1
Conceptualizing Core/Periphery
Hierarchies
for Comparative Study
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D.
Hall
The
objectives of this chapter are to clarify
basic
concepts for the comparative study of
world-systems
and to explicate general propo-
sitions
about the nature and role of
core/periphery
hierarchies in historical
social
change. It is now widely accepted that
contemporary
social change within national
societies
is importantly conditioned by the
linkages
and structural aspects of a global
stratified
intersocietal network composed of
"developed"
national societies in core re-
gions,
"less developed" peripheral nations,
and
intermediate semiperipheral countries.
Both
historical analysis and formal (quantita-
tive)
crossnational research have demonstrated
this
(Wallerstein, 1974; Meyer and Hannan,
1979;
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). But
in
order to understand the basic structural
features
and system logic of the contemporary
global
socio-economic system it is desirable
to be
able to compare it with intersocietal
networks
which are structurally different.
And in
order to know how system logic changes
(and thus
to have insights about how the
contemporary
system logic might be transformed
in the
future) it is desirable to study how
the
logics of world-systems have become
transformed
in the past. Archaeologists and
historians
have begun to consider the rele-
vance
of core/periphery hierarchies for the
evolution
of earlier, smaller regional socio-
economic
systems, but few of these recent
studies
are explicitly comparative, and confu-
sion
about basic concepts undermines the value
of even
the implicit comparisons which have
been
made.
We propose to clarify concepts for compara-
tive
study and to put forth several hypotheses
about
core/periphery hierarchies. Concept
formation
involves both deduction and induc-
tion. Since existing concepts about
core/periphery
hierarchies have been developed
primarily
from studies of the modern world-
system,
they need to be modified for compara-
tive
use in a study of earlier and very dif-
ferent
intersocietal hierarchies. It is
important
to avoid the mistake of simply
imposing
vocabularies developed to explain the
modern
system on earlier systems in ways which
distort
analysis. Our goal is to formulate
concepts
and propositions in a way which
allows
us to understand both similarities and
differences
among core/periphery hierarchies
in
stateless, state-based and capitalist
world-systems.
This investigation is relevant for macroso-
ciological
theories of social change, histori-
cal
development, and evolution. It has
become
rather
well-accepted that the development of
both
modern and ancient societies has been
importantly
conditioned by the existence of
larger
intersocietal networks of exchange and
interaction
(e.g., Mann, 1986). There are
important
controversies over how to conceptu-
alize
and bound these larger systems. The
strongest
world-system position claims that
there
is usually an explicit boundedness to
the
larger intersocietal network, and that it
is this
larger unit which displays system
logic
and the dynamic processes which affect
the
historical development of societies. In
other
words it is world-systems which develop,
not
societies, and these are distinctly bound-
ed
units. A looser version simply
acknowledg-
es the
importance of intersocietal interac-
tions
but does not assume that a particular
larger
unit is the determinant unit which
develops
or evolves. One of the main goals of
future
comparative research should be the
evaluation
of the fruitfulness of various
formulations
regarding the conceptualization
and
bounding of world-systems and their gener-
al
effects on societal development.
What
Are World-Systems?
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) defines a
world-system
as an entity with a single divi-
sion of
labor and multiple cultures, and
within
this category there are two sub-types:
world-empires
in which the intersocietal
division
of labor is encompassed by a single
overarching
imperial polity, and world-econo-
mies in
which the political system is composed
of many
states competing with one another
within
an interstate system. Wallerstein
excludes
the analysis of stateless societies
by
characterizing them as "mini-systems" in
which,
allegedly, production of basic subsis-
tence
goods is accomplished within a single
cultural
entity. The intent of Wallerstein's
definition
is to encompass those processes
which
are substantially important for the
reproduction
and historical development of
social
structures.
Our definition of world-systems has the
same
intent, but it is somewhat more general
in
order to facilitate the comparison of very
different
intersocietal networks. We define
world-systems
as intersocietal networks in
which the
interaction (trade, warfare, inter-
marriage,
etc.) is an important condition of
the
reproduction of the internal structures of
the
composite units and importantly affects
changes
which occur in these local structures.
One of the most important structural fea-
tures
of the contemporary global intersocietal
system
is the stratified set of relations of
dominance
and dependence between the "devel-
oped"
and "developing" countries.
The study
of the
mechanisms which reproduce internation-
al
inequalities is a burgeoning field in
cross-national
comparative research (see
review
in Chase-Dunn, 1989: Chapter 11). The
concepts
of core, periphery and semiperiphery
have
been developed in studies of the modern
world-system. Some scholars have begun the
task of
studying intersocietal hierarchies in
earlier
world-systems, but the conceptualiza-
tions
being used are often confused and con-
fusing. What is needed is an explicit effort
to
formulate competing notions of coreness and
peripherality
with an eye to a comparative
study
of intersocietal inequalities. It is
certain
that there have been intersocietal
hierarchies
in the past which operated in ways
very
different from that of the contemporary
global
relationship between "developed" and
"developing"
countries.
In the following we have taken a variation-
maximizing
approach to the study of intersoci-
etal
inequalities in order to explore both the
general
similarities and the important diver-
gences
among different sorts of world-systems.
We have
been stimulated to search for differ-
ences
by the very provocative general argu-
ments
made by Ekholm (1980) and Ekholm and
Friedman
(1982). They argue that all state-
based
world-systems can be characterized as
operating
according to a logic of "capital
imperialism"
in which core regions accumulate
resources
by exploiting peripheral regions.
They
also contend that conflicts within and
between
core societies are the primary factors
which
account for the demise of old cores and
the
rise of new ones. These general argu-
ments,
which are said to apply to both ancient
world-systems
and the modern world-system,
require
evaluation by means of systematic
comparison
of different world-systems. We
have
developed the hypotheses outlined below
in
order to elaborate possible differences,
but we
are also quite interested in the extent
to
which state-based and capitalist intersoci-
etal
systems share certain general features.
It should not be assumed, however, that all
intersocietal
systems have core/periphery
hierarchies. We can certainly imagine hypo-
thetical
world-systems without intersocietal
inequalities
or exploitation. Indeed, most
orthodox
theories of modern international
trade
assume equal exchange. The existence of
exploitation,
domination or equal exchange
should
not be a matter of assumption, but
rather
of investigation. We suspect that some
stateless
intersocietal systems did not have
core/periphery
hierarchies, while others had
only
mild and episodic ones. In order to
understand
the conditions which generate
intersocietal
inequalities it is necessary to
examine
cases in which they are absent.
In what follows we will outline our concep-
tualizations
of world-system boundaries,
core/periphery
hierarchies and a qualitative
typology
of very different intersocietal
systems. Then we will propose several hypoth-
eses
regarding the presence, nature and func-
tioning
of core/periphery hierarchies in
different
types of world-systems.
World-System
Boundaries
In
order to study world-systems comparatively
we must
conceptualize the spatial boundaries
of such
systems in a way which allows very
different
kinds of intersocietal networks to
be
compared to the modern global political
economy. It is commonplace that everything in
the
universe is in some way connected or
related
to everything else. But if we are in
the
business of formulating and testing scien-
tific
theories of human historical develop-
ment,
it is desirable to concentrate on those
types
of interconnection which are most impor-
tant to
the reproduction and transformation of
political
and socio-economic structures.
Lenski
and Lenski (1987: 51) refer to a single
"world
system of societies" as existing "thro-
ughout
history." The number and sizes of
world-systems
are, of course, a function of
the way
in which we define the connections
which
count. As Lenski and Lenski (1987) say:
Throughout history, human societies have
established and maintained relations
with one another.... During much of the
past direct ties were limited to neigh-
boring societies, since direct relations
with
distant societies were not possi-
ble.
But, even then, indirect relations
existed.
Society A maintained ties with
Society B, which in turn, maintained
ties with Society C, and so on through-
out the system. No society was ever
totally cut off from the world system of
societies for long, since even the most
isolated societies had occasional con-
tacts with others. With advances in
transportation and communication during
the last five thousand years, relations
between societies have increased greatly
and direct relations have been estab-
lished between societies far removed
from one another. As a result, the world
system of societies has grown more inte-
grated and more complex, and has come to
exercise a greater influence on the life
of individual societies (1987: 51).
By almost any definition there has been a
global
world-system since the end of the
nineteenth
century. Despite what the Lenskis
say,
before that there were human intersoci-
etal
networks which were substantially sepa-
rate
and autonomous with regard to their
material
and cultural processes of reproduc-
tion
and development. If we use trade,
infor-
mation
flows, political authority, or military
competition
to define intersocietal system
boundaries,
the human population of the Earth
has,
over the last ten thousand years, gone
from a
situation in which there were thousands
of
small, substantially separate regional
intersocietal
networks to the single global
network
of today.
There are a number of problems which are
encountered
in all network analyses which need
clarification
if we want to bound world-sys-
tems
theoretically and empirically. Differen-
tial
interaction densities, nested structures,
direct
and indirect connections, hierarchical
versus
decentralized networks, levels of
hierarchy,
multicentric hierarchies in which
the
centers are either directly connected or
only
indirectly connected through shared
peripheries
-- these are all possible problems
in
conceptualizing and empirically bounding
intersocietal
networks. And, in addition to
these
complexities, the type of connection and
the
institutional nature of interactions are
important. Thus, even if we decide to focus
on
material exchanges, it is important to know
what is
being exchanged, and the institutional
nature
of the exchange (gift, tribute, commod-
ity
trade, etc.).
Before designating an eclectic approach to
world-system
boundaries we will review the
proposals
of other scholars. The shift of the
unit of
analysis from societies to world-
systems
encourages us to consider interconnec-
tions
rather than uniformities as the impor-
tant features
of boundedness. Scholars who
have
debated the best ways to bound "civiliza-
tions"
(e.g., Melko and Scott, 1987) have
divided
into those "culturalists" who stress
the
homogeneity of central values as defining
civilizational
boundaries, and those other
"structuralists"
who use criteria of intercon-
nection
rather than homogeneity. Within the
group
of interconnectionists there are several
possibilities. Information flows have been
used by
some archaeologists (e.g., Renfrew,
1977;
Schortman and Urban, 1987) to bound
regional
systems. Most scholars, however,
employ
either political/military or trade-
based
interconnections.
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) uses two
different
criteria when he bounds world-sys-
tems: 1. mode of production and, 2. trade in
bulk
goods. Mode of production is the
struct-
uralist
Marxist terminology for the system
logic
of social structural reproduction,
competition
and cooperation. Thus capitalist,
tributary,
socialist, and kin-based modes of
production
are understood to be qualitatively
different
system logics. Wallerstein defines
capitalism
as a feature of the modern world-
system
as a whole. By this theoretical maneu-
ver he
incorporates peripheral capitalism into
the
capitalist mode of production, a decided
advance
over those who see the periphery of
the
modern world-system as exhibiting precapi-
talist
modes of production. An unfortunate
corollary
of this "totality assumption" is
that
each world-system can have only one mode
of
production, and thus it is not possible for
different
modes to be articulated within a
single
world-system. Hence, according to
Wallerstein
(1989, Chapter 3), the Ottoman
Empire
was a separate system from the European
world-system
until it had been entirely perip-
heralized
by the European powers in the nine-
teenth
century, because capitalism was not the
dominant
mode of production in the Ottoman
Empire. This requires defining the obviously
important
economic and political/military
interactions
between the Ottomans and the
European
powers over several centuries as
epiphenomenal.
The other criterion used by Wallerstein is
the
network of exchange of basic goods --
everyday
raw materials and foodstuffs. He
argues
that networks of the production, dis-
tribution
and consumption of these basic goods
unite
people across societal boundaries and
create
the systemic unity of a world-system.
In the
modern world-system (the "capitalist
world-economy")
these forward and backward
linkages
are called "commodity chains," but
Wallerstein's
usage suggests that non-commodi-
fied
exchange of material basic goods may also
be
understood as constituting the interconnec-
tions
of world-systems in which commodified
trade
is nonexistent or little developed.
Chase-Dunn (1989: Chapters 1, 16) has
argued
that Wallerstein's totality assumption
is a
theoretical mistake which makes the
empirical
bounding of world-systems in space
nearly
impossible. This is because we do not
have
clear conceptualizations of how modes of
production
are related to the spatial distri-
bution
of human activities. Chase-Dunn also
argues
that the totality assumption makes the
study
of the ways in which modes of production
become
dominant within world-systems, and are
transformed
into qualitatively different
system
logics, nearly impossible. If, by
definition,
each world-system has only one
mode of
production, how can we describe and
study
instances in which different logics are
contending
with one another within a world-
system? It is much preferable to define
world-system
boundaries in terms of empirical-
ly
ascertainable types of network interconnec-
tions
and then to tackle the difficult ques-
tion of
modes of production and their trans-
formation
after this bounding has been done.
Wallerstein's
second criterion (bulk goods
exchange)
is more easily operationalized and
we will
propose its use together with other
types
of interconnection.
Wallerstein differentiates between basic
goods
and "preciosities" which are luxury
goods
with a high ratio of value to weight.
He
argues that preciosities are not important
to the
reproduction or transformation of
social
structures, but only to the rather
epiphenomenal
aspects of elite life. This
argument
allows him to focus on the Europe-
centered
system, and to treat India and China
(long
linked to Europe by the long distance
trade
in prestige goods) as "external arenas."
But
Jane Schneider (Chapter 2 below) convin-
cingly
argues that, as most anthropologists
have
long known, the exchange of prestige
goods
is not epiphenomenal at all. Prestige
goods
are often very important to the repro-
duction
of local power structures as elites
use
them to reward subalterns and to symbolize
power. Imported bullion is used to sustain
the
army of the king and to pay mercenaries,
and is
thus important to maintaining and
changing
state structures.
On this basis Schneider argues that there
was a
larger precapitalist Eurasian world-
system
long before the emergence of an impor-
tant
core region in Europe. Janet Abu-Lugho-
d's
(1989) book on the importance of thir-
teenth
century interactions between Europe and
the
older core areas of the Near East, India
and
China adds valuable support to Schneider's
contentions.
Other authors have argued that prestige
goods
economies are not only important to the
reproduction
of power in some world-systems
(e.g.,
Blanton and Feinman, 1984), but that
the
process of state-formation in peripheral
areas
is often facilitated when one lineage
monopolizes
the import of core preciosities
(Webb,
1975). Friedman and Rowlands (1977)
and
Friedman (1982) have argued that prestige
goods
economies are important in the processes
of the
rise and fall of chiefdoms and the
emergence
of primary states. Even though bulk
goods
networks typically have much smaller
spatial
boundaries than networks of prestige
good
exchange, a comparative study of world-
systems
needs to examine both of these types
of
material exchange.
Fernand Braudel (l984), like Wallerstein,
developed
his terminology in order to make
sense
of the Europe-centered world-system.
Thus he
considers commodity exchange and
"economic"
trade to be the most important type
of
interconnection. He also thinks that
hegemony
is best defined in terms of economic
domination,
which is arguably the case for the
modern
world-system, but is certainly debate-
able
for earlier world-systems. In world-
systems
in which the tributary modes of pro-
duction
have been dominant, socially struc-
tured
inequalities, including those between an
imperial
core and dominated peripheral re-
gions,
were based more completely on politi-
cal/military
power. Braudel (1984: 27) de-
fined
the boundaries of world-systems in terms
of the
scope of economic hegemony of a single
city-state. Thus he described world-systems
centered
on Venice, Malacca, Genoa, Antwerp,
etc. Defining a network in terms of a single
center
precludes the possibility of multicen-
tric
networks. It is like treating the Brit-
ish
Empire as a separate system from the
French
Empire. The reality is that these were
colonial
empires within a larger multicentric
intersocietal
system. Many, if not most,
ancient
world-systems were also multicentric
in the
sense that either the core areas were
constituted
as an interstate system of several
autonomous
states, or there were a few large
empires
interacting with one another. The
thirteenth
century Eurasian world-system
studied
by Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) had three
separate
core areas linked directly by long
distance
prestige goods trade and indirectly
by
interactions with shared peripheral re-
gions. The notion of multicentricity should
not
preclude us from studying the differential
extent
of centralization within intersocietal
systems,
but defining these systems in terms
of
single centers is certainly a mistake.
Two other explicit suggestions for bounding
world-systems
have been made, both of which
focus
on political/military interaction rather
than
trade. Charles Tilly (1984: 62) has
suggested
the following "rule of thumb for
connectedness":
the actions of powerholders in one re-
gion of a network rapidly (say within a
year) and visibly (say in changes actu-
ally reported by nearby observers) af-
fect the welfare of at least a signifi-
cant minority (say a tenth) of the popu-
lation in another region of the netork.
Tilly's definition focuses on intentional
political
authority which is popularly per-
ceived. It addresses the problems of tempo-
ral and
spatial cutting points which any
network
approach must confront, and which also
needs
to be clarified in the trade-based
definitions
if they are to be operationalized.
Not
addressed are problems of multicentricity
and
indirect connections. Are two spatially
distant
kingdoms contending for domination in
an
intermediate region part of the same system
or are
they separate systems?
Another approach is that taken by David
Wilkinson
(1987). Wilkinson bounds
"civiliza-
tions/world-systems"
by the criterion of
interaction
through conflict, especially
military
competition. Thus two empires that
regularly
engage each other in military con-
frontations
are part of the same system. By
this
definition Wilkinson creates a spatio-
temporal
map which depicts the incorporation
of
fourteen "civilizations" into what he calls
"Central
Civilization" (Wilkinson, 1987: 32).
Citing
Simmel and Coser, Wilkinson writes:
Conflict always integrates in a mildly
significant way, in that the transaction
of conflicting always creates a new
social entity, the conflict itself. But
durable conflict also integrates more
significantly, by creating a new social
entity that contains the conflict but is
not reducible to it, within which the
conflict must be seen as occurring,
which is often of a larger scale and
longer-lived than the conflict that
constituted it. It is therefore legiti-
mate, and it is indeed necessary, to
posit the existence of a social system,
a single social whole, even where we can
find no evidence of that whole existence
other than the protracted, recurrent or
habitual fighting of a pair of belliger-
ents.
Such continuing relations, howev-
er hostile, between groups however dif-
ferent,necessarily indicates that both
are (were or have become) parts of some
larger group or system. (Wilkinson,
1987: 34; emphasis in the original.)
Because he focuses only on state-based
urbanized
"civilizations" Wilkinson excludes
from
consideration those intersocietal net-
works
in which there are no states, but his
criterion
could also be used to bound them.
For
example, Raymond Kelly (1985) has studied
the
ways in which habitual raiding between
Nuer
and Dinka pastoralists reproduced their
kin-based
social structures in a fascinating
instance
of "tribal imperialism." A
compara-
tive
study of core/periphery hierarchies
should
include consideration of systems in
which
there are no states or classes.
Another approach to defining intersocietal
linkages
has been formulated by Schortman and
Urban
(1987). Their review of the development
of
theoretical perspectives in archaeology
provides
valuable insights into the contribu-
tions
of diffusionism, studies of accultura-
tion,
ecological/evolutionism and world-system
approaches
to intersocietal interactions.
They
also review and evaluate the literature
of the
last two decades on the archaeological
study
of trade. Their own theoretical formu-
lation
of the problem of intersocietal linkag-
es
focuses on the concept of information,
which
is defined broadly as "energy, materi-
als,
social institutions, and ideas" (Schort-
man and
Urban, 1987: 68). They point out that
the
economic aspects of trade are only part of
intersocietal
interaction, and they emphasize
ideological
diffusion and, especially, "inter-
societal
ethnic links" (marriages) among
elites
involved in prestige goods economies.
The
relevance of prestige goods economies has
already
been discussed above, and Schortman
and
Urban are undoubtedly correct to emphasize
the
importance of the symbolic and cultural
aspects
of trade for some intersocietal sys-
tems. On the other hand, they completely
ignore
the systemic aspects of military compe-
tition
emphasized by Wilkinson.
The problem of world-system boundaries
necessarily
interacts with the question of the
theoretical
conceptualization of
core/periphery
hierarchies because it is
necessary
to distinguish between peripheral
areas
which are part of a system and regions
which
are external. The next section will
address
this problem. Here we want to propose
an
eclectic approach to the definition of
world-system
boundaries.
We propose to combine some of the approach-
es
discussed above. It would be
presumptuous
to
argue that certain forms of interaction are
always
causally more important for social
change,
especially when we want to study
world-systems
with very different sorts of
social
institutions and developmental logics.
It is
probable that the most important types
of
network linkages vary across different
kinds
of systems, but distinctions of that
kind
should be the outcome of research rather
than
the starting point.
We propose to study both economic and
political
forms of interaction as features of
world-system
networks. All material exchanges
will be
considered, although the patterns of
different
kinds of trade good networks will
undoubtedly
produce very different networks.
It will
undoubtedly be necessary to consider
how
localized networks of basic goods exchange
are
linked into larger networks of prestige
goods
exchange.
We will also utilize the criterion of
political-military
conflict inter-
action
proposed by Wilkinson. Again, this will
undoubtedly
produce networks with different
boundaries,
but it is best to use a broad and
eclectic
approach rather than to exclude
elements
a priori. Simplifications are desir-
able,
but should be made on a basis informed
by
empirical research.
The
Subunit Problem
Another problem which affects the conceptu-
alization
and bounding of world-systems for
comparative
study can be called the subunit
problem. What are the subunits of which
world-systems
are composed? When we use the
term
"intersocietal systems" this presumes
that
the subunits are "societies," but much
recent
analysis has stressed the difficulties
of
bounding societies even within the modern
world-system
composed primarily of nation-
states
(e.g., Tilly, 1984). Within the modern
world-system
there are a few multinational
states,
several states which govern only
portions
of societies, many transnational
actors,
and societal elements operating at the
international
or even at the global level.
These
problems are multiplied when we try to
compare
world-systems of very different sizes
and
kinds, especially "precapitalist" systems.
Wolf
(1982) cautions that group boundaries are
inherently
fuzzy and permeable. It is impor-
tant to
pay attention to the differing ways in
which
subunit boundaries are formed and "tran-
ssocietal"
interactions are constituted across
different
types of world-systems.
Urban and Schortman (1987) provide an
intelligent
discussion of the subunit problem,
and
they propose a solution which works fairly
well
for some world-systems but not nearly as
well
for others. They define the subunits as
a
"spatially delimited body of individuals
living
within and adapting to a specific
physical
environment" (1987: 63). This type
of
subunit, influenced by the ecologi-
cal/evolutionary
framework, works well for
some
smaller simpler systems, but it ignores
important
larger subunits, such as states and
empires,
which combine several types of eco-
logical
niches within their boundaries. The
way out
of this problem is simply to recognize
that
the sizes and types of organizations
which
interact within regional world-systems
vary,
and larger systems have increasingly
nested
and overlapping levels of organization.
In the
simplest intergroup systems, households
are
politically organized at the village or
intervillage
level, and there are no larger
overarching
political organizations. House-
holds
and villages are important subunits in
all
world-systems, large and small. One
important
difference between smaller regional
world-systems
and larger, more complex world-
systems
is the size of polities and the range
of
direct economic, military and cultural
interactions. It is not necessary to define a
single
type of subunit which is common to all
world-systems,
but rather to pay attention to
the
types and levels of organization within
each
whole world-system.
The search for bounded world-systems also
must
address the problem of direct and indi-
rect
links. Lenski and Lenski (1987) are
correct
in saying that all human groups inter-
act
fairly regularly and in important ways
with
immediately neighboring groups. This
means
that almost all groups are indirectly
connected
to all other groups. Only impas-
sable
physical barriers produce separate
networks
if we allow very indirect connections
to
count. This still produces a rather
large
number
of substantially separate world-systems
before
the advent of regularized oceanic
transportation. But it would seem advisable
to
utilize the criterion of the consequences
of
events and actions to further restrict what
we
consider to be significant indirect connec-
tions. Thus, even though each precontact
California
tribelet is connected to its neigh-
boring
tribelets, and therefore indirect
connections
extend North, East and South to
include
the whole of the Americas, there is a
rather
rapid fall-off in the impact that any
event
will have.
What this means is that, when we are con-
sidering
down-the-line interactions in which
a group
interacts primarily with its immediate
neighbors,
with few long distance direct
interactions,
we will not find world-system
boundaries
in the sense of lower density
interactions except insofar as these are
created
by natural barriers to interaction.
For
these cases it makes sense to choose a
group
or a connected set of groups as the
focus
of analysis and to use this "group-
centric"
focus to determine the boundaries of
the
relevant interactional network. For
example,
we can focus on the Pomo and study
their
world-system in the sense of the rele-
vant
intergroup interactions. We could just
as
easily focus on a different group, and then
the
"bounds" of the world-system would shift.
This
kind of "group-centric" approach is
unfortunate
in some ways because it would be
more
desirable to allow the bounds of the
analysis
to be determined by world-system
wholes
rather than by focal societies.
For the case of down-the-line types of
interaction
this seems the only solution.
Once
longer distance direct interactions
become
important and world-systems networks
develop
hierarchical and centric patterns,
these
reduce the difficulty encountered here,
but do
not eliminate it. What are we to say
about
the world-system of a village that is on
the
periphery of two core regions which are
not
directly connected to one another? We
do
not
want to have as many world-systems as
there
are possible focal societies, and yet it
is
empirically the case that each group's
insertion
into one (or more) world-systems is
different. The answer is to use whole world-
systems
as the unit of analysis in all cases
in
which this is possible because of longer
distance
direct interactions and patterns of
centralization. In many cases in which inter-
action
is almost completely down-the-line, we
will
need to employ the group-centric ap-
proach,
though our choice of which group with
which
to start may be somewhat arbitrary.
This, in turn, raises another problem: the
boundaries
and limits of group identities.
Wolf
(1982: 6) claims that, "by endowing
nations,
societies, or cultures with the
qualities
of internally homogeneous and exter-
nally
distinctive and bounded objects, we
create
a model of the world as a global pool
hall in
which the entities spin off each other
like so
many hard and round billiard balls."
Rather,
groups are often internally diversi-
fied,
boundaries are permeable, and member-
ships
fluid. This is especially true of band
and
horticultural societies. It is
important
in
discussions of ethnicity to not assume that
ethnic
phenomena are invariant over time and
space,
but vary with context. The linkages
between
the variable nature of ethnic identi-
ties and
the core/periphery hierarchy context
remain
problematic.
The operationalization of the multi-crite-
ria
approach to world-system boundaries will,
of
course, encounter different problems in
different
contexts. Archaeological evidence
can be
used for some kinds of trade networks,
although
perishable goods such as food tend to
leave
only indirect traces in the archaeologi-
cal
record. Evidence of authority relations
and
sustained military interaction is substan-
tially
more dependent on written records,
although
some archaeological evidence, such
as the
building of defensive walls and the
concentration
of previously dispersed settle-
ments
into larger defensible towns, is also
relevant. Ethnographic evidence will certain-
ly be
used, especially for nonliterate societ-
ies,
but ethnographic evidence from stateless
societies
long influenced by interaction with
state-based
and market-integrated societies is
often a
contaminated source for inferences
about
original stateless world-systems.
Core/Periphery
Relations
Considerable
controversy still exists about
the
best way to conceptualize coreness and
peripherality
in the modern global political
economy
(e.g., Arrighi and Drangel, 1986;
Chase-Dunn,
1989: Chapter 10). This debate
has
proceeded primarily with the modern global
system
as its context. The issues are some-
what
different when we consider the compara-
tive
study of core/periphery hierarchies
across
different kinds of world-systems. Here
we need
a more general conceptualization which
can
accommodate greater variation, and we need
to
allow for the possibility that some world-
systems
do not have core/periphery hierar-
chies.
Applying the notion of a core/periphery
hierarchy
to other than the modern world-
system
is itself somewhat controversial. The
esteemed
economic historian Paul Bairoch
(1986)
has argued that premodern core/peri-
phery
relations are relatively unimportant
because
there were not, he claims, significant
differences
in the level of living between the
populations
of core and peripheral areas, at
least
compared to the large gap which emerged
during
the industrialization of the European
core. Most historians of the ancient empires
would
disagree with the statement that
core/periphery
relations were unimportant, but
differential
degrees of internal stratifica-
tion
between core and peripheral societies may
indeed
turn out to be an important difference
between
the modern world-system and earlier
world-systems. While in the modern world-
system
there is typically less income inequal-
ity
among households in core societies than in
peripheral
societies, this relationship was
undoubtedly
the reverse in many of the ancient
world-systems
in which the core was an urban-
ized
and class-stratified society while the
periphery
contained less stratified groups of
pastoralists
and horticulturalists. The
examination
of such patterns and consideration
of their
role in processes of social change is
one of
the most interesting aspects of the
comparative
study of world-systems.
We will define two types of core/periphery
relationships
for the purposes of comparative
study. The first will be called
core/periphery
differentiation, in which
societies
at different levels of complexity
and
population density are in interaction with
each
other within the same world-system as
defined
above.
The second type is core/periphery hierar-
chy,
which will be understood to mean the
existence
of political, economic or ideologi-
cal
domination between different societies
within
the same world-system. This includes
political
domination, extraction of resources
through
raiding, taxation, tribute, and un-
equal
economic exchange. We are also inter-
ested
in cultural definitions of superiori-
ty/inferiority
and how these may interact with
more
objective forms of exploitation and
domination. These ideological aspects will
not, however,
be employed in our definition of
core/periphery
hierarchy.
We designate two types of core/periphery
relations
-- differentiation and hierarchy --
because
we think it is mistaken to assume that
all
relations among "more developed" and "less
developed"
societies involve exploitation and
the
processes of the development of underde-
velopment
which are often found in the modern
world-system. We need not assume that the
"more
developed" society always exploits the
"less
developed." Indeed there may be
cases
of the
reverse, and cases in which domination
exists
between societies at virtually the same
level
of complexity and population density.
Thus we
seek to analyze how differences in
societal
size, complexity, technological
productivity
and internal stratification are
related
to intersocietal domination. The
nature,
longevity and consequences for social
change
in both core and peripheral societies
of
various kinds of intersocietal relations
are the
findings which comparative study is
intended
to produce. Variations in the degree
to
which core/periphery relations cause the
"development
of underdevelopment" and the
factors
which account for such differences are
considered
below in the section on hypotheses.
We have intentionally left out any consid-
eration
of the nature of what is produced and
traded
between cores and peripheries. The
notion
that coreness and peripherality in the
modern
world-system is essentially constituted
around
a division of labor in which the core
produces
manufactured goods and the periphery
produces
raw materials is itself quite contro-
versial
(Chase-Dunn, 1989: Chapter 10) and it
is
known that important reversals of this
relationship
sometimes occurred within ancient
world-systems
(e.g., Lamberg-Karlovsky, 1975;
Kohl,
1987b). Nevertheless such differences
may be
important foci of comparative investi-
gation. This can best be pursued by not
building
these distinctions into our defini-
tion of
core/periphery relations. Rather we
need to
investigate in each case the linkages
between
intersocietal differentiation and
core/periphery
domination.
The intersection between the problem of
world-system
boundaries and core/periphery
hierarchy
mentioned above is especially sa-
lient
at the edge of the periphery. Wallerst-
ein
(1989: Chapter 3) argues that, for the
modern
world-system, even though an area has
been
plundered by a core power, it is not yet
incorporated
and peripheralized until local
production
has become integrally linked into
the
"commodity chains" of the larger world-
system. It has been often observed that
plunder
preceded the development of coerced
production
in both the ancient empires and the
Europe-centered
world-system. Indeed there
may
have been systems, such as the Nuer-Dinka
case
mentioned above, in which plunder was the
sole
form of core/periphery interaction. It
is
better to consider the dynamics of such
cases
rather than defining them out of court
at the
beginning, and indeed this may provide
important
insights into the institutional
requirements
of more stable core/periphery
structures. Thus we intend to use Wilkinson's
definition,
which includes regularized plunder
as a
form of linkage defining the boundaries
of a
world-system. By this definition West
Africa
was incorporated into the Europe-cen-
tered
world-system when slave raiding became
regularized,
rather than, as Wallerstein would
have
it, after the development of colonial
agriculture
in Africa. Economic exploitation
is a
more stable form of exploitation than
plunder
because it does not decimate the
peripheral
society to the same extent that
plunder
does. It is not the case, however,
that
precapitalist cores only extracted trib-
ute and
left production processes untouched.
The
Inkas completely reorganized production in
incorporated
territories and relocated popula-
tions
to new regions in which intensified
horticulture
could be carried out. A general
definition
should accommodate various forms of
exploitation
and examine their consequences
for
social change in both the core and the
periphery.
Hall's (1989: Chapter 2) reconceptualizat-
ion of
the incorporation process for the
modern
world-system expands the outer bound-
aries
of the system to include military alli-
ances
and "buffer zone" groups in the "contact
periphery."
This corresponds to Wilkinson's
definition
of regularized political/military
interaction,
and will be very helpful for
understanding
frontier relations in precapita-
list
world-systems (e.g., Dyson, 1985).
Clear conceptualization of core/periphery
relations
allows us to be more specific about
the
meaning of the semiperiphery concept.
As
with
coreness and peripherality, the defini-
tion of
the semiperiphery remains controver-
sial
even within the modern world-system (see
Chase-Dunn,
1989: Chapter 10). At this point
we
advocate that the semiperiphery concept be
defined
broadly to encompass all of the fol-
lowing
meanings:
1. A
semiperipheral region may be one which
mixes
both core and peripheral forms
of
organization.
2. A
semiperipheral region may be spatially
located
between core and peripheral
regions.
3.
Mediating activities between core and
peripheral
areas may be carried out in
semiperipheral
regions.
4. A
semiperipheral area may be one in which
institutional
features are in some ways
intermediate
between those forms found in core
and periphery.
Sorting out these different types of semip-
eripheries
remains an empirical as well as
theoretical
problem. Until more detailed
comparisons
among different kinds of world-
systems
are completed, it would be premature
to
define the semiperiphery concept more
narrowly.
A
Typology of World-Systems
In
order to achieve maximum variation in the
nature
of world-systems we have developed a
preliminary
typology based on distinctions
found
in the literature on social evolution
and
historical development (see review by
Moseley
and Wallerstein, 1978). These catego-
ries
are not conceived as fixed boxes into
which a
complex set of intersocietal networks
must be
stuffed, but rather as a set of gener-
al
signposts for the task of maximizing varia-
tion
across the diversity of human societies.
The central theoretical distinction we will
use in
studying system logic is the neo-Marx-
ian
notion of mode of production as it has
been
elaborated in the works of Eric Wolf
(1982)
and Samir Amin (1980). These scholars
outline
three major types of societal logic by
which
social labor is mobilized and resources
are
distributed: the kin-based mode of produc-
tion;
the tributary (state-based) mode, and
the
capitalist mode. Building on the work
of
Marx,
and adding insights generated by Karl
Polanyi's
(1977) theoretical approach, these
authors
define kin-based relations as norma-
tive
regulation based on consensual defini-
tions
of what exists and what is good. No
societies
are exclusively structured around
this
kind of social control, but in some
societies,
those without classes or states or
markets,
kin-based mechanisms of control and
distribution
are the dominant sources of
social
cohesion.
The tributary modes of production involve
the use
of physical coercion to mobilize
labor. A ruling class establishes control
over
some essential social resource and then
uses
this control to extract "surplus product"
from
direct producers. There are many
differ-
ent
institutional forms by which this is
accomplished. Most historical societies in
which
this form of integration is dominant mix
a
variety of these forms (taxation, tribute,
serfdom,
slavery, etc.) and also include
elements
of both kin-based and market forms of
integration. However, these latter are usual-
ly
incorporated in ways which reinforce the
fundamentally
coercive state-based logic of
the
tributary mode.
The capitalist mode of production is based
on the
commodity form, the mediation of human
interaction
by price-setting markets, and
market-like
institutions. The commodification
of
goods, land, wealth and labor are never
complete
within capitalist systems, but mar-
kets
play a much greater role than in systems
dominated
by other modes. Aspects of other
modes
continue to be found, but they generally
are
complementary with the reproduction of
commodified
relations. Thus we want to dis-
tinguish
between world-systems in which kin-
based,
state-based and capitalist modes of
production
are dominant.
By utilizing these distinctions, we are in
no way
endorsing a unilinear model of evolu-
tion. We argue that historical development is
open-ended
and that important bifurcations and
discontinuities
of development, rapid trans-
formations,
and instances of devolution are
normal
characteristics of the historical
processes
of social change (See Sanderson,
Chapter
5 below). We wish to evaluate the
idea
that world-systems, rather than societ-
ies,
are the relevant units of analysis for
understanding
these processes, but this does
not
lead us to ignore the processes which
operate
within societies.
In order to study the processes and pat-
terns
by which modes of production become
transformed,
we make use of rough set of
world-system
types based on social structural
distinctions. We seek to understand how
core/periphery
hierarchies may play a role in
the
reproduction or transformation of modes of
production,
and so we need to distinguish
between
types of world-systems in which both
core/periphery
relations and modes of produc-
tion
vary. We will propose a rough set of
categories
which will allow us to search for
the
relevant variation. This approach is
not
a
replacement for the study of long sequences
of
historical change in particular regions,
but is
rather only a preliminary step for
mapping
out the major empirical distinctions
between
types of core/periphery relations.
We propose the following list of world-
system
types. The typology indicates the
level
of structural complexity characteristic
of the
most complex societies within each
whole
world-system:
I.
Kin-based mode dominant
A. Stateless, classless
1. Semisedentary foragers,
horticultural-
ists,
pastoralists
2. Big man systems
B. Chiefdoms (classes but not true states)
II. Tributary modes dominant (true states,
cities)
A. Primary state-based world-systems (Lower
Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Indus Valley,
Ganges
Valley, China, Mexico, Peru)
B. Primary empires in which a number of
previously
autonomous states have been
unified
by conquest (Akkad, Old Kingdom Egypt,
Magahda, Chou, Teotihuacan, Huari)
C. Multicentered world-systems composed
of
empires, states, and
peripheral
regions
(Near East, India, China, Mesoamerica,
Peru)
D. Commercializing state-based world-sys-
tems in
which important aspects of commod-
ification
have developed but the system is
still
dominated by the logic of the tributary
modes
(Near East, Indian Ocean, China)
III.
Capitalist mode dominant
A. the Europe-centered subsystem since the
sixteenth
century
B. the global modern world-system
Under heading I above (kin-based mode
dominant)
are included all those world-systems
in
which none of the societies can be said to
have
true states. A true state is defined
following
Johnson and Earle (1987: 246) as
existing
when a regionally organized society
has
specialized regional institutions --
military
and bureaucratic -- which perform the
tasks
of control and management. This is
distinguished
from "complex chiefdoms" in the
degree
to which specialized state organiza-
tions
have developed. Complex chiefdoms,
which
are also large and stratified polities,
rely on
generalized institutions for regional
coordination
and control. Chiefdoms are
distinguished
from less stratified stateless
societies
by the size of the polity, popula-
tion
density, intensification of production,
and,
obviously, the degree of internal strati-
fication. In true chiefdoms, the chief has
institutionalized
access to substantial social
resources
to back up his power which are
largely
autonomous from the control of other
lineage
heads. In classless societies, in-
equalities
of power, prestige and wealth are
based
almost entirely on age and gender crite-
ria,
while class formation involves the in-
creasing
control over basic societal resources
(land,
trade, etc.) by a noble class. Such a
class
can appropriate surplus product based on
the
labor of direct producers.
The smallest autonomous polities are nomad-
ic
foraging bands. We choose to begin our
analysis
of world-systems with those more
sedentary
foragers who live most of the year
in
hamlets. These largely sedentary groups
define
communal territorial boundaries and
engage
in regularized intergroup relations
which
can be analyzed as composing a small
world-system
of interdependent interaction.
As
population density per land area increases,
foraging
strategies become more diversified
and
intensification of production occurs
(horticulture,
pastoralism). Big man systems
emerge
where there are pressures to increase
coordination
among groups, but these are not
sufficient
to sustain a more stable leadership
hierarchy.
The problem of the causal relationship
between
primary state formation and class
formation
has been the focus of a vociferous
debate
among anthropologists (e.g., Service,
1975;
Carneiro, 1970). Most of the work done
on this
problem has not explicitly taken
account
of the fact the these processes oc-
curred
within the context of core/periphery
relations. Exceptions to this are the work of
Friedman
and Rowlands (1977) and Gailey and
Patterson
(1987, 1988).
Within category II (tributary modes domi-
nant)
there are a number of distinctions which
need to
be explained. Primary or pristine
states
are those which develop without contact
with
existing states. States developing in
interaction
with existing states are termed
secondary. The same distinction can, of
course,
be applied to empires, and we do so in
category
IIB. We argue that most primary
state-based
world-systems were politically
structured
as interstate systems of competing
city-states
within a core region. Secondary
multicentric
empires are distinguished from
primary
empires by the prior existence of
empires
and often by the larger size of the
constituent
empires. The commercializing
world-systems
are distinguished from most
earlier
systems by their size, and by the
increasing
commodification of goods, land,
wealth
and labor. The use of money spread to
the
day-to-day lives of common people with the
development
of smaller standardized denomina-
tions
of coins, and forms of credit and inter-
est
became more developed. Wage labor and
other
semi-commodified forms of labor became
more
common. Price-setting markets and com-
modity
production for sale became more wide-
spread
within the political economy. Within
empires,
rulers became somewhat more sophisti-
cated
about the way in which they taxed mer-
chants
and commodity producers so as not to
kill
the golden goose; and outside the bounds
of
empires, in interstitial semiperipheral
regions,
autonomous city-states controlled by
merchant
and production capitalists created
and
sustained market relations between empires
and
peripheral regions.
The degree of commodification increased,
but
unevenly and not in the same way in each
area. There were spurts ahead and then either
devolution
to subsistence feudalism or reas-
sertion
of imperial control of the economy.
The
coming to dominance of capitalism in a
core
region was a tipping point which occurred
first
in Europe, and then spread with the
assistance
of the expanding European hegemony.
We do not want the above categories to
generate
a lot of dispute about which cases go
into
which categories. Obviously there are
many
borderline cases for which it is diffi-
cult to
decide. A different approach would be
to
analyze very long historical sequences
which
include the transformations of the
social
structural characteristics which we are
using
to distinguish among categories. This
would
eliminate the problem of "transitional"
cases,
and would focus attention on those
major
transformations which ought to be the
main
focus if we are ultimately trying to
understand
how fundamental changes could occur
in our
own time. But we suggest that it makes
sense
to first focus on the larger patterns of
association
among different kinds of
core/periphery
hierarchies and structural
features
of societies within world-systems.
After
these matters are mapped out, we can pay
more
attention to the causal nature of pro-
cesses
of reproduction and transformation.
Hypotheses
In this
section we describe our preliminary
formulation
of theoretical hypotheses about
variation
in core/periphery hierarchies based
on our
interpretation of several different
literatures: all the recent studies which
have
explicitly discussed the application of
world-system
concepts to precapitalist sys-
tems;
the literature on imperialism and
frontiers
in the ancient world; the archaeolo-
gy of
diffusion, trade and warfare; and ethno-
graphic
studies of intersocietal relations.
Elsewhere
Chase-Dunn (1989: Chapters 10 ,11)
has
reviewed the theoretical and empirical
studies
on the nature and causes of reproduc-
tion of
the modern core/periphery hierarchy.
The most general questions for a compara-
tive
study of core/periphery relations are:
1. Do
all world-systems have stable
core/periphery
hierarchies?
2. Do
the stability, magnitude and nature of
intersocietal
inequalities vary systemical-
ly with
the types of societies which compose
world-systems? What is the relationship
between
core/periphery differentiation and
core/periphery domination?
3. What
are the relationships between the
dynamics
of core/periphery relations and
the
reproduction/transformation of social
structures, institutions and basic system
logics?
Here we
discuss these broad questions and
formulate
positive
hypotheses
from them.
First, the generalizations we make apply to
whole
world-systems, and thus, whole systems
need to
be studied to test them. It is known
that
there is usually considerable variation
across
peripheral regions within each world-
system. This is important and needs to be
taken
into account. In studies of particular
world-systems,
differences between regions in
the
nature of core/periphery relations are an
important
consideration (e.g., Dyson, 1985).
But for
the general discussion of cross-system
comparisons,
we will be talking about "aver-
age"
or typical core/periphery relations
within
each system.
Obviously intersocietal networks in which
the
constituent societies are all at about the
same
level of complexity do not have
core/periphery
differentiation as defined
above. But of more interest is the matter of
core/periphery
hierarchies. Do all world-
systems
have stable core/periphery hierarchies
in the
sense that some societies exploit or
dominate
others? This involves consideration
of the
nature, degree, and longevity of inter-
societal
exploitation and domination. In
addition
it is desirable to consider differen-
tial
rates of development, "co-evolution," the
development
of underdevelopment, and processes
effecting
these. Also of interest will be the
relative
size of core, peripheral and semiper-
ipheral
areas, and the nature of relations
among
core societies and among peripheral
societies.
Our first hypothesis is that stable rela-
tions
of intersocietal domination are diffi-
cult to
create and reproduce in the absence of
hierarchical
social institutions within the
societies
involved. The development of inter-
nal
stratification and forms of the state are
quite
important in the stabilization and
reproduction
of core/periphery exploitation.
Thus we
predict that kin-based intersocietal
systems
will have only minimal and short-lived
core/periphery
hierarchies, and that the least
hierarchical
of human societies, those of
chiefless
foragers, will not have any regular-
ized
intersocietal domination or exploitation.
We expect that intersocietal exploitation
among
most semi-sedentary foraging groups is
limited
to episodic raiding and competition
over
favorable natural sites. War captive
slavery
to be found among some of the more
hierarchical
hunter-gatherers (e.g., the
Yurok)
and some pastoralists (e.g., the Nuer)
is
likely to be of a relatively mild kind
because
slaves must be incorporated into
existing
kinship networks in order to mobilize
their
labor, and kinship networks usually
bestow
rights as well as obligations.
An intermediate case between unstratified
and
chiefdom-based world-systems is that of
the
Nuer-Dinka relationships studied by Kelly
(1985). The Nuer lacked strong and permanent
chiefs,
but they did have three levels of
hierarchy
among villages which enabled them to
form
larger war bands than the neighboring
Dinka,
who were similar pastoralists, but had
only
two levels of intratribal hierarchy.
Thus
the Nuer systematically raided the Dinka
for
cattle and women, and expanded into Dinka
territory
over a 150 year period. Though the
Nuer
were clearly exploiting the Dinka by
appropriating
cattle and women, the limited
forms
of hierarchy within the Nuer society
prevented
this relationship from stabilizing
into a
core/periphery hierarchy based on
exploitation
of coerced labor in the periph-
ery. The Dinka women taken as captives were
rapidly
assimilated into Nuer kinship struc-
tures.
Kristiansen (1987) has studied local and
regional
hierarchical relations among state-
less
peoples in Scandinavia. Though he uses
the
terms core and periphery to describe these
relations,
he characterizes them as based on
the
"ritual superiority" of local centers over
hinterlands
based on the control of prestige
goods. Friedman and Rowlands (1977) have
argued
that core/periphery structures based on
prestige
goods economies are unstable and
subject
to rapid spread effects because of
the
ideological nature of the stratification
which
is not backed up by military coercion or
more
stringent dependencies on fundamental
goods.
Our second hypothesis is that the stability
and
exploitativeness of core/periphery hierar-
chies
increases with the degree of stratifica-
tion
within core societies and with the devel-
opment
of certain "technologies of power,"
(Mann,
1986) which enable centralized empires
to
extract taxes and tribute from peripheral
regions.
We hypothesize that the very first
"pris-
tine"
states will be found to be more success-
ful at
extracting resources from peripheral
areas
than kin-based cores, but still not as
successful
as later, more centralized, em-
pires. Also the "co-evolutionary" spread
effects
of development (Schortman and Urban,
1987;
Renfrew and Cherry, 1986) by which new
centers
emerge as a result of interaction with
the
original core areas, will be relatively
strong
compared to "underdeveloping" effects
because
the techniques for concentrating and
sustaining
resources in the core are less
developed
than in later empires.
Thus we are further predicting that
core/periphery
hierarchies will be relatively
more
stable, more hierarchical, and more
underdevelopmental
for peripheral regions once
centralized
empires have emerged. The decen-
tralizing
phase of the process of the rise and
fall of
empire-centers will reverse this trend
somewhat,
as increased local autonomy for
controllers
of land slows the concentration of
resources
in the center.
The growth of market forms of exchange,
monetary
systems, local and long-distance
market
trade, etc. will again increase the
"spread"
effects relative to the "backwash"
effects. More sophisticated empires, in which
the
state-based mode of production remains
dominant,
learn to extract surplus from market
trade
without smothering it. In these in-
stances
central empires which provide pacifi-
cation
and guarantee trade routes will streng-
then
spread effects. Commercialized states
also
learn to control the disruptive aspects
of
market relations and to deal effectively
with
potentially threatening peripheries.
The emerging dominance of capitalism in the
Europe-centered
sub-system produced a
core/periphery
hierarchy in which backwash
effects
strongly outweighed spread effects and
the gap
between core and periphery rapidly
increased. However, technological change is
much
faster and greater in both core and
periphery
in the modern world-system because
of the
historically unique effects of capital-
ism on
incentives for revolutionizing technol-
ogy. The gap produced is thus a relative one
in
which peripheral areas do develop, but at
much
slower rates than the core.
Regarding the matter of core/periphery
relations
and transformations of the mode of
production,
Chase-Dunn (1989) has argued that
capitalism
as a system logic is buffered from
its own
developmental contradictions by the
existence
of a necessary and reproduced
core/periphery
hierarchy. This implies that
peripheral
capitalism and core exploitation of
the
periphery should be understood as a neces-
sary
and constitutive part of the capitalist
mode of
production. The modern core/periphery
hierarchy
acts to sustain the multicentric
structure
of the core (the interstate system,
which
is arguably necessary for capitalism)
and to
disorganize those political forces
within
core states that would try to transform
capitalism
into socialism. This last is
accomplished
by sustaining national class
alliances
between core labor and core capital,
cemented
by intracore rivalry and peripheral
exploitation.
Ancient core/periphery hierarchies, we
suggest
research will show, were often central
to the
reproduction of centralized state
apparati. Keith Hopkins (1978) contends that
the
Roman empire was a system which, like
capitalism,
needed to expand in order to
survive. But, unlike the capitalist world-
economy,
its expansion was based on conquest,
the
importation of booty and slaves, and the
distribution
of land and dependent laborers to
a
growing class of non-producers. When
the
empire
reached a zero rate of return in terms
of
spatial expansion it was no longer able to
provide
the resources necessary to sustain its
growing
overhead costs. It then began to turn
in upon
itself, and eventually it crumbled.
Hopkins's
model, which is similar to the
analysis
of Anderson (1974), sees the "barbar-
ian
invasions" as exogenous shocks which
conjuncturally
dismembered a state which was
already
falling of its own contradictions.
But
though Rome fell, the state-based mode of
production
and the "Central Civilization"
(Wilkinson,
1987; see also Chapter 4) of which
Rome
was but a part, did not.
In other cases, such as China, the mode of
production
was "tributary" in the sense that
coercive
power was used to mobilize labor and
accumulation,
but this accumulation was pri-
marily
accomplished without exploitation of
peripheral
regions. In many of these cases
the
periphery did importantly affect the core
by
threatening border regions or by occasion-
ally
conquering the core (e.g Barfield, 1989;
Hall,
Chapter 7 below). Whether as a source
of
exploitable resources or military threats,
peripheral
regions were often important to the
reproduction
and transformation of social
structures
within cores.
Many semiperipheral regions have also
played
important roles in large scale social
change. We hypothesize that this is because
of the
peculiar combination of forces and the
organizational
opportunities of groups who are
"in
the middle" of core/periphery hierarchies.
Semiperipheral
regions, we argue, are unusual-
ly
fertile zones for social innovation because
they
can combine peripheral and core elements
in new
ways, and they are less constrained by
core
domination than are peripheral areas, and
less
committed than older core regions to all
the
institutional baggage which comes along
with
core status. Of course the particular
techniques
used by upwardly mobile semiperiph-
eries
vary depending on the nature of the
world-system
in which they are operating.
Four
types of semiperipheral development are
described
in Chase-Dunn (1988):
1.
conquest by semiperipheral marcher states;
2.
extensive and intensive commodification by
semiperipheral
capitalist city- states;
3. the
emerging global domination of the
Europe-centered
sub-system, which we argue
was
semiperipheral in the larger Afroeurasian
world- system; and
4. the
rise and fall of hegemonic core states
within
the Europe-centered
world-system.
A combination of Gerschenkron's (1962) idea
of the
"advantages of backwardness," Trotsky's
(1932)
"laws of combined and uneven develop-
ment"
and Service's (1971) "adaptation and
adaptivity"
can be used to formulate general
and
specific propositions about semiperipheral
development
(see Chase-Dunn, 1988).
Measurement
Problems
Even
though it will undoubtedly be necessary
to
operationalize the concepts of world-system
boundaries
and core/periphery relations dif-
ferently
for different cases, especially since
we have
intentionally chosen to pursue a
most-different
systems strategy, the goal of
testing
more general propositions requires us
to
think about the possibilities of operation-
alizing
concepts in ways that are helpful for
formal
comparisons across cases. Comparable
measures
will be especially important for
future
studies which seek to compare large
numbers
of world-systems using the methods of
formal
comparative research.
The problem of comparable measures of
system
boundaries is important because the way
in
which cases are bounded could influence the
outcome
of comparisons among cases. The only
way to
be sure that one has employed an ade-
quate
definition of system boundaries is to
compare
the results of comparative analyses
using
competing definitions.
It may be found that it is necessary to use
different
empirical criteria for bounding
world-systems
depending on the type of system
being
analyzed. Though this would be somewhat
messy,
it would not make the analytic compari-
son of
very different world-systems impossi-
ble. For the present we propose to use the
multidimensional
eclectic conceptualization of
boundedness
we have described above with
attention
to the consequences of bounding
according
to the different criteria.
Testing the hypotheses about the operation
of
core/periphery hierarchies requires, ideal-
ly,
that we be able to determine comparatively
degrees
of intersocietal exploitation and of
the
stability of core/periphery hierarchies.
It
would also be desirable to be able to
compare
rates of intersocietal mobility, and
the
relative balance of "spread" consequences
and
"backwash" consequences for differential
rates
of "development" between cores and
peripheries. These operational problems have
not yet
been resolved even for the contem-
porary
global world-system. Nevertheless, we
want to
clearly designate the desiderata of a
more
generally comparative research project so
that
exploratory case studies can be undertak-
en with
these purposes in mind.
The problems of measuring differences in
the
magnitude of inequalities across social
systems
are well-known. When the kinds of
resources
which are socially valued differ and
the
dimensions of inequality are structured in
completely
different ways, statements about
relative
degrees of overall inequality are
problematic. This is just as true of interso-
cietal
inequalities as of intrasocietal ones.
Though
it is often possible to rank objects
within
a system, such rank orderings do not
help
with the question of the magnitude of
inequalities. For this, interval or ratio
scale
measurement is required.
Nevertheless, rough estimations of differ-
ential
magnitudes of intrasocietal inequali-
ties
have been convincingly made by Lenski
(1966)
across very different societal types
(e.g.,
hunter-gatherer, horticultural, agrari-
an and
industrial). We propose to make analo-
gous
"guesstimates" of degrees of inequality
across
very different core/periphery hierar-
chies.
The problem of indicators of core/periphery
inequality
has been considered by some archae-
ologists. Often it is simply assumed that ar-
chaeological
indicators of core/periphery
differentiation
can be taken as evidence of
core/periphery
hierarchy. For example, the
existence
of a settlement system in which
villages
and towns are of substantially un-
equal
population sizes may be interpreted as
indicating
hierarchical interaction between
large
and small settlements (e.g., Nissen,
1988). But, as many archaeologists have
themselves
recognized, differentiation can
exist
without domination (e.g., Renfrew and
Cherry,
1986). All exchange is not unequal
exchange.
Looking for more direct archaeological
evidence
for core/periphery domination is
challenging. Lamberg-Karlovsky (1975) has
argued
that the village of Tepe Yahya on the
Iranian
plateau (where carved soapstone bowls
were manufactured
and exported to the Sumerian
cities)
must have been subjected to unequal
exchange
because burials did not become richer
at Tepe
Yahya over the long period during
which
trade occurred. This case contrasts
with
many others in which involvement in
regional
exchange networks did lead to in-
creased
local stratification as indicated by
the
emergence of richer burials (e.g., Marfoe,
1987).
Such observations might be used to differ-
entiate
between non-exploitative and exploit-
ative
intersocietal interactions, and to study
the
trajectory of interactions within particu-
lar
world-systems. This usage of mortuary
evidence,
may, however, encounter grave prob-
lems. Wealthier native Californians were
cremated,
while the remains of poorer villag-
ers
were buried. In this case the
appearance
of more
elaborate burials could mean less
rather
than greater local stratification. And
of
course there are other causes of changes in
burial
practices besides the nature of inter-
societal
interaction.
Though archaeologists have made amazing
strides
in the use of recoverable results to
develop
indicators of the spatial structure
and the
social form of exchange (see review by
Schortman
and Urban, 1987: 49-55), archaeolog-
ical
evidence alone is often quite problematic
for the
kind of inferences we want to make.
This is
why it is important to study cases for
which
archaeological data can be combined with
historical
documentary or ethnographic evi-
dence.
Conclusions
We have
proposed a set of definitions and
hypotheses
which allow the world-systems
perspective
to be extended from its current
focus
on the Europe-centered system to a
consideration
of very different sorts of
intersocietal
networks. In doing this we
propose
to use the primary analyses of ar-
chaeologists,
historians and anthropologists
as raw
materials for constructing a world-
system
theory of very long-term social change.
The
comparative strategy we propose will allow
us a
new purchase on the study of system
transformation
which may be of use for under-
standing
and transforming our own global
political
economy.
By defining world-systems and
core/periphery
hierarchies generally we hope
to be
able to sort out the important similari-
ties
and differences which ought to be the
explicit
backdrop for understanding future
human
possibilities. Everything is not differ-
ent
now, and neither is everything the same.
In
order to know which things are importantly
different
and which things are importantly the
same,
it will be helpful to have a systematic
theoretical
framework for comparing world-
systems. This approach does not require that
we
belittle those who are studying contempo-
rary
processes of political, economic and
social
change. Ultimately the very long run
comparisons
will need to be combined with more
immediate
studies in order to produce politi-
cally
useful insights.
The next order of business is a series of
exploratory
case studies which explicitly
address
the problems of concept formation and
comparable
measurement which we have raised.
Ultimately
we think that it would be desirable
to be
able to compare rather large numbers of
world-systems
in order to have greater certi-
tude
regarding the hypotheses we have proposed
about
core/periphery hierarchies. But we also
recognize
that the strategy of comparison
across
world-systems needs to be supplemented
with
studies of single world-systems over very
long
periods of time. This other strategy is
explicit
in the approach taken in Gills and
Frank
(Chapter 3) and Wilkinson (Chapter 4) in
this
volume. We see comparisons over time as
complementary
to comparisons over space, and
we have
made every effort to see that the
conceptualizations
employed in both approaches
find
common ground.
NOTES