EPILOGUE

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall

This is our opportunity to review the main

issues which have emerged from this collection

and to have the last word. There are a number

of major controversies, but one conclusion is

obvious: the world-systems perspective stimu-

lates new and fruitful approaches to pre-

modern socio-economic systems. Some of the

controversies are reflections of old debates

within the social sciences:

1. To what extent should we emphasize systemic

and evolutionary models versus historical

conjunctures?

2. What are the important similarities between

modern and premodern socio-economic sys-

tems and what are the qualitative differences?

3. Have there been major sea changes in the

logics of systems (transform ations) or have

there been only different mixes of logics (or

random changes)? How can we measure the

extent to which one logic is predominant over

another?

4. If there have been major transformations of

system logics, how can we theoretically

define and empirically measure these logics

and how can we explain the transforma-

tions?

A second set of issues are more particular

to our project as it is constituted in this volume:

1. How to define and bound world-systems?

2. How to define and measure core/periphery

hierarchies?

3. Does it make sense to compare stateless

intergroup systems with larger state-based

systems?

4. Is the comparison of a large number of

world-systems theoretically desirable? Is it

feasible?

5. Is the study of single world-systems over

very long periods of time a more fruitful

strategy?

6. Can the scientific study of the transforma-

tion of deep structural logics in world-

systems provide important clues about how the

modern global political economy might become

transformed?

Most of these problems are at least implic-

itly raised in each of the chapters in this

collection. We will discuss Chapters 2

through 8 to present our most recent reflec-

tions on these matters.

Chapter 2, Jane Schneider's path-breaking

discussion, raises many of the issues about

the nature and boundaries of world-systems.

Schneider argues that prestige goods exchanges

are important in reproducing and changing

power structures and thus they cannot be

considered epiphenomenal. The editors and all

of the authors in this volume agree with her.

Nevertheless the editors think that Immanuel

Wallerstein's emphasis on a division of labor

of bulk goods production and exchange should

not be abandoned because this is also impor-

tant to structural reproduction and change.

Thus we include both prestige goods networks

and bulk goods networks in our definition of

world-systems. This creates a boundary prob-

lem because the boundaries of these two types

of networks are rarely similar. We are most

likely to have at least two levels of integra-

tion: a number of regional bulk goods networks

linked together by a prestige goods network.

To complicate things further we also agree

with Wilkinson (Chapter 4) that regular polit-

ical/military competition and cooperation

should be used to bound world-systems. This

adds an additional degree of fuzziness to the

boundaries of world-systems because the net-

works of political/military interaction do not

usually correspond with the networks of pres-

tige goods exchange. This is discussed fur-

ther below.

The other problem which we need to mention

again is the use of modes of production to

bound world-systems. Wallerstein uses both

modes of production and bulk goods networks,

though he sometimes emphasizes one and some-

times the other. As stated in Chapter 1, he

argues that the European world-economy and the

Ottoman world-empire were separate systems,

but he does not argue that they engaged in no

trade of bulk goods. Rather he contends that

they were different systems because capitalism

was dominant in Europe but not in the Ottoman

Empire. We have claimed that the use of mode

of production criteria to spatially bound

world-systems is a theoretical mistake, but

this does not leave us in the same camp with

Gills and Frank, who argue that there are no

transitions between modes of production (accu-

mulation).

We think that capitalism (however defined)

did become predominant for the first time in

Europe, but that Europe was a subsystem of a

larger Afro-eurasian super-system. Europe had

not been a separate bulk goods network from

the rest of the Mediterranean littoral since

at least Roman times and the politi-

cal/military interactions and prestige goods

interactions between Europe and the other

areas of the Afro-eurasian super-system have

been important at least since the Greeks and

Phoenicians moved toward the west. Explana-

tion of the emergent predominance of capital-

ism in the European subsystem by focussing

exclusively on the uniqueness of European

feudalism or religion is a myopic exercise

which recent work by Abu-Lughod (1989) and

others has begun to correct.

Capitalist institutions were neither absent

from premodern and non-European systems, nor

were they randomly distributed among them.

The commodification of land, goods, wealth and

labor had been increasing, albeit unevenly, in

the Afro-eurasian super-system for thousands

of years. The empires of Central Civilization

were becoming increasingly commercialized. The

Roman and Chinese Empires were perhaps the

most capitalist of these, but within them the

tributary mode of accumulation remained pre-

dominant. Semiperipheral autonomous capitalist

city states were important agents of commodi-

fication that linked empires to one another

and to peripheral regions by marketized trade

(Chase-Dunn, 1991). The emphasis on continui-

ties stressed by Gills and Frank is an impor-

tant antidote to the quaint notion that Europe

was unique, but a more valuable approach would

study the ways in which commodification

emerged and spread within Central Civilization

and the other tributary world-systems. Only

this kind of approach can sensibly separate

the conjunctural aspects of the "rise of the

West" from its more evolutionary aspects.

Chapter 3 by Gills and Frank is an out-

standing contribution which focusses our

attention on the continuities which can be

found in the world-system. By claiming there

has only been one world-system for the last

5000 years they create many difficulties,

however. Their own definition belies this.

They argue that two regions are in the same

system if they importantly affect one anoth-

er. What about the pre-Columbian systems

described by Feinman and Nicholas and by

Peregrine? These were certainly not part of

the world-system. Wilkinson's approach is

superior. He is much more specific about how

he bounds his civilizations/world-systems and

he documents the expansion of the world-system

(his Central Civilization) without denying the

existence of others.

Gills and Frank also raise the issue of the

mode of production, which they call "accumula-

tion." Like Ekholm and Friedman (1982), they

deny that there is anything unique at the

level of the logic of accumulation about the

Europe-centered system which distinguishes it

from the earlier Eurasian system. As stated

above, we do argue that the Europe-centered

system was unique in the degree to which

capitalist accumulation became predominant. It

is possible to acknowledge many of the conti-

nuities which Gills and Frank describe while

still maintaining that the modern system is

qualitatively distinct in fundamental re-

spects.

One major difference between the modern

interstate system and the earlier systems of

political-military interaction is in the

nature of the cycle of political centraliza-

tion/decentralization. What are the similari-

ties and differences between the rise and fall

of empires and the rise and fall of hegemonic

core states in the modern world-system? An

important specification of the alternation

between empires and interstate systems is

presented by Wilkinson (see Figure 2 in Chap-

ter 4). The significant difference is that

the most successful states in the modern

world-system (the hegemons) do not try to

create universal empires, but rather act to

sustain the multicentric interstate system.

In premodern systems the most successful

states pursued a strategy of empire-formation

by conquest. Our explanation for this differ-

ence is the predominance in the modern world-

system of an alternative to the tributary

strategy of accumulation -- the accumulation

of wealth through the production of commodi-

ties. Capitalist accumulation thrives on a

politically multicentric system, and thus the

most successful states, which are now capital-

ist states, act to sustain the interstate

system, not to conquer it.

Wilkinson's larger theoretical apparatus

and his detailed specification in Chapter 4

are magnificent contributions. They are

conceptually explicit and clear. The fund of

empirical knowledge which Wilkinson shares

with the other civilizationists is detailed

and extensive. We have only a few demurs.

Wilkinson is a political scientist of the

international relations persuasion and the

histories upon which the civilizationists draw

are predominantly narratives about the wars of

the great men. When Wilkinson says that

"diamonds may be forever, but clubs are always

trumps" he is both making a witticism and

cleaving to a perspective which sees states as

the main actors in history. Wilkinson, like

Gills and Frank, does not believe in a major

sea-change which transformed the logic of the

game with the rise of the West. But the game

he thinks has continued to be played is dif-

ferent from the one hypothesized by Gills and

Frank. They emphasize the interaction between

economic exploitation and political domina-

tion, while Wilkinson sees political domina-

tion as the predominant logic of Central

Civilization in all ages.

This state-centric approach is reflected in

Wilkinson's use of political/ military inter-

action as the empirical means to spatially

bound world-systems. We agree that conflictual

interaction is important, but we expect that

the centrality of military conflict varies

across different kinds of systems, and we

argue that prestige and bulk goods networks

are also important forms of interaction. The

addition of these other criteria would compli-

cate Wilkinson's spatio-temporal schema.

Prestige goods networks are generally larger

than regularized political/military interac-

tion nets. China and Rome were linked by

prestige goods trade, but not by direct polit-

ical/military engagement. The mapping of

these three network criteria would usually

produce regional subsystems of bulk goods

exchange within larger systems of politi-

cal/military interaction within even larger

systems of prestige goods exchange.

We propose that: bulk goods networks be

called "regional subsystems," politi-

cal/military interaction networks be labeled

"world-systems," and prestige goods networks

be termed "supersystems." This sorts out

the issues rather clearly, we think, though

empirical work will undoubtedly raise many

more.

Wilkinson's definition of civili-

zations/world-systems raises another issue. He

uses both "level" and "interconnectedness"

criteria. We have already discussed the

interconnectedness aspect above in our consid-

eration of definitions and spatial boundaries

of world-systems. The "level" criterion is

similar to that used by other civilizationists

to differentiate between civilizations and

precivilizations. Wilkinson requires his

systems to have cities, record-keeping, eco-

nomic surplus and non-producing classes.

Gills and Frank also exclude intersocietal

systems which existed before the emergence of

urbanization and states in Mesopotamia 5000

years ago so they must also believe that some

such set of features is essential to a world-

system.

Our strategy is quite different. Instead

of emphasizing similarities we are searching

for differences. In variation we hope to find

explanations for the structural characteris-

tics of different kinds of world-systems.

Thus we extend the use of the term to class-

less, stateless systems. This raises many new

problems, but we believe that the effort to

include these very different kinds of systems

will be well worth the trouble. Our distinc-

tion at the conceptual level between world-

systems and core/periphery hierarchies is

helped immensely. Not only do different kinds

of world-systems have different kinds of

core/periphery hierarchies, but some world-

systems do not have them at all.

In terms of the "river system" analogy

employed by Gills and Frank to describe how

many smaller tributaries joined together to

form the world-system, we want to study creeks

and small streams. We believe that they will

be found to have some dynamics which are

generally similar to larger systems and yet

they differ in important ways. For example,

much recent research suggests that there is a

process of the rise and fall of chiefdoms

which is analytically similar to the cycles of

political centralization/decentralization

exhibited in the rise and fall of states,

empires and hegemonic core powers. We are not

claiming that this process is the "same" but

rather that the general similarities and the

important differences are worthy of investiga-

tion.

Does this mean that we are claiming that

every kind of human interaction system is a

world-system? If everything is inside a cate-

gory, the category is not useful. We are not

claiming a priori that all human groups live

in intergroup systems which importantly deter-

mine the conditions of social reproduction and

change. Rather we are arguing that whether or

not this is true should be examined. We do

exclude human interaction spheres in which all

the groups are extensively nomadic because we

believe that territoriality of some kind is

fundamentally important to the notion of a

world-system.

Another reason to include stateless, class-

less world-systems in our comparative study is

that this allows us to examine what everyone

would agree is a fundamental watershed in

system logic -- the transformation from the

kin-based modes to the state-based modes of

production (accumulation). We want to build

on the important work of Friedman and Rowlands

(1977) and Gailey (1987) to understand the

interplay between class formation, gender

hierarchy and pristine state formation in the

context of these tiny world-systems. For the

purposes of the long term goal of building a

theory of transformations this provides an

additional class of cases to serve as the

empirical foundation.

Wilkinson is also pleasantly explicit about

his usage of the terms core, periphery and

semiperiphery. His definitions differ from

ours. We distinguish between core/periphery

differentiation and core/periphery domination-

exploitation. Our concern is to create con-

cepts which do not carry more baggage from the

modern world-system than is desirable, and to

allow comparative research to fill in the

contents.

Wilkinson's usage more directly focusses on

political control or its absence. The semi-

periphery, in his usage, is a less developed

area which is under core control, while the

periphery is in trade or political contact

with the core, but not under control. We have

already endorsed the notion of the contact

periphery, but our periphery also includes

areas which are controlled and dominated by

the core. We also imagine that an area can be

economically exploited without being politi-

cally dominated (e.g., neo-colonialism in the

modern world-system). Our definitions would

produce different zonal boundaries -- most

evident in Wilkinson's maps in Figures 10 and

11.

Wilkinson's definition is not incompatible

with ours, but it does reflect differences in

what he calls "theoretical ancestors" as well

as differences in empirical scope. Because we

come from a neo-Marxian background we are more

likely to stress the importance of economic

exploitation. And because we want to examine

stateless systems we need to define

core/periphery relations broadly enough to be

able to capture very different kinds of inter-

societal inequalities.

We have already commented on the thoughtful

nature of Chapter 5 by Stephen Sanderson. We

agree that the world-systems perspective can

be thought of as evolutionary once the many

pitfalls of prior evolutionism have been

exorcised. We do not agree that "internal"

factors are generally more important than

world-system level factors in premodern sys-

tems, but that is a matter for research to

determine when hypotheses about the causality

of particular outcomes have been specified and

operationalized. For now we think that the

strong world-system position should be pushed

as far as it will go.

Sanderson follows Perry Anderson's claim

that European and Japanese feudalism were

institutionally unique compared to all the

other decentralized tributary systems on

Earth, and that this uniqueness accounts for

the strong development of European and Japa-

nese capitalism. It is our position that many

other regions had experienced the "parcelliza-

tion of sovereignty," but not in the context

of a larger system in which capitalist insti-

tutions were so fully developed. This, and

the decline of the East described by Abu-

Lughod, created an opportunity for semi-

peripheral Europe to form a new core region in

which capitalist-controlled cities were dense

and capitalist states became core states for

the first time. Earlier states controlled by

capitalists -- city states -- had been located

in the semiperipheral interstices between

empires. It was the formation of a regional

subsystem in which an interstate system was

dominated by states largely controlled by

capitalists which led to the eventual hegemony

of the West over a single global system.

Europe was simply in the right place at the

right time.

Peter Peregrine's study of Cahokia (Chapter

6) is an important contribution because it

shows how a complex chiefdom (or pristine

state) system can be analyzed as a world-

system. The description of this system as

based wholly on the monopolization of prestige

goods raises questions about the relationship

between this sort of control and other forms

of power. Friedman and Rowlands (1977) argue

that such systems are inherently unstable

because those who are dominated by symbolic

means can redefine the symbols or change their

beliefs. Thus such symbolic power needs to be

backed up by military power or by control over

less substitutable goods. In support of this,

the Cahokia-centered system was unstable. It

collapsed almost completely, and perhaps this

was due to over-reliance on the monopoly of

prestige goods. Even so, the rather hierar-

chical nature of the system makes us guess

that military and bulk goods aspects should be

given somewhat more attention than they re-

ceive from Peregrine.

Hall's discussion of nomads (Chapter 7)

raises many new questions without answering

them, but a few conclusions seem relatively

solid. First, failure to study the complex

roles of nomads in core/periphery hierarchies

will distort our understanding of the evolu-

tion and transformations of world-systems.

Second, the roles of nomads in core/periphery

hierarchies are complex, and are, at least in

part, understood only in the context of the

larger system in which they are embedded. Put

another way, frontiers are integral parts of

world-systems, even though they are -- by

definition -- on the fringe. Third, and more

tentatively, the technology of land transpor-

tation and communication in combination with

changing geopolitical structures accounts for

relative changes in the power of nomads within

various contexts. Once nomads are contained

within a bounded territory, and technology

exists to efficiently patrol that territory,

nomads cease to play a major role in

core/periphery hierarchy processes.

Both Central Asia and Northwest New Spain

appear to be unusual in the length of time

during which nomads played significant roles

in at least regional processes. We say "ap-

pear" because nomads have been so seldom

studied in this context that we cannot yet

realistically assess how unusual these cases

are. Regardless, these cases suggest openness

and sensitivity to other, more ephemeral yet

similar processes, in other locations and

other times. In particular, we should examine

the roles of nomads -- and others -- as inter-

mediaries between the various levels proposed

above: regional subsystems, world-systems, and

supersystems. Further empirical examination

of these will help refine or concepts and our

understanding of general processes.

The contribution by Gary Feinman and Linda

Nicholas (Chapter 8) reveals how archaeologi-

cal data can be used to examine the nature of

a regional division of labor. Their interest-

ing finding is that dependency emerges in this

region originally not on the basis of food

production but on the basis of craft produc-

tion, probably of prestige goods. This sug-

gests a sequence of core/periphery formation

which may also have occured in other early

world-systems.

Back to the Future

The comparative study of world-systems

poses potentially severe theoretical problems

for classical explanations of social change.

Most troublesome for Marxists is the possible

demotion of class from its central role as the

engine of social change. While it is certain-

ly premature to claim this to have been demon-

strated, it should be left open as a possibil-

ity that Marx was wrong to generalize the

centrality of class struggle in early capital-

ist Europe into the distant past. Class strug-

gle cannot have been the motor of change in

classless systems.

On the other hand, the more general Marxist

presuppositions employed by several anthropol-

ogists (e.g., Wolf, 1982) -- a focus on the

way in which social labor is mobilized in

connection with the production and reproduc-

tion of material life and the institutions

which regulate interaction -- may be the most

useful theoretical apparatus to employ for

developing a new general explanation of his-

torical development which focusses on world-

systems and core/periphery hierarchies. The

study of production, distribution and accumu-

lation ought to analyze the interaction be-

tween intrasocietal class relations and inter-

societal core/periphery hierarchies. And, as

with the modern system, we should examine the

transsocietal aspects of class relations.

The conceptual reformulations of world-systems

and core/periphery hierarchies presented in

this book knock all the endogenist versus

exogenist debates into a cocked hat. The

issue of the primacy of "internal" versus

"external" factors is transformed. We now need

to explicitly consider the multilevel nature

of all world-systems and to study the interac-

tions between levels.

The sorting out of what is external or

internal to which context is, of course,

complicated by the fuzziness of system bound-

aries. The designation of bulk goods regional

subsystem, political/military world-systems,

and prestige goods supersystems (or some other

set of terms) clarifies this problem somewhat,

but not completely. It is probably more

profitable to think in terms of degrees of

hierarchy, degrees of interconnectedness,

degrees of "systemness," and to study these

variables empirically. Stinchcombe's (1985)

comment that the early modern world-system was

a "ramshackle affair" remains cogent as does

John Hall's (1984) dissection of modern world-

-system holism.

Attention to context within larger networks

should also be paid in the comparative study

of the processes by which less hierarchical

systems become incorporated into more hierar-

chical ones. Small societies are transformed

into ethnic groups in the processes of incor-

poration, but the nature of these transforma-

tions may vary with the type of core/periphery

context.

The historical development from small

world-systems to the global one has been a

process of the emergence of larger and larger

levels of organization and the incorporation

of less hierarchical systems into more hierar-

chical ones. The transitions involved in

chiefdom formation, state formation, empire

formation, the rise and fall of hegemonic core

powers (and the possible future emergence of a

global state) may be seen as iterations of a

general process. It is the shared features in

the sequences of political centraliza-

tion/decentralization, the emergence of larger

levels of organization, and the general impor-

tance of core/periphery relations in these

processes, which are emphasized by Gills and

Frank, and Ekholm and Friedman.

But a closer study of these historical

patterns will reveal that there have been

important systematic differences across the

iterations. The clarification of these is

just beginning. The trick now is to employ a

comparative framework which can walk the

narrow trail between overly abstract general

model-building and overly specific emphasis on

uniquenesses and conjunctural circumstances.

Finally, we would like to extend our plura-

listic approach to the comparative study of

world-systems to include research strategies.

Synchronic, diachronic, comparative, and case

study strategies are all potentially useful.

Synchronic studies need to take into account

that contemporaneous world-systems may repre-

sent very different types of systems. The

degree of independence of cases becomes an

increasingly thorny problem through time.

Diachronic studies face the same problem in

spades. Even in a diachronic case study the

context is changing, but if the object of

study is a whole world-system this problem

should be reduced.

There are at least three broad strategies

for dealing with these problems comparatively.

The first is to examine a small number of

cases synchronically. This is certainly the

most feasible approach, and can be most help-

ful for addressing conceptual issues and for

making very general distinctions. It also

allows for another important product of case

studies -- the consideration of uniquenesses.

A second strategy is to make comparisons of

trajectories of change, that is to compare

long-term case studies -- Chapter 7 uses this

strategy. This approach can also be important

for formulating concepts and hypotheses about

processes of change. The third approach is to

make formal comparisons which examine varia-

tion across many different world-systems. This

approach can only be undertaken after concep-

tual work has been done and hypotheses about

comparative processes have been formulated and

operationalized. Though the problems of such

formal cross-world-system research are great,

it is the only design which can provide strong

evidence for or against hypotheses which are

derived from contending general theories of

historical development. Our effort in Chapter

1 to develop a typology of world-systems is

intended to facilitate such comparisons.

Hence, not taxonomic completeness, but a

preliminary and heuristically useful guide for

comparative studies is the goal of our set of

types.

Since we began this project we have found

many other social scientists who have been

working along similar lines and we have man-

aged to convince many others to join the

effort. We fancy that this might be the begin-

ning of the shift of social science from

multiparadigm childhood to grown-up normal

science, but if it is just one more turn in

the great sky-wheel which oscillates between

historical particularism and evolutionary

generalism, so be it. We are not convinced by

the current post-modern proclamation that

political and scientific progress is always an

illusion, though we certainly acknowledge that

the ideology of progress has been used as a

tool of oppression on many occasions. While we

think that the study of less hierarchical

societies may be able suggest ways for own

very hierarchical world-system to become more

humane in the future, we do not follow those

who romanticize the "primitive" because they

dislike the present. The contemporary involve-

ment of our own global political economy in

what almost everyone sees as important re-

structuring is a further source of inspiration

for a new study of the past. A "back to the

future" approach to the transformation of the

global world-system may turn out to be both

politically and scientifically progressive.

NOTES