Spatial and Other “Fixes” of Historical Capitalism1
by
Giovanni Arrighi
Capitalism
is the first and only historical social system that has become truly global in
scale and scope. Mapping this transformation over time is a particularly
challenging task. I have no disagreement with Christopher Chase Dunn’s and
Thomas Hall’s contention that the world capitalist system–like other
world-systems–can be described by means of four kinds of social interaction
networks, each operating at a different spatial scale: bulk goods networks at
the smallest scale, prestige goods and information networks at the largest
scale, and political-military networks at an intermediate scale (1997: 52-55).
This is a useful and illuminating proposition, and there can be little doubt
that a mapping of these networks over time for the world capitalist system
would provide compelling evidence of its peculiar expansionary character in
comparison with all other world systems.
Granted this, the resulting spatial-temporal
map would provide little information concerning the inner dynamic of historical
capitalism. It may even obscure the processes that have been associated with
its globalization over the last half millennium. Worse still, this
globalization has occurred through a tremendous increase in the number and
variety of each kind of network, as well as an increase in the scale of bulk
goods and military-political networks relative to prestige goods and
information networks. Without some theoretical guidance in the selection of the
networks to be mapped, there is a real risk of producing maps that are so
confusing as to be worthless.
The purpose of this paper is to
propose a conceptual map focused specifically on the processes
associated with the globalization of historical capitalism. This is not the
kind of map that this conference advocates. It is nonetheless a first necessary
step in the identification of the kind of geographic and historical information
that is needed in order to represent graphically the spatial-temporal dynamic
of historical capitalism. I shall begin with a brief discussion of David
Harvey’s (2003) concepts of “spatial-temporal fix,” “switching crisis,” and
“accumulation by dispossession.” I will then show that these concepts find a close
correspondence in the evolutionary pattern of world capitalism identified in The
Long Twentieth Century (Arrighi 1994) and developed further in Chaos and
Governance in the Modern World System (Arrighi and Silver 1999). I will
conclude by pointing to the kind of geographic and historical information that
would be most useful to represent graphically this evolutionary pattern and the
resulting globalization of historical capitalism.
I.
Spatial Fixes, Switching Crises, and Accumulation by Dispossession
In seeking
a connection between processes of capital accumulation and expansionist
political-military projects–such as the Project for the New American Century
that has inspired the US War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq–Harvey has
deployed a complex conceptual apparatus, the center-piece of which is the
notion of spatio-temporal fix. In his argument, the term “fix” has a double
meaning.
A
certain portion of the total capital is literally fixed in and on the land in
some physical form for a relatively long period of time (depending on its
economic and physical lifetime). Some social expenditures (such as public
education or a health-care system) also become territorialized and rendered
geographically immobile through state commitments. The spatio-temporal ‘fix’,
on the other hand, is a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to
capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion. (2003:
115)
Temporal deferral and geographical
expansion “fix” the overaccumulation crises that arise from the chronic
tendency of capital to accumulate over and above what can be reinvested
profitably in the production and exchange of commodities. As a result of this
tendency, surpluses of capital and
labor are left unutilized or underutilized. The incorporation of new space into
the system of accumulation absorbs these surpluses in two ways. At first, it
promotes their utilization in the activities involved in opening up the new
space and endowing it with the necessary infrastructure, both physical and social.
And then, once the new space has been adequately “produced,” the surpluses of
labor and capital can be absorbed in the new productive combinations that have
been made profitable by the spatial enlargement of the system of accumulation
(Harvey 2003: 109-112).
As Harvey notes, this metaphorical
meaning of spatial-temporal fix as solution to capitalist crises can and
recurrently does enter into contradiction with the material meaning of the
expression. For the geographical expansion, reorganization, and reconstruction
that absorb surplus capital and labor “threaten... the values already fixed in
place (embedded in the land) but not yet realized.” Hence,
The
vast quantities of capital fixed in place act as a drag upon the capacity to
realize a spatial fix elsewhere.... If capital does move out, then it leaves
behind a trail of devastation and devaluation; the deindustrializations
experienced in the heartlands of capitalism... in the 1970s and 1980s are cases
in point. If capital does not or cannot move... then overaccumulated capital
stands to be devalued directly through the onset of a deflationary recession or
depression. (Harvey 2003: 116)
Either way, spatial fixes can be
expected to be associated with interregional volatility and the redirection of
capital flows from one space to another. The redirection may occur smoothly, or
it may involve what Harvey calls “switching crises” (2003: 121-23; 1982:
428-29). Harvey does not spell out the relationship between overaccumulation
crises, spatial-temporal fixes, and switching crises. But the drift of his
argument seems to be that, while overaccumulation crises are the cause,
switching crises are a possible effect of the spatial-temporal fixes that
recurrently revolutionize the historical geography of capitalism. They stem
from resistance to the relocations involved in spatial fixes–a resistance that
at least in part originates from the contradictory logic of capital
accumulation itself. Indeed,“the more capitalism develops,” argues Harvey, “the
more it tends to succumb to the forces making for geographical inertia.”
The
circulation of capital is increasingly imprisoned within immobile physical and
social infrastructures which are crafted to support certain kinds of
production... labor processes, distributional arrangements, consumption
patterns, and so on. Increasing quantities of fixed capital... check
uninhibited mobility.... Territorial alliances, which often become increasingly
powerful and more deeply entrenched, arise.... to conserve privileges already
won, to sustain investments already made, to keep a local compromise intact,
and to protect itself from the chill winds of spatial competition.... New
spatial configurations cannot be achieved because regional devaluations are not
allowed to run their course. The uneven geographical development of capitalism
then assumes a form that is totally inconsistent with sustained accumulation
either within the region or on a global scale. (1982: 428-9)
In discussing the spatial fix that
in his view is most prominent in the present conjuncture (the emergence of
China as the main absorber of surplus capital), Harvey adds a new element to
the forces of geographical inertia that may prevent new spatial configurations
from being achieved: resistance to hegemonic change. For this “remarkable
version” of spatial-temporal fix “has global implications not only for
absorbing overaccumulated capital, but also for shifting the balance of
economic and political power to China as the regional hegemon and perhaps
placing the Asian region, under Chinese leadership, in a much more competitive
position vis-a-vis the United States.” This possibility makes US resistance to
a smooth spatial fix all the more likely, despite the fact that such a fix
holds out the best prospect for a solution of the underlying overaccumulation
crisis (Harvey 2003: 123-4).
The association between spatial
fixes and hegemonic shifts thus strengthens the “catch-22" that always
confronts previously leading centers of capitalist development. The
unconstrained development of capitalism in new regions brings devaluation to
these centers through intensified international competition. Constrained
development abroad limits international competition but blocks off
opportunities for the profitable investment of surplus capital and so sparks
internally generated devaluations (Harvey 1982: 435). If the competitively
challenged center is also a hegemonic center, either outcome threatens to
deflate not just its assets but its power as well.
Harvey envisages two possible ways
out of this catch-22. One is the use of financial means “to rid the system of
overaccumulation by the visitation of crises of devaluation upon vulnerable
territories” (2003: 134). And the other is the use of political and military
means to turn international competition to the advantage of the more powerful
states. The deployment of these means constitutes the “sinister and destructive
side of spatial-temporal fixes to the overaccumulation problem.”
Like
war in relation to diplomacy, finance capital intervention backed by state
power frequently amounts to accumulation by other means. An unholy alliance
between state powers and the predatory aspects of finance capital forms the
cutting edge of a “vulture capitalism” that is as much about cannibalistic
practices and forced devaluations as it is about achieving harmonious global
development. (2003: 135-6)
Harvey goes on to note that these
“other means” are what Karl Marx, following Adam Smith, referred to as the
means of “primitive” or “original” accumulation. He quotes approvingly Hannah
Arendt’s observation that “the emergence of ‘superfluous’ money... which could
no longer find productive investment within the national borders,” created a
situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
whereby Marx’s “original sin of simple robbery... had eventually to be repeated
lest the motor of accumulation suddenly die down” (Harvey 2003: 142). Since a
similar situation appears to have emerged again in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries, Harvey advocates a “general reevaluation of
the continuous role and persistence of the predatory practices of ‘primitive’
or ‘original’ accumulation within the long historical geography of capital
accumulation.” And since he finds it peculiar to call an ongoing process
“primitive” or “original,” he proposes to replace these terms with the concept
of “accumulation by dispossession.”
Historically, accumulation by
dispossession has taken many different forms, including the conversion of
various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into
exclusive property rights; colonial, semi-colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial
appropriations of assets and natural resources; and the suppression of
alternatives to the capitalistic use of human and natural resources. Although
much has been contingent and haphazard in the modus operandi of these
processes, finance capital and the credit system have been major levers of
dispossession, while the states, with their monopolies of violence and
definitions of legality have been crucial protagonists (Harvey 2003: 145-9).
But whatever its manifestations, agencies, and instruments,
What
accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including
labor power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Overaccumulated
capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable
use. (Harvey 2003: 149)
Accumulation by dispossession can
take place both at home and abroad. The more developed capitalistically a state
is, however, the greater the difficulties involved in practicing it at home,
and the greater the incentives and the capabilities to practice it abroad. It
follows that accumulation by dispossession is only in part a substitute for
spatial fixes to overaccumulation crises. To an extent that increases with the
development of capitalism in the states or regions facing overaccumulation
problems, it involves a spatial fix of its own–a spatial fix, that is, that
expands the geographical scope of the system of accumulation through the
forcible or fraudulent appropriation of something for nothing, rather than
through the exchange of nominally equivalent values.
II.
A Conceptual Map of Historical Capitalism
The
concepts reviewed in the preceding section can be used, as Harvey does, to
interpret current US dispositions to remake the map of the world to suit US
interests and values, in comparison with the dispositions that drove the
territorial expansion of capitalist states in the late 19th and
early 20th century. But they can also be used to interpret the
peculiar expansionary tendencies of historical capitalism over a much longer
time horizon than that encompassed by Harvey’s observations. This much longer
horizon stretches as far back in time as we can detect overaccumulation crises
that are in key respects comparable to the present one.
As I have argued in The Long
Twentieth Century, persistent systemwide overaccumulation crises have
characterized historical capitalism long before it became a mode of production
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Taking long
periods of “financialization” across political jurisdictions as the most valid
and reliable indicator of an underlying overaccumulation crisis, I identified
four partly overlapping “systemic cycles of accumulation” of increasing scale
and decreasing duration, each consisting of a phase of material expansion–in
the course of which capital accumulates primarily through investment in trade
and production–and a phase of financial expansion, in the course of which
capital accumulates primarily through investment in property titles and other
claims on future incomes. Contrary to the reading of some critics, the
identification of these cycles does not portray the history of capitalism as
“the eternal return of the same,” as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri put it
(2000: 239). Rather, they show that, precisely when the “same” (in the form of
recurrent system-wide financial expansions) appears to return, new
spatial-temporal fixes, major switching crises, and long periods of
accumulation by dispossession have revolutionized the historical geography of
capitalism. Integral to these “revolutions” was the emergence of a new leading
agency and a new organization of the system of accumulation.
A comparison of these distinct agencies and organizations
reveals, not only that they are different, but also that the sequence of these
differences describes an evolutionary pattern towards regimes of increasing
size, scope and complexity. This evolutionary pattern is summed up in figure 1
(the figure and much of what follows in this section are taken from Arrighi and
Silver 2001: 264-68). The first column of the figure focuses on the
"containers of power"—as Anthony Giddens (1987) has aptly
characterized states—that have housed the "headquarters" of the
leading capitalist agencies of the successive regimes: the Republic of Genoa,
the United Provinces, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Leading Regime
Type/Cycle Costs
Internalized
Governmental
Organization
Extensive
Intensive
Protection Production Transaction Reproduction
World-state
US
Yes Yes Yes No
British Yes Yes No No
Nation-state
Dutch Yes No No No
Genoese No No No No
City-state
Figure 1: Evolutionary Patterns of
World Capitalism
Source: Arrighi and Silver (2001: 265)
At the time of the rise and full
expansion of the Genoese regime, the Republic of Genoa was a city-state small
in size and simple in organization, which contained very little power indeed.
Yet, thanks to its far-flung commercial and financial networks the Genoese
capitalist class, organized in a cosmopolitan diaspora, could deal on a par
with the most powerful territorialist rulers of Europe, and turn the relentless
competition for mobile capital among these rulers into a powerful engine for
the self-expansion of its own capital. At the time of the rise and full
expansion of the Dutch regime of accumulation, the United Provinces was a
hybrid kind of organization that combined some of the features of the
disappearing city-states with some of the features of the rising nation-states.
The greater power of the Dutch state relative to the Genoese enabled the Dutch
capitalist class to do what the Genoese had already been doing—turn interstate
competition for mobile capital into an engine for the self-expansion of its own
capital—but without having to "buy" protection from territorialist
states, as the Genoese had done through a relationship of political exchange
with Iberian rulers. The Dutch regime, in other words, “internalized” the
protection costs that the Genoese had “externalized” (see Figure 1, column 4).
At the time of the rise and full
expansion of the British regime of accumulation, the United Kingdom was not
only a fully developed nation-state. It was also in the process of conquering
a world-encompassing commercial and territorial empire that gave its ruling
groups and its capitalist class a command over the world's human and natural
resources without parallel or precedent.
This command enabled the British capitalist class to do what the Dutch
had already been able to do—turn to its own advantage interstate competition
for mobile capital and "produce" all the protection required by the
self-expansion of its capital—but without having to rely on foreign and often
hostile territorialist organizations for most of the agro-industrial production
on which the profitability of its commercial activities rested. If the Dutch
regime relative to the Genoese had internalized protection costs, the British
regime relative to the Dutch internalized production costs as well (see Figure
1, column 5). As a consequence of this internalization, world capitalism continued
to be a mode of accumulation and rule but became also a mode of production.
Finally, at the time of the rise and
full expansion of the US regime of accumulation, the US was already something
more than a fully developed nation-state.
It was a continental military-industrial complex with sufficient power
to provide a wide range of subordinate and allied governments with effective
protection and to make credible threats of economic strangulation or military
annihilation towards unfriendly governments anywhere in the world. Combined with the size, insularity, and
natural wealth of its domestic territory, this power enabled the US capitalist
class to internalize not just protection and production costs—as the British
capitalist class had already done—but transaction costs as well, that is to
say, the markets on which the self-expansion of its capital depended (see
Figure 1, column 6).
This steady increase in the
geographical size and functional scope of successive regimes of capital
accumulation on a world scale is somewhat obscured by another feature of the
temporal sequence of such regimes. This feature is a double movement, forward
and backward at the same time. For each step forward in the process of
internalization of costs by a new regime of accumulation has involved a
revival of governmental and business strategies and structures that had been
superseded by the preceding regime. Thus, the internalization of protection
costs by the Dutch regime in comparison with the Genoese regime occurred
through a revival of the strategies and structures of Venetian state monopoly
capitalism that the Genoese regime had superseded. Similarly, the internalization of production costs by the British
regime in comparison with the Dutch regime occurred through a revival in new
and more complex forms of the strategies and structures of Genoese cosmopolitan
capitalism and Iberian global territorialism.
And the same pattern recurred once again with the rise and full
expansion of the US regime, which internalized transaction costs by reviving
in new and more complex forms the strategies and structures of Dutch corporate
capitalism (see Figure 1, columns 1 & 2).
This recurrent revival of previously
superseded strategies and structures of accumulation generates a pendulum-like
movement back and forth between "cosmopolitan-imperial" and
"corporate-national" organizational structures, the first being
typical of "extensive" regimes—as the Genoese-Iberian and the British
were—and the second of "intensive" regimes—as the Dutch and the US
were. The Genoese-Iberian and British
"cosmopolitan-imperial" regimes were extensive in the sense that
they have been responsible for most of the geographical expansion of world
capitalism. Under the Genoese regime, the world was "discovered," and
under the British it was "conquered." The Dutch and the US
"corporate-national" regimes, in contrast, were intensive in the
sense that they have been responsible for the geographical consolidation
rather than expansion of the historical capitalism. Under the Dutch regime, the
"discovery" of the world realized primarily by the Iberian partners
of the Genoese was consolidated into an Amsterdam-centered system of commercial
entrepots and joint-stock chartered companies. And under the US regime, the "conquest" of the world
realized primarily by the British themselves was consolidated into a
US-centered system of national states and transnational corporations.
This alternation of extensive and
intensive regimes blurs our perception of the underlying, truly long-term,
tendency towards the formation of regimes of increasing geographical scope.
When the pendulum swings in the direction of extensive regimes, the underlying
trend is magnified, and when it swings in the direction of intensive regimes,
the underlying trend appears to have been less significant than it really was.
Nevertheless, once we control for these swings by comparing the two intensive
and the two extensive regimes with one another—the Genoese-Iberian with the
British, and the Dutch with the US—the underlying trend becomes unmistakable.
The globalization of historical
capitalism has thus been based on the formation of ever more powerful
cosmopolitan-imperial (or corporate-national) blocs of governmental and
business organizations endowed with the capacity to widen (or deepen) the
functional and spatial scope of the system of accumulation. And yet, the more
powerful these blocs have become, the shorter the life-cycle of the regimes of
accumulation that they have brought into being—the shorter, that is, the time
that it has taken for these regimes to emerge out of the overaccumulation
crisis of the preceding dominant regime, to become themselves dominant, and to
attain their limits as signaled by the beginning of a new overaccumulation
crisis. Relying on Braudel’s dating of
the beginning of financial expansions, I have calculated that this time was
less than half both in the case of the British regime relative to the Genoese
and in the case of the US regime relative to the Dutch (Arrighi 1994: 216-17).
This pattern of capitalist
development whereby an increase in the power of regimes of accumulation is
associated with a decrease in their duration, calls to mind Marx's contention
that "the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself"
and that capitalist production continually overcomes its immanent barriers
"only by means which again place these barriers in its way on a more
formidable scale" (1962: 244-5). But the contradiction between the
self-expansion of capital on the one side, and the development of the material
forces of production and of an appropriate world market on the other, can in
fact be reformulated in even more general terms than Marx did. For capitalism as historical social system became
a "mode of production"—that is, it internalized production costs—only
in its third (British) stage of development.
And yet, the principle that the real barrier of capitalist development
is capital itself, that the self-expansion of existing capital is in constant
tension, and recurrently enters in open contradiction, with the expansion of
world trade and production and the creation of an appropriate world market—all
this was clearly at work already in the Genoese and Dutch stages of development,
notwithstanding the continuing externalization of agro-industrial production by
their leading agencies. In all instances the contradiction is that the
expansion of trade and production was mere means in endeavors aimed primarily
at increasing the value of capital. And yet, over time it tended to generate
more capital than could be absorbed profitably within the confines of the
extant spatial-temporal fix (in the material meaning of the expression),
thereby threatening to drive down overall returns to capital and thus deflate
its value.
The resolution of the ensuing
overaccumulation crises through a new spatial-temporal fix (in both meanings of
the expression) has taken relatively long periods of time–as a rule more than
half a century. In all instances, the resolutions have been punctuated by major
switching crises and have involved processes typical of accumulation by
dispossession. Although much in the modus operandi of these
processes has indeed been contingent and haphazard as Harvey suggests, in Chaos
and Governance my co-authors and I have nonetheless detected some
regularities, three of which are especially germane to our present concerns.
First, one kind or another of
financialization has always been the predominant response to the
overaccumulation problem of the established organizing centers of the system of
accumulation. Thanks to their continuing centrality in networks of high
finance, these centers have been best positioned to turn the intensifying
competition for mobile capital to their advantage, and thereby reflate their profits
and power at the expense of the rest of the system. Over time, however,
financial expansions have promoted the geographical relocation of the centers
of capital accumulation by rerouting surplus capital to states and regions
capable of ensuring a more secure and profitable spatial-temporal fix to the
overaccumulation crisis. Previously dominant centers have thus been faced with
the Sisyphean task of containing forces that keep rolling forth with ever
renewed strength. Sooner or later, even a small disturbance can tilt (and
historically have invariably tilted) the balance in favor of the forces that
wittingly or unwittingly are undermining the already precarious stability of
existing structures, thereby provoking a breakdown of the system of accumulation
(Arrighi and Silver 1999: 258-264).
Second, the states have been key
protagonists of the struggles through which old spatial-temporal fixes are
destroyed and fixes of greater geographical scope are attained. In the past,
switches to fixes of greater geographical scope were premised on the
interstitial emergence of governmental-business complexes that were (or could
plausibly become) more powerful both militarily and financially than the still
dominant governmental-business complex--as the US complex was relative to the
British in the early twentieth century, the British complex relative to the
Dutch in the early eighteenth century, and the Dutch relative to the Genoese in
the late sixteenth century. In the present transition, it is not yet clear
whether and how a governmental-business complex more powerful than the US
complex can emerge and eventually provide a solution to the ongoing
overaccumulation crisis. But in so far as the past dynamic of historical
capitalism is concerned, this tendency towards the formation of ever more
powerful governmental-business complexes is one of its most important features
(Arrighi and Silver 1999: 88-96, 263-70, 275-8, 286-89).
Finally, in each transition
accumulation by dispossession has provoked movements of resistance and
rebellion by subordinate groups and strata whose established ways of life were
coming under attack. Interacting with the interstate power struggle, these
movements eventually forced the dominant groups to form new hegemonic social
blocs that selectively included previously excluded groups and strata. This
increasing “democratization” of historical capitalism has been accompanied by a
speedup in the impact of social conflict on overaccumulation crises. Thus,
while the overaccumulation crisis of the Dutch regime of accumulation was a
long drawn out process in which systemwide social conflict came much later than
the systemwide financial expansion, in the overaccumulation crisis of the
British regime the systemwide financial expansion gave rise almost immediately
to systemwide social conflict. This speedup in the social history of capitalism
has culminated in the explosion of social conflict of the late 1960s and early
1970s, which preceded and thoroughly shaped the crisis of the US regime of
accumulation (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 153-216; 282-6; Silver 2003).
III.
Toward a Geographical Representation of Historical Capitalism
The
foregoing analysis suggests five basic rules that in my view are essential to a
minimally accurate geographical representation of the processes that underlie
the globalization of historical capitalism over the past half millennium.
Having run out of time, I can only list these rules and leave their further
specification for the presentation of the paper at the conference.
Rule # 1. The idea still
dominant in world-system analysis of a quantitatively expanding but
structurally invariant world capitalist systems must be abandoned, including
and especially the notion of Kondratieff cycles, hegemonic cycles, and
logistics as empirical manifestations of such a structural invariance. The
globalization of historical capitalism must instead be represented as involving
fundamental structural transformations of the spatial networks in which the
system of accumulation has been embedded.
Rule # 2. In this kind of
representation, priority should be given to the networks of each regime’s
leading business and governmental organizations. Due attention should be paid
to the fact that the spatial organization of “cosmopolitan-imperial”
(extensive) regimes is quite different from that of “corporate-national”
(intensive) regimes. Comparisons across time of the degree of globalization
attained by historical capitalism must take into account and highlight the most
important differences between these two kinds of regime.
Rule # 3. Representaions
should focus on those points in time that enable us to highlight not just
cyclical but structural transformations as well. Points in time close to the
change of phase from material to financial expansion are the most important
from both points of view. By comparing a succession of representations at such
times, we would highlight structural transformations. And by comparing each of
these representations with analogous representations at later points within the
life-time of the same regime, we would highlight the cyclical transformations
involved in the recurrence of overaccumulation crises.
Rule # 4. Representations of
any particular regime of accumulation at a late stage of its development,
should depict not just the dominant spatial fix but also the interstitial
emergence of agencies and networks that subsequently provided a solution to the
underlying overaccumulation crisis. If feasible, we should try to represent
also the interstitial emergence of other agencies and networks that never
became dominant but constituted plausible historical alternatives to those that
did.
Rule # 5. To the extent that
social conflicts are included in the representations, account should be taken
both of their concentration in periods of accumulation by dispossession, and of
their transformation from being a “dependent variable” to being an “independent
variable” in relation to overaccumulation crises. In any event, the
geographical mapping of social conflict requires concepts and techniques that
fall beyond the scope of this paper.
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