6
Prehistoric
Chiefdoms on the American Midcontin-
ent:
A World-System Based on Prestige Goods
Peter Peregrine
Cultural
evolution in the eastern United
States
reached its pinnacle with the emergence
of
Mississippian societies in the major river
valleys
of the Midwest and Southeast around
A.D.
900 (Smith, 1978:480). Mississippian
societies
were differentiated from their
predecessors
because of their reliance on
maize
horticulture for subsistence, the con-
centration
of population at major riverine
centers,
often palisaded and containing large,
flat-topped
mounds, and the presence of an
elite
social strata (Steponaitis, 1986:387-
93). Indeed, Mississippian societies repre-
sent
the first true chiefdoms in eastern North
America
(Peebles and Kus, 1977).
Some of these Mississippian chiefdoms grew
to
enormous proportions. It is estimated
that
Cahokia
and its environs, the largest of the
Mississippian
centers, was inhabited by at
least
10,000 people at the height of its
occupation
(circa A.D. 1150), and perhaps by
as many
as 40,000 people (Fowler, 1974:25; cf.
Milner,
1990). At least 100 mounds were
constructed
at Cahokia; the largest, Monks
Mound,
is estimated to contain over 600,000
cubic
meters of earth, and is the largest
prehistoric
structure north of Mexico (Fowler,
1974:6). Other Mississippian centers were
built
on a smaller scale, but still demon-
strate
the political power Mississippian
chiefs
must have possessed in order to procure
the
labor necessary to build mounds and pali-
sades,
and to keep order within these large
communities
(Reed, 1973; also see DePratter,
1983:162-170).
I suggest that Mississippian societies
operated
in the framework of a type of precap-
italist
world-system that I call a "prestige-
good
system," and that the extraordinary
political
power of Mississippian chiefs de-
rived
largely from their control over the
manufacture
and trade of prestige-goods (Pere-
grine,
1990). The concept of prestige-good
systems
is not new, and is indeed based large-
ly upon
the ideas of Claude Meillassoux (par-
ticularly
1978). But viewing prestige-good
systems
as world-systems is a rather different
concept,
as I will discuss in a moment.
Prestige-good
systems themselves have been
well
documented in the ethnographic litera-
ture,
and can be described in some detail
(Ekholm,
1972; Frankenstein and Rowlands,
1978;
Friedman, 1982; Friedman and Rowlands,
1977;
Peregrine, 1990; Welch, 1986).
Prestige-Good
Systems
Political
power in prestige-good systems is
based
upon the control of objects needed by
members
of the society to pay social debts
such as
bridewealth, initiation and funerary
fees,
punitive fines, and the like (Peregrine,
1990:16). Because political leaders in pres-
tige-good
systems control these goods, they
are
able to control individuals' abilities to
pay
social debts, and in turn, to socially
reproduce
themselves. This is the most funda-
mental
aspect of prestige-good systems: those
with
power control the abilities of others to
socially
reproduce by controlling the means of
social
reproduction -- prestige-goods.
Prestige-good systems appear to evolve out
of
lineage-based societies in situations where
lineage
elders are unable to control the means
of
production (Peregrine, 1990:116-19). An
alternate
strategy for these elders to gain
political
power is to foster the use of lin-
eage
symbols they control in ceremonies of
social
reproduction. In this way, they come
to
control the means of social reproduction
(Meillassoux,
1978:138-39; also see Brumfiel
and
Earle, 1987:3).
Friedman (1982:184) suggests that all
prestige-good
systems share four elements in
common:
(a) generalized exchange; (b) monopoly
over prestige-good imports that are
necessary for marriage and other crucial
payments, i.e., for the social reproduc-
tion of local kin groups; (c) bilineal
tendency in the kinship structure (asym-
metrical); and (d) tendency to asymmet-
rical political dualism: religious-po-
litical chiefs, original peoplenew--
comers, etc.
Friedman's
notions about prestige-good systems
are,
however, based largely upon theoretical
conceptions
of how these types of societies
may
have operated prehistorically (developed
by
Friedman and Rowlands [1977]), and only
marginally
on the way extant systems operate.
Certainly
the first two elements are present
in all
prestige-good systems -- they are
defining
elements. The other two may be
present
in some systems, but not in all; and
Friedman
leaves out some elements, most impor-
tantly
the reproduction of the smallest social
unit in
the political structure and an empha-
sis on
elder/ younger relations, which appear
to be
central features of prestige-good sys-
tems I
have studied (Peregrine, 1990:24-120).
In order to discuss the basic nature of
prestige-good
systems in more detail, and I
hope
with more accuracy, I will compare and
contrast
three well-documented systems of
varying
political centralization, subsistence
patterns,
and geographic location. The first
is the Kongo
Kingdom of west Africa (Ekholm,
1972). The second is the Tongan chiefdom in
extreme
western Polynesia between Fiji and
Samoa
(Gailey, 1987; Gifford, 1929; Goldman,
1970;
Kirch, 1984). The third is the Karava-
ran
big-manship located on Karavar Island
between
New Britain and New Ireland, off the
coast
of Papua New Guinea (Errington, 1974,
1977).
In all prestige-good systems generalized
exchange
of prestige-goods occurs. In both
Kongo
and Tonga foreign trade and the goods
that
come from it are controlled at the high-
est
level of the political hierarchy (Ekholm,
1972:100-101,133;
Kirch, 1984:238,241). These
are
distributed down the hierarchy in return
for
service and tribute, but the distribution
is
certainly general and not reciprocal.
In
Karavar,
although all do have some divara
(shell
"money"), big men control amounts
beyond
the potential of most individuals
(Errington,
1977:36). This divara is given out
for
specific work done, to subordinates in
order
for them to enter ritual grades, and at
funerary
rituals such as matamatam (Errington,
1977:27). Distribution of divara by big men
is also
generalized -- in most cases all the
big men
get in return is prestige and the
knowledge
that they have strengthened their
political
position.
Monopoly over goods needed for marriage,
initiation,
and other crucial payments at the
highest
level of the political hierarchy is
also
present in all prestige-good systems.
In
Kongo,
shell beads, raffia cloth, and other
imported
preciosities are needed to make
bridewealth
payments, and these can only be
obtained
from the king (although they flow
down
the political hierarchy so that most
individuals
get them from local chiefs or
lineage
heads [Ekholm, 1972:86,111]). In
Tonga,
red feathers, fine painted cloth and
mats,
beaded baskets, and other items needed
by
Tongans to make extravagant marriage pay-
ments
in order to arrange status-maintaining
or
enhancing marriages are traded from Fiji by
the
Tui's (pre-eminent chiefs) and are only
obtainable
from them (although, as in Kongo,
these
goods flow down the hierarchy, and are
obtained
by most people through local chiefs
[Kirch,
1984:239,241]). Finally, in Karavar,
divara
is needed to enter the ritual grades
necessary
for a youth to become a man, and to
be
eligible for marriage. Again, although
anyone
can acquire divara, the amounts neces-
sary to
enter the final ritual grades can only
be
obtained from a sponsor, often a big man
(Errington,
1974:91-97).
A bilineal tendency in kinship is also
present,
to some extent, in all prestige-good
systems
I have investigated. In Kongo, matri-
lineal
lineages are contrasted with the patri-
lineal
nature of the political structure
(Ekholm,
1972:40-51). In Tonga, the matrilin-
eal
line carries status, while the patrilineal
line
carries political power (Goldman, 1970:-
289-90). In Karavar, society is organized
into
matrilineal moieties, while the basic
political
units are men's groups organized
around
a big man (Errington, 1977:25-26). It
is
clear that in all these prestige-good
systems
there is some tendency for bilineal
relationships
to occur, but those relation-
ships
are highly varied between the three.
There
seems to be no clear-cut bilineal kin-
ship
system at work in these three prestige-
good
systems, and therefore bilineality may
not be
as important an element of prestige-
good
systems as Friedman states.
Rather than focusing on bilineal kinship in
prestige-good
systems, I believe it is more
important
to consider the reproduction of a
society's
basic kinship structures in its
political
hierarchy. Indeed, it may be this
tendency
to reproduce kinship structures in
the
political structure that gives rise to the
apparent
bilineality Friedman perceives. In
Kongo,
the basic relationship between elder
males
and younger males within localized
matrilineages
is reproduced as a hierarchy of
chiefs
(Ekholm, 1972:25). Each chief is
subordinate
to an "elder" chief (except, of
course,
the king), and superordinate to a
"younger"
chief. These subordi-
nate/superordinate
relationships are designat-
ed by
kinship terms, such as father/son and
grandfather/grandson
(Ekholm, 1972:50-51). In
Tonga,
a similar situation is present, with
even
the taboos placed upon relationships
within
the lineage being reproduced in rela-
tionships
within the political hierarchy
(Gifford,
1929:18). In Karavar, one can
compare
big men with fathers: sponsoring
younger
males as fathers are supposed to if
they
can; teaching younger males dukduk and
tubuan
magic, again as fathers are supposed to
do if
they can. Indeed, sponsorship often
leads
to the ritual adoption of a young man
(Errington,
1974:92-98). Karavaran big men,
in a
sense, are a recreation of the father/son
relationship
in a political form.
This father / son, elder male / younger
male
emphasis is another important element
in
the
prestige-good systems I have studied.
Political
power is directly associated with
social
elders, and the legitimation of politi-
cal
power lies in possessing elder status.
Youths
are excluded from political power and
prestige,
and are exploited by elders to
enhance
their own power and prestige. To
reiterate,
in both Kongo and Tonga political
superiors
are considered to be the social
elders
of their political subordinates (Ek-
holm,
1972:37-38, 55). These relationships
take on
the kinship terms for elder/ younger
such as
father/son and grandfather/grandson
(Gifford,
1929:28). In Karavar, although
there
is no political hierarchy, there is a
hierarchy
of ritual grades. Those who have
entered
more of the grades are social elders
to
those who have not, and only the eldest
socially
(those who have bought a tubuan) are
eligible
to be big men (Errington, 1974:91).
In
these prestige-good systems, political
power
is directly linked to, and legitimated
by,
being eldest socially.
Finally, Friedman's statement that pres-
tige-good
systems tend to have asymmetrical
political
dualism is not well supported in the
prestige-good
systems I have investigated.
Certainly
Tonga has asymmetrical political
dualism
between the Tui Tonga, the spiritu-
al/religious
head, and the Tui Kanokupolu, the
social
head (Kirch, 1984:224-25), but neither
Kongo
nor Karavar exhibit this dualism.
Indeed,
both have leaders who act as combined
religious/political
heads. The Kongan king is
the
closest to the ancestors of all Kongans,
yet he
is also the political leader (Ekholm,
1972:23-24). A defining feature of the Karav-
aran
big man is the control of the tubuan
spirit
(Errington, 1974:118). Asymmetrical
political
dualism only occurs in a few of the
prestige-good
systems I have studied, and may
not be
an important element of prestige-good
systems
in general.
Four major elements seem to characterize
prestige-good
systems: (1) generalized ex-
change
of prestige-goods; (2) monopoly over
prestige-goods
at the highest political level;
(3) the
reproduction of basic kinship struc-
tures
in the political structure; and (4)
political
power held by the socially eldest
members
of society.
Prestige-good systems can be viewed as
world-systems
when there is competition be-
tween
localized political leaders for access
to
foreign prestige-goods. As explained by
Frankenstein
and Rowlands (1978:76):
The specific economic characteristics of
a prestige-good system are dominated by
the political advantage gained through
exercising control over access to re-
sources that can only be obtained
through external trade...Groups are
linked to each other through the compet-
itive exchange of wealth objects as
gifts and feasting in continuous cycles
of status rivalry. Descent groups repro-
duce themselves in opposition to each
other as their leaders compete for domi-
nance through differential access to
resources and labour power.
One of
the fundamental aspects of world-sys-
tems,
competition between localized polities
for
advantageous economic position (Schneider,
Chapter
2), is therefore inherent in prestige-
good
systems. The other major aspect of
world-systems, differentiation and division
of
labor between localized polities (Schnei-
der,
Chapter 2), is inherent in the prestige-
goods
themselves. By definition, prestige-
goods
must be exotic or of high labor invest-
ment. They embody esoteric knowledge about
the
world outside of the local group or knowl-
edge of
special manufacturing techniques
(Helms,
1979, 1988). Because prestige-goods
are
traded from outside the local group or
commissioned
from artisans with specialized
skills,
there is an inherent division of labor
in
prestige-good systems, as Brumfiel and
Earle
(1987:7) make clear:
Interacting regional elites can agree to
exchange their stores of domestic
wealth, each supplying the other with
what becomes a stock of exotic wealth.
Exotic wealth then supplements or sup-
plants domestic wealth as the customary
means of social payment (since elders
control the statuses to which young men
aspire, they can define the qualifying
criteria as best suits them). Clients
come to depend on patrons to supply
wealth which they no longer manufacture
for themselves.
Prestige-good systems, therefore, appear to
be an
unusual form of a precapitalist world-
system. They are unusual in that they are
founded
specifically upon a lineage-based
social
structure which, although modified as
the
system becomes more politically central-
ized,
maintains its basic lineage form even in
the
political hierarchy. They are also
unusu-
al
because they are based upon a division of
labor
in exotic goods, a division of labor
which
some world-system theorists might argue
has
little impact on the societies involved
(Wallerstein,
1974:42, 333, also 1989:130-32).
The
important thing to recognize here, howev-
er, is
that these exotic goods are not "luxu-
ry"
items in prestige-good systems, but are
necessary
for social reproduction.
The
Mississippian Prestige-Good System
There
is sound evidence to support the idea
that
Mississippian societies were participants
in some
form of a prestige-good system. There
was
extensive interregional trade in exotica
in
Mississippian societies: such as marine
shell
from the Gulf coast, copper from Lake
Superior,
obsidian, bauxite, and minerals from
as far
west as the Rockies, and various other
minerals
and cherts from localized sources
scattered
across the eastern United States
(Griffin,
1967:156). During the height of
Mississippian
centralization, specific design
motifs
and unusual artifact types of what has
been
called the "Southeastern Ceremonial
Complex"
circulated between centers in a truly
pan-Mississippian
exchange network of exotica
(Waring
and Holder, 1945; Galloway, 1989).
More importantly, however, the distribution
of
these exotic raw materials and the objects
made
from them appears to be consistent with
that
expected from a prestige-good system.
Evidence
to support this idea has been pre-
sented
in detail elsewhere and need not be
repeated
at length here (Welch, 1986; Pere-
grine,
1990). A study I conducted recently
showed
that the distribution of prestige-goods
found
in Mississippian burials (giving a per-
capita
measure of their distribution) paral-
leled
that expected from a prestige-good
system,
both within and between communities
(Peregrine,
1990:179-222). In a study that is
somewhat
the inverse of mine, Welch (1986)
tested
four models of chiefdom political
economy
against the material record for the
Mississippian
chiefdom at Moundville, Alabama,
and
found that the model most consistent with
the
archaeological data was that of a pres-
tige-good
system (although his conception of
prestige-good
systems differs somewhat from
mine,
particularly as it is not based in a
world-system
framework). In both studies it
was
clear that the Mississippian societies
being
analyzed were participants in some form
of a
prestige-good system.
Viewing Mississippian societies as partici-
pants
in this unique type of pre-capitalist
world-system
is not really helpful unless it
increases
our understanding of their social
structures
and evolution. I argue this per-
spective
is able to do both. First, because
prestige-good
systems are rooted in a lineage-
based
social system (and indeed, foster spe-
cific
developments in that social system),
probable
social structures of Mississippian
societies
can be inferred readily by viewing
the
archaeological record through this theo-
retical
lens.
In terms of political organization, the
implications
of the Mississippian prestige-
good
system should be clear. Political power
was
based upon the ability to control pres-
tige-goods,
legitimated through a lineage
structure
(Peregrine, 1990:63-69). Since
Mississippian
societies were apparently orga-
nized
as chiefdoms (Peebles and Kus, 1977), a
hierarchy
of chiefs was likely, similar per-
haps to
Kongo or Tonga, with the pre-eminent
chief
located at a major center, and lower
level
chiefs located at minor centers and in
outlying
hamlets. This hierarchy seems to be
reflected
in the Mississippian settlement
system
(Fowler, 1978; cf. Milner, 1990). The
hierarchy
was probably organized like a lin-
eage,
with individuals in each level both
superior
and socially "elder" to individuals
in
levels below them (DePratter, 1983:100-
110). At the lowest level in the political
hierarchy
were localized lineages, with elder
males
as their heads.
Localized lineages would have formed the
basic
social structure in Mississippian soci-
eties
as well, and are represented archaeolog-
ically
in the organization of Mississippian
cemeteries
(Goldstein, 1980:136-37) Lineage
leaders
were the "socially" eldest members of
the
lineage. Social age was likely a dual
product
of one's ancestry and one's ability to
create
alliances with elder lineage members
from
whom one could obtain both the knowledge
and the
prestige-goods needed to be initiated
into
various ritual grades (Meillassoux,
1978). There were probably a number of ritual
grades
in Mississippian societies, some of
which
were necessary to simply be recognized
as an
adult or as a member of the society, and
some in
which membership brought prestige and
political
power (Hudson, 1976:325-27, 336-40).
In terms of economic organization, local-
ized
lineages may have also been the basic
production
units. Some individuals apparently
served
as craftsmen for pre-eminent chiefs,
manufacturing
prestige-goods at chiefdom
centers
(Welch, 1986:171-72). Although horti-
culture
was practiced in order to produce
enough
to both support artisans and political
leaders and allow them to remain in the same
location,
there was probably little systematic
trade
between centers and outlying hamlets in
maize
or other agricultural products (Welch,
1986:130-32;
cf. O'Brien, 1990). The logis-
tics of
bulk trade in the Mississippian period
would
have been formidable, and major centers
were
located on rich soils, certainly capable
of
producing enough to support the inhabitants
(Peebles,
1978).
Finally, in terms of ideology, ancestry
would
have been all-important. A "cult of
the
ancestors"
in some form was a probable feature
of
Mississippian societies, and may be repre-
sented
in the unique stone figurines, charnel
structures,
and elaborate burial ceremonialism
characteristic
of Mississippian culture (De-
Pratter,
1983:111-54). The pre-eminent chief
himself
was probably both the social and
spiritual
"father" of the chiefdom. He
was
seen as
a contact between the ancestors and
the
people, as he was the social elder of the
people,
and so the closest to the ancestors
(DePratter,
1983:68). This reverts to politi-
cal
power, as the pre-eminent chief's close-
ness to
the ancestors probably reinforced his
political
position (Shils, 1971). Hence
power,
social structure, and ideology were all
intermeshed
in the processes of the Mississip-
pian
world-system.
Perhaps more importantly, the prestige-good
system
model provides a unique theory of
Mississippian
evolution, one that ties the
origins
of social stratification to processes
beginning
more than a thousand years earlier
(Peregrine,
1990:278-86). During the late
Archaic
period, burial mounds began to be
constructed,
apparently to mark territories
controlled
by corporate lineages (Charles and
Buikstra,
1983). At about the same time
systematic
interregional trade in exotic goods
began
(Winters, 1968). The implications are
that
the Archaic period saw the initiation of
lineages
in the Eastern Woodlands and the
beginnings
of elder control and manipulation
of
imported preciosities (Bender, 1985a).
The control and manipulation of exotic
goods
by lineage elders apparently became more
intense
during the Woodland period, culminat-
ing in
the "Hopewell interaction sphere"
through
which exotic goods from distant sourc-
es were
moved across midcontinental North
America
(Struever and Houart, 1972). These
goods
were apparently being used to arrange
marriages
between localized groups (Bender,
1985b),
and it is likely that lineage elders
were
fostering the use of prestige-goods in
other
ceremonies of social reproduction (-
Brose,
1979). As these goods came to be in
greater
demand, the lineage elder's power grew
in
direct proportion (Peregrine, 1990:75-86).
Certainly
fostered by population growth which
increased
the demand for prestige-goods during
the
Woodland period (Buikstra, 1977:76-77,
81),
and perhaps spurred further by an appar-
ent
re-organization of society at a lower
hierarchical
level during the Late Woodland
period
(Tainter, 1975), lineage elders during
the
formative Mississippian period gained
enough
power to differentiate themselves from
other
lineage members, and became an emergent
elite.
Conflict, perhaps over access to advanta-
geous
trade routes, may have played a role in
the
emergence of Mississippian elites.
Many
Mississippian
centers occupy relatively cir-
cumscribed
riverine environments and are often
surrounded
by defensive palisades. Larson
(1972)
and Green (1977) argue that a need to
defend
these prime riverine locations was
critical
to the evolution of Mississippian
societies. Although conflict has probably
never
been the sole factor behind the emer-
gence
of social stratification (Wenke, 1984:-
215-18),
the need to coordinate labor for
defense
(or conquest) could have provided
lineage
elders in the emergent Mississippian
period
additional control over junior lineage
members,
and fostered the development of new
social
forms legitimating increased levels of
political
power held by specific individuals
(Carneiro,
1970; Johnson and Earle, 1987).
In considering the emergence of social
stratification,
one must also consider the
intensification
of production necessary to
sustain
elites. Indeed Renfrew (1982:263) has
argued
that "all development towards more
complex
society implies intensification,
permitting
the support of administrative and
other
central activities."
Intensification
for the
support of Mississippian elites was
apparently
accomplished by increasing labor
dedicated
to maize horticulture, which had
been
present in the prehistoric East since at
least
Middle Woodland times, but was never
heavily
relied upon for subsistence (Griffin,
1985:61). Individuals apparently increased
production
to support their elites in competi-
tive
exchanges with others so that they would
have
more access to prestige-goods, and hence
a
better opportunity to socially reproduce
themselves
(Peregrine, 1990:19-20).
As elites competed for exotic goods in the
emergent
Mississippian prestige-good system,
elites
located at nodal points on trade
routes,
and who had a supportive population,
were
able to control those routes and the
goods
flowing through them (Peregrine, 1990:-
247-69). Elites less fortunately located grew
dependent
on elites controlling trade routes,
and may
have been undermined by them. Popula-
tion
was attracted to elites who offered
greater
access to prestige-goods, and hence
better
opportunities to socially reproduce.
In this
way Mississippian centers with dense
populations
emerged in the central riverine
valleys
of the midcontinent, where riverine
trade
could be controlled, and where intensi-
fied
production through maize horticulture was
possible
(Peregrine, n.d., 1990:269-73).
Beginning about A.D. 1250, Mississippian
societies
went into a decline that lasted
until
the coming of Europeans (Tainter, 1988-
:15-16). The prestige-good system model
provides
insight into this decline as well,
for
these systems appear to be relatively
unstable
(Friedman and Rowlands, 1977:228,
232). The items that constitute prestige-
goods
are socially defined, and subordinate
elites,
disgruntled with a particular leader
or
group of leaders, have the potential to
undermine
their power base by promoting the
use of
alternate prestige-goods (Ekholm,
1972:128-44),
or by simply no longer recogniz-
ing the
need for these goods in ceremonies of
social
reproduction. Since many prestige-
goods
are obtained through foreign trade, the
disruption
of trade routes or alliances can
also
bring about rapid alterations in pres-
tigegood
systems. Peebles (1987) argues that
one of
the major factors correlated with the
collapse
of the Moundville chiefdom is the
sudden
suspension of interregional trade in
exotic
goods. The prestige-good system model,
then,
has the potential to explain both the
rise
and decline of Mississippian societies
within
a unified framework.
The concept of Mississippian social evolu-
tion
based on the processes of a prestige-good
system
also avoids some of the problems pres-
ent in
many theories for the evolution of
political
complexity (Peregrine, 1990:2-8).
Chiefs
emerge because of their ability to
control
prestige-goods, and perhaps from
personal
ambition, but not from some desire or
need to
manage their society altruistically.
Social
evolution grows out of the systemic
interaction
of independent polities within the
prestige-good
system, not from simple migra-
tion or
diffusion. Intensified production
through
agriculture is not a "prime mover"
behind
social evolution, but emerges out of
the
evolutionary process itself. Decline,
too, is
linked to the processes of social
interaction
and conflict. In addition, this
perspective
links the evolution of Mississip-
pian
societies to the longue duree of North
American
prehistory, providing a unity of
theory
that has never been possible before.
Conclusions
Regardless
of the impact this perspective
might
have on our understanding of North
American
prehistory, I think it carries with
it some
important ramifications for world-
systems
theory in general. First, it re-
emphasizes
and indeed expands the point made
by
Abu-Lughod (1989:364) that "the principles
of
organization of world-systems can have
considerable
variability." In the Mississip-
pian
case, the world-system's organization is
rooted
in the kinship structure of the inter-
acting
societies, for the basic economic units
of
prestigegood systems are localized lineag-
es, and
political power is legitimated through
the
lineage hierarchy. The intimate link
that
exists
between political economy and kinship
in
stateless societies is one that must be
incorporated
into world-systems theory if we
hope to
apply the world-system perspective to
the
study of these societies and how they
change. It is perhaps because many world-
system
theorists lack a thorough grounding in
the
study of kinship systems and their rela-
tion to
political economy that they have been
slow to
apply the world-system perspective to
stateless
societies; indeed, since most of
these
theorists come from disciplines outside
of
anthropology, they may not even recognize
that
this crucial link exists.
Second, this study demonstrates that in
some
circumstances world-systems can be based
upon
the trade and manufacture of exotica.
Again,
the lack of understanding among many
world-system
theorists about the important
role
exotic goods play in the political econo-
my of
many stateless societies has made the
application
of this perspective to the study
of
stateless societies very difficult. The
simple
fact is that systematic trade in food-
stuffs,
clothing, ordinary raw materials, and
other
"bulk" goods is rare in stateless soci-
eties. Trade in exotica, on the other hand,
is
common, and as this study demonstrates,
can
have systemic impact on the societies
involved.
I hope the reader is left with an awareness
of two
basic ideas: first, that stateless
societies
can be studied using a world-system
perspective,
and that this perspective can
increase
our understanding of these societies
and how
they change; and second, that precapi-
talist
world-systems are often quite different
than
the ones envisioned by Wallerstein, Abu-
Lughod,
or even Schneider. Many precapitalist
world-systems
must be studied with an emphasis
not
only on economic processes, but also on
social
ones, for the political economies of
these
world-systems are intimately linked to
their
social structures; one cannot be under-
stood
in the absence of the other.
NOTES