chapter 16).
The study of international regimes [i.e.
the evolution of agreements about specific issues such as aid, debt, foreign
investment, the law of the
sea, etc. (Krasner, 1985; Lipson, 1985;
Wood, 1986)], as well as discussions of international distributive justice
confronted in the debate over a "new international economic order"
(Murphy, 1984), have certainly illuminated the process of consensus formation
and disputation in the emergence of a world normative order. Stephen Krasner's (1985) study of debates
between core and
peripheral states reveals the feature,
well-known from studies of other cases
of distributive justice, that peripheral
states are much more likely to favor
an international regime which controls
resources on the basis of globallydefined interests, whereas core states are
more likely to favor the
distribu¬tion of resources according to ability of individual states to pay. Systems of linguistic equivalence have become
institutionalized in the practices of international translators, and artificial
world languages such as
mathematics are accepted everywhere. A single method of time-reckoning is
nearly universal, and pressure is exerted
to standardize other measure¬ments.
Communications protocols, traffic signs,
medical terminology, national economic
accounting, social indicators, and even
aesthetic and literary judgements are
increasingly consensualized. World
literature, world history, and even theory
and research on something called the
world-system, are perhaps expressions of
the emergence of a unitary world culture
(see also King, 1984).
Identification with the human species
as a whole is not a very important
solidarity in the integration of the
contemporary world-system. The
boundaries
of human solidarities have been expanding
their scope for a long time. The
development of "world" religions
such as Christianity and Islam separated
kinship and blood ties from the definition
of membership in the moral order.
The actual content of the idea of
universalism has expanded to include the
whole human species in the
"brotherhood of man," the "species-being" of nineteenth century
socialists. Contemporary discussions of
the global village, or spaceship earth, stress the extent to which we share a
common fate as a species. And most of
contemporary social science assumes the oneness of the human species. Of course ideas may be expressed or held by
a minority without being institutionalized into social structures. When we discuss the nature of
contemporary solidarity, the global
community is revealed to be only weakly
institutionalized. There are many competing world religions,
including the
variants of socialism. And international law, although stressed by
Parsons
(1961) in his discussion of normative
order at the international level, is yet
poorly institutionalized. Even the most central actors simply disregard
the
World Court when it suits them.
Durkheim used changes in legal systems
as a measure of the type of solidarity found in a society. In a similar fashion, many people have
examined
the world legal system to see if global
normative regulation is emerging. The
function¬ing of the
criticism (e.g. Falk, 1982). The importance of normative regulation at the
global level undoubtedly oscillates with
the level of conflict in the worldªsystem.
In addition it seems likely that international law has indeed increased
its importance compared with earlier centuries.
But this trend has not significantly shifted the overall logic of the
world©system toward that of a normatively regulated system. That is to say, though normative regulation
may have increased to some extent at the
global level, it remains a very weak
force. Complex
cultures are never very homogeneous.
Parsons (1971) speaks of
differentiated cultures in which subunits
specialize in separate but interdependent forms of consciousness and
meaning. Thus lawyers think differently from
doctors (have a subculture) which is nevertheless part of a larger integrated
culture. Perhaps the emerging world
culture is such a differentiated civilizational whole. Many have argued that certain underlying
cultural
themes have penetrated everywhere in the
modern world-system, or at least are
shared by national elites
everywhe¬re. Variously called
"modernism" or
"Westernism," this world culture
has been spread by colonialism and market
relations to every corner of our
earth. Its content has been described as
focusing on economic develop¬ment,
rational bureaucracy, secular humanism and
science, and political democracy, although
the global status of the latter is
questionable because of oscillation between
democratic and authoritarian
regimes in the periphery and semiperiphery. Nevertheless, it must be significant that
there are few true monarchies left in the world. Legitimation of the state from
"below," that is, as an organization operating in the interest of the
"people," has become nearly universal. This is very different from the ideologies of
tributary states and empires, which are agents of the
gods (see chapter 6). If there is something like a world culture
then English is obviously one
of its major languages. This has resulted from the far©flung expanse
of the
British Empire, but also from the fortunate (or unfortunate for Anglophobes) circumstance
that the British hegemony was followed by that of a hegemon carrying a similar
linguistic gene, the United States. A
hegemonic core power promotes its own language and many speakers find it a
necessary ”lingua franca•.
Certainly the number of spoken languages
has decreased over the last 500
years as a result of the European conquest
of earth. And bilingualism has
expanded to increase the size proportions
of the world's population speaking one or another of the largest
languages. But synthetic languages (such
as mathematics) and methods of time-reckoning, methods of measuring space, etc.
have spread somewhat independently of natural languages. Linguists
such as Sapir (1949) and Whorf (1956) have argued that meanings
are non-trans¬lateable across language
groups employing incompatible assumptions
about the nature of reality. We have all heard of the difficul¬ties of
translating certain German or French words
into English. How much more
difficult to express the Eskimo notions of
snow or the Navaho attribu¬tion of
modified action to what we think of as
inanimate objects (e.g. the log bumps,
instead of a bump on the log). Problems of this kind are resolved (or
obliterated) when translation equivalences
become institutionalized, as when
professional translators at the United
Nations develop standard solutions to
the problem of equivalences. The original nuances are lost, but this is
nevertheless a form of global consensus creation.
Cultural Imperialism
Culture usually reflects socially
structured inequalities. That is,
culture is
itself hierarchical and comes to reflect,
and to reinforce, hierarchy. Marx
said that the dominant ideas of an age are
the ideas of its rulers, and Gramsci
analyzed ideological hegemony in terms of
the ability of a ruling class to
legitimate itself by propagating a dominant (but not totally exclusive)
world-view. Much of what has been called world culture by
Parsons (1961, 1971)
and the modernization school, has been
called Western cultural imperialism by
others (e.g. Galtung, 1971). William Meyer (1987) has performed an
operationalization of "the
struc¬tural thesis of cultural imperialism" which examines certain key
propositions with data on 24 developing countries. He uses cross-sectional multiple regression
analysis to examine the relationships between two indicators of the penetration
of a country by Western news and information flows and three indicators of
Westernization of the economy, education system,
and consumption. Meyer does not find support for the
hypotheses of cultural
imperialism, but his study can hardly be
cited as firm evidence. The small
number of cases (small for regression
analysis) and problematic operationalizations make the results
untrustworthy. The same can be said of
other comparative studies which have sought to examine the effects of media imperialism
(see Stevenson and Shaw, 1984). These
questions are important and relatively unplowed ground for careful comparative
research. While no one can deny the existence of hierarchical aspects of
world culture, I will argue that this form of imperialism is not very central
to the functioning and reproduction of inequality in the modern world-sys¬tem.
Cultural imperialism certainly propagates
core popular culture and the "preference structures" which create
demand for the consumption of core commodities in every part of the globe. This is accomplished in part through the
centralization of communications and information-providing systems in core countries
(Schiller, 1969). Coke, Pepsi, rock-and-roll,
and American television programs are everywhere.But just as oppressed groups
within nations have often found it possible
to redefine themselves, to throw off the
styles and identities provided by dominant groups and to assert their own
"traditional" or "unique" definitions of self or group,
this kind of resistance also operates in the core/periphery hierarchy. The psychology of national liberation is
essentially the creation of new national identities in reaction to the colonial
ideologies of the past.
This form of resistance has been fairly
successful, although not unproblematically so.
The secular trend toward unifying cultural understandings remains
subject to important resistance. Groups
and nations which feel short-changed by the accretion of allegedly
"universal" culture may often redefine themselves (Wuthnow,
1980). The traditionalism of the
Khomeini regime in
of core countries, on the other hand,
appears as an atavistic denial of the best universalist tendencies of modern
society. Yet both kinds are the productof
a world political economy which divides peoples from one another and promotes
conflict over resources. Albert
Szymanski's (1981:257-88) chapter on "ideological hegemony as a mechanism
of imperial domination" shows the important extent to which core culture
has been promoted in an effort to legitimate core/periphery exploitation. Szymanski also reveals the ease with which
nationalist regimes in the
periphery may produce their own television
programs, etc. The falling cost of
communications technology has provided the
means to counter the centralization
of the provision of information and
entertain¬ment. In the modern
world-system
it is much easier for oppressed people to
redefine themselves, to adopt a more
positive self-definition even in the face
of "hegemonic" cultures, than it is
to change the position of a nation in the
economic and political/military
hierarchy.
Thus we have the phenomenon of
"overmodernization." Many
developing
countries adopt the trappings of
development: state planning, mass
education,
national monuments, etc. without being
able to create the material bases of
economic development. Meyer and Hannan (1979) show that all
countries,
regardless of the rate of economic growth,
expanded their education systems in
the period between 1950 and 1970. The worldwide education explosion, however,
is unmatched by worldwide economic
development because it is much easier to
create students, schools and teachers than
it is to institute productive and/or
profitable economic enterprises in the
context of a competitive world market.Of course some countries have rejected
modernization as Western imperialism and sought to recreate
"indigenous" institutions and ideologies. The Iranian revolution is
an obvious example, but many other peripheral and semiperipheral countries have
similar elements in their national ideologies.
It is fairly easy to accomplish such a
redefinition and rejection of the
dominant world culture because ”the world culture itself is pluralistic.
Participation in the world market, or even
in the international system of
diplomacy, does not demand much in the way
of cultural uniformity. The above points
support the contention that world culture is not the main way in which order is
sustained in the contemporary world-system.
But a counter-argument could contend that the world-system is not well©
integrated,
and that this is due to a lack of
normative consensus. Many have perceived
international relations not as a system,
but rather as an "anarchy of nations"
each out to get as much as it can. It is clearly the case that warfare is an
institutionalized part of the competition
among states. Warfare is nearly
continuous on the earth, and war among
core states is periodically produced by
the process of uneven capitalist economic
development (see chapters 7 and 8). While
warfare indicates that competition regularly breaks into conflict, it is
misleading to characterize the world-system as an "anarchy of
nations."
The system reveals many regular patterns
of interaction despite the fact that it is not strongly integrated by consensual
culture. The market interdepen¬dence and
the related political-military balance of power mechanisms operate to produce
certain features which contradict the hypothesis of a disordered Hobbesian war
of all against all. First, the
core/periphery
hierarchy is fairly stable. Despite a certain amount of upward and
downward
mobility, any area is most likely to
remain in the position in which it has
long been.
And the number of sovereign states has increased rather than
decreased.
In a system based purely on conquest we would expect the number of
sovereign states to decrease as
empire-formation takes place.
One of the most persuasive arguments in
favor of a strong world culture
is that by John W. Meyer. Meyer claims that certain values, primarily
those of
economic progress and rationality, are institutionalized as normative rules in
the world polity. As Meyer (1987:50) puts it, “Explanations of the world-wide state
system that stress cultural factors are on the right track. Yet their commitment to a narrow
conceptualization of culture caused them to miss the awareness that modern
world culture is more
than a simple set of ideals or values
diffusing and operating separately in individual sentiments in each society. The power of modern culture -- like that of
medieval Christendom -- lies in the fact that it is a shared and binding set of
rules exogenous to any given society, and located not only in individual or
elite sentiments, but also in many world institutions (interstate
relations, lending agencies, world
cultural elite definitions and organization, transnational bodies, and so on).
The United Nations, although a weak body
organizationally, symbolically represents many of the rules of the modern world
polity....It symbolizes the rules of a political system in which national©
states are constitutive citizens. Meyer
contends that a strong set of institutionalized norms accounts for the
stability of the interstate system, supports the sovereignty of existing
states, and legitimates the expansion of
state regulation within national
societies in both the core and the
periphery. Meyer notes that peripheral
states expand their internal jurisdiction
and adopt the trappings of "modernity" (welfare systems, educational
systems, etc.) even in the absence of much domestic economic development, and
there is considerable empirical support for this contention (see Meyer and
Hannan, 1979).
I agree with Meyer that the normative
rules institutionalized in the United Nations and the protocols of diplomacy
support the interstate system and the sovereignty of states. But I disagree that these norms are the main source
of support for these important central structures of the modern
world-system. Meyer's assumption that
the norms are "shared and binding" is simply incorrect. When norms are binding the cost of deviance
is opprobrium from a valued other (shame) or self-punishment motivated by
guilt. Deviance from the norms of
diplomacy or the UN Charter is not sanctioned in these ways in the contemporary
world-system. My own explanation of the
expansion,
stability, and reproduction of the
interstate system also refers to institutions, but not to rules and values
embodied in the world culture. In
chapters 6, 7 and 8 I argue that the features of states and the interstate
system to which Meyer refers (and others) are produced by an institutional¬ized
capitalist mode of production and by the efforts of groups to protect
themselves from market forces and exploitation by core powers. I agree that normative and value-based
consensus has increased at the global level, and that world culture is evolving
as a differentiated complex system of institutionalized values. But I also contend that these emergent
features do not yet play a strong
integrative role in the dynamics of the contemporary world-system. System integration is primarily mediated by markets,
and this is backed up by the functioning of the interstate system, a political/military
balance of coercive power which regularly (but not randomly) employs warfare as
a means of competition. World culture
operates to legitim¬ate commodity production and the interstate system, but is
not an important determinant of the dynamics of our world-system. Consciousness may, however, play an important
role in the transformation of the current system to one based more on consensus
and normative integration.
The Future of World Culture and Community
The trend toward world cultural
integration which can be discerned in an
increasing convergence around basic themes
and the isomorphism of national
cultures has not yet reached the point at
which normative processes have a
central role in world-system
processes. The capitalist world-economy
is an
historical system with contradictory
tendencies which will eventually lead to
its transformation into a qualitatively different kind of system. My argument
above should not be interpreted to mean
that ideas will have no importance in
the transformation of this system. On the contrary, it is my hope that a
scientific analysis of the deep structural
tendencies of the system will be
useful in transforming it. As Polanyi (1944) suggested for national
societies,
the enormously productive forces of
capitalist develop¬ment are also enormously
destructive of certain human values which
do not easily enter into the calculus
of "private" (or partial)
profit-making. The normative assertion
of these
collective values is an important part of
constructing a world polity which can
democratically and rationally plan world
production, distribution, and development.
Thus the "universalism" generated by capitalist culture needs
to be carried forth to a new level of socialist meaning, albeit with a
sensitivity to the virtues of ethnic and national pluralism (see Chase-Dunn,
ed., 1982b:chap¬ter 14). The claims made
by Parsons (1971) and the other culturalist
theorists that normative universalism is a
central feature of the existing
capitalist world-system must be debunked,
but the possibility of such a world
society in the future should be
recognized. Now we turn to a consideration
of the role of states and the interstate system in the capitalist
world-economy. A summary of the
conclusions reached
in Part I is contained on pages 8 to 11 in
the Introduction.
PART II : States and the Interstate System
Economics and politics are not really separate phenomena despite
the needs of academic disciplines to maintain their boundaries. Political economy is the study of the
interaction and interdependence between economic and political activities. We cannot understand any social system
without knowing how both power and production are organized. A debate has emerged about the nature of the
modern world-system and the relationship between its economic and political
aspects. Some authors stress the
autonomous nature of geopolitics (Skocpol, 1977; Zolberg, 1981) and others,
like Modelski and Thompson (1988) analyze long cycles of power concentration in
which the long-range military capabilities of the "great powers" are
the main focus. The world-system theory
developed here looks at the specific ways in which economic and political
action are intertwined within the capitalist world-economy. It is argued that the interstate system of
unequally powerful and competing states is the political body of capitalism,
and that capitalist institutions are central to the maintenance and
reproduction of the interstate system, as well as vice versa.
According to Levy's
(1983:table 3.1) compilation there have been 64 wars involving two or more
states classified as "great powers" since 1495. Several different definitions and lists of
wars are reviewed and critiqued by Levy (1985).
Here I am defining world wars as major conflicts among core powers for
control of core areas of the world-system. Rather than simply counting wars,
students of international conflict have devised measures of the intensity of
warfare. Goldstein (1985, 1988) uses a
measure based on the number of battle deaths per year to study cycles of core
war severity.
Though individual
conflicts may have many causes, the cycles of world war among core states are
understood here as a normal part of the restructuring of political relations
which follows the uneven development of capitalist accumulation. The rise and
fall of hegemonic core powers is also seen as a consequence of uneven
development and associated processes of class conflict and core/periphery
interaction.
Contrary to the
arguments of some analysts (e.g. Schumpeter, 1955), capitalism is not a pacific
mode of production. Rather warfare
appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist
world-economy. In the modern
world-system warfare is in large part an adjunct to strategies of trade and
investment, whereas in the precapitalist world-empires it was itself the
primary form of competition. For
capitalism the interstate system of sovereign nation-states, which presumes the
legitimacy of warfare, is a crucial institution. It is contended here that the emergence of a
system-wide world state, even a confederation limited solely to the prevention
of warfare among nation-states, would be the beginning of the end of capitalism
as a dominant mode of production.
Chapter 6 reviews
recent neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian studies of states as organizations. The process of state-formation, the size of
states, and differences between core and peripheral states are considered. Chapter 7
examines the arguments that claim that geopolitics is a separate
game from economic competition. I
contend that these two forms of competition
constitute a single integrated logic in the modern
world-system. The ways in which the
interstate system and the world economy are intertwined with one another in the
modern world-system are examined.
Chapter 8 continues this
discussion by focusing more explicitly on the institutions of
capitalism andtheir role in reproducing the interstate system; it compares the
modern interstate system with earlier world-empires, and considers the patterns
and linkages between different kinds of wars.
Chapter 9 outlines an explanation of the rise and decline of hegemonic
core states, the most successful states within the capitalist world-system.
Chapter 6: States and Capitalism
It has been implied that the world-system perspective is a
vulgar "economistic" approach which contends that political action is
determined by economic structures. It is
undeniable that the relationship between political action and socio-economic
structures is somewhat loose. This is
quite evident when we consider the extremely complicated connections between
class interests and political action.
They are by no means as simple and direct as Marx and many Marxists have
assumed (and wished). Analogously, if we
examine the link between the world-system position of states and the policies,
organizational forms, and regime structures of those states there is not a
simple and complete fit. To be sure, we
can not explain everything about political action and state structures by
knowing how and where a country is inserted into the world hierarchical
division of labor. As John Willoughby's
(1986:43) excellent discussion of core and peripheral state formation in the
context of the internationalization of capital concludes:
Neither imperial
nor subordinate state behavior can be explained without reference to more
specific national and international historical processes. No narrow focus on the tendencies of capital
can by itself explain state behavior.
The method does account for certain general structural trends in the
evolution of the global polity, but these findings only provide a basis for
understanding the subject of imperialism proper. It is still
necessary to develop a framework that can model the interactions among
core and peripheral nation-states and international organizations. Otherwise, it will not be possible to
anticipate the shifting contours of political-economic subordination and
conflict so basic to the capitalist world.
This said we can, however, observe certain general regularities
which may be helpful in understanding the world-system as a whole, and also the
constraints and possibilities of particular states.1 Those who wish to take a less deterministic, more voluntarist,
approach to the state and politics often take the Weberian methodological route
which emphasizes variability, and seeks to explain why it is different in such
and such a place. Charles Ragin and
David Zaret (1983) have recently clarified the distinction between Durkheimian
variable-based and Weberian case-based explanation. The latter emphasizes explaining the genesis
of diversity, while the former focuses on explicating the general model rather
than the deviant case. Both strategies
are useful and ought to be combined, as Ragin and Zaret contend. What they do not point out, and what is often
missing in those analyses of particular states which emphasize historical
contingency, is that explanation of variability or diversity assumes the
adequacy of the general model with which the particular case is being
contrasted. What I wish to do here is to
focus on the formulation of a general model.
This chapter considers
recent studies which compare core, peripheral, and semiperipheral states, and
which discuss generalizations about the connection between the core/periphery
hierarchy and features of states. It
also discusses the question of the nature of the state within a capitalist mode
of production, this in the context of the world-system perspective. The interconnection between the interstate
system, geopolitics, and capitalist institutions are examined in two following
chapters. Here we will focus on
individual states.
Is it true that the
typical capitalist state is one which only provides social order and does not
intervene in markets or production decisions?
Or, to ask the question another way, is capitalism a system which is
best conceptualized as operating within the context of such a minimalist
state? What is the real relationship
between states and markets within the capitalist mode of production? Are core states typically stronger than
peripheral states, anddoes this hold for both internal power and power vis--vis
other states? Are core states typically
more democratic, less centralized, and less authoritarian than peripheral and
semiperipheral states? If there is such
a correspondence between regime form and world-system position, what explains
this correspondence? These and related
questions are discussed in this chapter.
State Strength: Internal and External
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) contends that core states tend to be
strong, both internally and vis--vis other states, while peripheral
states tend to be weak. And he argues
that these tendencies are reinforced by certain structural features of the
world-system, by ongoing processes of exploitation and oppression which
reproduce the core/periphery hierarchy (see also Rubinson, 1976; Kick,
1980). The strong state/weak state
formulation has been criticized by neo-Weberians, as has the alleged
"economism" of Wallerstein's approach (e.g. Skocpol, 1977). It is contended by critics that some non-core
states are very strong vis--vis internal oppositional forces, and that
some core states look rather weak internally.
It is generally agreed that in external stateto-state relations
Wallerstein's generalization holds. Core
states are always more powerful than peripheral states vis--vis other
states in terms of military power and economic power deriving from position in
the hierarchical international division of labor. These different types of power may not be
perfectly correlated, as some states emphasize one or the other, and attention
must be paid to the fact that some states change their relative position,
moving up or down in the core/periphery hierarchy. The thing which
distinguishes a capitalist world-economy from earlier
world-systems is the extent to which states in the core rely on comparative
advantage in production for the world market instead of politicalmilitary
power. This does not imply,however, that
the normal or typical capitalist state is one which does not interfere with
market exchange. The laissezfaire
state is, in fact, rather atypical, corresponding to those hegemonic core
states who are big winners in the world market without needing to resort to
strong mercantile interference, or small states greatly dependent on
international exchange who do not have the option of exercising effective
politicalmilitary influence.
The rough
correspondence between external state strength and relative status in the
core/periphery hierarchy is a matter of definition for those who understand
geopolitics to be the main arena of competition in the modern
world-system. It must be admitted that
politicalmilitary competition is important, but if we seek to understand how
the modern world-system differs from earlier world-systems we must examine the
interaction between states and capitalist commodity production.
The question of
internal power is admittedly more complex than the question of external
power. I will argue that the form of the
government, (whether it is constitutionally democratic, monarchical, or one or
another form of centralized authoritarianism) is not simply related to the
question of internal state power. A
democratically constituted state may be weak or strong vis--vis internal
opposition groups, as may an authoritarian state. And state strength vis--vis potential
and/or actual internal opposition varies over time (relative to itself) in both
core and the peripheral states, as do the formal constitutional forms taken by
states and the composition of class alliances backing particular regimes.
The question of the
internal power of states is, like all discussions of power, both theoretically
and empirically problematic. Much of the
recent literature focusing on states analyzes the "capacities" of the
state toimplement policy decisions in specific realms of social, political, and
economic activity (Skocpol, 1985). This
is a useful conceptualization of internal state power, but it needs to be
clarified in several ways. The quantity
of various kinds of resources directly controlled by governmental agencies
(assuming these can be quantitatively measured) needs to be compared with the
resources available to internal groups that are prone to resist state
policy. And both the state itself and
its contending oppositional groups need to be analyzed, not as monolithic, but
in terms of the degree of united action versus competing or even conflicting
subsections. One important determinant
of the power of a state visvis internal opposition is the degree to
which state managers and state agencies support each others' actions. Indeed, Arthur Stinchcombe has made this his
definition of legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1968:
chapter 4).
It should be noted
that it is a characteristic of the most successful hegemonic core states to be
relatively decentralized in form. Thus
the
have a nationally directed education system or a serious public
central institution for national economic planning. The
Presiding over an
economy in which transnational capital is the dominant fraction of the
"local" bourgeoisie inhibits the expansion of the state's domestic
economic role in capital-exporting countries.
The interests of trans
national capital
coalesce with the geopolitical concerns of state elites around an
"externally strong, internally weak" state apparatus. The
Evans' usage applies
best when we are considering processes such as those that occur in declining
hegemonic core powers (see chapter 9).
It is then that capital exports become relatively great as domestic
opportunities for profit contract. In
these states formerly convergent interests among different types of capital,
and between capital and significantly large groups of core workers, show signs
of increasing divergence. No doubt the
state becomes weaker (relative to itself at an earlier time) in such a
situation as the coalition of interests behind the state becomes increasingly
problematic. But it would be inaccurate
to characterize core states as typically internally weak relative to
semiperipheral or peripheral states. The
power of a state as an organization really comes down to the amount of
resources it can mobilize relative to the amount of resources which can be
mobilized against it. In core countries
there are more total resources to be mobilized, and thus a state may need to
mobilize great resources against an actual or potential internal
challenge. But decentralization and
democratic political forms are not direct indications of state weakness. In fact, these forms may help create legitimacy
and consensus among significant supporters of a state, and thus undermine
challenges and resistance to state authority.
As implied by the
above discussion, legitimacy is an important component of internal state
strength. Robert Philip Weber (1981) has
demonstrated that there is an association over time in changes in the content
of political rhetoric and the Kondratieff cycle. Weber performed a content analysis of British
Speeches from the Throne from 1795 to 1972 which reveals a 52year thematic cycle,
and this closely corresponds to the Kwave.
Weber argues that this shows that problems of political legitimacy are
linked to the contradictions produced by capitalist development. Regardless of how this empirical relationship
is explained, the finding confirms the existence of a connection between
"internal" legitimacy processes and the long economic cycle of the
worldsystem.
We normally think of
autonomy and "sovereignty" as definitionally involved with state
strength. Sovereignty is a very problematic
thing when we turn to a consideration of peripheral states. The most extreme and obvious example of lack
of sovereignty in the periphery is the formal colony, an extension of the state
apparatus of a core power. Although such an apparatus may be very powerful vis--vis
oppositional groups in the periphery, we would not consider it to be, in
itself, an internally strong state. It
is likely to lack legitimacy, and it always lacks autonomy. External and internal state strength are thus
not completely independent from one another even at the level of
definition. Sovereignty vis--vis
other states is a requirement for internal
strength as well as external strength because it would be
nonsensical to characterize a comprador state or formal colony (whose very
existence is guaranteed primarily by the forces of a core state) as being an
internallystrong state. Internal state
strength must be defined in terms of those resources which are autonomously
controlled by the particular state under consideration. In practice this is a difficult distinction
to make, but we must make it in order to distinguish colonies and comprador
regimes from strong states.
A related point, first
outlined by Richard Tardanico (1978), is suggested by the conventional use in
comparative research of government revenues or expenditures as measures of
state strength. While these are
obviously direct measures of some of the resources commanded by a state, a
better measure would be the amount of resources commanded by the state during
a period in which state power is challenged. Though the seventeenthcentury
state to mobilize greater resources when they were needed
means that the state as an organization was probably internally stronger in
A strong state, then,
is strongly supported by an alliance of capitalists which is itself unified and
has relatively convergent interests, and is thesource of important
resources. There are analytically two
elements here: the magnitude of resources, and the relative unity within and
among classes. Richard Rubinson (1978)
has analyzed the political processes by which powerful coalitions among
capitalists and landed property owners were forged to form a strong bloc behind
upwardly mobile semiperipheral states in
An important
difference between a capitalist state (which mainly provides order and other
conditions for profitable commodity production and commerce) and precapitalist
states (which directly engaged in the tributary mode of production in which
political-military power was itself the main source of surplus appropriation)
suggests reasons why a lowbudget state may be, at the same time, very powerful vis--vis
both internal and external opposition.
Capitalists want effective and efficient states that is, states which supply sufficient
protection for successful capitalist accumulation at cost. A state which does this will be strongly
supported by groups with large resources, and yet these states may have
relatively small bureaucracies and sparse budgets.
The above arguments
notwithstanding, most crossnational studies of internal state strength use some
measure of the resources available to the government and compare this magnitude
to some measure of the overall resources available in the country. The most common measure is the ratio of
government revenues to the GNP. Most of
this research has examined the causes of the relative growth of states and the
effect of state strength on other variables(e.g. Rubinson, 1977b). A recent
Ph.D. dissertation by SuHoon Lee (1986) demonstrates that growth in the extractive
capacity of peripheral and semiperipheral states (revenues), their coercive
capacity (the military), and their integrative capacity (mass
education) are primarily the consequence of international interactions (such as
involvement in interstate wars and the international market) rather than
internal factors. Cameron (1978) finds
that the extractive capacity of core states is highly related to their degree
of involvement with the international market.
Here is some
additional evidence which bears on the question of the internal strength of
core and peripheral states. Table 6.1 is
taken from information contained in the World Bank's World Tables (1983). This table shows the average levels of
government consumption as a percentage of GDP for groups of countries from 1960
to 1981. The country groups are composed
by the World Bank. In our terms, the 21
so-called "industrial market economies" correspond almost exactly
with the core. "Lowincome
developing economies" (those 43
countries with less than $405 GDP per capita in 1981) are all peripheral, while
"middle income developing economies" includes 106 countries, both
peripheral and semiperipheral. So-called
"East European non-market economies" and "high income oil
exporters" are excluded from the above groups.2
--Table 6.1 About Here--
The item, general
government consumption, is defined as follows:
General
government consumption comprises all current expenditure for purchases of
goods and services by government bodies:
that is, central, regional, and local governments; separately operated
social security funds; and international authorities that exercise tax or
governmental expenditure functions within the national territory. It excludes outlays of public non-financial
enterprises and public financial institutions.
The current expenditure of general government covers outlays for
compensation of employees, purchases of goods (excluding the acquisition ofland
and depreciable assets) and services from other sectors of the economy,
military equipment, and other purchases from abroad. Capital expenditure on national defense (except
for civil defense) is treated as
consumption,
whereas all expenditure on capital formation (including civil defense) is
included in gross domestic investment.
(World Bank, 1983 I:xi)
Government consumption
as a percentage of GDP is by no means the ideal measure of internal state
strength. It does not take account of
the resources which would become available to a state in the face of an
emergency, an important component of state strength suggested in the argument
above. Neither does it at all capture
the dimension of unity (or disunity) among state agencies nor potential
opposition groups, nor does it include certain capital expenditures (e.g. land
purchases) or the expenditures of state-owned firms, which probably are
indications of internal state strength.
Undoubtedly this measure is affected by differences in accounting
procedures and other things which are unrelated to state strength. It does, however, take roughly into account
the magnitude of the economic resources normally available to states and
weights this by the total value of final economic transactions in the society
(GDP) As such this ought to be a rough
proxy (in cross-national comparison) for the normal extractive power of a state
vis--vis its national society.
Table 6.1 shows that
the percentage of GDP attributable to government consumption has risen since
1960 in all groups. This supports other
research (Boli, 1980; Lee, 1986) which has demonstrated increases in
state-formation in both the core and the periphery. Of more relevance to the question of
differential state strength, however, is the indication in table 6.1 of considerable differences between zones of the
world-system with regard to the extractive capacity of states. The level of average extractive capacity
amongcore states is significantly higher than that found in either middle or
low income developing countries, and this difference continues over time
despite the rise of each group.
The differences
between the low and middleincome groups indicate, with one exception, that
semiperipheral states may be internally stronger than peripheral states. This conclusion is uncertain however, because
the group of middleincome countries includes both semiperipheral and peripheral
countries.
A State-centric View of Exploitation
The recent literature which emphasizes the relative autonomy of
state managers, and their inclination to expand the state bureaucracy and to
organize stable and protected access to resources to expand state power and control as far as
they can needs to be considered within a
context of different modes of production. Charles Tilly (1985) has
characterized modern nation-states as predatory accumulators on their own
account, as legalized protection rackets operating to obtain the largest
possible share of resources. It is
important to remember that, although there has been a trend toward the growth
of states in both core and periphery, there still remain important differences
between
the operation of states within a capitalist world-system and the
operation of states within systems in which tribute-gathering is the main form
of accumulation. States within the
contemporary world-system certainly have a tendency to expand their resources. State managers often and regularly attempt to
extend their power by finding or creating constituencies which allegedly need
their services, and by expanding state access to resources. But the objects of state policy and the
continuing limitations on the use of state power need to be considered in the
context of a world capitalist system.
The expansion of core
states has been analyzed by certain Marxists in terms of necessary correctives
to contradictions produced by "monopoly capitalism." Baran and Sweezy (1966) noted that the
post-Korean war expansion of the
But O'Conner's work
also contends that there are important limitations on the further expansion of
state expenditures, and this idea of constraints is often neglected by
state-centric analysts. Contrary to the
tone one often finds in the literature on the predatory expansiveness of state
managers, there remain powerful forces which limit the tendency to state
expansion. Taxation has been resisted in
all historical systems, but in a capitalist
system the ruling class itself lives primarily on profits from
commodity production rather than tax revenues.
Tax payments constrain profit-making in many ways. Taxes on capitalist firms raise the cost of
products and reduce competitiveness, and thus profits. Taxes paid by consumers lower the effective
demand for commodities. Thus, as Fred
Block (1978) and many other analysts have pointed out, the very structure of
capitalist accumulation limits states to activities which promote an atmosphere
of "business confidence."
States themselves are
often major purchasers of products from the private sector, of course. And, increasingly, modern states are
themselves directlyentering into the production of commodities. Bennett and Sharpe (1985:71) usefully
summarize the differences between private and publicly owned firms. Public firms may operate at a loss if there
is sufficient political support to subsidize them. But even state capitalism is eventually
subjected to cost considerations emanating from competitive markets. If states produce for export they must
compete with foreign producers, and so cost considerations are important. And, even when they produce only for their
own monopolized domestic market, there are important constraints. If they produce for a protected internal
market the political costs of maintaining an internal monopoly vary with the
disparity between the internal price and the world price. Above a certain differential the costs of
preventing smuggling, and/or illegal internal production, become exorbitant. As long as the interstate system remains a
competitive arena there is a tendency toward the "equalization of surplus
profits" in which the political conditions for the maintenance of
monopolies are subjected to a logic of cost efficiency.
The historian of
action between state power and the economic growth of firms in
terms of the notion of "protection rent." States, which he calls
"violencecontrolling enterprises," are differentially successful in providing
effective and efficient protection to merchants and commodity producers. In the context of a competitive interstate
system and an international pricesetting market, protection rent is an
important component of the profits which are gained by firms. Lane explains,
An essential
charge on any economic enterprise is the cost of its protection from disruption
by violence. Different enterprises
competing in the same market often pay different costs of protection, perhaps
as tariffs, or bribes, perhaps in some other form. The difference between the protection costs
forms one element in the income of theenterprise enjoying the lower protection
cost. This element in income I will call
protection rent. (Lane,
1979:1213, emphasis in the original).
Though Lane's notion has been applied primarily to
"mercantilist" states, protection rent, and competition among states
to provide relatively efficient protection for their international merchants
and producers, continues to be an important constraint on state expenditures in
the contemporary world-system because capital can migrate to where effective
protection costs are lower.
Of course, as William
H. McNeill (1982) has argued, there is a contextual effect by which the level
of expenditure of any single state will be justified in rising along with the
general level. McNeill contends that
market-based industrialism and rapid innovations in military technology have,
in the context of the continuation of an extremely competitive interstate
system, created a virtual explosion (excuse the grim pun) of military
expenditures.
The expansion of
states everywhere, and their increasing tendency to become directly involved in
the process of economic development, may have somewhat weakened the constraints
on state expenditures which emanate from the world market and the competition
for investment capital, but these forces still remain important limitations on
the expansion of state appropriation of resources.
Raymond Duvall and
John R. Freeman (1981) present an excellent theoretical analysis of state
entrepreneurship in dependent capitalist states, mainly semiperipheral
ones. They make the important point that
there is no such thing as "the capitalist state" in general. The particular articulation of each state
within the larger world-system must be taken into account in any theory of
state economic policy. Peter Evans's
(1979) analysis of the Brazilian trip, the alliances, bargaining, and
competition among statemanagers, local capitalists and transnational firms operating
in
It is extremely
difficult for states to cut themselves off from the larger world-system and to
create a closed internal economy, although many have tried. The most successful in some respects are the
large semi-peripheral
states, especially
military threats that tend to undercut autarchic
industrialization.
Mercantilist state power (la Friedrich List) was also
used to protect infant industries from foreign competition in earlier
successful industrializers
England, the United States, Germany and Japan (Senghaas,
1985) and state power has been very
important in the recent industrialization of Brazil, Mexico, India, and of
course South Korea and Singapore.
Contrary to the
implications of Gershenkron's (1962) analysis, it is not only late
industrializers that employ mercantilist protection and state intervention in
order to foster capitalist accumulation.
Both
competition. In
Elizabethan England the government acted to constrain thebusinesses of foreign
merchants in
Similarly the
imperial revolution against
development, the granting of commercial monopolies, and the
regulation of land and water use.
Intervention at the federal level turned toward an increasingly
mercantilist "American System" policy in a series of struggles and
not a few setbacks, which were finally settled by the Civil War. My own study of tariff politics in the US
between 1812 and the Civil War shows, in this single policy terrain, how
shifting coalitions of core capitalists, peripheral capitalists, farmers, and
urban workers eventually led to the firm establishment of core capitalism in
the United States (Chase-Dunn, 1980).
It is obvious that
some states are able to move upward in the core/periphery hierarchy. These include Gershenkron's so-called late
industrializers. The world-system
analysis of "national development" views these cases of upward
mobility as exceptions against the background of the more frequent
"development of underdevelopment."
This is not just a matter of vocabulary.
Discussions of the state and national development which focus only on
the industrialization of national economies have difficulty accounting forthe
phenomenon of a reproduced core/periphery hierarchy based on uneven
development, with dependent industrialization occurring, but little or no
reduction in the overall magnitude of world-system inequality.
As Peter Evans and
John Stephens (1987) have persuasively argued, state control and market freedom
are not mutually incompatible alternatives. States increasingly act to both
control markets and create them. Indeed,
the policies of states that successfully promote capitalist development are
oriented, not
only to the efficient supply of social order, but also to the
creation of structures which promote profitable enterprises. State capitalism does not simply wait for
entrepreneurs to succeed so that it can tax them. It acts to create opportunities for
entrepreneurs, and sometimes it takes on the entrepreneurial role itself. Evans (1986) has analyzed the Brazilian
creation of a domestic micro-computer industry by some state
"technicos" who managed to create a constituency for themselves by
spawning domestic computer-producing firms.
"
It is not simply a
question of intervention versus the free operation of markets, but rather the
goals and content of state policies. It
is undoubtedly true that economic intervention has increased and become much
more sophisticated than when states imposed import and export tariffs primarily
as a mechanism for raising revenues. But the larger point is that this kind of
intervention is not precapitalist nor anti-capitalist, but is rather the normal
operation of states within a capitalist mode of production. The definition of capitalism as private
business conducted in the context of a minimalist state was a mistaken
representation produced by focusing on a core state (
Peripheral and Semiperipheral States
Rather than focusing on the exceptional success stories, the
upwardly mobile states, attention should be given to the more usual patterns
revealed by the relative stability of the core/periphery hierarchy and its
constraints on state action. As many have
argued, even core states are limited in terms of their possible actions by the
fact of their interdependence in the larger world-
system.
Political-military conflicts and economic competition restrict the range
of policies which a core state can adopt.
And of course, the longrun operation of the whole system conditions the
kind of class structure, political institutions, etc. which we find
"internal" to core states as well as
peripheral states (e.g. Walton, 1981). Nevertheless, the room for manuever is
considerably greater for core states than it is for peripheral states because
their access to resources is relatively greater and less dependent on external
forces or constrained by internal opposition.
The observation that peripheral capitalism relies more heavily on
political coercion to maintain class relations and to accomplish production and
distribution can be linked to an analysis of the organizational forms of states
and regimes in the periphery.
Marx's examination of
"primitive accumulation" (Marx, 1967a:part 8) discusses the plunder
and dispossession which occurred in the expansion of European hegemony. In a sense capitalist accumulation was
always, and still is, more "primitive" in the periphery. Its reliance on political coercion is more
than a passing phase which occurs during the creation of capitalist
institutions. The precapitalist
world-empires utilized political coercion directly in the maintenance of
master/slave or lord/serf relations.
Thegathering of tribute, taxes and rents was a relatively visible form
of surplus appropriation compared to the more opaque form of exploitation in
the
capitalist/proletarian relationship. So peripheral capitalism does bear a greater
similarity to precapitalist societies based on the tributary mode of production
than does core capitalism.
And yet it is
misleading to conceptualize the developmental process we observe in peripheral
areas as a separate precapitalist mode of production, or a period of transition
to full capitalism. These usages are
more than merely semantic differences because a mode of production ought to be
largely self-reproducing, and a period of transition should not last for
centuries. But peripheral capitalism,
though it changes its form and, in some ways, does take on aspects of core
capitalism (more proletarianization, more commodification, more state
formation, more nation-building, etc.) never arrives at the destination of
"advanced capitalism." That
is, the relative gap between the core and the periphery is reproduced, not
eliminated (see chapter 12).
Thus peripheral
states do develop, just as the economy of the periphery does. But they very rarely become core states. Peripheral areas experience state formation. Decolonization creates formal
sovereignty. The state arrogates greater
powers over other social and political organizations such as tribes, village
communities, ethnic and religious organizations, etc. The expansion of mass
education performs the magical rituals of nationbuilding by producing and
distributing national ideology and the political status of the citizen (Ramirez
and Rubinson, 1979).
And yet other features
of peripheral states seem more reticent to "develop." The literature on modernization and democracy
argues that economic development is necessary in order to institutionalize a
democratic polity. Yet, though there has been a good deal of industrialization
in many peripheral and semiperipheral countries, this has not resulted in
stable democratic government in most cases.
If we want to analyze
the possibilities and constraints of peripheral and semiperipheral states the
first thing we must notice is that many of these states depend on core states,
transnational banks, or core-based transnational firms for a significant share
of their resources, and these forms of support come with certain explicit or
implicit limitations on state action.
Bruce Moon's (1983) comparative study of the foreign policies of
peripheral states demonstrates that patterns of voting in the UN can best be
interpreted in terms of rather stable structures of core power domination based
on the dependency of periheral states rather than in terms of a more flexible
set of bargaining relationships. And
Nora Hamilton's (1982) study of Mexican social movements and the state in the
1930s shows the effects of changing core state policy on the limits of
peripheral state action. One of the
biggest factors allowing a significantly populist and nationalist state action
(the expropriation of USowned oil companies) by the
Maurice Zeitlin's
(1984) careful study of the class backgrounds of nineteenth century Chilean
statesmen and the class forces behind two civil wars in
factors") explain the failed "bourgeois
revolution" of Balmaceda, actually reveal a clash of interests between two
sets of peripheral capitalists: those vested in copper mines (who were
suffering from declining prices and stiff foreign competition for export
markets); and those rising producers of nitrate exports (who were enjoying
grand profits).
Balmaceda's intended
policy of state mobilization was supported primarily by the copper interests
who wanted to tax the nitrate exporters in order to invest in infrastructure
which would improve their position in the world market. Yes, this is a class struggle explanation,
but one in which the interests and actions of the important class fractions are
heavily influenced by their points of insertion and varying fortunes in the
world market. The "rounds of
accumulation" notion, which is useful in understanding regional uneven
development in core areas (e.g. Smith, 1984), can be seen operating in the rise
and fall of extractive and agriculture export products in peripheral
areas. These boom and bust sequences
account for a great part of the political changes which occur in the periphery
(Bunker, 1985).
The world-system
perspective also has implications for the nature of politics in semiperipheral
states. In addition to these states
being relatively intermediate in terms of their levels of internal and external
power, it is thought that the relative balance of peripheral and core types
of production within some semiperipheral states tends to create
combinations of class interests and regime form which, it is argued,
differentiate semi-
peripheral from both core and peripheral states. A recent volume edited by
Giovanni Arrighi (1985) presents a collection of studies which
examine the applicability of the semiperiphery concept for understanding
twentiethcentury political changes and patterns of economic development in most
of the countries of
These studies exhibit
the many problems of trying to understand the particular histories of countries
with a concept which has emerged from the attempt to describe and explain
features and processes which appear when we focus on the world-system as a
whole. When we use a telescope we see
different patterns than when we use a magnifying glass. Nevertheless the studies are illuminating,
not only because we learn a lot about the countries which are examined, but
because the exercise clarifies some of the confusing aspects of the
semiperiphery idea and some of the limits of its usefulness (see chapter 10).
Regime Form: Democracy and Authoritarianism
It is a common observation that, though both core and peripheral
states exhibit authoritarian regime forms, this feature is much more frequently
found in peripheral or semiperipheral states.
Kenneth Bollen (1983) presents a cross-national study of the
relationship between world-system position and political democracy which
demonstrates that both semiperipheral and peripheral states are less likely to
have democratic regime forms than core states.
Bollen's findings also show that peripheral states are even more likely
to be undemocratic than semiperipheral states (Bollen, 1983:table 2). This striking larger pattern requires
theoretical attention.
There has been much
recent study of peripheral and semiperipheral states, their organizational
characteristics, and the ways in which the state is linked to the local class
structure. Michael Timberlake and Kirk
Williams (1984) use cross-national data to examine the relationship between the
levelof penetration by transnational firms, exclusion of non-elite groups from
politics, and levels of repressiveness of peripheral and semiperipheral
governments. Their results show that
dependence on foreign capital does not have a direct effect on government repressiveness,
but it is associated with political exclusion, and affects repression
indirectly through its effects on exclusion.
Thus, among peripheral and semiperipheral countries, it is those most
dependent on foreign capital that are most likely to have authoritarian
states.
Guillermo O'Donnell's
(1978, 1979) analysis of bureaucratic
authoritarianism in the Southern Cone countries of
Clive Thomas
(1984) has examined the authoritarianism of more recently decolonized
peripheral states in Africa and the
articulated through the state apparatus are virtually the only game
around, and so fierce competition over control of the state undercuts the
emergence and maintenance of democratic institutions. Regimes tend to form around an authoritarian
one-party state.
When we compare the
analysis by O'Donnell with that of Thomas the first things that strike the eye
are the important differences between the semiperipheral Southern Cone
countries with their relatively developed national economies and significant
middle classes, and the more peripheral
While these
explanations may seem to be at odds, they are easily reconciled if we employ
two explanations suggested by the literature which compares regime types. A recent review of this literature by Peter
Evans and John Stephens (1988) suggests a useful synthesis of the approach
suggested by
Barrington Moore's (1966) study of democracy and dictatorship
and recentMarxist analyses which focus on the organizational power of the urban
working class.3
The class power
approach is complementary with
class struggle, building strong autonomous political
organizations (unions and parties) which exert power on the state to extend
citizenship rights and welfare rights.
This is, of course, a restatement in Marxist terms of
T. H. Marshall's (1965) thesis.
The relative size of
the urban working class and middle stratum is known to vary with the level of
national industrialization and the position of each country in the
core/periphery hierarchy. When we add
this to
Evans and Stephens
(1988) add two other factors. They argue
that late industrialization is more capitalintensive and thus creates a
relatively smaller industrial working class, and this weakens the association
between industrialization and democracy.
Also they argue that state strength and democracy are inversely related,
contrary to the argument I have made above.
In support of this last contention they interpret Mouzelis's (1986)
study of semiperipheral oscillation between populism and authoritarianism (see
below) as the consequence of a precociously overdeveloped state apparatus. Similarly they attribute the authoritarian
nature of the East Asian NICs to their relatively strong and interventionist
state apparati. And conversely, they
characterize the formerly British
The contention that
state strength is inversely related to the stability of democratic regimes is
another instance of the confusion (discussed above) of state strength with
authoritarianism. I argued above that
democratic states are more likely to be internally strong than authoritarian
ones. I know of no cross-national
comparative research which has directly addressed this question. The easiest
empirical test is the relationship between government revenues per capita (or
per GNP) and regime form. This would not
completely answer the question because of the problem mentioned above there is a potential discrepancy between the
actual amount of resources a stateobtains through taxation and the amount it
might obtain from supporters if its power were challenged. Even so I would guess that the correlation
between this somewhat faulty proxy for internal state strength and authoritarianism
would be negative in cross-national comparison.
Some support for this
surmise is had from the study by Thomas, Ramirez, Meyer and Gobalet (1973:table
11.3). They demonstrate that the level
of economic development has a negative effect over time on the centralization
of the party system and the likelihood of having a military regime. If internal state strength is associated with
the level of economic development (as indicated by my table 6.1), then it is likely
that authoritarian regimes are associated with (and perhaps caused by) weaker
states, not stronger ones.
To the agrarian class
relations and working class power explanations we can also add some other
features which come from our analysis of the capitalist world-system. We have already mentioned the world-wide long
business cycle (Kwave) which affects political developments in all states. There are several major forces operating
which, in combination, account for the overall core/periphery differences in
regime form. All states are more likely
to take an authoritarian form when they are significantly threatened by
internal or external opposition. Thus authoritarianism is a sign of weakness,
not of strength. This applies to both
core and peripheral states. Most
analyses of fascism understand it as a reactive response to strong opposition
from the Left. Socialist states are
thought to move toward authoritarianism as a result of both internal opposition
and threats from foreign capitalist states.
Political and economic crises in the core and in the periphery
tend to evoke a rise in centralization and authoritarian actions by
states. Even the strongly
institutionalized core democracies do this during time of war, and
recentpolitical commentary from the Trilateral Commission has suggested that
democracy in the core may have to be tightened up as the increasing
"cacophony of equity demands" produce an "ungovernable"
situation (Wolfe, 1980).
Against this tendency
for states to become more authoritarian in the face of increasing opposition is
an opposing tendency which affects all states in the capitalist world-economy
(but not equally). This is the tendency
for capitalism to structurally sustain a political ideology of egalitarianism. Commodity production and markets assume that
buyers and sellers have equal political standing, and the process of the
commodification of labor-power supports an ideology in which both capitalists
and workers are defined as equal citizens freely exchanging labor for
wages. These institutional supports for
democratic ideology exert pressure on states to adopt a form of government
based on legitimation from below, from the "people" or citizens. Rather than states as agents of God, most
modern states are constitutionally defined as agents of the people. This institutional push on modern states
stems from the process of commodification.
It has resulted in the nearly worldwide shift from legitimation based on
the divine right of kings to legitimation based on the consent of the
governed. Authoritarianism is, of course,
contrary to democratic ideology, but most contemporary forms of
authoritarianism are defined as temporary and necessary exercises, rather than
the restoration of legitimation from above.4
The ideological
pressure toward democratization affects the core and the periphery to different
extents precisely because commodification is more complete in the core than in
the periphery. This partly explains
core/
periphery differences in both the degree and the form of
authoritarianism. Not only are authoritarian
regimes more common in the periphery, but some of theseare legitimated by
traditional hierarchical ideologies. The
world's few really powerful remaining monarchs are in
Recent studies demonstrate that peripheral
states in which the majority of citizens are freeholding peasants have
difficulty enforcing policies and appropriating resources when peasants are
opposed (Hyden, 1980). Stephen Bunker
(1983) has shown that it is not really land tenure as such, but rather the
combination of local effective control of land use with the production of
export crops on which state development plans depend. This is a crucial
combination that allows local oppositional groups to effectively resist the
peripheral state. These and many other
possible combinations which create openings for either state autonomy or
effective local resistance may account for a good deal of the variation in
state strength, and thus affect the tendency to form an authoritarian
regime.
In addition to the
ideological effect which commodification has on politics, there is another
connection between core capitalism and democracy. It is an interesting fact that all the
hegemonic core powers, both citystates and nation-states, which have been
analyzed as hegemonic centers of the European capitalist world-economy by
Braudel (1984) have been republics or
federations, or both. This could
be explained by the ideological connection with commodity production, but it
may also be due to the need for a hegemonic core state to have a responsive
state apparatus which can adjust quickly to changing needs for appropriate
state policy in a rapidly changing world marketand geopolitical environment. If this sounds too functionalist, run it the
other way. Those core states that happen
to have such a democratic, pluralist regime are better able, in combination
with other necessary ingredients, to take on the role of a hegemon in a worldsystem
in which commodity production is an important form of competition. Thus
This factor does not
contradict
advantage of leaving primary production to others.
The matter of working
class power must be reinterpreted, but not discarded. It is not so much a matter of the industrial
revolution la the factory system creating an industrial proletariat as
usually conceived. Many
of these core powers did contain a significant industrial and
productive sector which facilitated their centrality in the expanding world market,
but in addition to this, the fact of being at the center of a world-system,
with higher rates of profit and more opportunities for "clean" work,
made class struggle a less contentious matter than it was in other areas (see
chapters 10 and 11). This extension of
Lenin's aristocracy of labor thesis back in timeadds a consideration to the
explanation of regime form which is not suggested by analyses which focus only
on national development and ignore the core/
periphery hierarchy.
Wallerstein suggests
that the internal strength and spatial scope of state power is an important
difference between semiperipheral and peripheral areas. Evans (1979) analyzes the strengthening of
the semiperipheral Brazilian state after the military coup of 1964, and the way
in which the state
effectively mediated bargaining between transnational firms and
national capitalists. Evans notes that
the effectiveness and autonomy of the authoritarian Brazilian state varied
across different sectors of the economy depending upon the production and
market characteristics of different
industries. Bunker
(1985:chapter 4) shows that the Brazilian state's autonomy was quite limited
when it attempted to regulate an internal extractive periphery, the Amazon
region.
O'Donnell's (1978, 1979)
work on bureaucratic authoritarianism contends that the semiperipheral states
in South America have been quite effective in regulating their national
economies, and have demonstrated a high degree of autonomy vis--vis both
internal private power groups and transnational firms. The recent reversion of these same states
back toward populist and democratic
constitutional forms supports the idea that they are relatively
strong states, at least if my argument about the relationship between regime
form and state strength is correct.
Portes and Kincaid (1985) have argued that the recent shift back toward
democratic forms in Argentina and Uruguay resulted from a "crisis of
authoritarianism" in which the economic policies of the authoritarian
regimes were exhausted and largely ineffective, and the level of opposition had
risen high enough to promote a return to democratic government, albeit under
difficult economic and political conditions.5
Nicos Mouzelis (1986)
has explicated a theory of semiperipheral politics which accounts for an
apparent long-run cyclical swing between authoritarian and populist regimes
based on the contradictory tendencies of dependent capitalist development. Mouzelis applies his theory to interpret the
political history of
authoritarian regimes depending on the shortrun successes or
failures of particular development schemes, and ups and downs in the world
market.
This explanation
differs from that of O'Donnell in two ways.
First it tries to explain semiperipheral politics in longrun structural
terms rather than focusing on the details of particular conjunctures. Secondly, Mouzelis and O'Donnell differ in
their portrayals of the strength or weakness of "civil society." O'Donnell claims that it is the middleclass
groups demanding more from the state which precipitate authoritarianism, while
for Mouzelis it is the lack of strong and supportive middleclass organizations
which underlies the instability of democracy.
Of course both could be correct if there is a nonlinear relationship
between middleclass strength and authoritarian regimes. A middle class may be strong enough to press
political demands, but not sufficiently strong to resist the opposition which
such demands engender.
The growing scale of
economic production has stimulated greater involvement of states in the economy
and the increasingly frequent use of the ideology of corporatism. As local economic circuits become more
completely integrated into national and international networks, states come to
be the only organizations which are large enough to exert leverage in the
economy. Corporatist ideology, the
notion of an interclass organic unity of interest which is mediated by the
state, takes many forms. In semiperipheral
countries both the bureaucratic-authoritarian and populist-democratic regimes
have utilized corporatist ideology.
Some of the apparently
contradictory implications of case studies of particular states with the
analysis of states located in the core/periphery hierarchy may result from
confusion between different types of comparison. Many case studies compare a state to itself
at an earlier point in time, whereas world-system studies most often compare
states to one another. Thus a state may
indeed gain in internal strength relative to itself, as Evans and O'Donnell
have claimed for
To summarize, I have
argued that core states are stronger internally and externally than peripheral
states, and they are more democratic.
These features of states are thought to result from a combination of
several world-system processes interacting with nation-building, state
formation, and class struggles. Only
further comparative research can place weights on
these various factors and settle matters of controversy. The matter of internal state strength needs
further conceptual clarification and empirical operationalization, as does the
relationship between state strength and regime form. For now we have established for certain that
important characteristics of states are associated with their position in the
larger world-system. Let us now turn to
the analysis of a larger structure, the interstate system which is composed of
these contending and unequally powerful states.
Chapter 7: Geopolitics and Capitalism: One Logic or Two?
As we have seen in previous chapters, the focus on the
world-system has raised anew the issue of the relationship between economic and
political processes in the capitalist mode of production. This has coincided with a new emphasis on the
autonomy of political processes by neo-Marxists seeking to correct the
overemphasis on economic determinism in earlier Marxist analyses.1 While focusing most directly on the
capitalist state and class relations within the core of the world-system, Nicos
Poulantzas (1973) and Perry Anderson (1974) have stressed the autonomy of
political processes and the "relative autonomy" of state managers
from determination by capitalist class interests.2 This emphasis on the autonomy of politics,
long central among political scientists, has been extended to a critique of the
alleged "economism" of the world-system perspective. At the international level this critique
argues that geopolitics is an autonomous game in its own right which can be
understood separately from an analysis of world economic structures. Theda Skocpol (1977, 1979) is the neo-Weberian
sociologist who has most explicitly made this argument, but it has also been
made by several political scientists who share a state-centric approach to
social science, e.g. George Modelski (1978), Aristide Zolberg (1981), and
Kenneth Waltz (1979).
All these authors
claim that Immanuel Wallerstein has reduced the operation of the
"international" system to a consequence of the process of capitalist
accumulation. Indeed some have contended
that geopolitics and
state-building are themselves the main motors of the modern
world-system (e.g. Winckler, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). Here I will argue that the capitalist mode of
production exhibits a single logic in which both political-military power and
the appropriation of surplus value through production of commodities for sale
on the world market play an integrated role.
This chapter discusses a metatheoretical issue, and presents an argument
about the interdependence of the interstate system and the capital accumulation
process.
First I will present a
case for a change in terminology. The
world-system scholars of the
A Metatheoretical Issue
In this chapter, rather than arguing at a metatheoretical level
about economics, politics, and political economy in general, I shall ground the
discussion in the particular processes which have been operating
in the capitalist world-economy since the sixteenth century. But before I advance arguments for my
contention that the interstate system and the capitalist accumulation process
are part of the same interactive socio-economic logic I would like to briefly
discuss a metatheoretical problem raised by this issue.
In order to know
whether it is most elegant to conceive of capitalism as a singular process
which incorporates both economic and political dynamics, or, on the other hand,
if it is more powerful to emphasize the autonomy of these processes, we should
be able to specify formally and compare a unified theory with a theory which
posits spearate economic and political subsystems.
Ideally these two
theories should have different implications for concrete social change, and for
our understanding of the dialectical transformation of capitalism into a
qualitatively different system.
Unfortunately my argument here does not proceed at this level of
theoretical clarity. Rather I only
adduce a case for the superiority of a unified theory. But it is important to cast this argument in
the context of the attempt to develop the world-system perspective into a
formalized theory of capitalist development.
Why have most of the
theorists who focus on politics tended to adopt a narrowly historicist approach
to capitalist development? Marx made a
broad distinction between the growth of the forces of production (technology)
which occurs in the capital accumulation process, and the reorganization of
social relations of production (class relations, forms of property, and other
institutions which structure exploitation and the accumulation process). Samir
Amin (1980a) has applied this broad distinction to the world-system. The widening of the world market and the
deepening of commodity production to moreand more spheres of life has occurred
in conjunction with a series of 40 to 60 year business cycles, the Kwave. The Kwave is associated with
"noneconomic" political events such as wars, revolutions, etc. This has caused some economists (e.g.
Adelman, 1965) to argue that long waves are not really economic cycles
at all, but are set off by "exogenous" political events.
The causal links
between wars, revolutions and long business cycles are not precisely understood
despite a vast literature on Kwaves (see Barr, 1979), but Amin (1980a) and
Mandel (1980) have made the insightful argument that the accumulation process
expands within a certain political framework to the point where that framework
is no longer adequate to the scale of world commodity production and
distribution. Thus world wars and the
rise and fall of hegemonic core powers can be understood as the violent
reorganization of production relations on a world scale which allows the
accumulation process to adjust to its own contradictions and to begin again on
a reorganized political foundation.
Political relations among core powers and the colonial empires which are
the formal political structure of core/periphery relations are reorganized in a
way which allows the increasing internationalization of capitalist production
and the spatial shifts which accompany uneven development. The observation that capitalism has always
been "international" (and transnational) does not contradict the
existence of a longrun increase in the proportion of all production decisions
and commodity chains which cross state boundaries the upward secular trend of the
transnationalization of capital.
The above discussion
does not establish causal priority between accumulation and political
reorganization. But it implies that
these are truly interdependent processes.
The tendency to a narrowly historicist approach on the part of those who
focus on political events may be due to the low predictability of politics and
the apparently more direct involvement of human collective rationality in
political action. On the other hand, the
over emphasis on determinism and mechanical models on the part of those who
focus exclusively on economic processes may be due to the greater regularity of
these phenomena and their law-like aggregation of many individual wills
seemingly independent of collective intentions.
These perceptions are
correct to a considerable extent precisely because capitalism as a system
mystifies the social nature of investment decisions by separating the
calculation of profit to the enterprise from the calculation of more general
social needs. Anti-capitalist movements
have tried to reintegrate economics and politics in practice, but up to now,
the expanding scale of the commodity economy has evaded them. The interaction of the world economy and the
interstate system is fundamental to an understanding of capitalist development
and also to its potential transformation into a more collectively rational
system. Neither mechanical determinism
nor narrow historicism is useful in this project.
States as Production Relations
The critiques of Wallerstein's work mentioned above contain
implicit assumptions about the nature of capitalism which tend to conceptualize
it as an exclusively "economic" process. Skocpol (1979:22) formulates the issue by
arguing that Wallerstein "assumes that individual
nation-states are instruments used by economically dominant groups to pursue
world-market oriented development at home and international economic advantages
abroad." She continues, explaining
her own position:
but a different
perspective is adopted here, one which holds that nation-states are, more
fundamentally, organizations geared to maintain control of home territories and
populations and to undertake actual or potential militarycompetition with other
states in the international system. The
international states system as a transnational structure of military
competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it
represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality interdependent in its structure and
dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it, (Emphasis in the
original).
Modelski (1978) and
Zolberg (1981) argue even more strongly for the autonomy of the interstate
system in opposition to what they see as Wallerstein's economic
reductionism. These authors raise the
important question about the extent to which it is theoretically valuable to
conceptualize economic and political processes as independent subsystems, but
in so doing they over-simplify Wallerstein's perspective.
Wallerstein's work
suggests a reconceptualization of the capitalist mode of production itself such
that references to capitalism do not point simply to market-oriented strategies
for accumulating surplus value.
According to Wallerstein the capitalist mode of production is a system
in which groups pursue both political-military goals and profit-making
strategies, and the winners are those who effectively combine the two. Thus the interstate system, state-building,
and geopolitics are the political side of the capitalist mode of production.
As discussed in
chapter 1, Wallerstein argues that a mode of production is a feature of a whole
world-system, not of parts or subunits.
His distinction between world-economies and world-empires as different
types of world-systems emphasizes important structural differences in formal
political organization across economic networks. In Wallerstein's view it is very important
that modern capitalism became dominant in the context of an interstate system
of competing states. This view is shared
by many other analysts of the rise ofthe West, who focus on the decentralized
features of European feudalism which were conducive to the emergence of a
strong commodity-producing economy. In
the more centralized world-empires the logic of the tributary mode of
production was able to fend off the emergence of capitalism.
Max Weber was most
explicit about the connection betwen capitalism and the competitive interstate
system. Inspired by Leopold von Ranke's
study of early European states4 (von Ranke, 1887; see Weber, 1978:354) Weber
added the interstate system to his list of necessary structural conditions for
the emergence and reproduction of modern capitalism (see Collins, 1986:chapter
2). After mentioning in his General
Economic History (Weber, 1981:337) that the European states were
"competing national states in a condition of perpetual struggle for power
in peace or war," Weber continues:
This competitive
struggle created the largest opportunities for modern western capitalism. The separate states had to compete for mobile
capital, which dictated to them the conditions under which it would assist them
to power. Out of this alliance of the
state with capital, dictated by necessity, arose the national citizen class,
the bourgeoisie in the modern sense of the word. Hence it is the closed national state which
afforded to capitalism its chance for development and as long as the national state does not
give place to a world empire capitalism also will endure.
In Economy and Society Weber elaborates:
"Finally, at
the beginning of modern history, the various countries engaged in the struggle
for power needed ever more capital for political reasons and because of the
expanding money economy. This resulted
in that memorable alliance between the rising states and the sought-after and
privileged capitalist powers that was a major factor in creating modern
capitalism and fully justifies the designation "mercantilist" for the
policies of that epoch. ....At any rate,
from that time dates that European competitive struggle between large,
approximately equal and purely political structures which has had such a global
impact. It is well known that this
political competition has remained one of the most important motives of the
capitalist protectionism that emerged then and todaycontinues in different
forms. Neither the trade nor the
monetary policies of the modern states
those policies most closely linked to the central interests of the
present economic system can be
understood without this peculiar political competition and "equilibrium"
among the European states during the last five hundred years a phenomenon which Ranke recognized in his
first work as the world-
historical
distinctiveness of this era. (1978:3534)
To this I can only add that the neoWeberians ought to pay more attention
to Weber.
Some Marxists, such as
Colin Barker (1978) also recognize that the political basis of capitalism is
not the state but the interstate system.
Particular states vary in their emphasis on politicomilitary
aggrandizement or free market accumulating depending, in part, on their
position in the larger system. And the
system as a whole alternates between periods in which there is greater emphasis
on competition based on state power versus periods in which a relatively freer
world market of price competition comes to the fore (see chapter 13).
Core states with a
clear competitive advantage in production are usually the most enthusiastic
advocates of free trade. And, similarly,
peripheral states under the control of peripheral capitalist producers of low
wage goods
for export to the core usually support the "open
economy" of free international exchange.
As Stephen Krasner (1976) points out, smaller core states heavily
dependent on international trade also tend to support a liberal economic order. Semiperipheral states and larger second tier
core states contending for hegemony utilize tariff protectionism and
mercantilist monopoly to protect and expand their access to world surplus
value. Periods of rapid world-wide
economic growth are generally characterized by a relatively unobstructed world
market of commodity exchange as the interests of consumers in low prices come
to outweigh the interests of producers in protection (ChaseDunn, 1980). Inperiods of stagnation protectionism is more
frequently utilized to protect shares of the diminishing pie.
According to the model
proposed in chapter 1, the capitalist mode of production includes both
commodity producers employing wage labor in the core areas and coerced labor in
the peripheral areas. Peripheral areas
are not seen as "precapitalist" but rather as integrated, exploited
and essential parts of the larger system.
Capitalist production relations, in this view, are not limited to wage
labor (which is nevertheless understood to be very important to the expanded
reproduction of the core areas) but rather production relations are composed of
the articulation of wage labor with coerced labor in the periphery. This articulation is accomplished not only by
the world market exchange of commodities, but also by the forms of political
coercion which the core powers often exercise over peripheral areas. The direct and indirect use of
political-military power by core states is emphasized by James Petras (1981) as
the most central way in which imperialism operates to constrain political
action in peripheral areas. Petras's
research clearly reveals the operation of this kind of coercive power, and its
importance is without doubt. Albert
Bergesen (1983) in combating charges that the world-system perspective is
"circulationist" (i.e. a theory based on relations of exchange rather
than class relations of production) has emphasized the importance of
colonialism, core ownership, and other direct forms of control.
The states, and the
system of competing states, which compose the
world polity, constitute the basic structural support for
capitalist production relations. Marx
saw that the state stood behind the opaque exploitation of wage labor by
capital in nineteenthcentury
forces the commodified capital/wage labor relationship in the
core, the coerced labor extraction in the periphery, and the extra-economic
forms of exploitation between the core and the periphery. This constitutes the basis of production
relations for the capitalist system.
States are the
organizations which are often utilized by the classes that control them to help
appropriate shares of the world surplus value.
Market forces are either reinforced or regulated depending on the world
market position of the classes controlling a particular state. When I say "classes that control the
state" I am including state managers.
I am not a vulgar instrumentalist arguing that the state is simply the
executive committee of the bourgeoisie.
The extent to which business interests directly control a state
apparatus versus a situation in which state managers
successfully achieve a certain autonomy by balancing off different economic
interests is an important variable characteristic of states.
Richard Rubinson
(1978) has made the important point that state managers are most capable of
effectively pursing a policy of national development and upward mobility in the
world-system when there is a considerable convergence of political interests
within the dominant class in a nation.
This clarifies an issue which is posed by the "relative autonomy"
theorists, who ask whether or not the state represents the "general
interests" of capital. As Barker
(1978) reminds us, the world capitalist class exhibits a high degree of
interclass competition and conflict.
There is no single world capitalist state torepresent the interests of
capital as a whole, so the various national states represent the interests of
subgroups of capital. The extent to
which they do this effectively depends on the degree to which the interests of
the subgroups within a state converge or diverge as a consequence of their market
position and options within the larger world economy. Fred Block (1978) reminds us that state
managers are often able to expand the capabilities of the state in response to
the demands of workers and peasants, and thus states not only come to institutionalize
the interests of capitalists, but also, especially in the core, they take on
redistributive functions which benefit workers.
Both political
organizations and economic producers are subjected to a longrun "competing
down" process in the capitalist world-economy, whereas in the ancient
empires the monopoly of violence held by a single center minimized both market
and political competition between different organizational forms. This accounts for the much more rapid
transformation of both production
technology and political organization by capitalism. State structures themselves are submitted to
a political version of the "competing down" process which subjects
firms to price competition in the realm of the market. Inefficient state structures, ones that tax
their citizens too heavily or do not spend their revenues in ways which
facilitate political-economic competition in the world-economy, lose the
struggle for domination. In Marxist
theoretical terms, the interstate system produces an equalization of surplus
profits, the profits which return due to the use of political power to enforce
local monopolies. There are no corewide
monopolies. Even the largest organizations
(both states and firms) are subjected to the pressures of political-economic
competition.
The Emergence of Capitalism and the Interstate System
It has been pointed out by Zolberg (1981) and many others
(Ekholm and Friedman, 1982) that not all precapitalist world-systems were
world-empires.
Wallerstein's discussion implies that earlier world-economies
were short-
lived, tending to either dissolve into economically delinked
local systems or to experience empire formation. But Ekholm and Friedman (1982) have
noted that many ancient world-systems had interstate systems
which were quite stable in the sense that a balance of power mechanism operated
to prevent empire formation for rather long periods. Their most important example is the Sumerian
world-economy of city-states, but others have described rather stable
interstate systems in ancient
The fact that there
have been long-lived interstate systems prior to the emergence of the European
world-economy raises the question of whether or not these were structurally or
behaviorally different. Clearly the
normative rules of diplomacy were different (see Modelski, 1964), but it is
unclear if these are important determinants of the dynamics of an interstate
system. A comparative study of
interstate systems which employs a world-system perspective could perhaps
answer this question, but such a study has not yet been done (see Chase-Dunn,
1986). My guess is that the most
important difference between ancient and modern interstate systems is the
nature of the competition among states, and therefore the substantive content
of state policies. The modern interstate
system is composed mostly of states which are significantly controlled by
capitalists, which means that the goals of market protection and expansion
constitute a larger proportion of state action than in precapitalist interstate
systems. This characteristic probably
also leads to other differences. It is likely that threatened hegemons in
ancient interstate systems engaged in a policy of empire-formation, while in
the capitalist world-economy this does not happen.
Feudalism is another
type of precapitalist system which is not a world-empire. Zolberg (1981) is correct to point out that
classical European feudalism (i.e. around the ninth century) was not a
world-empire, but additionally it was a very strange kind of world-system. As a devolved residue of the Roman
world-empire classical European feudalism was characterized by a regional
political and cultural matrix organized across an economy which was almost
completely delinked into self-subsistent manors. The medieval states were so weak that in most
places most of the time the lord of each manor constituted a mini-state. Anderson (1974a) and many others have pointed
out that it was the "parcellization of sovereignty" within this very
decentralized system which allowed the capitalist mode of production to expand
in institutional interstices, and to begin to dominate exchange, production,
and politics.
The growth of
commodity production for both local, urban/rural, and long distance exchange
was stimulated by the limitations of the manorial economy and the opportunities
for profit-making presented by a system which had little regional political
ability to regulate production and exchange.
The constitution of cities as relatively autonomous elements within the
segmented matrix of manors enabled merchants and artisans to obtain "state
power" within a jurisdiction (the medieval city) which could then be used
to legitimate and militarily back capitalist exchange and production. The fact that successful cities soon tried to
protect their market advantages with politically-guaranteed monopolies simply
drove the market economy to expand elsewhere and to increase its spatial
dimensions. This process of capitalist
urban growthalso spurred the strengthening of the nation-state, as kings were
able to gain resources from capitalists to use against recalcitrant local
lords. Thus the nation-states and the
European interstate system came into existence.
It was the dynamic of mercantile and commodity production competition
between both state and private enterprises in the long sixteenth century,
together with the emergence of a core/periphery hierarchy, which led
Wallerstein to argue that the capitalist world-system was then born.
militarily threatening international state system emanating from
In the competitive
interstate system it has been impossible for any single state to monopolize the
entire world market, and to maintain hegemony indefinitely. Hegemonic core powers, such as
able commodity production; and the ability to produce
efficiently for the competitive world economy.
This is not the statecentric system which some analysts describe,
because states cannot escape, for long, the competitive forces of the world
economy. States that attempt to cut
themselves off or who overtax their domestic producers condemn themselves to
marginality. On the other hand, the
system is not simply a free world market of competing producers. The successful combination of political power
and competitive advantage in production is a delicate balance.
There have been
important differences among European states in terms of the strategies of
development that they have followed.
Some have relied more on continental military advantage and centralized
fiscal structures while others, the more successful ones, have employed a low
overhead policy of strategic protection of the vital business interests of
their national capitalists. Again, I
don't claim that all states equally employ a policy of support for their capitalists.
The most
successful core states have achieved their hegemony by having strong and
convergent business class interests which unified state policy behind a
sustained drive for successful commodity production and trade in the world
economy. Second-runners have often
achieved some centrality in the world economy by relying on a more directly
state-organized effort to catch up with the hegemonic state.
It could be argued
that the existence of states which successfully follow a more
political-military development path is evidence in favor of the thesis that
geopolitical and economic processes operate independently. The existence of such a development path is
unquestionable (e.g.
The Reproduction of Capitalist Accumulation
There are several ways in which the competitive interstate
system allows the capitalist accumulation process to temporarily overcome the
contradictions it creates, and to expand.
The balance of power in the interstate system prevents any single state
from controlling the world-economy, and from imposing a political monopoly over
accumulation. This means that
"factors of production" cannot be politically controlled to the
degree that they could be if there werean overarching world state. Capital is subjected to some controls by
states, but it can still flow from areas where profits are low to areas where
profits are higher. This allows capital
to escape most of the political claims which exploited classes attempt to
impose on it. If workers are successful
in creating unions which enable them to demand higher wages, or if communities
demand that corporations spend more money on pollution controls, capital can
usually escape these demands by moving to areas where opposition is weaker. This process of "capital flight"
can also be seen to operate inside of countries with federal states.
Class struggles are
most often oriented toward and constrained within particular territorial state
structures. Thus the interstate system
provides the political underpinning of the mobility of capital, and also the
institutional basis for the continuing expansion of capitalist
development. States which successfully
prevent domestic capital from emigrating do not necessarily solve this problem,
because foreign competitors are likely to take advantage of the less costly
production opportunities outside the national boundaries, and thus push the
domestic products out of the international market.5
The implication of the
above is that capitalism is not possible in the context of a single world
state, as Weber claimed. The
transformation of the interstate system into a world state would eventually
develop the political regulation of resource allocation. If this world state were socialist it would
more regularly and fully include social desiderata in the calculation of
investment decisions. The dynamic of the
present system, in which profit criteria and national power are the main
controllers of the use of resources, would eventually be transformed into a
system in which development combinesefficiency with a calculation of the
individual and collective use values of human society. Such a collectively rational system would not
constitute a utopia in which the problems of production and distribution would
be completely solved, but the political struggles for resources which would be
oriented toward a single overarching world government would exhibit a very
different longrun dynamic of political change and economic development than
that which has characterized the capitalist world-economy.
Of course this is an
optimistic assessment. It is also
possible that world state formation would bring about a transformation to a new
version of the tributary mode of production.
Both socialism and the tributary modes utilize primarily political means
of accumulation, but the tributary modes employ large amounts of coercion,
while socialism produces, distributes, and invests democratically. Either way though, capitalism would no longer
be the dominant mode of production.
Capitalist Reproduction of the Interstate System
Thus the interstate system is important for the continued
viability of the capitalist accumulation process. But is the accumulation process equally as
important for the generation and reproduction of the interstate system? First, what do I mean by reproduction of the
interstate system? I am not making fine
distinctions between types of interstate systems such as those introduced by
Partha Chatterjee (1975). By an
interstate system I mean a system of unequally powerful and competing states in
which no single state is capable of imposing control on all others. These states are in interaction with one
another through a set of shifting alliances and wars. Changes in the relative power of states
upsets any temporary set of alliances leading to a restructuring of the balance
of power. When is such a system not
reproduced? If an interstate system either:
1 disintegrates due to
the dissolution of the individual states;
2 dramatically reduces
to nearly zero the amount of material exchange and political-military interaction among
the states; or
3 becomes dominated by
a single overarching state,
the system can be said to have fundamentally changed (i.e. it
has been transformed, not reproduced).
In this definition the stages of classical, imperial, bipolar, and
"contemporary" interstate systems identified by Chatterjee are
subsumed into a single broad type which is nevertheless quite different from
the precapitalist agrarian empires or the economically self-
subsistent and "stateless" system which existed in
feudal
Which Came First?
Skocpol (1979) contends that the European interstate system
predates the emergence of capitalism6 and she implies that this is evidence of
its relative autonomy.7 No one denies that
states predate capitalism. At issue is
the genesis of a dynamic interstate system which is self-reproducing rather
than a transitional stage on the way toward empire-formation. It is clearly the case that multistate
systems exhibiting some of the characteristics of the European interstate
system existed prior to the emergence of the dominant capitalist mode of
production. The multicentric
"international system" which developed among the Italian city-states
and their trade partners in the East and West invented many of the institutions
of diplomacy and shifting alliance which were later adopted by the European
states. As Lane says of the sixteenth
century, "The Italian state system was being expanded into a European
state system" (1973:241). While this
constitutes prior development, it may not be evidence in favor of the autonomy
of the interstate system, as we shall see. Many
of the capitalistic financial and legal institutions later elaborated in the
European capitalist world-economy were invented in the Italian city-
states. The Christian
Mediterranean was part of an interstitial proto-capitalist regional
economy. Analogous to Marx's analysis of
merchant capitalism, the Mediterranean regional economy, though developing the
seeds of capitalist production with labor as a commodity, was primarily based
on the exchange of "unequals" between social systems which were not
integrated into a single commodity economy.8
Nevertheless this proto-capitalist regional economy succeeded in
developing several institutional features which were only later fully
elaborated in the capitalist world-economy which emerged in Europe and Latin
America in the long sixteenth century.
One of these was the interstate system, which as Zolberg (1981) agrees,
only became stably formed after its emergence in
But doesn't the
continuity of the Italian interstate system, and its failure to develop into a
world-empire, constitute a case for the independence of the interstate
system? Two factors militate against
this conclusion. The states of the
Italian system were already rather capitalistic, thus explaining the weakness
of attempts at empire-formation, and the Italian system became incorporated
into the larger European world-economy, which was already becoming dominated by
production capitalism in the sixteenth century.
I am not arguing that
capitalist institutions are the only factors which enable an interstate system
to resist empire formation. It is likely
that a common cultural matrix also works against empire-formation by
facilitating the diffusion of military and other technologies, and thus
maintaining a relatively equal distribution of power among contending core
states. The European system shared this
feature (an interstate common cultural matrix) with earlierlong-lived
interstate systems such as those in ancient
institutions such as international markets, money, banking, and
opportunities for investment further stabilize an interstate system by
inhibiting efforts at empire formation.
Skocpol's contention
about the prior emergence of the interstate system also receives support from
the "fully formed capitalist mode of production" as
becoming dominant only in the eighteenth century. Wallerstein's interpretation contends that
"agrarian" capitalism became dominant in the long sixteenth century.
Wallerstein's
interpretation implies that the capitalist mode of production became the most
important stimulus for change well before the "bourgeois revolutions"
in which explicitly capitalist interests came to power in nation-states.
An Outside
One clue to the dependence or independence of the interstate
system is its ability to reproduce itself, or to weather crises without
becoming transformed into either a world-empire or experiencing disintegration
of its network of international economic exchange. Wallerstein's analysis of the effort by the
Habsburgs to transform the still shaky sixteenthcentury capitalist
world-economy into a world-empire (1974:164-221) demonstrates the importance of
capitalism in reproducing the interstate system. I will discuss the later points at which
similar challenges to the interstate system were mounted (Louis XIV's, the
Napoleonic wars, and the twentiethcentury world wars) and the causes of
continuity of the interstate system, but first I want to consider another point
made by Zolberg (1981).
Zolberg argues that
the European interstate system occasionally incorporated powers that were
outside the capitalist world-economy into alliances which affected the outcome
of politico-military struggle. His main
example is the alliance between
Once again this shows
that the interstate system was important for the survival and growth of
international capitalism. On this there
is little disagreement. But what would
have happened to the European interstate system if international capitalism had
been encompassed by the Habsburg empire?
Obviously both international capitalism and the interstate system would
have been transformed into a world-empire, and probably one in which capitalism
as a mode of production was subordinated to the logic of imperial tribute and
taxation. Though I agree that capitalism
had become dominant over the logic of the tributary mode of production in the
long sixteenth century it is obvious that its domination in that first epoch
was somewhat shaky. The attempt to
convert the nascent capitalist world-system into a tributary world-empire was
stemmed, not by the institutional strength of capitalism alone, but in
conjunction with the somewhat fortuitous alliance between the French and an
"outside" power, the Ottoman Turks.
As we shall see below,
later challenges to the interstate system were undercut by the logic of
international capitalism alone. Zolberg
is right in pointing to the FrenchOttoman alliance as evidence of the
importance of the interstate system, but in later challenges it was the
strengthened
institutions of international capitalism by themselves that
prevented the interstate system from becoming a world-empire.
Another reason why
Zolberg argues for the existence of an autonomous logic of the interstate
system is his confusion over the difference between
colonial empires and world-empires. It is perfectly correct that core states
engage in imperialism in the sense of using military power to dominate parts of
the periphery. These colonial empires
expand cyclically with the growth of the modern world-system (Bergesen and
Schoenberg, 1980). But this phenomenon
is very different from the imposition of a single state over the whole system,
including other core states.
More Recent Challenges
The European world-system became a global world-system in a
series of waves of expansion which eventually incorporated all the territories
and peoples of the earth. Although
political-military alliances with states external to the system occurred after
the sixteenth century, they were never again so crucial to the survival and
development of capitalism as was the French/Ottoman alliance. But the capitalist world-economy continued to
face challenges of survival based on its own internal contradictions. Uneven economic development and the vast
expansion of productive forces outstripped the structure of political power,
causing violent reorganizations of the interstate system (world wars) to
accommodate new levels of economic development.
This process can be seen in the sequence of core competition, the rise
and fall of hegemonic core states, which has accompanied the expansion and
deepening of the
capitalist mode of production (see chapter 9).
After the failure of the
Habsburgs there have been three other efforts to impose a world-empire on the
capitalist world-economy: those of
Why Hegemons Don't Try Imperium
It may be argued that one or another of these did not really
constitute a serious effort at imperium.
There has been much dispute about German intentions in World War I (see
Fischer, 1967, and his critics) but the real issue is not intentions, but the
structural consequences which a German victory would have had for the
interstate system. If the balance of
power system, and thus the multicentric nature of the core, could have survived
such a victory, then these events did not represent real threats to the
interstate system as such, but merely a challenge to the extant balance of
power. If none of these efforts
presented a real possibility of world imperium (i.e. the formation of a core
state large enough to end the operation of the balance of power system) we must
ask why there have been no strong challenges to the interstate system since the
Habsburgs.
Some authors imply
that the size of the European states has been limited by the range of effective
territorial control, but this cannot explain the absence of empire formation in
It is the dynamic
uneven development of capitalism which systematically undercuts the
possibilities for empire formation, thus reproducing the interstate
system. One of the striking things about
these ineffectivechallenges to the interstate system is that they were not
perpetrated by the hegemonic core powers themselves, but rather by emerging
second runners among the competing core states.
This raises the question of why hegemonic core powers do not try to
impose imperium when it becomes obvious that their competitive advantage in
commodity production is waning.
Similarly we may ask, as Zolberg did of the sixteenth century, why
opposing forces were able to prevent the conversion of the system into a single
empire. To both of these questions I
would answer that it is the transnational structures associated with the
capitalist commodity economy which operated to tip the balance in favor of
preserving the interstate system.
Hegemonic core states
often use state power to enforce the interests of their "own"
producers, although typically they do not rely on it as heavily as other
competing core states. But, when a
hegemonic core power begins to lose its competitive edge in production because
of the spread of production techniques and differential labor costs, capital is
exported from the declining hegemonic core state to areas where profit rates
are higher. This reduces the level at
which the capitalists within the hegemonic core state will support the
"economic nationalism" of their home state. Their interests come to be spread across the
core. Another way to say this is that
hegemonic core states develop subgroups of their capitalist classes having
divergent interests; there comes to be a group of "international
capitalists" who support free trade, and a group of "national
capitalists" who seek tariff protection.
This explains the ambivalent, contradictory, and zig-zagging policies of
hegemonic core powers during the periods of their decline (Goldfrank, 1977; see
also chapter 9 below).
Schumpeter (1955)
pointed to the lack of patriotism which many capitalists evince9 as proof that
capitalism itself is a peace-loving system.
He claimed that modern warfare is caused by atavistic survivals of the
pre-capitalist era which periodically grip the world and lead to violent
destruction on a massive scale. It is
important to distinguish between capitalism as a system and the sentiments of
those who make investment decisions.
While some capitalists may be peace-loving, it is the export of
investment capital to other core states during hegemonic decline which is the
major factor which explains why hegemonic core states do not try to impose
imperium. And it is the reproduction of
the interstate system, which presumes the legitimacy of warfare, that
guarantees recurrent bouts of violent destruction.
Why Do Challenges Fail?
Why have the second-running core powers who have sought to
impose imperium on the world-economy failed?
Most theorists of the interstate system have not addressed this question
as such. The balance of power idea
explains why, in a multicentric system, alliances between the most powerful
actors weaken. Coalitions in a triad,
for example, balance the power by allying the two weakest actors against the
strongest. But this alliance falls apart
when the stronger of the partners gains enough to become the strongest single
actor (hegemon) because the weaker power can gain more by allying with the
declining former hegemon than by sticking to the original alliance. This simple game
theory is extended to the interstate system by the theorists of
power equi
librium, but it does not answer our question substantively. Again, in the modern world-system it is not
the most powerful actor that tries to impose imperium, but rather upwardly
mobile second runners with less than their "fair" share of political
influence over weaker areas of the globe.
Organski's (1968) theory explains why these second runners try, but not
why they fail.10
Of course one might
employ strictly historical explanations which make use of unique conjunctural
factors, a theoretical maneuver (or rather an atheoretical maneuver) which is
easy to accomplish when one is explaining only four "events." Here we seek an explanation of what seems to
be a regularity of the world-system based on our hypotheses about its deep
structural logic.
Morganthau (1952)
invokes the notion of a normatively organized liberal world culture which
successfully mobilizes counterforce against the threat to the balance of power
system. This conceptualization of a
normatively
integrated worldsystem has already been described and critiqued
in chapter 5. While I do not deny that
some normative patterns are generalized across the system, I emphasize the fact
that culture tends to follow state boundaries and that the larger system
remains significantly multicultural.
From this perspective it is far fetched to explain the failure of
empireformation in terms of commitment to internationally shared norms.
Craig Murphy (personal
communication) contends that another reason why hegemonic core powers do not
try to impose imperium on the whole system is the enlightened view of certain
core statesmen that the multistate system is necessary for the survival of
capitalism. Disraeli is suggested as an
example. This type of consciousness can
be understood as a response to the dispersion of investment capital and
consumer interests which accompanies the declining hegemony of the leading core
state. I doubt that liberal
internationalist ideology plays much of an independent role in the reproduction
of the interstate system.
On the other
hand, I have suggested above that interstate systems in which the states share
a consensual regional culture are more likely to resist empire formation
because new organizational and military technologies will rapidly diffuse and
maintain rough power equality among the contending core states. This explanation does not invoke normative
integration (the regulation of behavior by consensual belief in rules), nor is
it dependent on the specific content of cultural forms. It simply argues that information is more
likely to flow across state boundaries when the states have somewhat similar
ideological and cultural systems. Such a
condition existed among the core states of the European world-system and this
could have partly explained the failure of empire formation in
It is my argument,
however, that both the attempts and the failures of world imperium can be
primarily explained as reactive responses to the pressures of uneven
development in the world-economy. We
have already noted that the attempts were fomented, not by the most powerful
states in the system, but rather by emerging second-tier core powers contending
for hegemony. One striking thing about
all four cases is that they appear, in retrospect, to have been wildly
irrational. The countries who adopted
the strategy of aggrandizement reached far beyond their own capacities, and
failed to generate sufficient support from allied countries.
I agree with Modelski
(1978) that the predominantly land-oriented continental expansionism of the
French monarchy was not a strategy which could lead to hegemony in the
capitalist world-economy. It is notable
that the overhead costs of purely geopolitical expansionism (Oliver Cox's
[1959] "Florentine model" of domination) could not successfully
compete with the low overhead strategy of allowing a more decentralized
political system to bearthe costs of administration while surplus value
appropriation is accomplished by trade.
It was this "Venetian model" (Cox again) which was followed by
the states which became hegemonic core powers (
Why didn't the French
or German attempts at imperium receive more support? Probably in part because potential allies
doubted the extent to which their interests would be protected under the new
imperium, and because the path of capitalist growth in the context of the
multicentric system appeared preferable to the emerging bourgeoisies of
potential allied states.
If I am correct, the
interstate system is dependent on the institutions and opportunities presented
by the world market for its survival.
There are two main characteristics of the interstate system which need
to be sustained: the division of
sovereignty in the core (interimperial rivalry) and the maintenance of a
network of exchange among the states.
The commodified nature of the capitalist world-economy assures that
states will continue to exchange due to natural and socially created
comparative advantages in production.
Withdrawal from the world market can be accomplished for short periods
of time but it is costly and unstable.
Even the "socialist" states which have tried to establish a
separate mode of production have eventually returned to production for and
exchange with the larger commodity market.
The maintenance of
interimperial rivalry is facilitated by a number of institutional
processes. At any point in time national
sentiments, language and cultural differences make supernational integration
difficult, as is well illustrated by the EEC.
These "historical" factors may be traced back to the longrun
processes of state formation and nation building, and these processeshave
themselves been conditioned by the emergence of commodity economy over the past
500 years.
But the main
institutional feature of the world-economy which maintains interimperial
rivalry is the uneven nature of capitalist economic development. As discussed above, hegemonic core powers
lose their competitive advantage in production to other areas and this causes
the export of capital, which restrains the hegemon from attempting to impose
political imperium. Second-running
challengers, who may try to impose imperium, cannot gain sufficient support
from other core allies to win, or at least they have not historically been able
to do so. This is in part because the
potential for further expansion and deepening of the commodity economy, and
development in the context of a decentralized interstate system, appears
greater to potential allies than the potential for political and economic power
within the proposed imperium. Success
stories in the development history of the interstate system are frequent enough
to undermine empire formation.
Now let us further
consider the ways in which the transnational institutions of capitalism
interact with geopolitics to reproduce the interstate system.
Chapter 8: Warfare and World-Systems*
Part of this chapter is a response to William R. Thompson's
(1983c) valuable criticism of an earlier version of chapter 7.* The issues raised by Thompson's article are
addressed and a problem on which his analysis is conspicuously silent is
considered. Thompson's discussion fails
to address the argument that the reproduction of the interstate system is due
to the operation of specific institutions characteristic of a capitalist mode
of production. His comparison of
generally "political," as opposed to "economic," variables
ignores the role of historically specific economic institutions such as
commodity production, wage labor, commodified wealth, and capital in the
dynamics of the modern interstate system.
I shall make further comparisons of the modern capitalist world-economy
to pre-capitalist world-empires and world-economies in order to demonstrate the
importance of capitalist institutions for the reproduction of the modern
interstate system. In addition I will
examine the arguments and research on the relationship between the long
economic wave (Kwave) and world wars.
Thompson and George
Modelski (1978; see also Modelski and Thompson, 1988) have contributed
theorization and important research to the study of the modern
world-system. While their
conceptualization of that system is somewhat different from mine, they
nonetheless recognize it as a hierarchical structure in which unequally
powerful nation-states contend with one another for position. In this they have moved well beyond the still
widelyheld view that nationstates can be understood as either
"advanced" or "developing" without regard to the larger
context in which they are interacting.
___________________________________
*An earlier version of this chapter was coauthored with Joan
Sokolovsky.
On the other
hand both Modelski and Thompson proceed without any discussion of
capitalism. They instead focus on the
issue of the primacy of either "economic" or "political"
variables (Modelski, 1982; Thompson, 1983c).
While this may be a convenient short-hand, an understanding of the
underlying dynamics of the modern world-system requires comparison of its specific
institutional structures with those of other historical, large-scale social
systems. I do not claim that
"economic" variables are more important to the dynamics of the modern
system, but rather that several specifically capitalist features of the
political economy act to reproduce the interstate system. The notion of "historical systems,"
which differ from one another in fundamental ways, is absent from Thompson's
analysis, but central to mine.
Commodities and Markets
Thompson reduces the discussion of capitalist institutions to
"economic growth" and "uneven development." This may be, in part, due to a lack of clarity
in the work he was criticizing (Chase-Dunn, 1981), which uses such concepts as commodity
production without benefit of explanation.
In Marxist theory commodity production refers to the production for sale
in a price-setting market of somewhat standardized commodities (including
services). Everything is not a
commodity. Some items are produced, not
for exchange in a market, but for direct consumption by the producer. Other items are produced for exchange in a
normative reciprocal system or in a politically administered redistributive
system, but not for sale in a market.
Other things are produced for sale, but are sufficiently unique that
their conditions of production are not regularly and systematically subjected
to price competition, e.g. art objects.
Other things are sold but are not produced for sale, such as
untransformed land or other resources appropriated directly from nature.
Commodification is a process by which social relations become mediated by
markets. A price-setting market is one
in which the competitive interaction of a large number of independent buyers
and sellers determines the ratios (prices) at which particular commodities
exchange.
Capitalist commodity
production exists when wealth, land, and labor have become largely (but not
completely) commodified. Capitalist
production implies a hierarchical division of labor between controllers of
commodified means of production (capital) and the workers whose labor produces
commodities for profitable sale.
Empirically there are
no perfect price-setting markets. Prices
are always influenced to some extent by normative and political factors. And there are no completely capitalist social
systems, even our own. Capitalist
commodity production and markets have been present to some extent in most of
the historical systems since at least the emergence of cities some 5000 years
ago in
We should note that
commodities and markets are, in the final analysis, human institutional
artifacts. As such, they are
historically variable. Most human
societies in the history of social development have been predominantly based on
either normative reciprocity or politically determined production and exchange
in which markets have played only a very limited part.
Capitalists in Power
Weber's analysis of capitalism (1978) stresses the importance of
political control by capitalist merchants and producers. The medieval European cities which, by
revolution or accretion, came under the autonomous control of merchants, were
important early examples of institutionalized capitalist control of legal
systems and coercive power. The
capitalist cities of northwestern Europe provided political and economic
resources which enabled kings to gain power over feudal lords and to construct
the absolutist monarchies which first formed the European interstate system (
Capitalist merchants
and producers have gained power within most of the nation-states of the modern
world-system, but capitalist control of states has never been complete. Some states have been directly dominated by
capitalists, while others are in the hands of state managers who aggregate
contradictory class interests, but all states include other classes in their
ruling coalitions to some extent. Both
the class content of the ruling coalition and the constraints of the
world-system are important determinants of state policy.
Precapitalist World-systems
When I say that commodity production dominates world-system
dynamics I do not mean that it is all-inclusive. We must look at the way in which commodity
production is systematically interrelated with normative and political
institutions. All social systems are
built on a specific articulation of normative, coercive, and economic
institutions. In the modern worldsystem
capitalist commodity production is integrated with a set of political
processes: state formation, nation building, and the geopolitical game which we
know as the interstate system. Like
markets and money, these political institutions are not natural or
ahistorical. They are products of human
invention, and their stability, change, and/or transformation must therefore be
understood historically.
We know that the
process of state formation has occurred in various forms since the emergence of
agrarian civilizations 5000 years ago, and that for most of the history of
civilization this has been the most important process by which societies have
increased in complexity, hierarchy, and size.
Kinship systems were elaborated vertically into class systems in which
various forms of taxes or tribute were appropriated to support a non-producing
ruling class.
precapitalist world-systems.
Most systems based on the tributary mode of production tended toward
empire formation in which a single state apparatus came to exercise domination
over the core area. This facilitated
politically organized extraction of surplus product. The wage labor that existed in some of the
tributary empires was limited to certain sectors and was a very small
proportion of the work force. Slave
labor, a partially commodified form of labor control which is directly
dependent on political coercion, was important not only in the peripheral
regions but also in the core of many tributary empires.
The relatively large
role played by private property, markets, wage labor, and commodity production
in the Graeco-Roman world led to the invention of legal institutions
particularly appropriate for a capitalist society. This law later became the basis for municipal
legal systems in many of the capitalist cities of the European
Renaissance. But in classical
The Modern World-system
In the capitalist world-economy system dynamics are produced by
a single logic in which capitalist commodity production interacts with the
processes of geopolitics, state formation, class formation, and nation
building. Relative to the precapitalist
world-systems, the weight of commodity production is much greater. The business cycles, rapid technological
change, and the relatively rapid changes of fortune of different regions are
due to the operation of a world market which is much less constrained by
political-military structures than were the trade networks of earlier systems.
This is not to say
that political structures are unimportant, but rather that a particular kind of
political structure is most suitable for the continued operation of this
competitive economic system. A
centralized system tends to articulate political and normative constraints on
resource allocation and to enhance the possibility for longrun monopolies of
advantagein which production cost considerations are not important determinants
of income. Decentralized and competitive
political systems allow market
efficiency to be a much greater determinant of prices and the
distribution of returns.2 The
multicentric structure of the interstate system allows competitive advantage in
production to be an important continuing determinant of success.
Some states succeed in
becoming more central in the capitalist world-economy through a mode of
operation which bears some resemblance to that of the
Capitalist Institutions Support the Interstate System
More problematic is my contention that capitalist institutions reproduce
the contemporary interstate system.
I need to define clearly what the
interstate system is so that we may tell when it has been reproduced or
fundamentally changed, and I need to specify clearly my claims about attempts
to transform
that system.
Thompson (1983c) correctly points out that my definition of the
interstate system overlaps somewhat with my definition of a world-economy.
A world-economy is any
territorial division of labor (network of exchange of fundamental goods) in
which there are multiple political entities and multiple cultural systems. Thus world-economies always have interstate
systems.
An interstate system,
by contrast, is defined as a system of three or more states in direct or
indirect competition with one another in which none of the states is powerful
enough to dominate the whole system. An
inter-
state system could exist in which political interaction occurred
without exchange of material goods. In a
sense the European system of classical feudalism in the eighth and ninth
centuries was such a system. The
"states" were the manors, economically self-subsistent
units interacting
with one another in a shifting set of military alliances. While such a system is not a world-economy,
it is an interstate system.
The modern interstate
system is composed of nation-states, culturally integrated countries which
contain more than one city, whereas world-
economies of the past most usually contained interstate systems
composed of city-states and empires.3
Precapitalist world-economies have had interstate systems in which the
political and military competition among several states determined the nature
and extent of most material exchanges among states. This is Polanyi's (1977)
"state-administered" trade.
Precapitalist world-economies composed of citystates were most often
based on class relations in which each urban ruling class utilized political
institutions to extract surplus product from its own rural hinterland. Empires were formed when one of these city-
states succeeded by warfare in conquering others and extracting
tribute, and onforming a core/periphery system based on military
domination. Today warfare is less
central (though still important) to the workings of the modern world-
system.4
Modelski's (1978) and
Thompson's (1983c) explanation of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers
invokes a systemic need for order.
International order is conceptualized as a "public good" which
is most effectively provided by a single hegemonic core state. This functionalist explanation has
difficulty accounting for the decline of core states or
decreases in the amount of systemic political order. In my model relative peace among states is
conditioned by a long period of economic growth in which a single hegemonic
core state supports both economic and geopolitical order. This stability has costs, however, and
periods of increased conflict emerge with the spread to other states of those
economic and technological advantages which enabled the 'great power' to become
hegemonic. World wars represent a
reversion to
military competition and a restructuring of the world political
order which, up to now, has subsequently allowed for the further expansion of
capitalist production.
My contention that
capitalist institutions acted to prevent the interstate system from evolving
into a world-empire led in the previous chapter to three questions:
1 Why have attempts to
create a world-empire been so few, and seemed, in Thompson's and Modelski's eyes (and the eyes
of the most central actors), so
unfeasible?
2 Why have hegemonic core
states never attempted imperium?
3 Why have
second-running challengers to hegemonic states been unwilling or incapable of creating a world-empire?Here
I will elaborate some further considerations which these questions raise.
An interstate system is
basically a game in which multiple players engage in shifting alliances in
order to gain advantages. In a simple
threestate version of such a game the two weakest states ally against the
stronger,but if their combined resources are fewer than those of the strongest
state it (the strongest) will eventually take over. Thus an interstate system will become a
world-empire any time a willing single state or coalition of states can
coordinate resources greater than the possible coalitions against it
(them). Why has this not happened during
the 500 year history of the capitalist world-economy?
Some would argue that
state formation on a sufficient scale is unfeasible due to technological or
cultural constraints. I have already
mentioned in the previous chapter that the
Of course, in the long
run they are crucial in all systems, as the demise of the
The more direct and
powerful constraints on state budgets in a capitalist world-economy are part of
the reason why there are so few attempts to take over the system and to create
a world state. The overhead costs of
such a state
would be greater than the costs of supporting competing
nation-states, especially to capitalist producers. And such a centralized world state, while it
holds the attractive possibility of world-wide monopoly, also holds the
potential for anti-capitalist social movements to coordinate their activities
and to concentrate political action toward a single center. Transnational corporations might enjoy some
advantages of centralized control, but they would have much less flexibility to
pit political organizations and states against one another.
Why don't declining
hegemonic core states change the rules of the game and attempt to retain their
hegemony by organizing a world imperium?
It is curious that no one, not even marginal political ideologues, ever
suggest such a project. The greatest
support for international organizations (of a limitedkind) comes from a hegemon
during its golden age of hegemony. Its
dominant ideology of free trade, firmly supported at first by its relative
advantage in commodity production for the world market, appears later to have a
life beyond its basis in competitive advantage.
There is an element of institutional and ideological momentum which
carries free trade ideology and liberal internationalism along as a guiding
policy in declining hegemons long after most other core states have shifted
back toward economic nationalism.
But the structural
basis behind this apparent ideological inertia is the power of
"international" capitalists within hegemonic core states. As a hegemon loses its comparative advantage
in production (because competitors abroad adopt and improve upon production
techniques, and because labor costs and taxes go up in a successful hegemon as
workers and other interest groups use political power to obtain a share of the
profits) a significant amount of capital from the hegemonic country gets
exported to where greater profits are
to be had. This gives the
"international capitalists," those who have invested abroad, a
continuing interest in free trade and a liberal international order. They oppose political thrusts toward
protectionism, and they also would be unsupportive of a policy of aggressive
political military expansion over other core powers if, indeed, anyone
suggested it. They do, however, support
maintenance of the interstate regime as currently structured against possible
challengers who want to create imperium or carve out a protected region. Some of the interests of workers, national
capitalists and international capitalists diverge during the period of
hegemonic decline, but because these groups are somewhat evenly balanced, the
result is a zig-zagging domestic and international economic policy in the
declining hegemonic core states. This
topic is explored further in chapter 9. But
why do the rising powers which militarily challenge the dominance of declining
hegemonic powers not go on to establish imperium? They may be ambivalent about the returns of
imperium.
periphery structures but they did not need to take on the
overhead costs of world imperium. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, if a challenger did propose the creation of
a world-empire it would be difficult to mobilize sufficient support because
most potential powerful allies would likely calculate their opportunities for
profitable commodity production in a world market to be greater than their
potential returns from participation in an imperium.
World Wars and the Restructuring of the World-economy
Jack Levy's (1985) discussion and critique of different
conceptualizations of world wars is a valuable review of recent scholarly
works, including the world-system perspective, the long cycle theory of
Modelski and Thompson, and Robert Gilpin's (1981) theory of hegemonic war. Levy compares different criteria for defining
world wars, and criticizes those approaches which define these conflicts in
terms of their consequences the
restructuring of the international system.
Levy claims that this builds a logical circularity into the definition
of world wars which makes it impossible to test important propositions about
the relationship between wars and system structure. His proposed criteria are
independent of outcomes and result in a list of ten "general" wars
since the sixteenth century. The
disputes over definitions and
lists of wars have generated a profuse literature. The following argument lays out a typology of
wars and their hypothesized roles in the world-system.
Without denying the
importance of the periodic emergence of hegemonic states in the development of
the modern worldsystem, I am not prepared to accept an explanation for the
dynamics of the system that is grounded solely in terms of the ascension to
military dominance of these leading states.
This necessitates a reinterpretation of the concept of world wars as
presented by Thompson and Modelski.
While I agree with Thompson that world wars represent attempts to
restructure political relations among states to correspond with changing
economic realities, I also think they may be seen as a way in which states try
to convert political-military strength into a greater share of world surplus
value. In part, this is a function of
the interdependence of political and economic factors in the capitalist mode of
production. In either case,
world wars, defined as those conflicts in which one state
attempts to take over and thus destroy the interstate system or struggles in
which leading power status is determined, are not the only important wars in
the struggle among states in the capitalist world-economy.
Extending our
consideration beyond the great powers to include the entire hierarchical
division of the world-economy since 1500, we can identify three structural
roles which wars have played. Most
fundamentally, they may represent struggles for control or dominance over the
entire interstate system. Although disagreements
clearly exist over the analysis of particular cases, the world wars identified
by Thompson all reflect struggles for preeminence to a greater or lesser
degree. The Napoleonic Wars and World
Wars I and II may be considered extreme examples of this type. There is no definitive answer to the
counter-factual question of what would have happened if the
unsuccessfulcoalition in one of these wars had managed to achieve its goals;
yet it is difficult to argue that the interstate system as we know it could
have continued to exist if either the Napoleonic or German attempts to conquer
most of the core zone had succeeded.
Secondly, wars may be
used to facilitate the upward or downward mobility of individual states and the
creation of a new structure of power that more accurately reflects the
strengths and weaknesses of key actors.
Examples of wars of this nature are legion.
During the eighteenth
century when economic and political power was quite evenly distributed
throughout the core of the system, wars of this second type were more
prevalent. The War of the Spanish
Succession resulted in the exhaustion of Dutch resources and the fall of the
status but did not lead to the immediate creation of a successor
state.
Finally, wars may be
used to restructure relations between core states and the periphery in keeping
with relative changes in power among actors.
The trade wars between
Conversely, when wars have resulted only in changes in relative
position within a more equal framework, victories have been accompanied by
changes in formal
control of particular peripheral areas to reflect the new
balance of power. Bergesen and
Schoenberg (1980) have documented the close relationship between periods of
multicentricity within the core and the development of formal colonial empires
as contrasted with periods of hegemony and the movement toward free trade and
decolonization.
Clearly, none of these
categories of wars are mutually exclusive, and historically world conflicts
have usually involved a combination of them.
Indeed the growth of exchange networks and interlocking alliances within
the world-system have insured the spread of conflicts to encompass states with
widely divergent motives. Thus the Seven
Years War linked the conflict between
In analyzing the
trajectory of military conflicts it is often nearly impossible to distinguish
between the real aims of participants, their statedaims, and the effect that
the victory of one or more actors is perceived as portending for the whole
system by other states. To make matters
more complicated, war aims regularly change with initial successes or
defeats. However it should be possible
to determine the impact of global conflict on the restructuring of the
interstate system.
When examined in these
terms wars have operated to reduce discrepancies between economic and military
power structures in the world-system.
Some states, like
Conversely, states
like
Overall, then, I share
basic agreement with Modelski and Thompson on the existence since the sixteenth
century of a multicentric world-system tied together by political relations
among states and economic exchange networks.
I concur as to the importance of the periodic emergence of a preponderant
economic and political power.
I differ from the
"power cycles" approach in my effort to go beyond a systemic need for
order to the construction of a causal model that will explain both the reasons
for the recurrent rise of these global powers and their failure to hold their
position within the structure of world power.
I believe that these causes lie in the institutions of capitalist
development. Upward mobility within the
system has been conceptualized as a two-sided process. While productive advantage has frequently
been converted to political strength by leading states in the system, other
states have been able to use the increased share of world surplus value gained
through military force to stimulate their own economic expansion.
The waning of dominant
status has also been linked to the operation of the capitalist
world-economy. Changes in competitive
advantage, costs of control and diverging interests among capitalists, workers,
and state bureau
crats within declining hegemons have been advanced as some of
the mechanisms through which this relationship is articulated.
The Kwave and Wars
One aspect of the link between the interstate system and the
world economy is revealed in the connection between the Kondratieff cycle
(Kwave) and warfare,first posited by Kondratieff himself. An impressive research literature has
blossomed in recent years investigating this linkage, and, although
considerable disagreement still exists about the causal connections involved,
quite a bit is now known.
An entire industrial
sector of international relations scholars have been working for scores of
years to code the timing, participants, territory, costs and destructiveness of
warfare in the interstate system. Levy's
(1983) book,
War in the Modern Great Power System, 14951975, presents a recent complete compilation of the data on
warfare. Although visual inspection of
the frequency of wars and other measures reveals an obvious sequence of periods
of more and less war, Levy reports that warfare does not exhibit any strictly
cyclical features. Joshua Goldstein
(1988:244) however, demonstrates that a statistical test (the AutoCorrelation
Function) applied to Levy's data on war severity (the number of battle deaths
per year) produces clear evidence of a 50 to 60 year cycle over the period from
1495 to 1975.
Thompson and Zuk
(1982) and Goldstein (1988) use time series analysis techniques to examine the
relationship between wars and the Kwave.
Goldstein uses several price and production series and the dates given
by four earlier scholars (Braudel, Frank, Kondratieff, and Mandel) to produce a
set of trough and peak dates for Kwaves between 1494 and 1975. He argues that strict periodicity is an
inappropriate standard for social cycles.
Thus he analyzes sequences of phases with unequal periods in his measure
of the Kwave. Goldstein's results reveal
a clear association between the Kwave and the severity cycle (battle deaths per
year) of war among core powers. He
argues that severe wars are more likely to occur during the upswing phase
of the Kwave and his empirical work finds support for this. This conclusion isdependent on the dates
Goldstein uses to distinguish between upswing and down
swing phases of the Kwave (see 1988: figure 11.3). Thompson (forthcoming) doubts the soundness
of Goldstein's periodization of the Kwave before 1790. Nevertheless Thompson finds support for the
relationship between war and Kwave price upswings in his own analysis of the
period between 1816 and 1914. What is
not in doubt is the finding that the Kwave and the war cycle are linked in some
systematic way.
The business cycle is
most often measured by price series.
Goldstein argues that there is a productionstagnation cycle which
precedes the price cycle by 10 to 15 years.
The war cycle peaks in between the peaks of the
production cycle and the price cycle in Goldstein's model. The data on long run series which indicate
real production and related indicators are rather scanty, so most empirical
work has focused on the relationship between price series and war. Some of that relationship is undoubtedly a
rather simple matter of the effects of warfare on inflation, a matter studied
by Thompson and Zuk (1982). They
conclude that most Kwave price downturns can be attributed to the ending of major
wars, but that Kwave price upswings regularly occur before the outbreak of
wars.
Goldstein's causal
model of the connection between war and the Kwave production cycle posits a
negative feedback loop. According to
Goldstein wars occur during Kwave production upswings because, though states
always desire to go to war, warfare is expensive and so states do it when
economic growth is providing them with more resources. Goldstein argues that warfare, on the other
hand, has a negative effect on economic growth through nonproductive
expenditure and destruction of people and property. Thus the two cycles spur one another on. Like Thompson, Goldstein does not consider
the capitalist nature of the institutions and processes which link warfare and
economic growth in the modern worldsystem.
For him states are simply war machines that go after one another when
they have the resources to do it, and since capitalist economic growth provides
great resources, warfare is endemic.
Goldstein's study
reveals empirical details of the relationship among business cycles, wars, and
the rise and fall of hegemons which must be
taken into account in any theory of the world-system. He shows that Kondratieff waves and peaks in
the severity of wars among core powers are closely
associated in time, with nine out of ten peaks in world war
since 1500 occurring near the end of an upward phase of the price
cycle. The somewhat surprising finding
here is that, according to Goldstein, world wars regularly occur during a
period of economic expansion. This is
surprising for two reasons. Most people
think first about World War II, which is the single exception among the ten
core war peaks since 1500. And many
theories of core
war are based on the idea that war is caused by increasing
competition among core states, [socalled "lateral pressure" (Choucri
and North, 1975)] which has been assumed to be most severe during periods of
economic stagnation.
Examining data series
on prices and several indicators of production, innovation and investment,
Goldstein concludes that the production cycle and the price cycle are somewhat
out of phase with one another, with the production cycle lagged about 10 to 15
years behind the price cycle. In
Goldstein's model (1988:259) the war cycle peaks just between the production
cycle and the price cycle. This model
is, of course, an idealized depiction of the exact features which are only
generally supported by Goldstein's analysis of actual data. Nevertheless, if Goldstein's representation
is correct we may be able toexplain why there has been considerable
disagreement about the timing of the relationship between warfare and the
Kwave. Goldstein follows Kondratieff and
many other theorists in arguing that warfare is most likely to be severe during
the upswing phase, but his own model implies that warfare actually peaks in
between the peak of the price cycle and the production cycle. If we believe that the psychology and logic
of production decisions as well as statecraft are involved in the relationship
between warfare and the Kwave, as the
Wallersteinian worldsystem perspective would emphasize, then it
is most interesting that the warfare peak is alleged to occur after the
peak of the investment cycle, in other words during the beginning of the investment
and production downswing. This is
simultaneously a period in which states have a lot of resources available for
war and capitalist investors have begun to slacken investments, presumably
because they perceive limitations on profit
taking. Increasing
competition for markets and investment opportunities is
due to overproduction by producers of core goods for the world
market relative to effective demand, and this kind of competition leads to
pressure for the use of extraeconomic power, that is state power, to protect
and/or expand market shares and investment opportunities.
Goldstein does not
distinguish the prices of different kinds of commodities, but other researchers
have shown that price cycles vary across different kinds of commodities. Michael Barrat-Brown's (1974) study of the
terms of trade between core and peripheral areas demonstrated that there are
differences in the degree of price changes such that terms of trade of
peripheral goods vis--vis core goods rise and fall over time, and this finding is confirmed by Paul Bairoch
(1986:205-8). This supports
Wallerstein's (1984b) argument that core commodities are overproduced in some
periodsrelative to effective demand, that is relative to the politically
structured distribution of resources in the world-system. This causes military conflict among core
states, and sometimes results in the restructuring of the inter
national order under a new hegemon.
Goldstein's
demonstration of the link between war cycles and the Kwave is extremely important
evidence in support of the contention that geopolitics and the world economy
are interdependent processes. The
connections between the war cycle, the Kwave, and the hegemonic cycle are
examined in the next chapter. Here I
would like to quote Goldstein's observations of four trends based on his
analysis of warfare over the last 500 years:
First, the
incidence of great power war is declining
more and more "peace" years separate the great power
wars. Second, and related, the great
power wars are becoming shorter. Third,
however, those wars are becoming more severe
annual fatalities during war increasing more than a hundredfold over the
five centuries. Fourth (and more
tentatively), the
war cycle may be gradually lenthening in each successive era, from about 40
years in the first era to about 60 years in the third. The presence of nuclear weapons has continued
these trends in great power war from the past five centuries any great power wars in this era will likely
be fewer, shorter and much more deadly.
(1985:432)
Now let us turn our
attention to the hegemonic sequence.
Chapter 9: The
Rise and Decline of Hegemonic Core Powers
Here it is argued
that three states have been hegemonic in the capitalist world economy since its
consolidation in the long sixteenth century ─ the United Provinces of the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and the United States of
America. The periods in between these hegemonies were characterized, I
contend, by a relatively equal (multicentric) distribution of military
power and economic competitive advantage
among core states, and by relatively higher levels of conflict and competition
within the core. I also think that these
periods were characterized by more
bilateral and politically controlled relationships between the core and the
periphery in which each core state attempted to
monopolize exchange with its "own" colonial empire. Stephen Krasner (1976) has contended that
periods in which a single great power has been hegemonic have been characterized by relatively more
free trade among different areas of the world economy. The interaction between the hegemonic cycle,
with its rise and fall of hegemonic core
powers, and changes in the structure of the core/periphery hierarchy is
analyzed in chapter 13. This chapter
focuses on the core zone itself, and
processes which cause the rise and fall of hegemons, and it considers the
current situation of the
Rise and Fall in
Different Systems
In order to
understand the dynamics of the current
One important
difference between the Roman world-empire and the
capitalist
world-economy is the organization of the state.
In
The main
consequence of this structural difference is its effect on the dynamics of
competition, reproduction, and growth in these two types of systems. In the Roman world-empire, competition was
primarily mediated through a single state apparatus and, although
monetarization of the economy was extensive (
centralized in a
single state apparatus. The main type of
growth was extensive, through the addition of control over lands and
slaves. As Keith Hopkins (1978b:62)
shows, the dynamic of the Roman economy was fueled by conquest. Roman military organization and transport
technology, by far the most advanced in antiquity, eventually reached their
cost-effective spatial limits, and territorial expansion halted.
The slave mode of
production required new inputs as slaves were worked to death on the latifundia
of
By contrast, the
capitalist world-economy, with its more decentralized polity, allows for much
greater economic and political competition. The existence
of the price-setting world market (which includes both national and
international markets), while it is not a "perfect" market, does
regularly encourage investors to increase the efficiency of production (to
produce at lower cost) in order to gain a greater share of income. Thus technical development of productivity is
facilitated by the fact that there is no central state that can impose monopoly
control on the whole arena of economic competition. Similarly, the multicentric interstate system
encourages the "export of capital" because political opposition to
profitable investment and labor exploitation is mediated by the individual
nation-states and often can be escaped by crossing state boundaries.
Political
competition in the capitalist world-economy is also much more dynamic than in
world-empires. The interstate system
allows different paths to "success" in the competition among
states. Some emphasize political-military
expansion, while others emphasize a strategy of competitive commodity production
for the world market. In such a
decentralized political system new forms of political organization can emerge
unconstrained by any central state and are thereby free to compete with one another for dominance. What makes the modern world economy a capitalist
world-economy, however, is its unique combination of an interstate system with
the institutions of commodity production for profit on a market, and a high
level of the commodification of labor power.
These institutions are
interwoven, along with the "private" nature of investment decisions,
into a competitive interstate system; and it is the institutional combination
of all these elements that creates the qualitative uniqueness which differentiates
the capitalist world-system from earlier world-systems.
The modern system
has shown its flexibility over the 500-year period of its expansion and deepening. Unlike the Roman world-empire, it has changed
its center without going into devolution as a system. Thus the present period is most probably not
a demise of "Western imperialism" (àla Galtung et al. 1980)
but rather the demise of the hegemony of the
The main
difference between the modern world-system and earlier world-systems is that
commodity production has become the dominant logic of competition at the
center of the system. In the Roman
world-empire and many other pre-capitalist world-systems there was much
commodity production, but it flourished
mainly in the interstices. It was the
business of clients, freedmen, or the specialty of semiperipheral trading
states, while the "perspective of
the world" was a game played exclusively by men more interested in
expanding state power as the primary means to wealth, power, and status. It was the emergence of a different kind of
state in the core region of the European world-economy, the hegemonic Dutch
state employing its military capabilities primarily to provide protection rents
to its capitalists, which signaled the consolidation of a world-system in which
capitalism had become the dominant mode of production.
Definitions of
Hegemony
Wallerstein
(1984a) defines hegemony in terms of economic comparative advantage ─ the concentration of a
certain type of commodity production within the borders of a single core
state. Remember that "core
production" is commodity production which utilizes relatively
capital-intensive technology and skilled, highly paid labor. Hegemony in this sense is comparative
advantage due to a combination of product development ─ producing the
most sophisticated and desirable products ─ and competitive prices
─ the ability to price the exported core products at levels which make it
hard for competing national economies to avoid purchasing them, and yet, at the
same time, to make a profit while selling at such prices. Wallerstein observes that economic
comparative advantage enables one core country to penetrate the home markets of
other core countries with capital-intensive commodities. The production of these types of commodities
has, of course, relatively denser forward and backward linkages, and spinoffs
which multiply the growth effects of investments within the national economy.
Very different
conceptualizations of global power are utilized by political scientists studying the
"international system." George
Modelski and William R. Thompson (1988) propose a theory of a long cycle of
political-military power in which great powers rise and fall. Their theory is similar in some respects to the Wallersteinian
perspective. They claim to be studying
the world system (without the hyphen ─ see Thompson, ed, 1983) and they
agree that periods of concentrated power
correspond with relatively lower levels of conflict among core powers, while
periods in which there is a more equal
distribution of power among core states tend to be more
conflictive. But they have a very
different notion of what constitutes concentrated power (they do not use the
term "hegemony"). For them the
central matter is naval power, which is an indicator of the ability of a great
power to exercise "global reach."
Predominant naval power enables a great power to maintain order at the
level of long-distance international interactions. Modelski and Thompson contend that land
armies and general military expenditures are not useful indicators of
"global reach" because these resources are usable primarily in regional or continental warfare,
not for domination of the global power system.
This argument illustrates Modelski and Thompson's "layered"
conceptualization of the world system, in which the global level of interaction
is analyzed as importantly distinct from local and regional interactions.
Modelski has
defined "world powers" as "those units monopolizing (that is
controlling more than one half of) the market for (or the supply of) orderkeeping
in the global layer of interdependence" (1978:216). The global system since the sixteenth century
is said to have experienced the rise and fall of four of these "world
powers:"
Other political
scientists speak of hegemony in terms of "power capability," which
is defined broadly as the ability of one state to control or influence the
behavior of other states using rewards and punishments.
Robert Gilpin
(1981) explicitly conceptualizes hegemony in terms of relative overall military
power, although he analyzes the concentration of economic innovations which
provide the economic wherewithal behind superior military advantage.
For Wallerstein
hegemony comes to include productive, commercial, and financial dominance
within the world economy. But productive
efficiency must be accompanied by state power.
The creation and maintenance of economic preeminence requires the
political and military capacity to preserve a domestic class structure
favorable to capitalist accumulation, innovative production, and the
prevention of external restrictions on flows of capital or goods. In this sense political-military power is a
necessary but not a sufficient basis for the attainment of hegemony in a
capitalist world-economy.
The free market,
which initially favors the competitive advantages of a leading power,
eventually results in the flow of capital and technological innovations to
competing states. This results in the
loss of productive advantage by the hegemonic power. Further, the costs of maintaining the global
order are borne disproportionately by the leader, resulting in rising
production costs and an excessive expenditure of national resources in the
non-productive military sector. Recent
efforts by the
When they seek to
operationalize power capability many researchers have used what Thompson
(1983b) somewhat disparagingly calls an "omnibus" measure which combines
a number of different indicators of economic and military resources.
Organski and Kugler (1980:30-8) have argued strongly for "total
output," that is total GNP, as the best measure of power capability of the
great powers. They also argue (1980:
68-84) that total output should be combined with a measure of political
development, which they define as the ability of the state to mobilize the
resources of its own society. Another
study which has explicitly tried to measure variation over time in the degree
of concentration of power among the "great powers" is that by Singer,
Bremer, and Stuckey (1979). They
combined a number of economic and military indicators of the capacity of
states. A similar composite measure was
constructed by Ferris (1973). Curiously,
none of the indicators used are measures of economic development as usually
understood, but are rather indicators which combine size and development, as
does total GNP. Of the studies I have
reviewed, only that by Doran and Parsons (1980) utilizes measures of economic
development, and they combine these into a single composite index along with
size indicators.
Some surprises
emerge from my review of the studies which have tried to empirically measure
changes in the relative power capabilities of states. Although these have been done by political
scientists, only Modelski and Thompson focus exclusively on military power, and
they examine only a particular kind of military power ─ naval
power. Organski and Kugler argue that
total GNP is the best overall measure of power capability, although later they
combine it with a measure of internal state strength. None of the studies measures hegemony in
terms of total military power. None of
the studies examines measures of development separately from measures of
size. And none of the studies tries to
examine the relationship between economic and political types of power.
Causes and
Conditions of the Rise and Decline of Hegemonic Core States
In this section a
set of causes and conditions of the rise and decline of hegemonic core states
is hypothesized. Then I present a brief
overview of the three hegemonies. Later I describe the few quantitative studies
of the hegemonic sequence which have been conducted.
The rise and fall
of hegemonic core states can be understood in terms of the formation of leading sectors of core
production and the concentration of these sectors, temporarily, in the
territory of a single state, which hence becomes the most economically and
politically powerful of the core states.
Decline sets in when the hegemon loses its ability to develop lead
industries ahead of its competitors.
This process can be understood as a feature of the world-economy as a whole
insofar as it involves the interaction of systemic variables such as the
Kondratieff wave, the application of new technologies to production (Mandel,
1978; Rostow, 1978 and Bousquet, 1980); and the violent reorganization of the interstate system
through warfare. As noted in the
previous chapter the strong association in time between long business cycles
and wars among core powers has been empirically demonstrated.
The uniqueness of
the world-system perspective is that it examines the system-wide dynamics of these cycles as well
as the exclusively national processes involved.
The cycles that occur are the consequences of the relative
over-production in different periods of different types of commodities (core
commodities and peripheral commodities) and the limits on effective demand that
particular political structures impose on consumption. During periods of the expansion of core
production labor unions, guilds, and other politically organized interest
groups increase their demands for shares of income. The expansion of core production increases
the need for raw material inputs, many of which are produced in the
periphery. The terms of trade between
core and periphery shift in favor of the periphery, enabling peripheral
producers and the states they control to attain a relatively more favorable
market position and to make more effective demands for a larger share of
surplus value. This redounds on the
struggle for shares among core states, where wage increases (and the
"cacophony of equity demands") are less easily met by increased
exploitation of the periphery. This dynamic
leads to heightened class struggle within core countries and to increased
competition among core countries for shares of a no longer growing pool of
world surplus value. It is striking that
hegemony in the core is consolidated after wars in which potential contenders
have destroyed one another, leaving an opening for the emerging dominance of
the new hegemon. The pattern which is
documented by Thompson (forthcoming) and Goldstein (1988) is as follows: a
rising challenger (B) initiates war against the declining hegemon (A). (A) makes an alliance with another rising
core state (C) to combat the military challenge by (B). (A) and (C) win the war and (C) emerges as
the new hegemon.
Goldstein's study
examines the relationship between the war/growth cycles and the rise and fall of hegemonic
core powers. Utilizing the Wallersteinian
conceptualization of three hegemonies ─ the Dutch, the British, and the
American ─ he demonstrates that they are related, but not in a very
regular way. As Goldstein (1988:287)
puts it:
I find the connection between the causal dynamics of these two
cycles--long waves and hegemony cycles ─ to be weak. They are not synchronized, and there is no
exact number of long waves that makes up a hegemony cycle. Rather, I see the two cycles as playing out
over time, each according to its own inner dynamic but each conditioned by,
and interacting with, the other.
And further along he concludes:
Each hegemony cycle contains several long waves, but not a fixed number. Each of the long waves within the
hegemony cycle ends in a war peak that re-adjusts the international power
structure without bringing in a new
hegemony.
(Goldstein, 1988:288, emphasis in the original)
In a footnote
Goldstein continues: "All great power wars affect relative positions in the international 'pecking
order.' Hegemonic wars determine the top
position in that order" (1988:288).
Although
Goldstein does explicate a causal model which explains the relation-ship
between economic growth and periodic wars (see chapter 8), his explanation of
the linkage between these cycles and the three hegemonies is more historical. He argues that many contingencies link the
particular outcomes which are revealed by the hegemonic sequence and the
particular countries which become hegemons, challengers, and "also-rans." Goldstein does not, however, address the more
system-wide questions which were the focus of chapters 7 and 8 above: why is
the interstate system reproduced, rather than evolving into world-empire; why
do the successful hegemons rely more on accumulation through trade than
military expansion; and why don't hegemons facing decline opt for world-wide
imperium? Also, why are the direct
military challengers of hegemons never successful? As argued in previous chapters these
questions require attention to the peculiar nature of competition and accumulation
in a capitalist world-economy.
Though Goldstein
treats the hegemonic sequence historically, it is possible to try to delineate
the systematic conditions and processes which
contribute to the rise and demise of hegemonic core states. Let us discuss some similarities of the three
hegemons which suggest the kinds of processes
which can account for their rise and decline.
The Three Stages
of a Hegemony
Hegemonies have
three stages. The first is based on
competitive advantage in mass consumption goods that can penetrate the markets
of core producers in competing countries and also can expand the size of the
market by lowering the price of the product.
The second stage is based on the expansion of capital goods production,
and the third stage is based on the export of financial services and the
performance of central place functions for the world-economy (See Wallerstein,
1984a).
In terms of the cities that became hegemonic
world cities over the history of the modern world-systems we may compare
A number of
conditions may contribute to the determination of which country becomes a
hegemon. Geographical location would
appear to play some role in facilitating
hegemony. Hegemonic powers have been
centrally located
within the
economic networks they come to dominate.
This is obviously an advantage in
terms of transport costs, but may become less important as transport costs
decrease. Technology adequate to a
breakthrough in competitive core production must be available, either from
local inventors or through borrowing.
All three hegemonies have involved "industrial revolutions" in
the sense that new, more economically efficient technologies were applied that
allowed the production of mass consumption goods more cheaply than by
competitors. Another necessary condition
is the existence of investment capital sufficient to develop the new types of
production in the hands of those willing to risk it in entreprenuerial
ventures. Each rising hegemonic power has early on developed
diversified, capital-intensive agriculture for home consumption and for
export. They have eventually developed
access to cheap imports of some staple foods and raw materials, most often
produced in the periphery, which have been important inputs to industry. Human capital, that is, labor with skills
relevant to the new type of production, must be available. All these conditions contribute to the
ability of an emerging core state to form a leading sector of core production
that can serve as the basis for hegemony.
The political conditions of rise to hegemony are rather more
complicated. A hegemonic state must be
powerful vis-à-vis other states and must also have the strong support of
the class coalition that composes its regime.
The quality and unity of this class coalition are also important. It must strongly include classes with an
interest in pursuing a strategy of profitable production for the world
market. Although the ability of the
state apparatus to appropriate resources is undoubtedly important (Tilly,
1985), the conception of state power I am using is not reducable to the
extractive power of government. As
discussed in chapter 6, a state is powerful if the classes that support it will
grant it great support during emergencies (Tardanico, 1978). Its ability to extract surplus through
taxation does not automatically show that it is strong in the sense that I mean
here. The Dutch state could raise a navy
overnight by convincing the Amsterdam merchants that their interests were at
stake, whereas the French state, whose peacetime government revenues per capita
were much greater than those of the British throughout the nineteenth century,
could not raise so great a subscription during time of war.
The size of the
state is also important, and as Wallerstein is fond of pointing out, it is
possible to be too large as well as to be too small,2 especially if economic regions with
contradictory interests are part of the same state, as was the case with
What, then, are
the conditions that lead to the decline of a hegemonic core state? First it should be pointed out that core
states do not decline absolutely. The
entire world-economy continues to grow, albeit at different rates. What happens is that core states relatively
lose their hegemony, but they do not plunge into the periphery. The most important cause of relative decline is the spread of leading core
industries to other competing core countries, and to parts of the
semiperiphery. Hegemonic states attempt
to monopolize the new types of
production, but unsuccessfully because of their inability to politically
control the diffusion of techniques, skilled labor, and investment capital. Competing producers in other states attempt
first to win back their home markets, often employing political regulation of
trade (protectionism) as well as the adoption of the new production techniques
(Senghaas, 1985). Later some of them
will successfully compete with the hegemonic power in international markets.
Another factor
that contributes to the loss of hegemony we may term the turnover time of fixed
capital, especially investment (both private and public) in infrastructural inputs to the
production system. This obviously
operates at the
level of heavy investment in technologies such as plant construction and
expensive large-scale machinery.
Latecomers have an advantage in that they can adopt newer technical
innovations, while earlier investors must wait to recoup initial investment. Steel plants in the
Transportation
systems, urban structures, communications systems, and energy systems involve investments of
resources that, once made, tend to be relatively permanent or not easily
reorganized. The canal system of
It can be asked
why entrepreneurs within a declining hegemonic core state do not invest within their national
economies to revitalize material production and increase productivity. It may be that a particular steel company
must wait for its sunk capital to be depreciated before building a new plant
that uses more productive technology, but why don't other corporations make such investments? Here we may point out that the structure of
national tariffs plays a role in the determination of investment
locations. Tariff protection of national
industries increases in a period of slower growth as states seek to protect
their national markets against international competition. It may be in the strategic and national
interest to make new investments in steel, and indeed states often adopt
policies that subsidize such undertakings.
But the purely profit-oriented logic of investment is unlikely to help a
country which is losing its competitive position in the world market. Building a new steel plant next to the old
plant means that the national market will have to be shared, while buying steel
from more competitive producers abroad and investing in more immediately
profitable enterprises (often located in other countries) is the most
attractive strategy for private investors.
Thus economic
nationalism by itself might prevent the relocation of certain industries, but
declining hegemonic core states are usually ambivalent about the choice between
nationalism and internationalism. This
reflects the contradictory interests of their "national" and
"international" capitalists as well as the contradictory interests of
workers as consumers and job-holders (Hart, 1980). The road of state-sponsored
"revitalization" advocated by those in hegemonic core states most
concerned with the interests of national producers (both labor and capital) may
be taken, but other competing states will also employ this strategy, and they
are more likely to do it effectively
because the coalitions of classes that control these other states are less
dominated by those who have international investments (Evans, 1985). The international capitalists within a
declining hegemonic core state can often
convince
consumers that it is better to try to
hang on to centrality in world exchange and to benefit from low-cost imports
than to adopt an expensive (and risky) program of economic revitalization.
In addition,
organizational features tend to have a certain inertia (or momentum, if organization is a process). Once a national economy becomes organized in
a certain way there is a tendency to crystallization around patterns which are then not easy to
change. While organizational forms may
be more malleable than the infrastructural features discussed above
(because material sunk capital is less
malleable), social rigidities do crystalize around organizational forms.
A frequently
cited explanation for the British decline at the end of the nineteenth century was the reticence of
family-held firms to adopt the newly emerging corporate form (Crouzet,
1982). In many sectors family firms apparently preferred continued control to
additional profits, and thus British industry was late to adopt the expanded
scale and new organizational forms becoming widespread in
Another factor is
the opposition that successful capitalist accumulation creates. The very political pluralism and relative
egalitarianism that was earlier a competitive advantage allows the formation of
constraints on the
maneuverability
of capital and increases the costs of production. The most obvious example of this is the
formation of political organizations that protect and expand the interests of
workers. Wages, both direct and social,
tend to go up in a successfully hegemonic core state. Capitalists who are making big profits are
more likely to accept a higher wage bill accompanied by a stable labor
supply. This changes when competition
increases and profits decline.
Similarly, other
constraints on the continued revolution of production become politically
articulated. The state begins to respond
to the needs of core workers and other
groups (e.g. consumers, environmentalists, etc.), and these
"non-economic" demands on capital may reduce the relative profit-
ability of
production within the country, at least compared to offshore locations where
workers and other groups are less well organized.
Mancur Olson's
(1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations stresses rising wages as the most
important among the "social rigidities" which cause the decline of
formerly successful national economies.
Olson's analysis points to some interesting organizational features
which reduce relative efficiency of
production and increase the obstacles to economic growth and revitalization. Nations in which interest groups are
fragmented and specialized, such as the
and the ability
to compete effectively in world markets are the best measures of progress. Thus the policy implication of his analysis
is that states and firms should remain as independent as possible of the
demands of workers, or other interest groups.
A more balanced definition of progress would suggest that the logic of
growth ought to include the needs of workers, consumers and the
environment. "Efficiency"
across the world-system should take these needs into account without pitting
workers in different countries against one another. This can be accomplished only by
democratically regulating major investment decisions at the world level.
Another
condition, one that is often related to increasing politically-articulated
constraints on capital, is the export of investment capital. Capitalists respond to differentials in
profit rates, and so increasing costs of operating in the home economy produce
the incentive to invest elsewhere, and thus the phenomenon of the export of
capital or "capital flight."
This means that fewer new investments in material production are made in
the home economy, although new lead sectors do continue to emerge, especially
in the provision of financial services to the larger world economy. Thus the world cities located in hegemonic
core states typically become more important to the economy of the country in
the latter days of the hegemony. This is
because the centrality in exchange that developed from the earlier centrality
in production is an important resource for the national economy and for the
functioning of the larger world economy.
It may be the case that, although benefiting from centrality to
a certain extent, the hegemonic core
state comes to bear too great a proportion of the costs of maintaining order
in the larger world-economy. The smooth
operation of the world-system requires the repression of deviance and the
maintenance of order, as does any social system. In the contemporary system an important
degree of order is maintained through political-military
expenditures. Military expenditures may serve some economic
functions (e.g. Baran and Sweezy, 1966),
but several studies demonstrate that they do not contribute to national
economic growth (e.g. Szymanski, 1973; Väyrynen, 1988). The small or non-existent military expenditures
of
Comparison of
Hegemonies
Let us now assess
and qualify the generalizations of the previous section by reviewing the
characteristics of the three powers that have been hegemonic in the modern
world-economy (the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain, and the United States of
America) and by comparing them with the prior hegemony of Venice and with
the powers that contended for hegemony but did not attain it.
The Habsburg
Empire (which included the core "dorsal spine" of the European
world-economy in the first half of the long sixteenth century) (Bousquet, 1980) was based primarily on
political-military, rather than economic, centrality. The mercantile aggressiveness of the
Portuguese (Modelski, 1978) served as
the first wave of European expansion, but like the later centrality of Seville,
Portugal did not develop centrality in production.4 The Portuguese expansion, and the
"primitive accumulation" of money-capital by the Spanish, had
important, although complicated, effects
on the emerging European world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974:67-84), but
they did not lead to the development of core production in Lisbon or
Seville. Somewhat like the case of
The United
Provinces of the
Wallersteinian
conception of hegemony in a capitalist world-economy. The Dutch Revolution created a republican
federation in which the seafaring capitalists of
The Dutch state
is often seen as small, but in terms of the notion of state strength employed
in chapter 5, it was estimable (Braudel, 1984:193-5). Johan DeWitt, the Stadtholder of Amsterdam,
could raise sufficient funds in a day on the
The ideology of free trade and the rights of all nations to use
of the seas were propagated by the Dutch intelligentsia during the period in
which economic competitive advantage
enabled the
Barbour (1963)
contends that in many respects
Lane (1973)
observes that the Venetian ruling classes became land oriented during the
period of their decline, and he interprets this as an attempt to form a nation-state that could
compete with the larger states of the European world-economy in formation. The United Provinces seems rather small in
terms of land area and population size compared to the other states of Europe,
but it nevertheless played the role of
hegemonic core state rather effectively during the seventeenth century.5 The United Provinces may be seen as a kind of
midpoint between
The Dutch decline
exhibited the tendencies mentioned in my description of hegemonic stages: the shift toward financial services, the
export of capital, and the transformation of the capitalists from entrepreneurs
to rentiers (Burke, 1974; Riley,
1980).
The United
Kingdom fits the stages of hegemony best.6 Eric Hobsbawm's (1968) study, Industry and
Empire, depicts the three stages of hegemony in the rise of English cotton
textile production, its replacement in the middle of the nineteenth
century by the production and export of
machinery, railroads, and steamships, and the increasing importance of London
in the later nineteenth century as a center
of world financial services. The
Dutch hegemony, however, matches the three stages formulation rather well,
although the middle period of export of
ships, arms, and land reclamation projects fits the notion of
"capital goods" somewhat loosely.
The English
Revolution, like the Dutch, exhibits relative egalitarianism, pluralism, and
the firm incorporation of diverse capitalist interests into a flexible state
capable of mobilizing immense resources for international war while maintaining
a somewhat sparse and inexpensive peacetime bureaucracy. It should be repeated here that we are
describing features of the core of a larger capitalist system, not features of
capitalism as a whole. We do not want to
repeat the mistake of identifying capitalism as a system with the laissez-faire
state.
The unity of the
center coalition in the
The export of
capital from
Sometime after
1850 the average incomes of workers in
In general the
Southern peripheral capitalists, exporting raw materials to core industry in
The slave South
was the most successful peripheral economy the world has ever known, and it
sought to extend its political control over the West and over the Federal
state. After a series of confrontations
and compromises the "irrepressible conflict" was settled by the
Civil War, which resulted in the consolidation of control by core capital in
alliance with core labor and Western farmers.
In the 1880s the
The further rise
to hegemony by the
The success of
core production in the industrial North during the nineteenth century led to
the early export of cotton textiles, and not long after, to the export of
machinery. Electrical appliances and
automobiles became important mass consumption exports, along with other
industrial products. As discussed above,
the home market seems to have played a relatively larger role in the early
development of the
Let us compare
the
The
resulting
reorganization of the world political structure that would allow a new
hegemonic core power ─ not the
Soviet Union but perhaps
The apparently
shortening period of world-system cycles may reveal imminent changes in the
dynamics of the system which could alter the above scenario.
Since the late nineteenth century the system as a whole has begun to experience
certain natural and social "ceiling effects." Previously the contradictory aspects of the logic of
capitalist development have led to conjunctural reorganizations of the
political structure of the system through intracore war. This is what has pushed the decline of old
hegemonic powers and the rise of new ones able to operate on scales more
appropriate to the expanded size and intensified nature of the system. These reorganizations have allowed the
capitalist accumulation process to begin again on a new basis, that is, to
adapt to the problems created by its contradictory nature, and to continue
expansion and intensification. In the
twentieth century the ceiling effects have resulted in much deeper structural
problems for the system than previously (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979). The inclusion of virtually all global territory and population into the capitalist
world-economy in the late nine- teenth century eliminated the possibility of
expansion to previously unintegrated areas.
And the formal decolonization of the periphery, even though it has not
eliminated (or even reduced) the hierarchical core/periphery division of labor,
has increased the costs of exploiting the periphery. This reduces the amount of surplus value from
the periphery available for resolving class conflicts within core countries.
How do these
ceiling effects create a situation which is different from the one faced by the
Dutch or the British in similarly late phases of their hegemonies? One difference is a consequence of the
increased density of political
regulation of the capital accumulation process across the system. While most of this regulation is nationally
controlled, and thus is more an increase in state capitalism than a change in
the logic of the competitive accumulation process (Chase-Dunn, ed., 1982b),
there are incipient forms of supranational economic regulation, and this
provides a greater chance than ever before for the hegemonic core state to
engineer a political solution to the
trend toward increasingly bloody confrontation.
Ulrich Pfister and Christian Suter (1987), in their excellent study of
recurrent international financial
crises, argue that the ability of the contemporary world debt structure to
prevent (or postpone) collapse is due to the increased level of international
coordination among banks provided by such institutions as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The
process of world state formation may be unlikely to realize an effective
monopoly of legitimate violence in the next 40 years, but this outcome has a
greater probability of occurrence than ever before. The hegemonic core state, and especially that
sector of its ruling-class with the greatest dispersion of investments across
the globe, has the greatest interest in maintaining both the present order and
the global peace (Goldfrank, 1977).
From the point of
view of this cycle of core competition, where is the
matured in the
1945-70 period of the Pax Americana.
Economic hegemony began to
decline from about 1950 on. In 1950 the
Albert Bergesen
and Chintamani Sahoo (1985) show that the dominant position of US-based firms
has declined relative to the position of European and Japanese firms in various
world industries since the 1950s.
Financial centrality did not begin to slip until 1971, although signs of
unrest due to balance of payments deficits were visible earlier, as were
pressures to engage in trade protection (Block, 1977).
Examining trends
in their network measure of the structure of world trade of commodities at
different levels of processing, Smith and White (1986) show that the core is
becoming increasingly multicentric (less hierarchical) between 1965 and
1980. This finding supports the notion
that the decline of
The defeat in
Thus the golden
age of
It would seem
probable that the
Two trends may
portend a reorganization of US politics.
The
Cross-cutting
sectional differences are being evened out by the development of the sunbelt, a trend which
undercuts the domination of the South by "Dixiecrats." This makes the South more similar to the
North, and may reduce the regional cross-cutting which has been an important reason
that the major parties have resisted organization along class lines. Another factor may also increase the salience
of class interests in US politics ─ the trend toward a "shrinking
middle class" discovered in the income
distribution statistics since 1978 (Rose, 1986:table 5).
These trends may
well change the vocabulary of US politics toward serious consideration of
working-class interests and issues of democratic control of the economy, and in
this regard the
The Marxist theory of proletarianization is a theory about the
trajectory of changes in class structures in capitalism as such, not in
national units of capitalism. In a
period of rapid internationalization
of capital, therefore, national statistics are likely to give a distorted image
of transformations of capitalist class structures. If these arguments are correct, then one
would expect that changes in the class structure of world capitalism would be
unevenly distributed globally. In particular, there should be at least some
tendency for managerial class locations to expand more rapidly in the core
capitalist countries and proletarian
positions to expand more rapidly in the
This continued shift
toward a more core-like class structure may work against the other trends noted
above with regard to possible changes in US politics. While the decline of hegemony and the
increasingly unequal distribution of income may stimulate some polarization along
class lines and alter the focus of politics, it is unlikely that the
Conflicting class
interests over international economic policy will continue to make it difficult for the
The tendency for
core states to solidify relations with particular peripheral areas may undercut the tendency,
observed since World War II, for violent conflicts among core powers to be
fought out in the periphery. The export
of violent confrontation to the less powerful areas of the globe has been the
rule during the period of the Pax Americana.
But in a period of multicentricity, wars that break out in the periphery
may more easily become world wars.
Measuring the
Hegemonic Sequence
Most of the
studies of the hegemonic sequence have been of the type carried out above, a
narrative which tends to confirm the theoretical views of the narrator. The classic example is The Precarious
Balance by Ludwig Dehio (1962), a diplomatic history of the clashes among
the great powers of
There have,
however, been a few studies which have attempted to measure the sequence of concentration and dispersion
of power among core states. These have
been carried out primarily by political scientists studying the inter-
national system,
and they have employed very different ideas about what constitutes hegemonic
power, as reviewed above.
It would be
important, given that there are very different theoretical claims made by
students of the hegemonic sequence, to compare different measures, to study the timing and the
magnitude of hegemonic rise and decline, and to discover the causal
interactions between economic and political-military types of power. It should be noted here that only one of the
existing studies (Thompson, 1986) has employed a measure which could be
understood as even a rough proxy for the Wallersteinian notion of hegemony (see
below). It is, of course, difficult to
measure comparative advantages in core
production and the ability to penetrate foreign markets, especially if
we want to quantitatively compare our measures over long periods of time. I will
contend, however, that certain measures of national economic development are
good proxies for the idea of comparative advantage in core production.
After all, GNP per capita is highly correlated with national labor
productivity (GNP per worker), especially when we compare a large number of countries. Other measures known to cross- national
researchers to be highly correlated with GNP per capita may also serve fairly
well as estimates of comparative advantage in capital-intensive
production. It is well known that the
distribution of the national product across economic sectors ─ especially
the percentage of the total product in agriculture ─ is highly negatively
correlated with other measures of economic development in cross-national comparisons with large numbers
of countries, as is the percentage of the work force in agriculture.
I will contend
that these measures of economic development can serve as rough proxies for
relative core status in the Wallersteinian sense, at least until we can find
the resources to unearth data more directly related to the notion of
comparative advantage in core production.
Some results of the analysis of the distribution of economic development
measures among core countries for the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries are presented below.
But first let me
report what other researchers have found.
George Modelski and William R.
Thompson (Modelski and Thompson, 1988) have completed a monumental coding
project which estimates the amount of
naval power controlled by each of the great powers of
Because Modelski
and Thompson are focusing on naval power and not land-based armies, their list
of hegemons and the timing of hegemonic cycles comes out being fairly similar
to the sequence posed by Wallerstein.
They are focusing on the highest level of global control, which is the
arena of ships of the line, capital ships, and later, aircraft carriers. The reason that the
Modelski/Thompson
list of hegemons is similar to that of Wallerstein is that naval power and
global reach are especially important forms of control in a capitalist
world-economy in which international markets and core/periphery trade are
important in the determination of who wins and who loses.
There are,
however, some important differences between the "long cycle" and the
Wallersteinian narrative of hegemons.
Modelski (1978) claims that
century and a
second in the nineteenth century, following the Napoleonic Wars. Several smaller European states, which became
"developed" core countries in the nineteenth century, never make it
to the list of great powers.
The
Modelski/Thompson approach is similar in some respects to the
"transition" theory of Organski and Kugler (1980). They argue that important core wars occur
when a rising dissatisfied great power challenges the international regime
(from which it has been largely excluded) by making war against a declining or
stagnating formerly most-powerful state.
Organski and Kugler do not formulate a world-system level hegemonic
sequence, but they do see uneven rates of economic growth as the main cause of
changes in the relative power among core states. As mentioned above, they operationalize this by measuring total GNP.
I have always
thought of hegemony (in the sense of comparative advantage in core production)
as exhibiting a wave-like pattern in which
troughs are periods of relatively equal distribution of comparative
advantage among core powers and peaks are the golden age of a hegemon's economic
and military power. This picture is
typified, following Eric Hobsbawm's (1968) Industry and Empire, by the
rise of British productive advantage during the late eighteenth-century
industrial revolution, consolidated after the victory over
The picture
painted by Modelski and Thompson is very different. For them the peak of the cycle is right after
a core war in which the new victorious
global power is at the zenith of its naval advantage over contenders. Slow deterioration begins right away (in 1815
in the above example) and core war breaks out again when a new power is able to
imagine defeating the old hegemon.
Modelski and Thompson note that the military challenger never wins, but that the conflict
results in a reorganized international power structure, usually centered on a
country which was allied with the former
hegemon.
Thompson's
(1983a) analysis of his own data leads, however, to a modification of the
above hypothesized transition model. He
notes that the pattern of an increasingly powerful naval challenger is not
regularly revealed in his analysis of the relative power of core states,
although there is a tendency for the advantage of the hegemon to
deteriorate. He posits, instead, a
"two-step transition model" in which a secondary core power tries to
expand regionally through land based military adventures, and this regional war
becomes a global war when the old hegemon and another allied core power
perceive the regional challenge as a global challenge.9 As Thompson puts it:
It is most unclear, moreover, whether the primary challengers
realize, at the outset, the full extent to
which their regional activities will be viewed as threatening by either the 'reigning' world
power or its
eventual successor. How
else are we to account for the repeated surprise with which the primary
challengers confront the intervention of English, British and American
military forces? How else are we to
explain, especially in the twentieth century, war breaking out before the primary challengers have achieved
the capability base that they themselves
have projected as necessary for global competition? (Thompson, 1983a:112)
Before commenting
more on the Thompson/Modelski project I will describe another study of the
concentration of power among core states, that by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey
(1979). This is one of the studies which
devises what Thompson (1983b) calls an "omnibus" measure of power
concentration which combines six separate indicators. The indicators used are:
"demographic"
─ the number of people living in cities having population sizes larger
than 20,000; and the nation's total population;
"industrial"
─ total energy consumption; and total iron or steel
production; and
"military"
─ military expenditures and the number of persons in the armed forces
(Singer, 1979:273).
It should be
noted here that none of the variables used in the composite measure is an
indicator of the level of development.
They all combine aspects of a
nation's size with its level of development.
Thus simply being a large country can give a high score on any of the
indicators.
The resulting
scores were used to calculate a measure of the relative concentration or
dispersion of power among the "great powers." This was done by summing the values of each
indicator for all the nations thought to compose the circle of great powers,
and then calculating the percentage of that sum held by each country, and then
averaging the percentages across the six indicators to determine an individual
country's final score. These country
scores were then used to calculate a statistic invented by Ray and Singer
(1973) to estimate the concentration of power in an international system. The resulting concentration scores are
presented for five-year time points from 1820 to 1976 (Singer et al.,
1979:277).
Thompson (1983b)
uses the same concentration formula (the Ray─Singer index) to compare his
data on naval power with the Singer (et al., 1979) measure. He calls the Singer measure the C.O.W.
measure after the Correlates of War Project, a usage I shall adopt. Figure 9.1 is taken from Thompson (1983b:152)
and shows the relationship between the concentration index as calculated using
Thompson's naval data and the C.O.W. indicator from 1816 to 1960. Inspection of this graph reveals that the
concentration indices go way up during periods of core war. Thompson's
index drops dramatically following the Napoleonic War, contrary to the
notion of a slow deterioration, and both measures seem to rise slowly,
"mounding" rather than peaking during the nineteenth century before
they zoom up during World Wars I and II.
(Figure 9.1 about
here)
Although the
above raises questions about the pattern of concentration hypothesized by
Modelski and Thompson it does not really tell us much about the Wallersteinian version of hegemony. This is because none of the indicators used
in the above studies examines the distribution of development among the core
powers. A paper by Kugler and Organski
(1986) presents data showing the relative distribution of total GNP across
the circle of "great powers"
from 1870 to 1980. Kugler and Organski
utilize part of the C.O.W. methodology, summing the total GNP for all the
countries and then calculating each
country's percentage of the total. They
use the results of this table to dispute the contentions of many authors who
have written about hegemony. They show,
for example, that
The problem with
this "economic" measure is that it confounds size with development.
By this same measure
(Table 9.1 about
here)
Table 9.1, being
a transformed version of the Kugler and Organski table, contains some countries
which were not core countries in 1870, such
as
Table 9.1 also
indicates that, in terms of GNP per capita, British predominance peaked in the 1890s. This is well after the slowdown of British
growth studied by Crouzet (1982: chapter 12) which ostensibly began in the
1870s. Crouzet (1982:377) shows that
British growth rates between 1870 and 1913 in total output, output per head and
output per man-hour were lower than in Germany, Sweden, and the US, and even
France increased its output per head and output per man-hour slightly faster
than Britain in this period. But the
British growth rates are not significantly different than the average figures
for ten European countries during this period.
The depression of the 1870s was hard on all the countries, and it may be
that the British relative decline did not gain real momentum until the 1890s.
Another rough
proxy for the development of core production is provided by the figures on the
distribution of product across economic sectors (Mitchell, 1975). Table 9.2 contains information on
(Table 9.2 about
here)
As we can see,
the
In 1860 we have
data for
formation
immediately. The
manufacturing
production, and also by Thompson's (1986) study of the concentration of lead industries (see
below). On the other hand Maddison
(1982:table C5) indicates that fifty percent of the
I have examined
the relative concentration of several specific types of economic production and
other indicators (Chase-Dunn, 1976).
Several of these indicators were presented by Eric Hobsbawm in Industry
and Empire 1968: diagrams 23-25c).
Hobsbawm calculated his figures in terms
of ratios, the percentage of various things such as world trade,
industrial output, coal production, pig iron production, steel production and
cotton comsumption which occurred in, or were attributable to,
When we examine
the same distributions utilizing difference scores we indeed find peaks during the nineteenth
century, or more usually "mounds."
The British advantage over the sum of French, German and US quantities
generally rises to some point between 1870 and 1890 and then declines. For example, installed railway line per
kilometer of land area peaks around 1870.
Crude steel output peaks in 1890.
Raw cotton consumption peaks twice, once in 1880 and again in 1890. Pig iron production peaks in about 1880. Coal
output peaks in about 1885.
National income per capita peaks between 1890 and 1900, but then rises
again between 1910 and 1913. Foreign
trade doesn't really peak in the nineteenth century but rather rises and
continues to rise, as Hobsbawm (1968:diagram 26) shows, until about 1930. Similarly, steam engine power peaks in 1880
and then rises even higher after 1890.
Two things can be
inferred from the above. The
generalization about an overall peaking
of British hegemony in the 1870s must be considered a sort of average. When we look at particular sectors or
particular types of production the peaks
come at different times. And in some
respects the British hegemony continued on into the twentieth century. This was
especially true in terms of British centrality in international
trade. The
A study which
focuses on leading industries as the measure of economic advantage in the
hegemonic sequence has been presented by Thompson (1986). He uses Rostow's (1978) description of
leading sectors in national development to construct a list and periodization
of leading sectors in the development of the world economy (Thompson,
1986:table 3). He then computes national
proportions for several great powers beginning in 1790 for each of the lead
industries, and then averages the proportions across industries for each core
country to produce a measure of the concentration/dispersion of core
production in lead industries (Thompson, 1986:table 5). Thompson's results produce a rise and decline
for both the
Thompson's
measure of leading sector concentration is undoubtedly the best effort so far
to operationalize the rise and fall of economic competitive advantage in the
hegemonic sequence. And, like most good
empirical studies,
it produces some
surprises. Contrary to the description
found in Hobsbawm (1968) and suggested by my analysis above, Thompson's measure
shows the British hegemony peaking earlier, between 1810 and 1830, and his
measure also indicates that the
figure 6).