Religion and Radicalism in
Contemporary Transnational Social Movements:
The 2007
Rachel M. Meeker
Undergraduate Sociology Honors Thesis
2007-08
* Many thanks
to 2008 UCR Graduate student, Jesse Fletcher for his assistance, as well as UCR
distinguished Professor of Sociology Christopher Chase-Dunn and UCR Professor
Ellen Reese for their guidance in the formulation of this thesis and the use of
their survey data on the 2007 Nairobi World Social Forum. 5860 words, v. 6-23-08.
This document is available as IROWS Working Paper # 43.
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to explore the role of religion in contemporary transnational social movements (CTSM). A thorough analysis of survey data collected at the 2007 Nairobi World Social Forum (WSF) will be presented, as well as a data analysis of the global 1995 World Values Survey (WVS). By evaluating the data in terms of conflict theory, this essay will establish the religious trends among contemporary transnational social movements. Findings from the WSF support a conflict theory interpretation of the role of religion in CTSM. Some of the findings from the WSF are supported by the WVS results, though some WVS survey findings are not consistent with a conflict theory approach to the interpretation of religion in CTSM. This thesis advocates for further study of religion and political radicalism in CTSM, such as the WSF.
Introduction
In the past, the sociological literature
concerning religious social movements has often originated from the premise
that religious movements were the vestiges of a pre-modern history. Conversely,
secular social movements have been portrayed as necessary functional divisions
in modern society. It has, however, been apparent for some time that the
assumptions made regarding the nature of religious movements are incorrect.
Religion is more accurately characterized as an element of modern politics
through which adherents formulate their conceptions of morality and authority.
In other words, religion exists alongside secular humanism and science as a
source of functional division in modern society. Each of these paradigms are
simply alternative means of conceptualizing authority, ethics, morality, and
ontology. As such, the study of religious participants in transnational social
movements is a valid and necessary component in understanding the emerging role
of these social movements in world politics. Many questions should be raised
regarding the religious believers in participating in transnational social
movements. For example, how many of the participants involved in global justice
movements hold deeply religious convictions and how do the highly religious
participants differ from those who consider themselves less religious? This
research has been designed to answer these questions and explore many more.
For the purpose of this research, we will be
focusing on the World Social Forum (WSF) as an example of contemporary
transnational social movements. The WSF was established in response to
contemporary globalization and neoliberalism, as found in the World Economic
Forum. It was first held in
The hypotheses utilized in this
thesis are based on a conflict theory framework. In this framework, religiosity
is asserted to be the result of alienation and social oppression. Religion is
seen as a means of illusory compensation for the genuine happiness which comes
with freedom from oppression. Subsequently, religion is considered a product of
a condition which requires such an illusion, namely alienation. As such, those
who lack socio-economic and political power are expected to display a tendency
for high religiosity. Those who are not the object of oppression would
therefore be less religious or not at all religious (Marx & Engels, 1848;
Collins, 1975).
The purpose of this study is to
evaluate religion in contemporary transnational social movements (CTSM) using a
framework based on conflict theory, as opposed to a functionalist perspective.
Based on our theoretical framework, we hypothesize that the correlation between
religiosity and socio-economic standing is a negative correlation. Those who
are more advantaged politically and socio-economically, will tend to be less
religious whereas those who are disadvantaged socio-economically and
politically will be highly religious.
This
paper is divided into multiple sections. The first section will review the data
analysis, starting with WSF and WVS demographics and moving on to an analysis
of political radicalism in both the WVS and WSF survey data. The findings will then be discussed in terms
of theoretical implications and possibilities for improvement in future
research.
Data
Analysis
In both the WSF survey and the WVS,
respondents were asked to report their degree of religiosity (Figure 1, Figure
2). In our analysis, we cross-tabulated respondent religiosity with various
demographics. Special emphasis was placed on those demographics which highlight
inequalities, in order to determine if a conflict theory approach is
appropriate for examining religion in CTSM. All analysis was done using SPSS
and statistical significance was determined by Pearson Chi-Squared tests.
Statistical significance has not been given for WVS results, as sample size is
significantly large enough to ensure sample validity.
World
Social Forum Demographics
We now turn to the characteristics
of the attendees at the World Social Forums in 2007 (
Our analysis of WSF survey data
found significant correlations between degree of religiosity and the
self-identified demographics of the WSF respondents. In the WSF survey,
religiosity was identified in three categories. These categories were “Not
Religious”, “Somewhat Religious” and “Very Religious” (see Figure 1). Pearson
Chi-Square tests were run on all cross-tabulations to determine the significance
of each finding. Demographic categories of note were (1) geographic affiliation
with global north or south, (2) respondent national identity within World-systems,
(3) ethnicity, (4) class identity, and (5) relative income within country of
origin.
Respondents in the 2007 WSF survey
were asked to identify their country of origin. These responses were then
divided into two groups based on whether the reported country of origin
belonged to the global north or the global south. In terms of world-system
zones, as will be discussed later, it
should be noted that nations of the global north are analogous with core
nations. For global orientation in the
north or south, correlation was expected between global orientation and
religiosity. It was hypothesized that those from the north would be less likely
to be religious due to their position of global power. In support of this
hypothesis, the WSF survey data indicated that WSF respondents from the global
south tended to be more likely to be religious than WSF respondents from the
global north.
Of the percent within Global South,
over 49% of those who reported being from the global “South” also reported
being “Very Religious”, whereas only 12.5% who belonged to the global “North”
reported being “Very Religious”. Conversely, of the percent within Global
South, approximately 19% of those who were from the global “South” reported
themselves to be “Not Religious”, compared to the over 69% who were from the
global “North” who reported being “Not Religious” (Table 1.1). The Pearson
Chi-Square test on the cross-tabulation between Religiosity and North or South
orientation found a significance of .000 with a 95% confidence interval.
Based on the country of origin data
collected in the WSF survey, respondents were divided into world-systems zones.
Responses were coded as “Core”, “Semiperiphery” and “Periphery”. The expected
correlation was that respondents from periphery nations would be more likely to
be religious than other respondents due to their lack of global power. This
hypothesis was supported by the WSF survey data analysis. Among the “Periphery”
respondents, over half reported being “Very Religious”. Of the percent within world-systems,
69% of respondents who were from the “core” reported being “Not Religious”.
Conversely, 58% of respondents who reported being from a “Periphery” nation
also reported being “Very Religious” (Table 1.2). This indicates that there is
a negative correlation between religiosity and position within world-systems.
The Pearson Chi-Square test result was .000, indicating that this is a
statistically significant result.
In the process of evaluating
respondent country of origin, it necessary to consider a possible
over-representation of Kenyans or African respondents for the Periphery or
Global South categories due to the location in which the 2007 WSF survey took
place. When Kenyan respondents were isolated in the World-systems
cross-tabulation, it was noted that Kenyans were 73% of periphery respondents
and 40% of all the respondents at the WSF . This finding is statistically
significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000. Kenyan respondents
were also cross-tabulated with religiosity and it was found that the Kenyan
respondents are a significantly religious group. Of the percent within
Kenyan, 64% of Kenyan respondents at the
WSF reported being “Very Religious” and just under 30% of Kenyan respondents
reported being “Somewhat Religious”. Only 6% of Kenyans who were sampled at the WSF reported being “Not Religious”
(Table 1.3). These are statistically significant findings with a Pearson
Chi-Square test result of .000.
To determine whether high religiosity was
specific to Kenyans at the WSF or if this was also characteristic of other
African respondents at the WSF, two analyses of African respondents were
conducted. The first analysis juxtaposed WSF respondents from all African
nations with all other respondents. The second juxtaposed WSF respondents from
Sub-Saharan African respondents, excluding
The analysis of all African WSF
respondents found that Africans tended to be more religious than non-Africans.
Of the percent within African, among the African WSF respondents, just under
62% reported being “Very Religious”. In addition, 32% of African respondents reported being
“Somewhat Religious”, and only 5% reported that they were “Not Religious”. This
is a slightly less dramatic finding than that of Kenyan WSF respondents but it
is still notable. In contrast, non-African WSF respondents reported being less
religious. These findings are statistically significant with a Pearson
Chi-Square test result of .000.
When Sub-Saharan African WSF
respondents were isolated, the findings adjusted slightly but still supported
the overall observation that African WSF respondents reported being more
religious than non-African respondents. Of the percent within
SubSaharanAfrican, just over 63% of those who reported being from Sub-Saharan
Africa were “Very Religious” and 32% of WSF Sub-Saharan Africans reported being
“Somewhat Religious”. Only 4% of Sub-Saharan African WSF respondents reported
being “Not Religious”. Of the percent within SubSaharanAfrican, 15% of those
who reported that they were from “Other” nations also reported that they were
“Very Religious”. Only 23% of those who were from “Other” nations reported that
they were “Somewhat Religious”. Almost 62% of those respondents who reported
that they were from nations outside Sub-Saharan Africa reported that they were
“Not Religious” (Table 1.4). These findings indicate that African respondents
at the WSF, particularly Kenyans, are a highly religious demographic. These
findings are statistically significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of
.000.
Respondent age was obtained from
reported year of birth. Responses were then coded “35 and younger” and “36 and
older”. The expected correlation was that respondents 36 and older would be
more religious than those 35 and younger. The initial cross-tabulation
indicated the opposite. The 35 and younger group tended to be somewhat more
religious than the older group. However, the Pearson Chi-Square test result
showed a significance rate of .247. Based on this finding, the expected
correlation between age and religiosity is evidently absent. There is no
correlation between age and religion in the WSF survey data.
Class Identity responses were
recorded as “upper class”, “upper middle class”, “lower middle class”, “working
class” and “lower class”(Figure 4). These categories were collapsed into “upper
class to lower middle class” and “working and lower class”. The preliminary
hypothesis was that respondents identifying as lower or working class would
tend to be more religious than respondents who identified themselves with upper
or middle classes. This hypothesis is supported by the WSF survey data. Of the
percent within class identity, 48.6% of those that reported the class identity
of “working and lower class” claimed to be “Very Religious”. Conversely, 70.4%
of the respondents who identified with the “upper class to lower middle class”
reported that they were “Not Religious” (Table 2.0). The Pearson Chi-Square
test result was .002, indicating that this result is statistically valid and
that among WSF survey respondents there is a negative correlation between
religiosity and class identity.
Respondents were also asked to orient their
household income relative to other households in their country of origin.
Possible responses were “top one-fourth”, “second one-fourth from top”, “second
one-fourth from bottom” and “bottom one-fourth” (Figure 5) . The initial hypothesis was that respondents
identifying with lower quartiles of income distribution would be more religious
than respondents who identified with upper quartiles of income distribution due
to differences in economic power. This hypothesis was supported by the WSF
survey data. Of the percent within relative income, approximately 71% of those
in the top one-fourth income bracket reported that they were “Not Religious”.
Conversely, of the percent within relative income only 18% of the bottom
one-fourth reported that they were “Not Religious”. In fact, degree of religiosity was also
negatively correlated with income among those who reported that they were “Very
Religious”(Table 3.0). These findings are significant with a Pearson Chi-Square
test result of .000.
WSF survey respondents were asked to
report their gender. A correlation between gender and religiosity was expected.
It was hypothesized that female respondents would be more religious than male
respondents. The WSF survey data indicates that men are actually slightly more
religious than women. However, the chi-square test indicates that this is not a
significant finding at a result of .198.
The number of years of schooling also proved to be a statistically
insignificant variable in regards to religiosity. The correlation was similar
to income, as expected. The Pearson Chi-square test, however, indicates that
the results are not reliable at a significance of .092.
Religiosity was also cross-tabulated
with ethnicity. Respondents were asked
to identify their ethnicity or race. Respondents who reported that they were
“Black” and respondents who reported that they were “white” were cross-tabulated
with the variable for religiosity. It was hypothesized that those who reported
being “black” would be more religious than those who reported being “white”. In
keeping with the hypothesis, it was found that “blacks” did report being more
religious than “whites”. Of the percent within ethnicity, 58% the “black”
respondents reported that they were “Very Religious”. Of the percent within
ethnicity, only 42% of the “White” respondents reported that they were very
religious. Of the percent within ethnicity, over 66% of the respondents who
reported that they were “White” were “Not Religious”. Based on these findings,
it appears that there is a significant difference in religiosity across ethnic
groups. With a Pearson Chi-Square test
result of .000, these findings are statistically significant and may be related
to the findings for Kenyans, Africans and Sub-Saharan Africans respondents at
the WSF. The high religiosity of “black” respondents may be due in part to
their geographic origin and not solely their ethnicity.
When analyzing respondent employment
status, respondents who reported being “Unemployed”, “Part time” workers, and
“Full time” workers were cross-tabulated with the religiosity variable to
determine degree of religiosity. It was hypothesized that those who were
unemployed would report being more religious than those who reported
employment. In support of this hypothesis, those who reported being
“unemployed” tended to be more religious than those who reported that they had
some form of employment. Of the percent within employment status, over 64% of
those that reported themselves as “unemployed” also reported being “Very
Religious”. Conversely, of the percent within employment status, over 45% of
those who reported being employed “Full time” and over 45% of those who
reported being employed “Part time” also reported that they were “Not
Religious”. This indicates that there is a negative correlation between
religiosity and employment status. It may be asserted that this correlation is
related to the findings on income and religiosity. These findings are
statistically significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000.
Based on this demographic data,
there appears to be a strong correlation between global or socio-economic
position and degree of religiosity. This analysis has found that WSF
respondents from less advantaged backgrounds and nations tended to be more
religious than those from more advantaged backgrounds and nations. These
findings appear to support a conflict theory framework for the study of
religion in contemporary transnational social movements, such as the WSF. It
should also be noted that the high number of respondents who were Kenyans may
have created a sampling bias in respondents who identified with periphery nations and global south. This bias could not
thoroughly be tested, due to the insufficient number of respondents from
non-African periphery nations. In order to determine if the high attendance of
Kenyans at the 2007 Nairobi WSF may have skewed the results, this analysis
should be conducted again with data from a future WSF that has respondents more
representative of the nations within the within the periphery and global south.
World
Values Survey Demographics
We will now examine the characteristics of the
respondents for the World Values Survey that was conducted in 1995. The
following results are based on surveys administered by the European
Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. The surveys focus on sociocultural
and political change on a global level. Over 6000 respondents were surveyed
across the globe for the 1995 World Values Survey.
Our analysis of the WVS found significant correlations
between degree of religiosity and the self-identified demographics of the WVS
respondents. Religiosity was identified in four categories, namely “Not a
Religious Person”, “Religious Person”, “Convinced Atheist”, and “Other” (Figure
2). For compatibility with the WSF analysis, we will only be considering
respondents who reported being “Not a Religious Person” and “Religious Person”. Demographic categories of note were (1) class
identity, (2) socio-economic status, (3) age, (4) respondent national identity within World-systems
as represented by three countries, (5) income level, (6) gender, and (7)
employment status.
Respondents for the WVS were asked to identify
themselves as “upper class”, “middle class” and “lower/working class” (Figure
6). In keeping with the findings for the WSF survey, it was hypothesized that
those who reported that they belonged to lower classes would be more religious
than those who reported belonging to higher classes. This hypothesis was not
supported by the WVS data. Those who reported that they were “upper class”
tended to be slightly more religious than those who reported they were from the
“middle class” and “lower/working class”. Of the percent within social class,
approximately 78% of those who identified with the “upper class” reported that
they were a “Religious Person” while only 70% of the “middle class” and 71% of
the “lower/working class” reported being religious. Of the percent within
social class, approximately 18% of the “upper class” respondents reported that
they were “Not Religious” persons. For both the “middle class” and
“lower/working class” respondents, approximately 25% per group reported that
they were “Not Religious” persons (Table 4.0). These findings are statistically
significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000. The higher
religiosity of the upper class respondents is not consistent with the WSF
findings and may indicate either a sampling bias in one of the data sets or
that the religiosity of WSF attendees may not be representative of the global
population.
Respondent age was obtained from
reported year of birth. Responses were then coded “35 and younger” and “36 and
older”. It was hypothesized that those respondents who reported being 36 and
over would be more religious than those who reported being 35 or under due to
the increased socio-economic power of older demographics. This hypothesis was
supported by the WVS data. Of the percent within age, more than 69% of those
respondents who were “36 or older” reported being “Religious” persons. Slightly
lower than this is the approximately 66% of respondents “35 and under” who
reported being “Religious” persons. These findings were statistically
significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000. Due to the
statistical invalidity of the WSF Age and Religiosity results, this finding is
not particularly relevant to our discussion of the WSF respondents.
WVS respondents were evaluated in
terms of World-systems with three countries selected to represent the core,
periphery and semiperiphery. These countries were the
For employment status, it was
hypothesized that those respondents who were unemployed would be more religious
than those who were employed. This hypothesis was supported by the data from
the WVS. Of the percent within employment
status, almost 67% of those who reported being “unemployed” also reported being
“Religious” persons. This was less than the 69% of the “Religious” respondents
also who reported being “part time” but greater than the 64% of “full time”
workers who reported being “Religious” persons. It appears that degree of
employment is correlated with degree of religiosity, though not as clearly as
it is correlated in the WSF findings. This finding is statistically significant
with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000.
For income level, WVS respondents
were asked to identify their income level on a Likert scale from 1 to 10
(Figure 7). These responses were then coded as “top half” and “bottom half”
with bottom half being 1 through 5 and top half being 6 through 7. It was hypothesized that respondents who
identified themselves as low income would be more religious than those from the
higher income bracket. This hypothesis was not supported by the WVS data. Of
the percent within income, 64% of those who identified themselves as “bottom
half” of the income scale reported being “Religious” persons. For respondents
who identified themselves as belonging to the “top half” of the income scale,
approximately 73% reported being “Religious” persons (Table 6.0). These
findings are significant with a Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000.
WVS respondents were asked to
identify themselves as “male” or “female”. It was hypothesized that females
would be more religious than males. This hypothesis was supported by the WVS
data. Of the percent within gender, approximately 76% of those who identified
as “female” reported being “Religious” persons. For the respondents who
identified as “male”, approximately 64% also identified themselves as
“Religious” persons. These findings are statistically significant with a
Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000. Due to the statistical insignificance
of the WSF findings concerning gender, this result is not relevant to our
discussion of the WSF respondents.
Interestingly,
the hypotheses concerning income and class identity were not supported by the
WVS data and the results for employment status were erratically correlated.
The results for world-systems was also odd due to the overall high religiosity
of all respondents. One possible explanation for these results may be due to
the sampling for the WVS. People who are not religious or less religious may
not be inclined to participate in the WVS and people who are religious may be
more inclined to participate in the WVS. Another explanation for the
inconsistencies between the two data sets may be due to differences in the
phrasing of survey questions. In conducting our analysis we have attempted to
select variables that are as similar as possible in order to facilitate
comparison, though a perfect match was not possible. Regardless of the possible
sampling problems, the WVS still generally supports the WSF findings concerning
world-systems and religiosity.
Unfortunately, due to the statistical invalidity of the WSF findings on
gender and age, no statistically significant comparison can be made between the
two data sets concerning these variables.
Political
Opinion and Radicalism
Political Opinion variables in both
the WSF and the WVS data sets were cross-tabulated with Religiosity in order to
determine any correlation between religiosity and political radicalism. Based
on the proposed theoretical framework, it was hypothesized that respondents who
identified themselves as religious would be less radical than those who
identified themselves as not religious. All data was processed using SPSS and
statistical significance was determined through Pearson Chi-Square tests.
World
Social Forum Political Views
The WSF study found significant
correlations between degree of religiosity and respondent political opinions.
Religiosity was identified in three categories, namely “Not religious”,
“Somewhat religious” and “Very Religious”. Pearson Chi-Square tests were run on
all cross-tabulations to determine the significance of each finding. The main
political opinion category of note in the WSF survey was Political Views.
WSF respondents were asked to place
themselves on a Likert scale based on “left” to “right” political orientation
(Figure 8). It was hypothesized that respondents who identified themselves as
religious would orient themselves towards the political right whereas those who
identified themselves as not religious would orient themselves towards the
political left. This hypothesis was
supported by the WVS data. Of the percent within political views, 75% of those respondents who oriented themselves
with the political “far right” also reported being “Very Religious”.
Conversely, 67% of those respondents who
oriented themselves with the political “far left” also identified themselves as
“Not Religious” (Table 7.0). This indicates that there is a negative
correlation between religiosity and political radicalism. This result is in
keeping with the specified theoretical framework and is significant with a
Pearson Chi-Square test result of .000.
World
Values Survey Political Opinion
The WVS study found
significant correlations between degree of religiosity and respondent political
opinions. Religiosity was identified in three categories, namely “Not
religious”, “Religious” and “Convinced Atheist”. The main political opinion
categories of note in the WVS data set was Left/Right self-placement, as is
analogous to the WSF survey question on political views.
WVS respondents were asked to place
themselves on a Likert scale based on “left” to “right” political orientation
(Figure 9). It was hypothesized that respondents who identified themselves as
religious would orient themselves towards the political right whereas those who
identified themselves as not religious would orient themselves towards the
political left. This hypothesis was supported by the data. Of the percent
within Left Right Self Placement, 82% of those who oriented themselves with the
political far “right” reported being “Religious”, whereas 25% of those who
oriented themselves with the political far “left” and 32% who oriented themselves
to the number on the scale closest to the far left identified themselves as
“Not Religious” (Table 8.0). There appears to be a negative correlation between
religiosity and political radicalism among WVS respondents. These findings are
significant with a Pearson Chi-Square of .000 and support the proposed
hypothesis.
It should be noted that those
sampled in the WVS who reported being religious tended to orient themselves
more distinctly to the right than those in the WSF sample. This may indicate
that, though those who reported being “Very Religious” in the WSF sample were
less radical in their political orientation than those who identified as “Not
Religious”, the religious respondents at the WSF may overall represent a more
radical demographic of religious peoples than is found in the general
population, as represented by the WVS findings.
Discussion
Comparisons of religious and
non-religious respondents at the 2007 World Social Forum in
However, the findings in the WSF
survey respondents are not completely supported when we expand our examination
of religiosity and radicalism to the World Values Survey, which is intended to
be representative of the global population. Some variables of inequality within
the WVS indicate that upper class or high income respondents are more
religious. The respondents from the
Our research does, however,
entertain the likelihood that all religions are not the same in regards to
religiosity and political radicalism. Further research is needed on the topic
in order to distinguish how various religions differ on this topic. One
proposed hypothesis may be that there are important differences across various
religions in regards to religiosity and political radicalism. Future study
should also refer to other global data
sources for religiosity in order to determine whether the findings in this
study are representative of the global population.
Tables Index
Figure
1- WSF Religiosity Survey Question
|
Religiosity: WSF
Demographics II. 21 |
|
“How religious do you consider yourself?” -
Not Religious - Somewhat Religious - Very Religious |
Figure
2- WVS Religiosity Survey Question
|
Religiosity: WVS Beliefs V182 |
|
“Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say
you are?” - A religious person -
Not a religious person - A convinced
atheist -Other Answer |
Figure
3- WSF Nationality Survey Question
|
WSF- Demographics II.15 |
|
“What is your nationality or nationalities?” -Fill in the blank answer |
|
Table 1.1- WSF Nationality recoded into Global Orientation variable, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
|
Table 1.2- WSF Nationality recoded into World-systems variable, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
|
Table 1.3- WSF Nationality recoded into Kenyan variable, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
|
Table 1.4- WSF Nationality recoded into Sub-Saharan African variable cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
Figure 4- WSF Class Identity Survey Question
|
WSF Demographics II.25 |
|
“People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the
working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. In your current
situation, how would you describe yourself? Check one.” -Upper class -Upper
middle class -Lower middle
class -Working class -Lower class |
|
Table 2.0- WSF Class Identity recoded, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
Figure
5- WSF Income Survey Question
|
WSF Demographics II. 26 |
|
“Compared to other people in your country of residence, how
would you place your household income, including wages, salaries, pensions
and other incomes? Check one.” - Top ¼ - Second ¼ from
top - Second ¼ from bottom -Bottom ¼ |
|
Table 3.0- WSF Income variable cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
Figure 6- WVS Class Identity Survey Question
|
WVS Demographics V226 |
|
“People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the
working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you
describe yourself as belonging to the:” - Upper class - Upper
middle class - Lower middle
class - Working class - Lower class - Don't know |
|
Table 4.0- WVS Social Class variable cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
|
Table 5.0- Country variable recoded into World-systems variable, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
Based on country code for country in which survey was conducted.
|
|
|
Figure
7- WVS Income Survey Question
|
WVS Family Income V227 |
|
“Here is a scale of family incomes. We would like to know in
what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and
other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household
falls into, before taxes and other deductions.” 1
2 3 4
5 6 7
8 9 10 C
D E F
L H I
J K L |
|
Table 6.0- WVS Income variable recoded, cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
Figure
8- WSF Political Views Survey Question
|
WSF Political Opinions III. 31 |
|
“Which of the following describes your political views? - Far Left - Left - Center Left - Center - Center Right - Right
- Far Right - Indifferent - Not
sure |
|
Table 7- WSF Political Views variable cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
Figure 9- WSF Political Views Survey Question
|
WVS Political Opinions V123 |
|
“In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the
right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
10 DK= 99 Left Right |
|
Table 8- WVS Political Views variable cross-tabulated with Religiosity |
|
|
|
|
References
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B. 2003. “On The Attack”. New Left Review, 19, 41-60.
Collins,
Randall. 1975. Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science.
European
Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. WVS official file,
1995.
Online
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