7
The Role of Nomads
in Core/Periphery Relations
Thomas D. Hall
OVERVIEW
The
extension of world-system theory to "pre-
capitalist"
settings necessarily raises ques-
tions
about the distinctiveness of the "modern
world-system"
with respect to "precapitalist"
world-systems
(See Chapter 1, and Wallerstein
1974a,
1974b, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1990;
Abu-Lughod
1987, 1989, 1990; Chase-Dunn 1988,
1989,
1990a; Gailey 1985; Gledhill 1988; Hall
1986,
1989; Kohl 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1988).
An
examination of the historical evolution of
the
role of nomads in core/periphery hierar-
chies
is one way to address these questions.
Such a
study has additional significances.
First,
it appears that sedentary social orga-
nization
emerged from an entirely nomadic
context
(Nissen 1988). Implicitly problematic
here is
whether it is possible to have a
wholly
nomadic core/periphery hierarchy.
Because
of this issue, the following discus-
sion
will be restricted to core/periphery
hierarchies
with sedentary components. I will
return
to wholly nomadic core/periphery hier-
archies
in the final section. Second, nomadic
groups
frequently play complex intermediary
roles
in the interactions among sedentary
groups,
especially states and core/periphery
hierarchies. The significance of these roles
in
changes in core/periphery hierarchies needs
to be
examined. Third, each new world-system
or
core/periphery hierarchy is "restructured
from"
the remains of its predecessor(s) (Abu-
Lughod
1990). This is one way in which spe-
cific
historical events shape general pat-
terns. Fourth, following the work of both
Janet
Abu-Lughod (1989, 1990) and Thomas
Barfield
(1989), the rise and fall of the
Mongol
Empire played a major role in the
collapse
of the eastern circuits of the thir-
teenth
century Eurasian world-system. This
collapse,
in turn, initiated a restructuring
from
which the European "modern world-system"
emerged.
Based on Chapter 1, some additional com-
ments
are in order. First, there is no rea-
son, a
priori, to require that every
core/periphery
hierarchy have a semiperiphery,
or that
it be limited to only one tier between
core
and periphery. The extent of the
hierar-
chy
should remain an empirical problem. Sec-
ond,
the precise boundaries of nonstate soci-
eties
(especially nomadic societies) are both
theoretically
and empirically problematic. On
the one
hand, nonstate societies -- based on
both
contemporary ethnographic studies and
ethnohistory
-- do not have precise borders,
but
tend to "fade away" in decreasingly impor-
tant
kin and other connections (Wolf 1982).
On the
other hand, just how much and what type
of
interaction between state and nonstate
societies
constitutes a significant connection
also
remains problematic. Trade in vital
goods,
trade in luxuries, trade in captives,
alliances
for frontier buffering, recruitment
of
nomads for armies, or endemic warfare with
other
nomads probably have different implica-
tions
for the historical evolution of
core/periphery
hierarchies. Third, the thing
which
is evolving is not a self-contained
social
unit, such as a "tribe," a "state," an
"empire,"
or a "civilization," but a larger
unit,
which for want of a better term can be
labeled
a core/periphery hierarchy.
This chapter contributes to a general
discussion
of the historical evolution of
core/periphery
hierarchies. I do this by
examining
a few cases of nomad - sedentary
relations. The goal is not to produce defini-
tive
conclusions, but to uncover those aspects
of
nomad - sedentary relations that are espe-
cially
salient for the study of core/periphery
hierarchies. Because of this goal it is
useful
to review a few other general issues
concerning
nomad - sedentary relations.
Pristine
States, Trade, Nomads, and Technology
It
seems reasonably clear that states, and
hence
civilizations, originated in interaction
systems. Kohl argues that this is the case
for the
origin of the state:
One purpose of this study of long-dis-
tance trade in southwestern Asia was to
show that even the earliest
"pristine"
example of state formation cannot be
explained entirely as an internal pro-
cess of social differentiation but must
be viewed partly as the product of a
"world-economy" at different
levels of
development which stretched at least
from the Nile Valley and southeastern
Europe in the west to Soviet Central
Asia and the Indus Valley in the east"
(Kohl 1978, p. 489).
The
evidence, as is always the case with
archaeological
materials, is incomplete, and
subject
to revision based on new discoveries.
Nevertheless,
the evidence is very persuasive.
Trade
between lowland Mesopotamia and highland
Iranian
plateau supplied goods used by state
officials
to support their claims to authority
and
legitimacy. The trade induced mutual
dependency
between the two areas, and consti-
tuted a
"world-economy."
In a discussion of the contributions of
archaeology
to understanding the origin of the
state,
Gledhill also focuses on the interac-
tion
system:
A regional focus seems of crucial impor-
tance, since the fixation of many theo-
ries with agricultural intensifications
has tended to obscure the possible im-
portance of the fact that the environ-
mental settings of 'pristine' state
formation cannot be defined purely in
terms of aridity and its agricultural
implications. The 'nuclear areas' of
ancient civilization were also charac-
terized by intense interactions between
nomadic and sedentary populations, in-
teractions which linked farms to fisher-
men, gatherer-hunters and
pastoralists"
(Gledhill 1988, p. 23).
Kohl
(1978) urges archaeologists to make full
use of
information available in the historical
record,
using evidence on such things as:
... qualitatively novel developments in
transportation, communication, and mili-
tary technology associated with the
domestication of the horse; the appear-
ance of effective chariots; the spread
or "democratization" of metal
tools and
weapons...(Kohl 1988, p. 30)
Anthony (1986) discusses the domestication
of
horses in the context of state formation
and
regional interaction systems. A key
point
in
these discussions is that with the domesti-
cation
of horses, transportation and communi-
cation
over land are greatly enhanced. Fur-
thermore,
simple iron making technology is
very
portable and easily diffused among nomads
(Kohl
1987a, p. 22). Thus, relative
"depen-
dency"
between nomad and sedentary groups
might
be reversed: horses might have enabled
nomads
to dominate sedentary peoples, and/or
might
have been the impetus among nomadic
groups
for technological innovations that
subsequently
spread to sedentary groups.
With these issues and problems in mind it
is now
appropriate to turn to a brief examina-
tion of
several different types of nomad -
sedentary
interactions.
NOMAD -
CIVILIZATION RELATIONS
China
and Nomads
The
importance of nomads in Chinese history is
widely
acknowledged (Barfield 1989; Eberhard
1965,
1977; Elvin 1973; Kwanten 1979; Latti-
more
1951, 1962c, 1980; Szynkiewicz 1989).
This
account, however, stresses only certain
processes,
drawing heavily from the work of
Owen
Lattimore and Thomas Barfield. As Chinese
agriculturists
spread to the steppe they
adopted
other styles of making a living (e.g.,
herding)
that were better suited to the local
ecology. Thus, pastoralism was not a case of
"devolution,"
but an alternative survival
strategy
(Lattimore 1980). Those remaining in
agricultural
areas eventually developed a
cavalry
to fight nomads. When "China"
con-
sisted
of separate kingdoms, many built walls
as much
to mark their own limits as to keep
out the
nomads.
Since nomads produced little of interest or
value
to settled Chinese, nomads used threats
of
force to induce trade: trading and raiding
were
alternative means to the same ends.
Indeed,
some studies show that raiding corre-
lated
with changing conditions of trade (Szyn-
kiewicz
1989, p. 154) and changing state
stability
(Barfield 1989). Chinese officials
acquiesced
to this trade as a way of control-
ling
nomads. The trade was primarily in
luxury
goods used by nomadic leaders to shore
up and
symbolize their power. This interac-
tion
fueled changes both in China and among
nomads. It helped in incorporating new lands.
In
times of state decline, nomadic leaders
sometimes
served as protectors of beleaguered
areas. In times of state ascendance, unified
Chinese
response promoted wider unity among
nomads. Nomads were as often a source of
change
as a receiver (Lattimore 1980, Barfield
1989).
Barfield (1989) analyzes the interconnec-
tions
between the rise and fall of the Chinese
empire
and various steppe empires (see espe-
cially
his chart p. 13). The two are inti-
mately
connected via the organizational system
of the
Chinese empire and the varieties of
steppe
politics and organization. A key
feature
in Barfield's analysis is the distinc-
tion
between inner and outer frontier strate-
gies. The outer frontier strategy is the more
familiar. In this strategy a dominant steppe
leader
uses violent attacks to terrify the
court
of the sedentary empire, alternates war
and
peace to successively raise tribute pay-
ments,
and assiduously avoids taking over
Chinese
lands and the necessarily intendant
entanglements
in Chinese court politics (p.
49).
The inner strategy is more subtle, and one
that
develops when a steppe confederation
begins
to disintegrate. Some contending
steppe
faction leader, typically of a weaker
faction,
seeks alliance with Chinese officials
against
his rivals. The Chinese officials
acquiesce,
since typically they favor using
"barbarians
against barbarians." The steppe
faction
sometimes uses the Chinese military to
aid in
the defeat of his rivals, and uses
favor
at Chinese court to sever tribute flow
between
the Chinese and his rivals. Typical-
ly,
this leads to success on the part of the
Chinese
allied faction. Once dominant, the
steppe
leader can either use the new power
base to
unify the steppe and return to an
outer
frontier strategy or leave the steppe
politically
fragmented and seek to dominate a
local
region, monopolizing tribute flow (p.
63).
This oscillation explains the rather long
cycles
of nomad - Chinese relations (Barfield
1989,
p. 13). In particular, it explains the
correlation
of strong steppe polities with a
strong
Chinese empire. Only when the empire
is
strong can it be steadily "milked" via an
outer
frontier strategy. When the empire is
weak,
steppe leaders tend to favor an inner
frontier
strategy, making alliances with local
"war
lords." The Mongols used both
strate-
gies,
but with their own peculiar twists.
The
Mongol Empire
Analysis
of the relations between Mongols and
sedentary
states is doubly difficult. First,
the
entire Central Asian field of action must
be
examined (Morgan 1986; Allsen 1987; Bar-
field
1989; Kwanten 1979). This is a diffi-
cult
task because of the way records are made
and
preserved. The interpretation of docu-
ments
-- nearly always written by and from the
point
of view of sedentary state officials --
requires
detailed knowledge of many local
histories. Second, the Mongols were peculiar
in many
ways as a steppe empire (Barfield
1989). According to Abu-Lughod (1989, 1990)
they
played a pivotal role in the thirteenth
century
collapse of the Eurasian world-system
and in
the consequent rise of the European
world-system.
Mongol success can be attributed to factors
and
processes occurring at different levels
simultaneously
(Saunders 1971; Morgan 1986;
Lindner
1981, 1982). First, the states in
western
Asia were weak and thus vulnerable to
attack
and conquest:
This was the first time that a major
nomadic power direct from the Chinese
frontier had invaded the sedentary
states of the west. The outer frontier
strategy of devastation and terror
wreaked havoc with the more fragile
ecology of the region. China might
replace large population losses within a
relatively short period, but here the
damage was more long lasting. Cities
whose populations numbered in the hun-
dreds of thousands were completely de-
stroyed. Irrigation systems were ruined,
severely hampering economic recovery.
...
Nomads who had previously entered
southwestern Asia from the steppe had
always attempted, usually successfully,
to found new dynasties and become rul-
ers.
The Mongols with their heritage
from the Chinese frontier refused to
take administrative responsibilities
(Barfield 1989, pp. 201-202).
This
latter, of course, is the familiar outer
frontier
strategy, but in this case applied
against
states which were politically weaker
and
ecologically more precariously positioned
than
was typical for China.
Second, continual warfare made a client
relation
with the Mongols an attractive "bar-
gain"
given the alternatives:
Those areas which accepted the new situ-
ation (Manchuria, Korea, Uighar oa-
ses)... avoided destructive campaigns by
the Mongols and retained their own lead-
ers.
Those areas which rejected the
Mongol peace terms or reneged on previ-
ous agreements (Chin China, western
Turkestan, and the Tangut kingdom) be-
came the scenes of numerous campaigns
that wiped out much of their population
and productivity. In Chinggis' lifetime
wars of destruction were aimed at lead-
ers who violated previously agreed peace
terms.
These campaigns were so devas-
tating that they led to the overthrow of
the ruling dynasties and, by default,
their direct incorporation into the
Mongol Empire (p. 200).
One of
the peculiarities of the Mongol empire
was a
direct result of this policy (rooted in
Chinggis'
fierce demands for loyalty), namely
the
conquest of China and the founding of a
dynasty
due to overly vigorous pursuit of an
outer
frontier strategy of terror. This is
one of
the ways in which the Mongols differed
from
all previous Central Asian nomadic
groups. They over-pursued the outer frontier
strategy. In the west they destroyed some
states
or were forced to directly incorporate
and
administer others. In the east they were
ultimately
trapped by their own vigor and
success
into founding a new Chinese dynasty.
A third factor in Mongol success was con-
tinued
presence of pastoral nomads who main-
tained
a flexible tribal/kin social structure
which
allowed them to recruit first other
nomads,
later even sedentary groups, into a
larger
and larger machine for conquest.
Fourth
was the presence of several leaders who
were
able to manage astutely the drive for
conquest
and plunder, with the needs of admin-
istration. Specifically, Mongol leaders were
able,
for some time, to maintain a sufficient
volume
of plunder and tribute to insure loyal-
ty of
tribes that might otherwise be inclined
to
leave the confederation. In short they
perfected
the outer frontier strategy of
"milking"
sedentary states (with some excep-
tions
noted above). Fifth, superior logistic
ability
of pastoral nomads in communication,
transportation,
and mobility was key to con-
quest
of large territories, and even of seden-
tary
states. This superiority was rooted in
the
pastoral way of life: availability of
horses,
intimate knowledge of geography, and
ability
to move their entire society (families
and
their resource base, their herds) with
them. This same superiority was also a key to
the
collapse of the system.
All the great Khans -- if only temporarily
-- have
been able to put these processes in
operation
(e.g., Allsen 1987). First, capital-
izing
on the inclusive nature of pastoral
tribes,
conquered groups were given an honor-
able
option of joining the group (the alterna-
tive
was being put to the sword). This
worked
well
with other pastoralist and poorly with
sedentary
peoples (unless they wanted to
become
pastoralists). Second, as in modern
pyramid
schemes, as long as the system kept
expanding,
new recruits (groups) could gain
both
status and wealth. Continued expansion
also
alleviated, if it did not solve complete-
ly, the
problem of revenue by a constant
inflow
of booty. As long as this was success-
ful, it
distracted conservative elements from
social
changes which flowed from this strate-
gy, and
minimized factional rivalry. Superior
communications
and mobility were used to amass
troops
and overcome enemies. However, this
strategy
was inherently unstable, that is,
temporary.
The instability stems from two closely
intertwined
sources: political and technolog-
ical. The political problem is the orderly
succession
of rulers. A "big man" comes
to
power
on the basis of his personal skills, not
the
least of which is alliance-building.
Among
Central Asian pastoralists, this is
typically
based on military prowess. Hence,
succession
of rulership necessarily entails
armed
conflict. When there was only one son
who had
distinguished himself in battle,
conflict
was merely postponed for a generation
until
either there was no such son, or there
were
several. For the Mongols these problems
were
exacerbated by the competing, and at time
conflicting,
principles of lateral (older to
younger
brothers) and lineal (father to son)
succession. The lack of clear priorities
inevitably
led to justification of succession
by
arms. Institutionalization of
succession
would
have undermined the very basis of lead-
ership. Thus, it is not only that the Mongol
Empire
did not institutionalize political
control
as Eisenstadt (1963) argues, but also
that
Mongols could not institutionalize lead-
ership
and remain Mongols. The same problems
inhere
in political control and revenue gar-
nering.
A key to Mongol success was communication
and
mobility of men and resources. These
technological
factors also contributed to
instability
because they made it impossible
for any
central leader to monopolize control
of
strategic resources as a means of coercing
compliance. Hence, there was no way to insure
that
revenue collectors would forward revenue
to the
leader.
The same features that make tribes inclu-
sive
also make them divisive; what can be
built
quickly can equally quickly disinte-
grate. The material basis of this situation
is the
adaptation to plains/steppe environ-
ment. This is the underlying limit of pasto-
ralist
expansion. They cannot effectively
control
territory beyond the plains/steppe
without
giving up their lifestyle, thus the
edge of
the steppe remains a permanent fron-
tier
(Lindner 1982; McNeill 1964).
Conversely, sedentary states could not
conquer
nomads -- except by sedentarizing
them. They could control them by a combina-
tion of
constructing barriers and employing
highly
mobile troops, who could essentially
beat
the pastoralists at their own game --
decisive
hit-and-run victories (Lattimore
1962a,
p. 485). Thus, Central Asian pastora-
lists,
especially the Mongols, could build
huge
empires, but could not maintain them.
Conversely,
the Chinese could manipulate, but
never
conquer, their nomadic adversaries.
According
to several writers (Allsen 1987;
Barfield
1989; Lattimore 1951, 1962d; Morgan
1986),
this accounts for the convoluted quali-
ty of
Chinese histories of these events.
Chroniclers
had to warn princes and emperors
of the
inherent impossibility of conquest,
while
never admitting that the "son of heaven"
was not
all powerful -- a task that makes
contemporary
American "spin doctors" appear to
be rank
amateurs.
The
Ottoman Empire
The
formation of the Ottoman empire is of
interest
because it was built by the transfor-
mation
of nomadic pastoralists into sedentary
farmer-soldiers. According to Lindner (-
1983),
nomads, particularly of the "tribe" of
Osman,
played a vital role in the founding of
the
Ottoman Empire. It was precisely the
fluid,
multi-cultural aspects of tribal orga-
nization
that made nomadic "tribalism" an
effective
model for building a state. Once
built,
the needs of the new state led to the
oppression
and destruction of nomads by con-
version
into sedentary peasants.
The erstwhile nomads, now rulers of a large
state,
were compelled to sedentarize the
remaining
nomads. This was done by first
shifting
obligations of support of the state
from
contributions of manpower in fighting
(nomad
tradition) to taxes in kind and/or
money,
and later by levying taxes in early
spring
immediately after lambing time, count-
ing all
animals as adult sheep, and therefore
taxable. This contrasts with the Mongol
custom
which exempted small herds so that they
could
continue to function (p. 57). In other
words,
the goal of Ottoman tax policy was to
undermine
nomad economy.
Two sets of state needs impelled this
policy. First, the state rulers sought to
avoid
the "state within state" arrangement
implied
in tribal loyalty, in which the local
chief
administered his tribe with considerable
autonomy. This
required clear tribal bound-
aries,
but tribal boundaries are highly perme-
able,
membership changing with shifting eco-
nomic
and political conditions.
The second set of reasons behind sedentari-
zation
were military. As the nature of war-
fare
changed, especially as gunpowder came
into
use, the demand for mounted archers
decreased,
while the demand for infantry
increased. Thus, nomads per se had less to
offer
the state in compensation for their
political
administrative liabilities. Addi-
tionally,
more people -- and therefore more
fighting
men -- could be supported on the same
amount
of territory in a sedentary, agricul-
tural
adaptation than by nomadic pastoralism.
The
volatility of pastoral production due to
disease
and weather also makes sedentary
production
more certain.
While the Ottoman Empire had clear nomadic
origins,
it became and remained a sedentary
state
which eventually destroyed its own
nomadic
foundations. In contrast, the Mongol
Empire
never made a successful transition to a
sedentary
state. The tribe of Osman did
succeed,
but only by ceasing to be nomads.
Spain,
America and Los Indios B rbaros
The
comparison of Spanish and American treat-
ments
of various nomadic groups inhabiting
what is
now the American Southwest, what was
long
the northwest of New Spain, is useful in
several
ways. First, the region is the same
in both
cases. Second, the region was a
frontier
for both states -- a "periphery of a
periphery"
(Weber 1982). Third, America and
Spain
contrast a rising capitalist state with
the
earliest phases of the capitalist world-
system,
more akin to an empire (Cipollo 1970,
Doyle
1986, Eisenstadt 1963, 1967).
Spanish explorers first entered the region
sometime
in the 1530s, slightly over a decade
after
Cort‚z conquered Mexico. The region was
not
formally colonized until 1598. That
colony
collapsed, due to the Pueblo Revolt, in
1680,
and was re-established in the early
1690s. Thereafter it remained a tenuous, but
relatively
thriving colonial outpost whose
fortunes
waxed and waned with those of New
Spain
and the Spanish Empire in general. Both
before
the Pueblo Revolt, and for the half
century
or so after the reconquest, the region
was
marked by a state of endemic warfare with
surrounding
nomadic groups. In the early
eighteenth
century this warfare became so
intense
that the sedentary Pueblos, and erst-
while
ousters of the Spaniards, formed a
symbiotic
alliance with them. The late eigh-
teenth
century was marked by considerable
local
population growth and relative prosperi-
ty. In 1786 a lasting peace was established
with
several closely linked bands of Shoshoni
speakers
who became widely known as Coman-
ches. This peace between Comanches and
Spaniards
lasted well into the American era.
The
Mexican interregnum disrupted this pattern
and
renewed the pattern of conflict with
nomads
common in the early phases of the
colony.
Throughout the Spanish era, warfare with
nomadic
groups rose and fell with changes in
the
trade in Indian captives, with the need
for
local governors to impress the viceroy
with
their success in subduing "los indios
b rbaros"
or their desire for more money and
troops,
and with viceregal and crown concerns
for
protection of the borders of New Spain
from
rival European powers. It is the latter
concerns
that were the driving force behind
first
maintenance, then re-founding of the
colony
(Bolton 1929). These concerns likewise
shaped
policies toward nomadic groups, at once
a
nuisance along the frontiers, yet simulta-
neously
-- especially after the Comanche peace
-- a
singularly effective "border patrol" for
scouting
and controlling movement of European
rivals.
The Bourbon reforms, instituted in New
Spain
in the late eighteenth century, were
intended
to increase state efficiency. These
policies
led to a general increase in prosper-
ity
throughout the Empire (Lang 1975) and in
New
Mexico. Subsequent Indian policy aimed at:
(1)
pursuit of peace in order to increase
revenues;
(2) use of frontier bands as buffers
against
foreign intrusion; and (3) lowering
the
cost of administration and defense.
These
goals
gave rise to four strategies to control
nomadic
groups. First was the use of
"gifts"
to
engender dependency upon Spaniards.
Sec-
ond,
divide-and-conquer strategies were used
to pit
one group against other hostile groups.
Third,
nomadic groups were pressed to form
more
centralized political structures, which
gave
rise to the "tribes" we know
today.
Fourth,
the frontier provinces were reorga-
nized,
a line of forts was constructed, and
highly
mobile "flying companies" were used to
control
hostile nomads (Moorhead 1968, 1975;
Griffen
1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1985; Thrapp
1967).
American influence in the Southwest dates
to the
opening of the Santa Fe Trail in 1821.
As
trade increased, New Mexico became more
strongly
oriented toward the United States.
The
Mexican - American war (1846-1848) result-
ed in
the annexation of the northern half of
Mexico
to the United States in 1848. Califor-
nia and
Texas were the major goals of the
conquest. New Mexico (which then included
modern
Arizona) was primarily a "land bridge"
between
California and Texas. Fighting with
nomadic
groups increased until the American
Civil
War (1860-64), spurred by increasing
traffic
through nomad lands and increased
trade
or encroachment on hunting territories.
After
the Civil War the American state began a
major
effort to control nomadic groups throug-
hout
the west (Utley 1984). The Comanche
bands
became a major internal nuisance instead
of a
buffer-border patrol. A major effort
was
mounted
to force them, and subsequently the
Apache
bands, onto very limited reservation
territories.
Comanches declined from "Lords of the
South
Plains"
(Wallace and Hoebel 1952) to a handful
of
reservation dwellers (from between 20,000
and
30,000 in the early nineteenth century to
between
1,000 and 2,000 in the late nineteenth
century
[Hall 1986, 1989]). Their territory
shrank
from the western half of Texas to a
small
reservation in Oklahoma (Indian Territo-
ry).
They had become a barrier to internal
trade
in the U.S., and their major resource,
the
buffalo, had become very scarce.
Apache groups fared better. Centuries of a
"raiding
mode of production" had perfected
their
survival techniques. Low interest in
New
Mexico and Arizona led to considerably
lower
pressure on Apaches. A combination of
eastern
sentiments for the "vanishing red
man,"
and lucrative contracts to be had for
supplying
first the army and later reserva-
tions,
prevented complete genocide.
Thus, the American state succeeded in
accomplishing
in less than fifty years what
Spanish
administrators had not been able to
accomplish
in nearly two hundred and fifty
years
-- total sedentarization of nomadic
groups.
DISCUSSION,
CONCLUSIONS, AND SPECULATIONS
What,
then do these brief cases suggest about
the
roles of nomads in the historical evolu-
tion of
core/periphery hierarchies? I begin
with
some general remarks, then turn to some
more
specific conclusions, and end with dis-
cussion
and speculation about further re-
search.
Nomads,
States, and Core/Periphery Hierarchies
While
it is clear that I have not sampled the
entire
range of nomad - sedentary relations
(for
instance, there is no examination of
wholly
nomadic settings as a limiting case,
nor of
very early, pre-horse, nomad - seden-
tary
relations), still, a tentative, schematic
account
of the role of nomads in the histori-
cal
evolution of core/periphery hierarchies is
discernible. This sketch is not intended as a
definitive
statement, but as an elaborate
working
hypothesis useful for guiding further
research.
Once states domesticated horses and mas-
tered
the production and use of iron, they
more
commonly took the core role in
core/periphery
hierarchies, giving rise to
other
states, and unleashing interstate compe-
tition
(Chapters 1, 4; Chase-Dunn 1989, 1990a;
Wilkinson
1983, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). States
also
altered the other elements in
core/periphery
hierarchies. As core states
sought
to increase their wealth -- not infre-
quently
to maintain and enhance their internal
control
over subjugated portions of their
populations
-- they began to expand territori-
ally. Sometimes this expansion was in the
direct
pursuit of wealth through conquest,
other
times through enlarging the quantity and
types
of trade goods they could acquire.
Expansion
necessarily led to contact with, and
frequently
incorporation of, new groups into a
core/periphery
hierarchy.
The incorporation process varies in both
speed
and intensity, can be reversed to some
degree
(Hall 1983, 1986, 1989), usually pro-
motes
social change among incorporated groups,
and
typically elicits resistance to incorpora-
tion
(Hall 1989; Gailey and Patterson 1987,
1988). This type of change is precisely what
is
meant by the statement that "civilization
gave birth
to barbarism" (Lattimore 1962d, p.
99,
cited in Wallerstein 1974b, p. 98).
Typically,
but not exclusively, such "barbari-
ans"
occupied peripheral or semiperipheral
positions
in core/periphery hierarchies.
For
China, they were nomadic pastoralists; for
the
early Sumerian states they were other
states
(see Chase-Dunn 1988). Even the pre-
ceding
brief account of Central Asian nomads
indicates
that, as with early marcher states,
such
"barbarians", once engendered by adjacent
states,
could become relatively autonomous
sources
of social change.
When the degree of technological difference
between
nomad and sedentary populations was
low, as
it was in the early stages of the
agrarian
era (3,000 to 1,000 B.C., +/- 1,000
years),
which group would dominate a
core/periphery
hierarchy was an open issue.
Stationary
targets are easier to attack than
mobile
ones, thus nomads could readily defeat
sedentary
groups in battle. Furthermore,
sedentary
agriculturists could either be
forced
to pay tribute or be moved and used as
slaves
elsewhere. Nomads, however, are more
difficult
to defeat. Additionally, their
wealth
-- usually in the form of animals -- is
mobile,
and hence they can avoid paying trib-
ute. Conversely, they are inimical to seden-
tary
life and difficult to make into slaves.
However, nomads can be induced into trade
relations.
Sedentary peoples typically have
some
surplus agricultural products, but a
shortage
of meat and/or horses. Nomads typi-
cally
have a surplus of meat in the form of
animals,
but a shortage of vegetable resourc-
es. Thus, there is opportunity for trade.
Where
the terms of trade were not suitable, or
where
sedentary people were unwilling to
trade,
raiding became an alternative form of
exchange. The Mongols perfected the threat
(and
use) of violence as a tool in trade
relations.
Where large distances separated different
states
or core/periphery hierarchies, nomads
could
become middlemen in trade based on their
superior
mobility, and superior knowledge of
the
"uncivilized" territory, as was the case
for
Central Asian nomads and for Comanches
under
the Spanish empire. Where state traders
were
sufficiently strong they could conduct
trade
directly, but were subject to raids by
nomads,
or they could engage nomads as armed
protectors. Nomads were strategically and
tactically
well positioned to extract "protec-
tion
rent" (Lane 1973; Chase-Dunn 1989).
Even
in the
case of strong states, nomads could
maintain
a considerable degree of autonomy --
or even
domination -- if they could play one
state
against the other (Kohl 1987b). The
many
ways in which state systems deal with
nomads,
in turn, shape their own administra-
tive,
political, and trade systems, as was
clearly
the case for both China and the Span-
ish
empire.
Conclusions
Several
conclusions emerge from this discus-
sion. First, formal systems (bureaucracies,
in
short, states) have a very difficult time
dealing
with informal, or acephalous, societ-
ies. This is true whether it is the Aztecs
dealing
with the "Chichimecas" (McGuire 1980,
1986;
Mathien and McGuire 1986), the Romans
dealing
with Gallic and Germanic "tribes"
(Luttwak
1976; Dyson 1985), the Chinese deal-
ing
with Mongols or Turks, the Byzantine
empire
dealing with Turks and others (Lindner
1983),
the Spanish empire dealing with "los
Indios
b rbaros," or the United States dealing
with
various Native American "tribes" (Hall
1989;
Utley 1984).
Second, nomads occasionally conquer states,
but
cannot rule them (for long) without becom-
ing
sedentarized. Lattimore (1962b, p.508)
has
described the problem cogently:
As the Chinese pithily expressed it long
ago, an empire could be conquered on
horseback, but not ruled from horseback;
civil servants more sophisticated than
barbarian warriors were needed to ex-
tract a regular flow of taxes and trib-
ute from the civilized part of the em-
pire, they could be recruited only among
the upper classes of the conquered civi-
lized people, and they and their fami-
lies had to be protected and allowed to
perpetuate themselves. It was therefore
impossible to fuse completely the bar-
barian and the civilized parts of the
structure of empire, and impossible also
to make the barbarian conquerors as a
whole a new upper class imposed on the
conquered society.
Comparison
of the Chinese, Mongol, and Ottoman
empires
underscores this argument: empires
require
a sedentary base. Clearly, pastoral
empires
or core/periphery hierarchies are
ephemeral. The Mongol empire is distinctive
precisely
because of its success in thwarting
this
general tendency. Yet, even the Mongol
empire
built a capital city, Karakorum.
I must add a caution based on Barfield's
account. Under special circumstances nomads
can
extract some tribute from sedentary
states. The outer frontier strategy of Cen-
tral
Asian nomads is an example of this. The
outer
frontier strategy was not a monopoly of
the
Mongols. Nomadic Indians in the
American
Southwest,
especially Comanches, were also
adept
at extracting tribute from the Spanish
Empire. There is a significant difference,
however,
between extraction of a minimal
"tribute"
which constitutes a nuisance and
large
scale extraction familiar in tributary
empires.
Assessment as to whether "gifts"
from
sedentary
rulers to nomadic clients consti-
tutes
tribute or "trinkets" is a complicated
matter. Relative worth is a significant
component
of the assessment. What may have
been
"mere trinkets" to the state, may have
been
vital prestige goods to the nomads.
Evaluation
of relative worth is not facilitat-
ed by
the nearly universal tendency of contem-
porary
writers (almost all from sedentary
societies
themselves) to gloss such gifts as
trinkets,
even when the cost of those gifts
was
bankrupting the state treasury.
A third, yet abstract, conclusion is that
comparisons
of seemingly similar social forms,
such as
"nomads," "tribes," or "chiefdoms"
that
span long periods (centuries or millenia)
must be
executed with extreme care. The
qualities
of these types of social groups have
shifted
through time as core/periphery hierar-
chical
systems have evolved. Frequently, such
social
structures cannot be understood apart
from
their place in larger social systems
and
social
processes. Similar manifest forms may
belie
very different processes of formation,
some of
which may have a significant role in
shaping
further changes. Still, ethnohistori-
cal
materials, if used with due caution, can
shed
considerable light on the processes of
change,
as Kohl (1978, p. 475) suggests.
Fourth, the qualitative aspects of nomad -
sedentary
relations have shifted through time.
The
effect of nomads on states has lessened
through
time, while the effect of states on
nomads
has strengthened through time. This
trend
is due, at least in part, to a growing
technological
gulf between nomadic and seden-
tary
populations. As Kohl (1987b, p. 22-23)
puts
it:
Economic development and dependency were
not linked phenomena during the Bronze
Age in the manner postulated by contem-
porary critical theory for -- to para-
phrase their terminology -- the develop-
ment of underdevelopment in the Bronze
Age was sharply constrained or itself
underdeveloped. Critical technologies,
such as metal working, could diffuse
relatively easily and new means of tran-
sportation and sources of power, such as
horses, could be raised in peripheral
zones and radically restructure this
ancient world- system.
Thus,
while relative dependency may be prob-
lematic
for the Bronze Age, it becomes less
problematic
after the appearance of mounted
pastoralists
in Central Asia, and entirely
clear
by the seventeenth century of the Chris-
tian
era.
Fifth, the preceding conclusions underscore
the
argument that world-system theory requires
considerable
elaboration and modification to
provide
a framework for examining precapital-
ist
core/periphery hierarchies. In doing so,
several
supposed distinctive features of the
modern
world-economy must be seen as somewhat
different
repetitions of older patterns and
processes. The perennial problem of changes
in
intensity shading into qualitative changes
remains. One aspect, however, of the "modern
world-system"
that is clearly distinctive is
the
capability, through twentieth century
technological
means, to eliminate nomads as a
source
of social change.
These conclusions easily give rise to as
many
questions as they answer, and suggest a
number
of continuing research problems.
Speculations
First,
the preceding evidence and analysis
sheds
precious little light on the role and
significance
of wholly nomadic core/periphery
hierarchies
-- if indeed, such can even be
said to
exist. Further research, in this
case,
highly speculative based on archaeologi-
cal
evidence, will be required to discover if
anything
like a core/periphery hierarchy
existed
in a wholly nomadic setting. Analysis
of such
a core/periphery hierarchy would
compound
and conflate the problems of perme-
able
group boundaries and fluid group member-
ships
with ephemeral geographic boundaries.
Since,
by definition, the wealth of nomads is
portable,
wholly nomadic core/periphery hier-
archies
probably would have been very fragile,
and
marked by a very shallow gradient of
hierarchy. Hence, they would leave little
direct
physical evidence of their existence.
Since the formation of states so dramati-
cally
altered the entire social field, great
caution
must be used in using any post-state
nomadic
societies as bases for speculation
about
pre-state nomadic societies. This is
not to
say that the task is insurmountable,
but
that it must be approached with great
caution. The evidence for, or against, the
existence
of wholly nomadic core/periphery
hierarchies
will be quite thin.
Methodological and evidential problems
notwithstanding,
this suggests several inter-
esting
research questions. Were the forms of
states
that we know of from the historical
record
the only solution to these problems?
Were
there others? Could there have been
others
if the extant ones had not preempted
the
field? Do different solutions to the
ephemeral
quality of wholly nomadic settings
give
rise to different types of core/periphery
hierarchies?
Second, the profound social changes that
accompany
changes in transportation technology
suggest
parallels between the nomad - seden-
tary
distinction and the overland - maritime
distinction
elaborated by Fox (1971), Hochberg
(1985),
Genovese and Hochberg (1989), Tilly
(1989),
and Fox (1989). Horses, like sea
transport,
enhance communication over broad,
trackless
areas, and as with maritime powers,
do not
readily facilitate amassing permanent,
large
armies. Horses and ships do, however,
permit
sizable temporary amassings for rapid
attacks.
A key feature of nomadic empires,
like
maritime states, is their relative fra-
gility
and instability as compared with agrar-
ian
states and empires, and the typical depen-
dence
of the former on the latter -- albeit
with
many exceptions. The major differences
seem to
be that horses can be produced on the
trackless
area, where ships are built on land,
while
ships facilitate bulk trade, horses (and
camels
and mules) are better used for (rela-
tive)
luxury goods. How important were nomads
in the
diffusion of ideas and technologies?
Clearly,
they played a vital role in the
diffusion
of diseases, transmitting the
plagues
to both Europe and China (McNeill
1976).
Third, the inner and outer frontier strate-
gies
can be seen as precapitalist analogues of
strategies
for advancement used by semi-
peripheral
states in the "modern world-system"
--
right-wing, authoritarian regimes in alli-
ance
with capitalists and left-wing, class-
based
anti-systemic rebellions (Chase-Dunn
1990b). In both settings, the semiperipheral
players
can be either sources of stability, or
instability. This parallel warrants further
examination. Is the semiperipheral social
position
always a locus of change? Does the
role,
or set of possible roles, of the inter-
mediate
tiers of a core/periphery hierarchy
change
systematically with the type of
core/periphery
hierarchy? Do the roles change
with
the type of social unit (sedentary,
nomad,
state, nonstate) occupying the posi-
tion?
Whatever the answers to these questions,
the
evidence appears to be compelling that
the
study of social change must focus on
core/periphery
hierarchies, or at least the
intersocietal
context, and should not focus
exclusively
on various individual components
(states,
tribes, etc.) of the hierarchy.
Within the
system or hierarchy, peripheral and
especially
semiperipheral units play highly
variable
roles, which are at times crucial to
processes
of change. Specifically, nomadic
groups
have had major influences on the course
of
social change. The habit of pushing
bar-
barians
beyond the pale -- a military and
political
goal that was seldom achieved by any
empire
for any significant period of time --
is for
intellectual pursuits at best mislead-
ing,
and potentially disastrous for under-
standing
the processes and variations of
historical
evolution.
NOTES