Trajectories
and Causes of Structural Globalization: 1800-2000
Christopher
Chase-Dunn
Sociology
University
of California, Riverside
(Submitted to NSF January 15, 2000)
v. 12-17-99 (7248 words)
The
research here proposed is designed to examine the historical trajectories
of these important types of globalization and the causes of these structural
changes. Did the globalized world economy arrive all at once in a rapid
and recent transition from national to global economic networks? Or rather
are the processes of international integration long-term trends that have
been going up for centuries only to be noticed recently because they have
reached such a high peak?Or, alternatively,
is globalization a cyclical phenomenon in which the world-system alternates
between periods of national autarchy followed by periods of international
economic and political integration?We
propose a conceptualization of structural globalization as several inter-related
dimensions of the expansion and intensification interaction networks. The
real trajectories of different kinds of globalization over the last two
centuries are knowable only if we gather comparable data over time.Studies
of recent decades in which trends are well known do not answer the question
of the shape of long-term trajectories.Our
project improves upon data for the nineteenth century and splices earlier,
cruder measures with later, more refined and more complete data series.
And we will operationalize the main variables that have been hypothesized
to cause expansions and contractions of global economic integration.
The
two main objectives of our proposed research are:
·to
determine the trajectories of trade, investment and political globalization;
and
·to
empirically examine the relationship between these and several other world-system
variables that have been hypothesized to cause international economic integration.
The
trajectories of different types of globalization have important implications
for our understanding of the processes of development in the modern world-system.
The results of our research will have important implications for understanding
how the world political economy has been developing in recent decades as
compared with earlier periods, as well as implications for potential future
developments.
Project
Description:
Both the popular and the academic
discourses about globalization contain great confusion and disagreement
regarding the meaning and connotations of this contested term. We contend
that the scientific study of globalization can move forward by making a
clear distinction between globalization as greater integration and interdependence
of the world-system, on the one hand, and the political discourses that
employ ideas about global integration and competition to justify actions
and policies on the other. Our research will distinguish between:
·globalization
as ideology, and
·globalization
as objective structural trends of spatial integration.
Our
main focus is on different types of structural globalization, but we are
also interested in understanding changes in the ideologies that are used
to legitimate the actions of the powerful. Giovanni Arrighi is researching
the transition from theories of national development to the neo-liberal
展ashington Consensus. Phillip McMichael (1996) describes the emergence
of what he calls the 堵lobalization project a revitalized glorification
of market mechanisms as allegedly efficient antidotes to rent-seeking and
the 砺ampire state.The 堵lobalization
project emerged with Thatcherism and Reaganism in the 1980s, and has swept
around the world as a justification for attacking and dismantling welfare
states and labor unions following the demise of the Soviet Union. While
this is an interesting and consequential phenomenon,it
is not to be the main focus of the research here proposed.
Rather we intend to determine
the real temporal trajectories of structural dimensions of global integration
over the past two hundred years. We understand structural globalization
as composed of different inter-related dimensions of expanding and intensifying
interaction networks especially political, economic and cultural globalization
(Chase-Dunn 1999).We specifically
reject the notion that these dimensions constitute completely different
aspects of social reality that should be studied separately by different
academic disciplines, but we contend that it is useful to distinguish between
them in order to understand how they have affected one another.
Our
research has already shown that trade globalization is primarily a cyclical
phenomenon, though the most recent upsurge has reached a level that is
significantly higher than the level reached at earlier peaks (Chase-Dunn,
Kawano and Brewer 2000).Here we
propose to determine the trajectories of:
·investment
globalization the extent to which international capital flows and investmentsincrease
(or decrease) in relationship to the size of the world economy; and
·
political globalization-- the degree
to which the multipolity international system has moves toward centralization,
integration and hierarchy.
The
quantification of political globalization will require measures of the
relationship between the power and sizes of large and small political and
military organizations in the world-system. We propose to operationalize
these characteristics of the whole world-system over the past 200 year
in order to compare their temporal trajectories with that of trade globalization,
and to examine the hypothesized causes of these variables.
We
define structural globalization as the increasing spatial scale and
intensity of interaction networks. Charles Tilly (1995:1-2) proposes
a similar definition of globalization as "an increase in the geographic
range of locally consequential social interactions, especially when that
increase stretches a significant proportion of all interactions across
international or intercontinental limits." If both national level and global
networks increase in intensity at the same rate, this approach would not
see an increase in the globalization of interaction.Globalization
in the structural sense is both integration and interdependence.
Human
interaction networks have been increasing in scale and intensity for millennia
as transportation and communications technologies have made regular trade
and interaction over greater distances possible.It
is obvious that the railroad and the steam ship facilitated a massive increase
in the spatial scale of interaction networks.Ideally
we would like to trace the relative degrees of interaction integration
at several levels.Households exchange
goods and ideas with other households. Neighborhoods and towns exchange
with other neighborhoods and towns, cities with cities and etc.But
such a study is not feasible at the present for two reasons: our unit of
analysis is the world-system as a whole meaning all the countries of
the world; and we want to examine trends over the past 200 years.It
might be possible to examine local and regional interaction networks for
a particular country or for a few core countries in recent decades. But
in order to study the whole system over two centuries we must necessarily
use data on the units that have been the main data-gatherers in this period
of human history the national states.
By
this decision we do not mean to imply that national states are the only,
or even the most important, actors in the world-system. We recognize the
importance of transnational relations emphasized by political scientists
thirty years ago (Keohane and Nye 1970; and more recently by Sklair 1995).The
world-systems perspective has long pointed out that the interstate system
the system of sovereign national states --is
only one institutional structure of the global political economy.The
world-system is composed of individuals, households, towns, cities, regions,
firms, classes, states,and other
non-governmental and international organizations.It
is not simply a matter of 妬nternational relations. The world-system is
the whole system, not just relations among states.Transnational
relations occurring across state boundaries between all these social actors
are not a new, nor a recent, phenomenon.Intersocietal
migrations and trade among individuals, families and firms have been important
aspects of small, medium and large world-systems for thousands of years.
There was never a time in which the members of different societies did
not importantly interact with one another (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).But
the spatial scale of both societies and intersocietal interactions has
grown. And intersocietal integration only became global in the sense of
linking every region of the Earth into a single network in the nineteenth
century.The unit of analysis we
will study in this research is the modern Europe-centered system as bounded
by the system of allying and conflict states. It was during the nineteenth
century that the states systems of East Asia and Europe came together.
If
we think of the world economy as a system the phenomenon of globalization
should represent increases in the intensity of global interaction networks
relative to the intensity of local interaction networks.If
both local and global interactions increase at the same rate it would be
mistaken to say that the system is becoming more globalized.It
is when global interactions increase at a greater rate than local interactions
that the system qua system is more integrated at the global level.
In order to study globalization in this sense we need to measure the intensity
of both global and local interactions.
This
study will focus on variable characteristics of the world-system as a whole.The
questions we are asking here are about the continuities and changes at
the level of the whole system, and so our empirical strategy will be to
construct measures of how this single larger system changes over time.
For this reason we have only one 田ase, though we can utilize the method
of time series analysis to test propositions about the relationships among
variables in this single case (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 15).
Internationalization
of finance and investment, the growth of international trade as a proportion
of all economic interaction, and the organization of production on a global
scale by transnational corporations have undoubtedly increased in the last
two decades. There are potentially a large number of different indicators
of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns
with respect to change over time.
Trajectories
of Trade and Investment Globalization
We
have constructed an improved measure that shows that there have been three
waves of trade globalization since the early nineteenth century.Our
new measure of trade globalization extends yearly data further back in
time and greatly improves the time resolution relative to the widely spaced
estimates that had been previously available. Our new measure of 殿verage
openness trade globalization estimates the world level based on averages
of country ratios of GDP to imports.Because
both GDP and imports are available in country currencies (e.g. francs,
pesos, etc.) we are able to estimate trade globalization without resorting
to the problematic assumptions involved in converting country currencies
into a single currency (e.g. U.S. dollars), and we did not have to convert
the current values intoconstant
values using estimates of inflation and deflation.The
results of our study are forthcoming in the American Sociological Review
(Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000).[1]
Our study of trade globalization shows that it is a cyclical phenomenon,
as well as containing a long-term upward trend based on the comparison
of the peaks of the cycles (see Figure 1).
Figure
1: Average Openness Trade Globalization, 1830-1992 (Weighted)
It
is possible that investment globalization behaves in a similar way, but
we do not know for sure. Existing estimates of investment globalization
(e.g. Bairoch 1996) are even more intermittent than estimates of trade
globalization were before we undertook our ASR study.It
would be desirable to have a better understanding of the relationship between
investment and trade globalization and to be able to study the causes of
both. In this proposal we outline our plan to improve upon the existing
estimates of investment globalization in order to determine its trajectory,
and we propose to begin the daunting task of testing the hypothesized causes
of trade and investment globalization.
Trajectory
of Political Globalization
We
conceptualize political globalization analogously to our understanding
of economic globalization as the relative strength and density of larger
versus smaller interaction networks and organizational structures.Much
has been written about the emergence and development of global governance
and many see an uneven and halting upward trend in the transitions from
the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations and the United Nations toward
the formation of a proto-world state. The emergence of the Bretton Woods
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the
more recent restructuring of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
as the World Trade Organization, and the visibility of other international
fora (the Trilateral Commission, The Group of Seven [Eight]; the Davos
meetings,etc.) support the idea
of emerging global governance.The
geometric growth of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
is also an important phenomenon of global governance and the emergence
of global civil society (Murphy 1994; Boli and Thomas 1999).
All
world-systems go through cycles of political centralization and decentralization
with occasional leaps toward new and higher levels of political integration
(Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). In the modern world-system the cycle for the
last 400 years has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core
states. Some claim that this hegemonic sequence is now morphing
into a new structure of core condominium (Goldfrank 1999).We
intend to study both the hegemonic sequence and emerging global governance.
While these might be combined into a more general concept of political
globalization, we contend that it is important to keep them separate because
hegemonic rise and fall is an old feature of the world-system, whereas
political globalization is arguably much more recent.Political
globalization can be analytically reduced to the question of the relative
strength of larger vs. smaller political and military organizations (including
also the functionally 兎conomic ones (IMF, World Bank, WTO) mentioned
above.[2].
There
is a single size distribution of political/military organizations in the
world-system. We will operationalize three different parts of this size
distribution, as well as the whole thing.Our
conceptualization of political globalization will be analogous to our understanding
of economic globalization a ratio of the size and importance ofglobal
and international organizations vs. the sum of size and importance of national
(and multinational) states.But we
will also operationalize the hegemonic sequence by examining changes in
the distribution of economic and military power among the core states using
the research of Modelski and Thompson (1996).And
we will study thechanging shape
of the whole system of states as well, taking into account the processes
of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980), the
incorporation of the peripheral and semiperipheral regions into the interstate
system, and changes in the distribution of economic and political/military
power in the whole system of states.We
will also combine political globalization, hegemonic rise and fall, and
state power stratification into a single overall measure of the distribution
of power among state and proto-state institutions. This latter we will
call 登verall global political/military inequality.Before
we describe our research plans we will give a brief overview of the main
theoretical perspectives on the causes of economic globalization.
Causes
of Economic Globalization
Figure
2 illustrates the propositions about the causes of trade and investment
globalization that can be found in the social science literature.Because
these overlap and to save space, we have included both investment and trade
globalization in the same figure. The simplest economic explanation for
the expansion of both long-distance trade and international investment
is the decline of transportation and communications costs. This decline
is a long-term and increasingly rapid downward trend (United Nations 1999:
30). It is also plausible that economies of scale in production and services
will have a positive effect on both trade and investment globalization
because it should become more efficient to have a few big global producers
rather than many small producers in those industries in which scale economies
are increasing.Changes in technology
are here assumed to be the main driving force behind the expansion of economic
globalization.
The
major alternative hypothesis focuses on the structure of power in the international
system of states. The general term that is used for this approach is 塗egemonic
stability, though there are important differences in the way that hegemony
is conceptualized and different hypotheses about the nature of the causal
connections between hegemony and trade globalization.The
general idea is that the international system is more than an 殿narchy
of states competing and fighting with one another. World order is a product
of international competition and cooperation.There
is greater order and more peaceful interaction when a single hegemonic
state has sufficient power and/or influence to coerce and cajole other
states and international actors. Hegemony is sequential in that there is
a systemic cycle of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers (Webb and
Krasner 1989). 
Figure
2: Hypothesized Causes of Trade and Investment Globalization
When
a hegemon declines, the system enters a period of rivalry among the great
powers, and the levels of trade and investment globalization go down.Most
of the discussions of hegemony agree that the Dutch performed the role
of hegemon in the European interstate system of the 17th century, the British
in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th
century.
There
are three main arguments about the way in which hegemonic stability is
linked with economic globalization, and these are shown in Figure 2. The
first argument sees hegemony in predominantly military terms. The power
of the hegemon is mainly a matter of its global reach, the ability to project
intercontinental force. The early work of Modelski and Thompson (1988)
focused on the distribution of naval power among the great powers as a
measure of the rise and fall of hegemons.World
trade is facilitated because the hegemon sets up the rules of international
trade and acts as a power-balancer in the system of states. This produces
a relatively peaceful international system of states, and so merchants
trade with one another more freely and more often across international
boundaries than they can when the system is split into warring factions.A
more pacific and predictable international context also facilitates foreign
investment. This approach predicts a sequence of upward and downward movements
of economic globalization that correspond with the rise and fall of hegemons
and with changes in the severity of warfare.
The
second major mechanism alleged to causally link hegemony with economic
globalization is the political implementation of free trade treaties and
institutions that protect and encourage foreign investment.Most
states most of the time have acquired revenues by means of taxing imports
(import tariffs). But modern hegemonic core states have championed the
ideology of free trade and tried to get other states to adopt free trade
as their official policy and to lower international barriers to free market
competition.It is well known that
the British made a major (and partially successful) effort to get other
core states to adopt liberal trade policies in the middle of the 19th
century. It is less well known that the Dutch state produced similar ideology
in the 17th century (the essays on the benefits free trade by
Johan DeWitt, and Hugo Grotius痴 formulation of the law of the seas).And
since World War II the United States has been the major protagonist in
favor of reducing tariffs and other non-market barriers to international
trade. It is argued that trade and investment liberalization policies are
the major cause of economic globalization (Sachs and Warner 1995).
A
third major approach emphasizes the importance of cultural and ideological
leadership for hegemony.The idea
here is that the international order is a normative system to an important
extent, and that consensus about rules and goals are a central aspect of
the operation of the system.Hegemony
is thus not only a matter of economic and/or military power, but also a
hegemon must formulate and propagate a universalistic ideology in which
world order is legitimated by appeals to general values and goals.The
sociologists who have argued the normative approach to world culture are
John Meyer and his colleagues (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al
1997), as well as Volker Bornschier (1996) and Roland Robertson (1992).
British international liberalism, U.S. 吐ree world development, and the
neo-liberal 展ashington Consensus that has glorified free trade and international
financial flows, are all examples of the ideological aspects of hegemony
that are alleged to be major causes of greater economic globalization.
Ideological hegemony probably facilitates international business confidence
the comfort level of foreign investors, but this intervening variable
can also operate with other factors.
In
Political Science this approach has been advanced by those who study 妬nternational
regimes (Keohane 1984, Krasner 1983), and the 兎pistemic communities
of scientists and policy leaders who formulate key universalistic ideologies
(Hass 1990; Whiteneck 1998).International
regimes are normative agreements among important systemic actors that are
alleged to constrain as well as facilitate the actions of the powerful
Most
of these approaches agree that investment and trade globalization also
facilitate one another and so we include positive causal arrows between
these two forms of international economic integration in Figure 2.
Another
important theoretical approach is formulated by those who understand hegemony
as the predominance of a particular kind of 殿ccumulation regime that
is brought to perfection first by a rising hegemon and then spreads across
the system (Lipietz 1987; Kotz et al 1994).An
accumulation regime is an unusually profitable combination of new technologies,
economic organization and class relations that expands world markets by
producing key goods relatively cheaply.The
British in the 19th century are understood to have led the adoption
of large-scale mass production firms using coal-fired steam generators
to produce textiles, machinery, steamships, and railroad equipment.The
U.S. hegemony was based on so-called 擢ordism, larger and larger corporately-held
firms that developed assembly-line mass production using oil-based energy
and 澱usiness unionism labor relations in which unions agreed to contend
with capital only about wages and working conditions.
The
latest accumulation regime 吐lexible specialization is based on information
technology that allows for the profitable production of small batches of
customized goods by smaller firms who employ unorganized skilled workers
who must continually learn new techniques.Though
technology is an important component of the accumulation regime approach,
class relations and economic organization are also important, and so the
rise of new accumulation regimes is understood as an uneven and cyclical
process rather than a smooth upward trend. Investment globalization is
also hypothesized to be stimulated by increases in international profit
and interest rate differentials.
A
related approach is that of Giovanni Arrighi (1994), whose formulation
of the rise and fall of 都ystemic cycles of accumulation notes the important
shift toward emphasis on finance capital that occurs in the waning stages
of hegemony. Though this has taken somewhat different organizational forms
in the evolution from Genoese to Dutch to British and now U.S. hegemonies,
each saw the hyper-development of profit-making from financial transactions
in the period in which their comparative advantage was declining.Investment
globalization is understood to result from this shift of capital away from
profit making in production and trade to profit making based on financial
transactions. This approach implies that the cycles of trade globalization
should phase ahead of the cycles of investment globalization.
It
is plausible that both political globalization and the hegemonic sequence
are caused by economic globalization and so any effort to test causal inferences
will need to take the possibility of reciprocal causation into account.
Measuring
Investment Globalization
In principle, investment globalization
is the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by
non-nationals (i.e. 吐oreigners).In
practice we cannot easily measure the sum total of all invested or loaned
capital (or the amount of domestically owned capital) over the desired
time period, so we use the total of all the national GDPs to estimate the
economic size of the world economy. World GDP thus serves as the denominator
of our world totals estimate of investment globalization.
The
numerator includes most, but not all, international capital flows, ownership
claims and debts. We do not include transfer payments made by individuals
to their families in other countries. We do not include payments for imported
or exported goods -- these are the basis of our measure of trade globalization.
Nor do we include foreign reserves held by central banks in order to support
their currencies in the world money market.But
we do include loans and direct equity investment, repatriated profits and
intrafirm transfers that cross state boundaries regardless ofwhom
the parties to the transactions are.The
transacting parties may be individuals, firms, banks or governments.In
principle we want to measure all of the international financial transactions
that involve claims of ownership, control or debt irrespective of who the
parties are.And ideally we would
like to systematically distinguish among these different kinds of international
capital flows and obligations to see how they are similar or different
in their geographical and temporal distributions.
This
latter desideratum will only be possible for the period after World War
II. Before that we will find different combinations of the several types
of international capital flows and obligations in the available data and
we will need to be careful about how we combine and splice data series
that contain different components.For
example, for early periods we will be able to get data on loans made to
governments, but not on loans made to private firms or individuals within
a country.Whenever possible we will
continue the less inclusive measures into periods in which more comprehensive
and decomposable information is available and we will overlap less complete
indicators with more complete ones. This will enable us to splice different
data series in a more sophisticated way than simply switching from one
to another as more complete data become available.[3]
We
also need to pay close attention to the important distinction in international
capital data between stocks and flows. Stocks are the total accumulation
of debts or the book value of foreign investments at a particular point
in time, while flows are the amount of moneys that flowed in (or out) over
a short period, usually one year.
We
propose to pursue two different strategies for constructing a long-term
measure of investment globalization.These
are loosely analogous to the 努orld totals and 殿verage openness strategies
that we describe in our study of trade globalization. The first will involve
gathering data on the main investing countries, (e.g. Britain, France,
Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland) on
both the outflows and the accumulated values of foreign loans and investments.
This is the strategy that has been employed in earlier studies. It assumes
that the great bulk of foreign capital comes from these countries and so
efforts are concentrated where they reap the greatest informational returns.The
disadvantage is that the number of countries with significant capital outflows
increases over time and it is difficult to know how the missing cases might
be affecting the estimate of the value of international capital. This method
also requires the problematic assumptions involved in converting values
into a single currency unit for purposes of comparison of different countries,
and converting current into constant units for comparing over time.
Nevertheless
we propose to upgrade the currently available estimates that use this approach
by adding data from more investing countries.The
most complete long-run data series on the value of international capital
holdings has been compiled by Suter [1992:Appendix (f)]. We propose to
improve upon Suter痴 compilation by adding data from additional investing
countries and splicing the early series to a series compiled from more
complete data after 1950. We will also try to disaggregate the 渡et figures
used by Suter whenever possible for the countries that he did cover.Net
figures are the balance of credits and debits.This
cancels out a potentially important component of international capital
flows and obligations. [4]
Our
second strategy is similar to the 殿verage openness approach we developed
for studying trade globalization.This
will involve estimating 妬nvestment dependence for each country -- the
ratio of the foreign debt to the national income (GDP), and then taking
the weighted average of these as our indicator of world investment globalization.The
advantage of this approach is that if does not require converting into
a single currency and computing constant from current values.We
already have the country currency GDPs (national income estimates) from
Mitchell (1992,1993,1995) that we used for our measure of average openness
trade globalization.For our new
殿verage investment dependence measure of investment globalization we
will need to collect estimates of inflows and accumulated stocks and debts
of foreign capital in country currencies for each country.[5]With
complete data this indicator would be equivalent to the total sum of international
capital flows and obligations divided by the world GDP. But as with average
openness, we will not have complete data for the years before 1950. This
will be a 都ampling problem in which the sample is biased because we will
have more core countries than peripheral countries.This
indicator will be compared with the results of our first strategy discussed
above.
Measurement
of Variables Thought to Cause Economic Globalization
Figure
2 above displays the variables thought to cause economic globalization.Our
research efforts will be directed toward producing improved indicators
of investment globalization and operationalizing political globalization.We
will also use currently available data on other independent variables to
test the inferences of causality indicated in Figure 2.
The
declines of transport and communications costs are assumed to be a geometric
downward trend, and the few quantitative studies available reveal the problems
of looking for changes in the rate of this downward plunge (e.g. U.N. 1999).
Changes in the technologies make for abrupt breaks in time series. But
it is safe to assume that the downward trend never flattens or turns upward.Economies
of scale may not be so doggedly unidirectional. Indeed the flexible specialization
literature implies a flattening or reversal of the long-term trend of firms
to increase in size.Though this
will be difficult to measure over the long run on a global scale we intend
to measure the change over time in the size distribution of firms using
employees and yearly revenues as indicators for as many countries as is
possible.
Modelski
and Thompson (1988, 1996) have quantitatively measured the hegemonic sequence
in its economic and military aspects.They
examine the distribution of economic advantage and political/military power
among core states of the world-system. They make an important distinction
between long-range and short-range military capabilities that may have
rather different kinds of importance for global and regional dynamics.Rasler
and Thompson(1994) also demonstrate this convincingly. We will use their
measures to examine the temporal relationship between the rise and fall
of hegemonic core powers and the waves of economic globalization that we
expect to find.
We
also plan to operationalize a measure of the overall distribution of economic
and political/military power among states. This will include peripheral
and semiperipheral states and will take account of the waves of colonization
and decolonization in the world-system since 1800.The
distributional measures will also be combined into an overall index of
changes in the magnitude of the distribution of economic and military power
among states and proto-state institutions. This we will call 登verall global
political/military inequality.
A
major effort will be focused on the measurement of political globalization.
We
will construct a measure of the relationship between international organizational
sizes and the summed sizes of states to indicate the magnitude of political
globalization.We will update data
from Banks (1975) on government revenues, military personnel and total
government personnel. These three aspects of organizational size will be
compared with analogous measures from global in international-regional
political organizations.The numerators
of our three indicators of political globalization will be the sums of
the global and international-regional organizational size indictors, while
the denominators will be the sums of the analogous indicators from the
states. As with economic globalization, early and less reliable data series
will need to be spliced into later, more reliable and more complete data.
We
will also examine some of the hypothesized intervening variables between
hegemony and economic globalization. The quantitative study of conflict
as a system variable is easily accomplished by using available data on
interstate warfare(Goldstein 1988:
Appendix). Free trade agreements and policies are much studied and a plausible
coding based on past efforts is feasible, though this should not be called
true quantitative measurement. We do not propose a major new coding effort
focussed on free trade policies, but we will use the information and periodizations
that are available from the research literature.As
for ideological hegemony, a quantitative study of degrees of consensus
and based on content analysis would have to decide which documents and
which issues to analyze.It would
also be hard to determine the true origins of emerging ideas.This
is a major project that is beyond the our capability given limited resources.
Analyses
The
first task of analysis will be to use the new data we have coded on international
capital flows and obligations to construct two new indicators of investment
globalization. Then we will see how these relate to one another and study
their temporal trajectories in comparison to what we have found for trade
globalization.We expect that investment
globalization will show a similar cyclical pattern, but it may not. We
also will consider the question of a long-term trend in investment globalization,
much as we did in our study of trade.
The
second analytical task will be to do the same thing for three our measures
of political globalization.Will
we find a trend or a cycle or both? Will these political globalization
trajectories be similar or different from investment and trade globalization?
The third task is to make inferences about causality using multiple time series.Time series analysis as a statistical method is greatly hampered by the built-in assumption that things are in equilibrium.Developed mainly by economists, time series methods need to be applied carefully to large-scale historical processes that are quite unlikely to behave like a pendulum.Nevertheless, time series analysis can be used to study the causality of variable characteristics in a single case in which time points are the units of analysis. That is the situation that we find ourselves in when we want to test causal inferences at the world-system level.
It is likely that economic and political globalization may affect one another, so we need to use methods that can sort out reciprocal causality. And we want to see if hegemonic stability and the other variables illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed above do can be plausibly supposed to have caused economic globalization.Multiple time series analysis and Granger antecedence will be employed to test for causal relations among the different types of globalization, and to estimate the effects of those hypothesized causes that we are able to quantitatively operationalize.
Our
research plan time-line is as follows: During the first summer we will
focus on operationalizing investment globalization in consultation with
Christian Suter.We will also improve
upon our measure of trade globalization by adding data from East Asia.
Preliminary results of our research will be presented at the meetings of
the American Sociological Association in August. In the Fall and Spring
semesters we will begin working on political globalization. This will involve
updating and improving upon Banks痴 Cross-Polity Time Series and
coding personnel andbudgetary size
data for global and international regional organizations.In
the spring of 2001 we will present research results at the annual meetings
of the International Studies Association. During the summer of 2001 we
intend to complete the coding and construct the measures of political globalization
and the other distributional measures discussed above.We
will present another research report at the American Sociological Association
meetings in August.In the third
year we plan to operationalize the hypothesized independent variables and
to perform time series analyses to test inferences about causality. The
results of our causal analysis will be presented at the American Sociological
Association meetings in August.
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