Project Summary:

Trajectories and Causes of Structural Globalization: 1800-2000

Christopher Chase-Dunn


University of California, Riverside

(Submitted to NSF January 15, 2000)

v. 12-17-99 (7248 words)

The research here proposed is designed to examine the historical trajectories of these important types of globalization and the causes of these structural changes. Did the globalized world economy arrive all at once in a rapid and recent transition from national to global economic networks? Or rather are the processes of international integration long-term trends that have been going up for centuries only to be noticed recently because they have reached such a high peak?Or, alternatively, is globalization a cyclical phenomenon in which the world-system alternates between periods of national autarchy followed by periods of international economic and political integration?We propose a conceptualization of structural globalization as several inter-related dimensions of the expansion and intensification interaction networks. The real trajectories of different kinds of globalization over the last two centuries are knowable only if we gather comparable data over time.Studies of recent decades in which trends are well known do not answer the question of the shape of long-term trajectories.Our project improves upon data for the nineteenth century and splices earlier, cruder measures with later, more refined and more complete data series. And we will operationalize the main variables that have been hypothesized to cause expansions and contractions of global economic integration. 

The two main objectives of our proposed research are:

·to determine the trajectories of trade, investment and political globalization; and 

·to empirically examine the relationship between these and several other world-system variables that have been hypothesized to cause international economic integration.

The trajectories of different types of globalization have important implications for our understanding of the processes of development in the modern world-system. The results of our research will have important implications for understanding how the world political economy has been developing in recent decades as compared with earlier periods, as well as implications for potential future developments. 

Project Description:

Both the popular and the academic discourses about globalization contain great confusion and disagreement regarding the meaning and connotations of this contested term. We contend that the scientific study of globalization can move forward by making a clear distinction between globalization as greater integration and interdependence of the world-system, on the one hand, and the political discourses that employ ideas about global integration and competition to justify actions and policies on the other. Our research will distinguish between: 

·globalization as ideology, and 

·globalization as objective structural trends of spatial integration.

Our main focus is on different types of structural globalization, but we are also interested in understanding changes in the ideologies that are used to legitimate the actions of the powerful. Giovanni Arrighi is researching the transition from theories of national development to the neo-liberal 展ashington Consensus. Phillip McMichael (1996) describes the emergence of what he calls the 堵lobalization project a revitalized glorification of market mechanisms as allegedly efficient antidotes to rent-seeking and the 砺ampire state.The 堵lobalization project emerged with Thatcherism and Reaganism in the 1980s, and has swept around the world as a justification for attacking and dismantling welfare states and labor unions following the demise of the Soviet Union. While this is an interesting and consequential phenomenon,it is not to be the main focus of the research here proposed. 

Rather we intend to determine the real temporal trajectories of structural dimensions of global integration over the past two hundred years. We understand structural globalization as composed of different inter-related dimensions of expanding and intensifying interaction networks especially political, economic and cultural globalization (Chase-Dunn 1999).We specifically reject the notion that these dimensions constitute completely different aspects of social reality that should be studied separately by different academic disciplines, but we contend that it is useful to distinguish between them in order to understand how they have affected one another. 

Our research has already shown that trade globalization is primarily a cyclical phenomenon, though the most recent upsurge has reached a level that is significantly higher than the level reached at earlier peaks (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000).Here we propose to determine the trajectories of:

·investment globalization the extent to which international capital flows and investmentsincrease (or decrease) in relationship to the size of the world economy; and

· political globalization-- the degree to which the multipolity international system has moves toward centralization, integration and hierarchy. 

The quantification of political globalization will require measures of the relationship between the power and sizes of large and small political and military organizations in the world-system. We propose to operationalize these characteristics of the whole world-system over the past 200 year in order to compare their temporal trajectories with that of trade globalization, and to examine the hypothesized causes of these variables.

We define structural globalization as the increasing spatial scale and intensity of interaction networks. Charles Tilly (1995:1-2) proposes a similar definition of globalization as "an increase in the geographic range of locally consequential social interactions, especially when that increase stretches a significant proportion of all interactions across international or intercontinental limits." If both national level and global networks increase in intensity at the same rate, this approach would not see an increase in the globalization of interaction.Globalization in the structural sense is both integration and interdependence.

Human interaction networks have been increasing in scale and intensity for millennia as transportation and communications technologies have made regular trade and interaction over greater distances possible.It is obvious that the railroad and the steam ship facilitated a massive increase in the spatial scale of interaction networks.Ideally we would like to trace the relative degrees of interaction integration at several levels.Households exchange goods and ideas with other households. Neighborhoods and towns exchange with other neighborhoods and towns, cities with cities and etc.But such a study is not feasible at the present for two reasons: our unit of analysis is the world-system as a whole meaning all the countries of the world; and we want to examine trends over the past 200 years.It might be possible to examine local and regional interaction networks for a particular country or for a few core countries in recent decades. But in order to study the whole system over two centuries we must necessarily use data on the units that have been the main data-gatherers in this period of human history the national states. 

By this decision we do not mean to imply that national states are the only, or even the most important, actors in the world-system. We recognize the importance of transnational relations emphasized by political scientists thirty years ago (Keohane and Nye 1970; and more recently by Sklair 1995).The world-systems perspective has long pointed out that the interstate system the system of sovereign national states --is only one institutional structure of the global political economy.The world-system is composed of individuals, households, towns, cities, regions, firms, classes, states,and other non-governmental and international organizations.It is not simply a matter of 妬nternational relations. The world-system is the whole system, not just relations among states.Transnational relations occurring across state boundaries between all these social actors are not a new, nor a recent, phenomenon.Intersocietal migrations and trade among individuals, families and firms have been important aspects of small, medium and large world-systems for thousands of years. There was never a time in which the members of different societies did not importantly interact with one another (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).But the spatial scale of both societies and intersocietal interactions has grown. And intersocietal integration only became global in the sense of linking every region of the Earth into a single network in the nineteenth century.The unit of analysis we will study in this research is the modern Europe-centered system as bounded by the system of allying and conflict states. It was during the nineteenth century that the states systems of East Asia and Europe came together. 

If we think of the world economy as a system the phenomenon of globalization should represent increases in the intensity of global interaction networks relative to the intensity of local interaction networks.If both local and global interactions increase at the same rate it would be mistaken to say that the system is becoming more globalized.It is when global interactions increase at a greater rate than local interactions that the system qua system is more integrated at the global level. In order to study globalization in this sense we need to measure the intensity of both global and local interactions.

This study will focus on variable characteristics of the world-system as a whole.The questions we are asking here are about the continuities and changes at the level of the whole system, and so our empirical strategy will be to construct measures of how this single larger system changes over time. For this reason we have only one 田ase, though we can utilize the method of time series analysis to test propositions about the relationships among variables in this single case (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 15). 

Internationalization of finance and investment, the growth of international trade as a proportion of all economic interaction, and the organization of production on a global scale by transnational corporations have undoubtedly increased in the last two decades. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time.

Trajectories of Trade and Investment Globalization

We have constructed an improved measure that shows that there have been three waves of trade globalization since the early nineteenth century.Our new measure of trade globalization extends yearly data further back in time and greatly improves the time resolution relative to the widely spaced estimates that had been previously available. Our new measure of 殿verage openness trade globalization estimates the world level based on averages of country ratios of GDP to imports.Because both GDP and imports are available in country currencies (e.g. francs, pesos, etc.) we are able to estimate trade globalization without resorting to the problematic assumptions involved in converting country currencies into a single currency (e.g. U.S. dollars), and we did not have to convert the current values intoconstant values using estimates of inflation and deflation.The results of our study are forthcoming in the American Sociological Review (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000).[1] Our study of trade globalization shows that it is a cyclical phenomenon, as well as containing a long-term upward trend based on the comparison of the peaks of the cycles (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Average Openness Trade Globalization, 1830-1992 (Weighted)

It is possible that investment globalization behaves in a similar way, but we do not know for sure. Existing estimates of investment globalization (e.g. Bairoch 1996) are even more intermittent than estimates of trade globalization were before we undertook our ASR study.It would be desirable to have a better understanding of the relationship between investment and trade globalization and to be able to study the causes of both. In this proposal we outline our plan to improve upon the existing estimates of investment globalization in order to determine its trajectory, and we propose to begin the daunting task of testing the hypothesized causes of trade and investment globalization. 

Trajectory of Political Globalization

We conceptualize political globalization analogously to our understanding of economic globalization as the relative strength and density of larger versus smaller interaction networks and organizational structures.Much has been written about the emergence and development of global governance and many see an uneven and halting upward trend in the transitions from the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations and the United Nations toward the formation of a proto-world state. The emergence of the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the more recent restructuring of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade as the World Trade Organization, and the visibility of other international fora (the Trilateral Commission, The Group of Seven [Eight]; the Davos meetings,etc.) support the idea of emerging global governance.The geometric growth of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) is also an important phenomenon of global governance and the emergence of global civil society (Murphy 1994; Boli and Thomas 1999).

All world-systems go through cycles of political centralization and decentralization with occasional leaps toward new and higher levels of political integration (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). In the modern world-system the cycle for the last 400 years has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states. Some claim that this hegemonic sequence is now morphing into a new structure of core condominium (Goldfrank 1999).We intend to study both the hegemonic sequence and emerging global governance. While these might be combined into a more general concept of political globalization, we contend that it is important to keep them separate because hegemonic rise and fall is an old feature of the world-system, whereas political globalization is arguably much more recent.Political globalization can be analytically reduced to the question of the relative strength of larger vs. smaller political and military organizations (including also the functionally 兎conomic ones (IMF, World Bank, WTO) mentioned above.[2]

There is a single size distribution of political/military organizations in the world-system. We will operationalize three different parts of this size distribution, as well as the whole thing.Our conceptualization of political globalization will be analogous to our understanding of economic globalization a ratio of the size and importance ofglobal and international organizations vs. the sum of size and importance of national (and multinational) states.But we will also operationalize the hegemonic sequence by examining changes in the distribution of economic and military power among the core states using the research of Modelski and Thompson (1996).And we will study thechanging shape of the whole system of states as well, taking into account the processes of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980), the incorporation of the peripheral and semiperipheral regions into the interstate system, and changes in the distribution of economic and political/military power in the whole system of states.We will also combine political globalization, hegemonic rise and fall, and state power stratification into a single overall measure of the distribution of power among state and proto-state institutions. This latter we will call 登verall global political/military inequality.Before we describe our research plans we will give a brief overview of the main theoretical perspectives on the causes of economic globalization.

Causes of Economic Globalization

Figure 2 illustrates the propositions about the causes of trade and investment globalization that can be found in the social science literature.Because these overlap and to save space, we have included both investment and trade globalization in the same figure. The simplest economic explanation for the expansion of both long-distance trade and international investment is the decline of transportation and communications costs. This decline is a long-term and increasingly rapid downward trend (United Nations 1999: 30). It is also plausible that economies of scale in production and services will have a positive effect on both trade and investment globalization because it should become more efficient to have a few big global producers rather than many small producers in those industries in which scale economies are increasing.Changes in technology are here assumed to be the main driving force behind the expansion of economic globalization.

The major alternative hypothesis focuses on the structure of power in the international system of states. The general term that is used for this approach is 塗egemonic stability, though there are important differences in the way that hegemony is conceptualized and different hypotheses about the nature of the causal connections between hegemony and trade globalization.The general idea is that the international system is more than an 殿narchy of states competing and fighting with one another. World order is a product of international competition and cooperation.There is greater order and more peaceful interaction when a single hegemonic state has sufficient power and/or influence to coerce and cajole other states and international actors. Hegemony is sequential in that there is a systemic cycle of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers (Webb and Krasner 1989). 

Figure 2: Hypothesized Causes of Trade and Investment Globalization

When a hegemon declines, the system enters a period of rivalry among the great powers, and the levels of trade and investment globalization go down.Most of the discussions of hegemony agree that the Dutch performed the role of hegemon in the European interstate system of the 17th century, the British in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century.

There are three main arguments about the way in which hegemonic stability is linked with economic globalization, and these are shown in Figure 2. The first argument sees hegemony in predominantly military terms. The power of the hegemon is mainly a matter of its global reach, the ability to project intercontinental force. The early work of Modelski and Thompson (1988) focused on the distribution of naval power among the great powers as a measure of the rise and fall of hegemons.World trade is facilitated because the hegemon sets up the rules of international trade and acts as a power-balancer in the system of states. This produces a relatively peaceful international system of states, and so merchants trade with one another more freely and more often across international boundaries than they can when the system is split into warring factions.A more pacific and predictable international context also facilitates foreign investment. This approach predicts a sequence of upward and downward movements of economic globalization that correspond with the rise and fall of hegemons and with changes in the severity of warfare.

The second major mechanism alleged to causally link hegemony with economic globalization is the political implementation of free trade treaties and institutions that protect and encourage foreign investment.Most states most of the time have acquired revenues by means of taxing imports (import tariffs). But modern hegemonic core states have championed the ideology of free trade and tried to get other states to adopt free trade as their official policy and to lower international barriers to free market competition.It is well known that the British made a major (and partially successful) effort to get other core states to adopt liberal trade policies in the middle of the 19th century. It is less well known that the Dutch state produced similar ideology in the 17th century (the essays on the benefits free trade by Johan DeWitt, and Hugo Grotius痴 formulation of the law of the seas).And since World War II the United States has been the major protagonist in favor of reducing tariffs and other non-market barriers to international trade. It is argued that trade and investment liberalization policies are the major cause of economic globalization (Sachs and Warner 1995).

A third major approach emphasizes the importance of cultural and ideological leadership for hegemony.The idea here is that the international order is a normative system to an important extent, and that consensus about rules and goals are a central aspect of the operation of the system.Hegemony is thus not only a matter of economic and/or military power, but also a hegemon must formulate and propagate a universalistic ideology in which world order is legitimated by appeals to general values and goals.The sociologists who have argued the normative approach to world culture are John Meyer and his colleagues (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al 1997), as well as Volker Bornschier (1996) and Roland Robertson (1992). British international liberalism, U.S. 吐ree world development, and the neo-liberal 展ashington Consensus that has glorified free trade and international financial flows, are all examples of the ideological aspects of hegemony that are alleged to be major causes of greater economic globalization. Ideological hegemony probably facilitates international business confidence the comfort level of foreign investors, but this intervening variable can also operate with other factors.

In Political Science this approach has been advanced by those who study 妬nternational regimes (Keohane 1984, Krasner 1983), and the 兎pistemic communities of scientists and policy leaders who formulate key universalistic ideologies (Hass 1990; Whiteneck 1998).International regimes are normative agreements among important systemic actors that are alleged to constrain as well as facilitate the actions of the powerful

Most of these approaches agree that investment and trade globalization also facilitate one another and so we include positive causal arrows between these two forms of international economic integration in Figure 2.

Another important theoretical approach is formulated by those who understand hegemony as the predominance of a particular kind of 殿ccumulation regime that is brought to perfection first by a rising hegemon and then spreads across the system (Lipietz 1987; Kotz et al 1994).An accumulation regime is an unusually profitable combination of new technologies, economic organization and class relations that expands world markets by producing key goods relatively cheaply.The British in the 19th century are understood to have led the adoption of large-scale mass production firms using coal-fired steam generators to produce textiles, machinery, steamships, and railroad equipment.The U.S. hegemony was based on so-called 擢ordism, larger and larger corporately-held firms that developed assembly-line mass production using oil-based energy and 澱usiness unionism labor relations in which unions agreed to contend with capital only about wages and working conditions. 

The latest accumulation regime 吐lexible specialization is based on information technology that allows for the profitable production of small batches of customized goods by smaller firms who employ unorganized skilled workers who must continually learn new techniques.Though technology is an important component of the accumulation regime approach, class relations and economic organization are also important, and so the rise of new accumulation regimes is understood as an uneven and cyclical process rather than a smooth upward trend. Investment globalization is also hypothesized to be stimulated by increases in international profit and interest rate differentials.

A related approach is that of Giovanni Arrighi (1994), whose formulation of the rise and fall of 都ystemic cycles of accumulation notes the important shift toward emphasis on finance capital that occurs in the waning stages of hegemony. Though this has taken somewhat different organizational forms in the evolution from Genoese to Dutch to British and now U.S. hegemonies, each saw the hyper-development of profit-making from financial transactions in the period in which their comparative advantage was declining.Investment globalization is understood to result from this shift of capital away from profit making in production and trade to profit making based on financial transactions. This approach implies that the cycles of trade globalization should phase ahead of the cycles of investment globalization. 

It is plausible that both political globalization and the hegemonic sequence are caused by economic globalization and so any effort to test causal inferences will need to take the possibility of reciprocal causation into account.

Measuring Investment Globalization

In principle, investment globalization is the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. 吐oreigners).In practice we cannot easily measure the sum total of all invested or loaned capital (or the amount of domestically owned capital) over the desired time period, so we use the total of all the national GDPs to estimate the economic size of the world economy. World GDP thus serves as the denominator of our world totals estimate of investment globalization. 

The numerator includes most, but not all, international capital flows, ownership claims and debts. We do not include transfer payments made by individuals to their families in other countries. We do not include payments for imported or exported goods -- these are the basis of our measure of trade globalization. Nor do we include foreign reserves held by central banks in order to support their currencies in the world money market.But we do include loans and direct equity investment, repatriated profits and intrafirm transfers that cross state boundaries regardless ofwhom the parties to the transactions are.The transacting parties may be individuals, firms, banks or governments.In principle we want to measure all of the international financial transactions that involve claims of ownership, control or debt irrespective of who the parties are.And ideally we would like to systematically distinguish among these different kinds of international capital flows and obligations to see how they are similar or different in their geographical and temporal distributions. 

This latter desideratum will only be possible for the period after World War II. Before that we will find different combinations of the several types of international capital flows and obligations in the available data and we will need to be careful about how we combine and splice data series that contain different components.For example, for early periods we will be able to get data on loans made to governments, but not on loans made to private firms or individuals within a country.Whenever possible we will continue the less inclusive measures into periods in which more comprehensive and decomposable information is available and we will overlap less complete indicators with more complete ones. This will enable us to splice different data series in a more sophisticated way than simply switching from one to another as more complete data become available.[3]

We also need to pay close attention to the important distinction in international capital data between stocks and flows. Stocks are the total accumulation of debts or the book value of foreign investments at a particular point in time, while flows are the amount of moneys that flowed in (or out) over a short period, usually one year.

We propose to pursue two different strategies for constructing a long-term measure of investment globalization.These are loosely analogous to the 努orld totals and 殿verage openness strategies that we describe in our study of trade globalization. The first will involve gathering data on the main investing countries, (e.g. Britain, France, Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland) on both the outflows and the accumulated values of foreign loans and investments. This is the strategy that has been employed in earlier studies. It assumes that the great bulk of foreign capital comes from these countries and so efforts are concentrated where they reap the greatest informational returns.The disadvantage is that the number of countries with significant capital outflows increases over time and it is difficult to know how the missing cases might be affecting the estimate of the value of international capital. This method also requires the problematic assumptions involved in converting values into a single currency unit for purposes of comparison of different countries, and converting current into constant units for comparing over time.

Nevertheless we propose to upgrade the currently available estimates that use this approach by adding data from more investing countries.The most complete long-run data series on the value of international capital holdings has been compiled by Suter [1992:Appendix (f)]. We propose to improve upon Suter痴 compilation by adding data from additional investing countries and splicing the early series to a series compiled from more complete data after 1950. We will also try to disaggregate the 渡et figures used by Suter whenever possible for the countries that he did cover.Net figures are the balance of credits and debits.This cancels out a potentially important component of international capital flows and obligations. [4]

Our second strategy is similar to the 殿verage openness approach we developed for studying trade globalization.This will involve estimating 妬nvestment dependence for each country -- the ratio of the foreign debt to the national income (GDP), and then taking the weighted average of these as our indicator of world investment globalization.The advantage of this approach is that if does not require converting into a single currency and computing constant from current values.We already have the country currency GDPs (national income estimates) from Mitchell (1992,1993,1995) that we used for our measure of average openness trade globalization.For our new 殿verage investment dependence measure of investment globalization we will need to collect estimates of inflows and accumulated stocks and debts of foreign capital in country currencies for each country.[5]With complete data this indicator would be equivalent to the total sum of international capital flows and obligations divided by the world GDP. But as with average openness, we will not have complete data for the years before 1950. This will be a 都ampling problem in which the sample is biased because we will have more core countries than peripheral countries.This indicator will be compared with the results of our first strategy discussed above.

Measurement of Variables Thought to Cause Economic Globalization

Figure 2 above displays the variables thought to cause economic globalization.Our research efforts will be directed toward producing improved indicators of investment globalization and operationalizing political globalization.We will also use currently available data on other independent variables to test the inferences of causality indicated in Figure 2. 

The declines of transport and communications costs are assumed to be a geometric downward trend, and the few quantitative studies available reveal the problems of looking for changes in the rate of this downward plunge (e.g. U.N. 1999). Changes in the technologies make for abrupt breaks in time series. But it is safe to assume that the downward trend never flattens or turns upward.Economies of scale may not be so doggedly unidirectional. Indeed the flexible specialization literature implies a flattening or reversal of the long-term trend of firms to increase in size.Though this will be difficult to measure over the long run on a global scale we intend to measure the change over time in the size distribution of firms using employees and yearly revenues as indicators for as many countries as is possible. 

Modelski and Thompson (1988, 1996) have quantitatively measured the hegemonic sequence in its economic and military aspects.They examine the distribution of economic advantage and political/military power among core states of the world-system. They make an important distinction between long-range and short-range military capabilities that may have rather different kinds of importance for global and regional dynamics.Rasler and Thompson(1994) also demonstrate this convincingly. We will use their measures to examine the temporal relationship between the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers and the waves of economic globalization that we expect to find.

We also plan to operationalize a measure of the overall distribution of economic and political/military power among states. This will include peripheral and semiperipheral states and will take account of the waves of colonization and decolonization in the world-system since 1800.The distributional measures will also be combined into an overall index of changes in the magnitude of the distribution of economic and military power among states and proto-state institutions. This we will call 登verall global political/military inequality.

A major effort will be focused on the measurement of political globalization. 

We will construct a measure of the relationship between international organizational sizes and the summed sizes of states to indicate the magnitude of political globalization.We will update data from Banks (1975) on government revenues, military personnel and total government personnel. These three aspects of organizational size will be compared with analogous measures from global in international-regional political organizations.The numerators of our three indicators of political globalization will be the sums of the global and international-regional organizational size indictors, while the denominators will be the sums of the analogous indicators from the states. As with economic globalization, early and less reliable data series will need to be spliced into later, more reliable and more complete data.

We will also examine some of the hypothesized intervening variables between hegemony and economic globalization. The quantitative study of conflict as a system variable is easily accomplished by using available data on interstate warfare(Goldstein 1988: Appendix). Free trade agreements and policies are much studied and a plausible coding based on past efforts is feasible, though this should not be called true quantitative measurement. We do not propose a major new coding effort focussed on free trade policies, but we will use the information and periodizations that are available from the research literature.As for ideological hegemony, a quantitative study of degrees of consensus and based on content analysis would have to decide which documents and which issues to analyze.It would also be hard to determine the true origins of emerging ideas.This is a major project that is beyond the our capability given limited resources. 


The first task of analysis will be to use the new data we have coded on international capital flows and obligations to construct two new indicators of investment globalization. Then we will see how these relate to one another and study their temporal trajectories in comparison to what we have found for trade globalization.We expect that investment globalization will show a similar cyclical pattern, but it may not. We also will consider the question of a long-term trend in investment globalization, much as we did in our study of trade. 

The second analytical task will be to do the same thing for three our measures of political globalization.Will we find a trend or a cycle or both? Will these political globalization trajectories be similar or different from investment and trade globalization?

The third task is to make inferences about causality using multiple time series.Time series analysis as a statistical method is greatly hampered by the built-in assumption that things are in equilibrium.Developed mainly by economists, time series methods need to be applied carefully to large-scale historical processes that are quite unlikely to behave like a pendulum.Nevertheless, time series analysis can be used to study the causality of variable characteristics in a single case in which time points are the units of analysis. That is the situation that we find ourselves in when we want to test causal inferences at the world-system level.

It is likely that economic and political globalization may affect one another, so we need to use methods that can sort out reciprocal causality. And we want to see if hegemonic stability and the other variables illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed above do can be plausibly supposed to have caused economic globalization.Multiple time series analysis and Granger antecedence will be employed to test for causal relations among the different types of globalization, and to estimate the effects of those hypothesized causes that we are able to quantitatively operationalize.

Our research plan time-line is as follows: During the first summer we will focus on operationalizing investment globalization in consultation with Christian Suter.We will also improve upon our measure of trade globalization by adding data from East Asia. Preliminary results of our research will be presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association in August. In the Fall and Spring semesters we will begin working on political globalization. This will involve updating and improving upon Banks痴 Cross-Polity Time Series and coding personnel andbudgetary size data for global and international regional organizations.In the spring of 2001 we will present research results at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association. During the summer of 2001 we intend to complete the coding and construct the measures of political globalization and the other distributional measures discussed above.We will present another research report at the American Sociological Association meetings in August.In the third year we plan to operationalize the hypothesized independent variables and to perform time series analyses to test inferences about causality. The results of our causal analysis will be presented at the American Sociological Association meetings in August. 


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_______________________1998World Development Indicators

[1] The Appendix to our ASR article contains the aggregate trade globalization data as well as the results of comparison of our average openness measure with the traditional world totals approach. This is available at
[2]Our conceptualization of political globalization needs to include regional international organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, the European Community, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and etc.
[3] Economists typically assume that the slopes of least squares regression lines of two data series are the same in order to merge one series with the other. This would be a risky approach when we are dealing with variables that are known to be cyclical in nature. We will use a measurement error strategy that weights the different indicators according to our best guesses of how closely they measure the underlying theoretical concept. In practice this will usually mean that the more recent series will be given greater weight than the earlier series.
[4]Whenever possible we will compare the net figures with the credit figures to estimate how much error there is in the net figures. Christian Suter has agreed to help us improve his measure of international investment by serving as a consultant to our project. We also intend to improve our measures of trade globalization by adding information on East Asian interstate trade during the nineteenth century (Hamashita 1994).
[5]This means collecting data on country debits. We will also collect data on credits in country currencies and construct an analogous 殿verage investment dominance measure based on these.