North-South
Contradictions and Bridges at the World Social Forum*
Bamako Social Forum 2006
Chris Chase-Dunn, Ellen Reese,
Mark Herkenrath, Rebecca Giem,
Erika Gutierrez, Linda Kim and
Christine Petit
Forthcoming in Rafael
Reuveny and William R. Thompson (eds.) NORTH
AND SOUTH IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY. Blackwell.
v.
12-11-06 8452 words.
*Thanks
to Richard Niemeyer for producing the GIS map of WSF05 participant home places
in Figure 1 and to Toi Carter and Matt Kaneshiro for providing population data
broken down by age and gender.
This is IROWS Working Paper #
31 available at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows31/irows31.htm
University
of California-Riverside
Abstract:
This chapter uses the
results of a survey of participants at the World Social Forum that was held in
Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2005 to examine North-South differences within the
progressive sector of global civil society. We find significant differences in
both the characteristics and preferred strategies for social change among WSF
participants that reside in the core, semi-periphery, and periphery.
Understanding and overcoming such contradictions would help to promote more
effective cooperation among transnational social activists in global social
justice projects.
Keywords: North-South relations, global
inequality, transnational social movements, World Social Forum, semiperipheral
development, global social change
The World Social Forum (WSF) is both an open meeting
space and a movement of movements that are explicitly acting to oppose
neoliberal global capitalism and to address issues of global social justice and
environmental sustainability. It is also an organization governed by a charter
of principles and two leadership bodies: an International Council and a local
Organizing Committee. Because it is widely recognized that countries in the global
South are especially at risk of exploitation and domination, the world-level
meetings of the World Social Forum have all been held in the global South
(Porto Alegre, Brazil; Mumbai, India; and Nairobi, Kenya).[1] Overcoming global inequalities and injustices is
a major goal of those who are participating in the Social Forum process. This
paper focuses on North-South differences and complementarities among the people
and the movements that are participating in the World Social Forum using the
results from our survey of participants at the meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil
in January of 2005 (WSF05).
Civil society is a residual category of social organizations
that are not encompassed by either the state or the market (for a history of
the concept, see Calhoun 2001; Islamoglu 2001). It includes the family,
informal networks, social clubs and voluntary associations, non-state religious
organizations, and social movement organizations. We use the term transnational
civil society to mean those in civil society who are consciously
communicating, cooperating, and organizing across national boundaries (Amoore
and Langley 2004). In this chapter we are studying a particular portion of
transnational civil society – that segment that actively participates in, or is
allied to, the global justice movement and other progressive social movements.
The terminology of “North-South relations” has come to
refer to the relations between wealthy
powerful countries with poor and less developed ones (Reuveny and Thompson 2007
[forthcoming]). It is fair to say that most social science approaches to global
social change are core-centric, focusing mainly or only on the “great powers”
or the “advanced countries.” Our theoretical approach is the comparative
world-systems perspective that analyzes global inequalities as a
world-historically constructed hierarchy – an intersocietal stratification
system (Chase-Dunn 1998). This global
intersocietal hierarchy evolved out of the rise of European societies to power
over the rest of the world and it continues to exist despite the decolonization
of the Americas, Asia and Africa.[2]
This hierarchy is socially constituted and institutionally reproduced but it is
also repeatedly challenged by the organized and unorganized resistance of the
dominated and exploited peoples. The structure of global governance has evolved
in response to these challenges.
The terms we prefer are core, periphery and semiperiphery
defined as structural positions in a global hierarchy that is economic,
political-military and cultural. The core-periphery hierarchy at the global
level is organized spatially, but it is not a simple matter of latitude as
implied by the North-South terminology. It is a complex and multidimensional
hierarchy of different kinds of interrelated power and dependence relations.
The world-systems perspective also asserts that capitalism as a system is
dependent on successful exploitation and domination of the periphery and the
semiperiphery by competing core states and firms (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn
1985; Chase-Dunn 1998).[3]
The world-systems perspective holds that this global
hierarchy is a centrally important structure for understanding and explaining
world history and the trajectories of individual countries and regions. The
global hierarchy is reproduced over time in the sense that it is hard to move
up or down, although there is some vertical mobility. The semiperiphery,
composed of large states and national societies with intermediate levels of
development, is an important zone because innovations that transform
technologies and forms of organization tend to get implemented (and sometimes
invented) in the semiperiphery. It is a fertile location that produces
structural and evolutionary change. This is the hypothesis of “semiperipheral
development” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Chapter 5). Both the hypothesis of
semiperipheral development and the notion of the “necessity of imperialism” are
the main justifications for the assertion that core-periphery relations are a
key factor in the explanation of world historical social change.
The struggle of the elites to move up the hierarchy and
to stay on top requires hegemonic strategies that incorporate some of the
non-elites into developmental projects, but the resistance of those below to
domination and exploitation challenges hegemonic projects with new
counter-hegemonic strategies of protection and democratization. This systemic
core-periphery struggle is a major engine of world historical social change.
Efforts by local and national groups to come together in
transnational and international coalitions and organizations are not new. There
has been a series of world revolutions in which transnational and international
political alliances and organizations have played important roles for centuries
(Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1998). The
contemporary efforts by activists to overcome North-South cultural differences
and to deal with potential and actual contradictory interests between workers,
women, environmentalists, consumers, indigenous peoples etc. of the North and
the South need to be informed by both the failures and the successes of these
earlier struggles.
In the analyses that follow we use both the North-South distinction
and the core-semiperiphery-periphery distinction in order to compare the two.
The North-South breakdown we use is based on the World Bank’s classification of
countries into high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low
income countries, with the group of high income countries designated as the
global North. For the core-semiperiphery-periphery breakdown we use Jeffrey Kentor’s
(2000, 2005) measure, which includes indicators of military power and
international economic dependency along with indicators of national income (see
Appendix A). The “North” category is quite similar to the “core” as we have
trichotomized Kentor’s measure, except for eight countries that the World Bank
includes in its “high income” group (Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, New Zealand,
Portugal, Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel). We designate these as
semiperipheral.
We find that participants from countries in the periphery
are under-represented at WSF05, which is not surprising given the poverty
within that region and the location of the host country. Moreover, our results show
that a greater share of respondents from the periphery are affiliated with
externally sponsored non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which tend to have
greater financial resources to cover their members’ travel than self-funded
social movement organizations (SMOs) and unions. We also find that, despite
significant differences in the characteristics of participants from the
periphery, semi-periphery, and core, there are not significant differences in
terms of their opinions on a number of political issues. However, we did find
that, controlling for the effects of other factors, participants from the
semiperiphery (mostly Brazilians) are significantly less likely, compared to
other participants, to favor strategies that involve the creation of democratic
global governance institutions, but are more likely to favor the transformation
of the WSF into a global political actor.
How Inclusive is the
World Social Forum?
The
World Social Forum, despite official statements that decry the effort to represent
humanity as a whole[4],
tries to be broadly inclusive. Here and in other papers[5]
we present results that shed light on the extent to which this endeavor has
been successful.
Our survey is not a based
on a random sample of the participants, though we tried to make it as
representative as possible given the limitations of collecting responses during
the meetings. Toward that aim, we conducted our survey in three languages
(English, Spanish, and Portuguese) and surveyed participants at multiple types of
events and venues at the WSF meeting. To our knowledge, there have only been a
few surveys of WSF participants besides our own: Fundacao Perseu Abramo’s (FPA)
survey of participants at the 2001 meeting (Schönleitner 2003) and IBASE’s
(Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses) survey of participants at
the 2003, 2004, and 2005 meetings. In another paper (Reese et al. 2006), we compare some of our findings described below to
FPA’s findings about 2001 WSF participants and IBASE’s findings about 2005 WSF
participants, in order to get a better sense of how representative our sample
was to the total WSF participant population.[6]
In a nutshell, our findings about the demographic and social characteristics of
WSF participants are similar to those reported by FPA and IBASE, even though our
sample was more international compared to IBASE’s sample. About 54% of our
sample were Brazilian, compared to 80% of IBASE’s sample. We also found a
higher share (43%) of our respondents attended the Forum on behalf of a NGO
(FPA: 25%; IBASE: 34%) and that more of our respondents (49%) were attending on
behalf of a SMO (FPA: 13%; IBASE: 29%).
From whence did the participants in the 2005 WSF in Porto
Alegre come? Based on the 520 survey responses for which we were able to
ascertain the respondent’s home city, Figure 1 shows a global map of where they
came from. There were 163 cities plotted on this GIS map.
Figure 1: Residences of
participants in the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre
Obviously the “tyranny of distance,” despite the
long-term declining costs of long-distance transportation, continues to be a
major factor in shaping the geographical nature of participation in the WSF.
This can even be seen within South America. Fifty-six percent of the
participants came from Brazil.[7]
None of our respondents were from the Peoples Republic of China, except for the
five from Hong Kong, and none were from Russia.[8]
Table 1 shows the home region of the respondents of our survey.
|
|
Number of WSF
Participants |
Percentage of WSF
Participants |
Percentage of world
population in 2004 |
|
South America |
439 |
69% |
6% |
|
Western Europe |
67 |
10.5% |
12% |
|
North America(w/out
Mexico) |
53 |
8% |
5% |
|
Asia |
48 |
7.5% |
61% |
|
Africa |
9 |
1.4% |
12% |
|
Central America and
Caribbean |
7 |
1.1% |
3% |
|
Oceania |
2 |
.3% |
1% |
|
Total |
625 |
|
6,269,900,000 |
Table 1: Region of
residence of WSF05 respondents
Asia and Africa are the
most seriously under-represented world regions. Of course it is not just the
tyranny of distance that skews the participation in an event such as the World
Social Forum. People from different regions also have very different financial and
organizational resources and different degrees of connectivity to transnational
civil society. Table 2 shows the number and percentages of WSF2005 respondents
from the core, periphery and semiperiphery and compares these with percentages
of the world’s population in the countries in these categories.[9]
|
|
Number of WSF
Participants |
Percentage of WSF
Participants |
Percentage of world
population in 2005 |
|
Core |
125 |
20% |
13% |
|
Semiperiphery |
451 |
72% |
55% |
|
Periphery |
49 |
8% |
32% |
|
Total |
625 |
|
6,451,392,455 |
Table 2: Residence of
respondents by world-system zone
The core is slightly over-represented; the periphery,
which contains 32 percent of the world’s population, is seriously under-represented.
That is one reason why the 2007 World Social Forum will be held in Nairobi,
Kenya.
North-South Differences in Demographic and Social
Characteristics
In the analysis of demographic, social, and political
differences that follows we present the results broken down both by
world-system zone categories and by the North-South categorization shown in
Appendix A. As mentioned above, fifty-six (55.5%) of our respondents were from
Brazil. In this paper, we are particularly interested in comparing the views of
politically active participants of the WSF05, those who consciously
participating in transnational civil society.
We worried that some of the respondents were “drop-ins” who were
attracted to the atmosphere of the Forum but are not active within social
movements, and that this might be distorting our efforts to examine North-South
differences within the progressive sector of global civil society. We addressed
this concern by constructing a measure that we call “activists.” These are people who participated in at least
one political protest in the last year, or who report that they are actively
involved in a least one of the social movements listed in our survey, or who
have attended the WSF05 meeting on behalf of a social movement organization. Only
31 of our 639 respondents (4.9%) did not do at least one of these things. Although
some of these respondents may be emergent activists, many are likely to be
“drop-ins” who attended the WSF05 for non-political reasons, and so we excluded
them from our analyses of North-South differences among WSF participants. The
tables below include only those who qualify as social activists.
First, we will present and discuss the results of
cross-tabulations of North-South differences among attendees and then we will
further test the findings with multivariate logistic regressions. Table 3 shows
the gender breakdown by North-South and core, semiperiphery and periphery
categories.
Total WSF WSF North WSF South World
Population
Male 52% (309) 55% (74) 51% (235) 49%
Female 48% (282) 45% (60) 49%
(222) 51%
Core Semiperiphery
Periphery
Male 56%
(65) 50% (215) 66% (29)
Female 44%
(52) 50% (215) 34% (15)
(Numbers of respondents are in parentheses) Chi-Square= 4.675,
sig. =.10
Table 3: Gender
distribution among Social Forum Respondents in Porto Alegre, 2005[10]
Based on our sample of participants it is likely that
slightly more men (52%) than women (48%) attended the World Social Forum in
Porto Alegre in 2005. When the gender
numbers are broken down by North-South and core-semiperiphery-periphery
categories the story is similar, except for the periphery, where there is a
greater preponderance of men in attendance. [11] The differences were not large for any of the
categories except that of the periphery, where 66% of those attending were men
and only 34% were women. Recall that only 49 of our 625 respondents came from
countries that are categorized as being in the periphery. Nevertheless, this is nearly a statistically
significant difference between the gender breakdown among those from the
periphery and that of the whole group of attendees that answered our survey
(sig.=10%).
There are a number of plausible explanations for the
rather larger gender difference found for the attendees from countries of the
periphery. It could be that men are more likely to travel long distances than
are women, especially from countries in the periphery, or it could be due to
differences in income or education. Women from countries of the periphery still
typically do not have as many years of schooling as do men, and this affects
income, literacy, involvement in politics, etc. They also have higher fertility
rates and less access to child care services compared to women in the core,
making it more difficult for them to travel long distances.
Total WSF WSF WSF In Population of
Sample North South Countries from
Which
Attendees
Came
Under 26 years 42%
22% (30.5%) 47% (52%) 0-24= 46.6%
26-35 years 29%
38% (14%) 26%
(16%) 25-34= 15.4%
Over 35 years 29% 40% (55.5%) 26%
(32%) 35+= 38%
(Country
age percentages in parentheses)
Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Under 26 years
23% (30.5%) 49% (50%) 24%(58%)
26-35 years
36%(14%) 26% (16%) 37% (15%)
Over 35 years
42%(55.5%) 25%(34%) 39% (27%)
(Country age percentages in parentheses)
Chi-Square= 32.782 sig. = .000
Table 4: Age breakdown of
WSF05 Respondents and global population
Table 4 shows the age composition of WSF05 attendees and
compares this across respondents’ world system position. In the last column, we
report the average population share in each age group for all of the countries
from which respondents came. Forty-two percent of the whole group of attendees
were under the age of 26, and 49% of those from the semiperiphery were under
26. Brazil is in the semiperiphery and so a large number of the young people in
attendance were locals. But those who are included in this table have passed
the “activists” test mentioned above. The WSF attracts young activists and this
is also indicated by the fact that 23% of those who came from the core and 24%
of those who came from countries of the periphery were under 26 years of age.
But we should also recall that 47% of the population in countries from which
all attendees came are less than 25 years of age. The largest age differences
among attendees shown in Table 4 have to do with the larger numbers of young
people who come from the semiperiphery and older people who come from both the
core and the periphery. This is related to the different age structures within
the world-system zones. Peripheral
countries have only 27% of their populations that are over 35, while in core
countries it is 55.5%, so older people from the periphery are over-represented
while those from the core are under-represented. The percentage of young
attendees from the semiperiphery (49%) was almost equal to the percentage of
that age group in the general population of the semiperipheral countries from
which our respondents came (50%).
It may be that some of the same factors that explain why
significantly more of the attendees who come from countries of the periphery
are men also explain why attendees from the periphery tend to be older -- e.g.
income.
Table 5 shows the core-semiperiphery-periphery breakdown
by racial identification. These racial classifications were based on an
open-ended question in which respondents were asked to identify their race or
ethnicity; respondents’ answers were later recoded in terms of being “white” or
“non-white.”
|
|
White |
Non-white |
Total |
|
Core |
70% (49) |
30% (21) |
70 |
|
Semiperiphery |
51% (158) |
49% (153) |
311 |
|
Periphery |
15% (5) |
85% (29) |
34 |
|
Total |
212 |
203 |
415 |
(Numbers of attendees in
parenthesis) ChiSquare = 28.040 sig. = .000
Table 5: World-system
position breakdown by racial identification
The racial self-identification question was not popular, particularly
among people from Brazil, where silences about race and racism have a long history,
and in Western Europe, where discussions about “race” are often considered to
be “racist” (Telles 2004; Darder, Torres, and Miles 2004). Only 438 of our 639
respondents answered the question in a way that could be easily classified. The
remaining 201 gave no answer or answered by naming their religion or
nationality. Those who responded in terms of their nationality or failed to
answer the question mainly came from Western Europe and South America, namely
Brazil; surveyors noted that these types of responses seemed to be more common
among lighter-skinned people whose lack of “race consciousness” may reflect
their position of racial privilege (Reese et al. 2007).[12]
Global racial stratification is reflected in the attendees at the World Social
Forum. Seventy percent of those from the core (of those who chose to answer the
question) were self-identified as white, while only 51% of those from the
semiperiphery and 15% of those from the periphery were self-identified as
white. The differences shown in Table 5 are statistically significant. Race and
racism are North-South issues that must be addressed by all the
counter-hegemonic movements (Starr 2004; Reese et al. 2007 (forthcoming)).
Our results also show significant differences in terms of
respondents’ educational background. We found that 60% of the “activist”
attendees from the semiperiphery were currently students, while only 29% of
those from the core and 24% of those from the periphery were students (Chi-Square
= 47.286 sig. = .000). We also found that a significantly higher percentage of
attendees from the semiperiphery had less than sixteen years of education (54%),
while only 36% of those from the core and 43% of those from the periphery had
less than sixteen years. And an amazing 69% of the attendees from the periphery
had a degree in social sciences, while for those from the core it was 56% and
from the semiperiphery it was 48%. These differences are statistically
significant (Chi-Square = 6.289, sig. = .043). Social scientists are far more
frequently found among the progressive sector of global civil society than
their proportion in the larger world.[13]
Thirty-two percent of the surveyed attendees speak three
or more languages, and among those from the core it is an astounding 50%.
Thirty-three percent of the attendees from the periphery speak three or more
languages, while of those from the semiperiphery only 27% speak three or more.
These differences are statistically significant. These results show the
cosmopolitan nature of the attendees, and also that there are significant
differences in language ability among those from the different zones. The lower
percentage of respondents from the semiperiphery that speak three or more
languages is probably due to the large number of politically active locals from
Brazil who attended, who tend to be younger and have lower levels of formal education
than other WSF participants.
In sum, our analysis of respondents’ socio-demographic
characteristics suggests that WSF participants tend to be relatively young,
highly educated, and mainly Caucasian. Moreover, most respondents are from
Brazil and other (Latin American) countries at the world-system’s
semiperiphery. In fact, people from the semiperiphery turn out to be
overrepresented at the WSF when compared to its share in world population,
while there seems to be a strong presence of participants from North America
and Europe and a clear under-representation of people from the global
periphery. These findings corroborate the results found in the surveys of FPA
and IBASE (see Reese et al. 2006).
Political and
Organizational Involvements
The degree of political involvement also seems to differ
by world-system zone. We removed the non-political attendees from the analysis,
but the remaining activists differ amongst themselves in their level of
political activity. Twenty-nine percent of those from the semiperiphery
indicate that they participated in five or more political protests in the
previous year, while from the core it is 39% and from the periphery it is 38%.
This difference is statistically significant, and may reflect the large number
of Brazilian attendees and the fact that non-local participation in the Social
Forum requires a greater investment of time and resources than local
participation. Such costs tend to weed out those with lower levels of political
commitment. There may be other causes of the higher involvement of those from
the core. Political activity is correlated with income and education, and these
are relatively higher in the core.
A similar pattern is found in the responses to the
question about whether or not the person is attending on behalf of a social
movement organization. Twenty-six percent of those from the core said yes, as
did 28% of those from the periphery, while only 20% of those from the
semiperiphery said yes.[14]
These differences do not achieve statistical significance, and a somewhat
different pattern was revealed by the question about attending on behalf of an
NGO. Twenty-one percent of those from the core and 15% of those from the
semiperiphery said yes, while 40% of those from the periphery answered this
question in the affirmative (Chi-Square = 18.202 sig. = .000).[15]
The relatively higher proportion of those from the periphery who are attending
on behalf of an NGO may reflect NGOs’ greater access to organizational funds
compared to other kinds of political organizations as well as the efforts of
NGOs who support the WSF to help overcome the global inequalities that make it
difficult for people from the periphery to attend international meetings. These
differences are statistically significant.
Interestingly, affiliation with a union is highest among
core attendees (29%) and lowest among those from the periphery (23%), while 25%
of those from the semiperiphery are affiliated with unions. These differences
are not statistically significant. A different question about reporting to a
union finds the same pattern (15% in core, 11% in the semiperiphery and 5% in
the periphery), but these differences are also not statistically significant. The low level of union involvement among
attendees from the periphery is probably not related to the higher level of NGO
involvement because respondents were allowed to “check all that apply.” One could easily be affiliated with both a
union and an NGO. It is likely that union members in the periphery have lower
incomes and that their unions, which in some cases operate under conditions of
severe state repression, have fewer financial resources to use for world travel
than those in other world system zones. However, it may also be that union
members from the periphery are less sanguine about the benefits of
participation in transnational social movements than those in the core and the
semiperiphery.
Similarities and
Differences in Political Views
Is
there a growing convergence of political views among social activists from the
North and South? Valentine Moghadam (2005) has studied the global feminist
movement especially over the past three decades with an eye to understanding
how feminists have made progress in overcoming North-South differences. During
the 1960s and 1970s, transnational feminist organizing was largely dominated by
feminists from the global North, but there has been growing participation by
feminists from the global South. In these early years, there were significant
divisions between feminists from the global North and South in terms of their
priorities. Northern feminists focused more on gaining legal equality and on
expanding women’s reproductive rights, whereas Southern feminists focused on
issues associated with underdevelopment and colonialism. Such North-South
divisions were evident in the first and second United Nations conference on
women in Mexico City and Coppenhagen (Moghadam 2005: 5-6; Stienstra 2000). At
the third UN conference in 1985 in Nairobi, feminists focused on building
bridges among women and establishing a consensus.
Three historical
shifts facilitated a growing convergence among Northern and Southern feminists
in terms of their goals and priorities. First, global restructuring and the
rise of neoliberalism contributed to the decline of Keynesian welfare state,
creating new concerns among Northern feminists about economic rights. Second,
the new international division of labor relying heavily on cheap female labor contributed
to the international growth of unionization among women; it also raised
Northern feminists’ concerns about women’s labor rights. Finally, the rise of
fundamentalist movements in the global South increased Southern feminists’
concerns about reproductive rights and legal equality. The international
diffusion of feminist ideas also contributed to the growing convergence of
views among Northern and Southern feminists (Moghadam 2005: 5-6). These
developments led to a convergence between Northern and Southern feminists that
allowed them to better cooperate on common projects. Tensions between Northern
and Southern feminists remain however, over issues of leadership and
participation that are related to Northern feminists’ greater access to
resources (Stienstra 2000).
Research on other social movements indicates that
although transnational social movement cooperation tends to be concentrated
within regions, there is growing cooperation across the North-South divide
among organizations involved in various social movements; this may help to
reduce North-South differences in social activists’ political views over time (Smith
2004a, 2005; Smith and Wiest 2004; see also, Aguirre and Reese 2004; Brecher,
Costello, and Smith 2002 [2000]; Glasius and Timms 2006; Herkenrath 2006; Smith
2004b; Smith and Johnston 2002; Starr 2000; Tarrow 2005). To what extent do
North-South differences still exist for social activists in our sample, who are
active in a number of different social movements? If there has been a growing
convergence among activists in movements besides the feminist movement, we
would expect to find few differences in their political views. We find
significant differences in participants’ views across world system position
with regard to global governance issues, but do find similarities in their
views on other issues.
Attendees were asked whether they thought that capitalism
should be reformed or if it should be abolished and replaced. While 42% of the
activist attendees indicated that they were in favor of reforms, 58% indicated
that they were in favor of abolition and replacement. Those from both the core
and the semiperiphery were very close to this average percentage (with 58.4%
and 58.3%, respectively, favoring abolition), but only 56% of those from the
periphery chose abolition and replacement. This might indicate that attendees
from the periphery are slightly less radical, but the difference is very small
and not statistically significant. It is interesting to note, however, that
when we exclude Brazilian respondents from the analysis, participants from the
rest of the semi-periphery turn out to be significantly more radical than all
others, with a vast majority of 72% favoring abolition.
Another
interesting finding is that over half (58%) of our respondents agreed with the
proposition that the world needs less economic growth. Understandably a smaller
percentage of the attendees from the periphery agree with this, but it is still
widely held. Sixty-two percent of the respondents from core countries agree
that the world needs less economic growth, whereas 59% from the semiperiphery
and 49% from the periphery hold this view.
These differences do not attain statistical significance however,
perhaps because of the small number of respondents from the periphery.
Attendees were also given three options for international
financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and the World Trade Organization. The three options were: reform; abolish;
abolish and replace. As shown in table 6, 62% of all activist attendees favored
abolition and replacement, while 25% were in favor of abolition alone, and only
13% were in favor of reform. This result indicates that the activist attendees
are radical and that a very large number (87%) see a need to get rid of
existing global financial institutions. But these numbers differ significantly
across world-system zones. Participants from the periphery appear to be less
radical than those from the core. Eighteen percent of those from the periphery
favor reform, while for the core it is 11% and for the semi-periphery it is
13%. Although our sample of participants from the periphery is small and might
not be truly representative of all participants from this zone, their greater
propensity towards reform seems to be related to their strong connection to
NGOs; six out of the eight reformists from the periphery in our sample are
affiliated with NGOs. Seventy-four percent of respondents from the core favor
abolition and replacement, while for the semiperiphery it is 58% and for the
periphery it is 59%. This indicates that support for new kinds of global
financial institutions is much stronger among attendees from the core, although
it is also supported by a majority of those from the non-core. The pure
abolitionists (without replacement) are more frequently found in the
semiperiphery (28%) than in the core (15%) or in the periphery (25%). These
differences are significant at the .038 level.
Reform
Abolish Abolish and replace
Core 11%
(12) 15% (17) 74% (82)
Semiperiphery 13%
(54) 28% (113) 59% (235)
Periphery 18%
(7) 25% (10) 58% (23)
All respondents 13%
(73) 25% (140) 62% (340)
(Numbers of attendees in
parenthesis) ChiSquare = 10.156 sig. = .038
Table 6: Attitudes toward
international financial institutions by world-system position
Attendees were also given three options regarding a
future democratic world government: good idea and plausible; good idea but not
plausible; bad idea. Thirty-two percent of the activist attendees think that
democratic world government is a bad idea, while 39% think it is a good idea
but not plausible, and 29% think it is a good idea and is plausible (see table
7). Among those from the core only 16% say that democratic world government is
a bad idea, while in the periphery it is 23% and in the semiperiphery it is 37%.
At first, we suspected that this higher skepticism about democratic world
government in the semiperiphery was due to the large presence of locally
oriented activists from Brazil. However, when we exclude Brazilian attendees
from the analyses, the percentage of semiperipheral respondents opposing the
idea of a world government rises to 39% (results not shown in table 7). Thirty-nine
percent of those from the core think democratic world government is a good idea
and it is plausible, while 45% say that it is a good idea but not plausible.
The more sanguine core attitude toward global institutions found here and in
the question about international financial institutions may be related to the
fact that existing global institutions have been core controlled and that
democracy has been mainly institutionalized based on the cultural assumptions that
emerged from the European Enlightenment. These facts of world history are
likely to make non-core peoples skeptical about the possibility and
desirability of so-called democratic global governance. But even in the core
there is considerable skepticism about the real possibility of a democratic
world government. The interstate system is still strongly institutionalized
despite the rise of discourses about globalization.
Good idea Good idea Bad idea
and
plausible but not plausible
Core 39%
(40) 45% (47) 16% (17)
Semiperiphery 26%
(106) 37% (148) 37% (148)
Periphery 30%
(12) 48% (19) 23% (9)
All respondents 29%
(158) 39% (214) 32% (174)
(Numbers of attendees in
parenthesis) ChiSquare = 18.484 sig. = .001
Table 7: Attitudes toward
the idea of a global democratic goverment by world-system position
About half of the respondents agree that “The World
Social Forum should remain an open space for debate and should not itself take
public positions on political issues.”
But there is a notable difference among the respondents from the
semiperiphery; only 46% of the attendees from the semiperiphery agree with this
statement while 54% of attendees from the core and 57% of attendees from the
periphery do so. Since such a large share of respondents from the semiperiphery
reside in the host country of most of the WSF meetings, it is not surprising
that they feel more comfortable, compared to those traveling longer distances
to attend, with treating these meetings as representative bodies. Non-local
participants are more likely to have greater concerns that statements made by
WSF participants exclude the many voices of those unable to attend for
financial or other reasons.
Consistent with this
interpretation, when Brazilian participants are excluded from the analyses, the
share of respondents from the semiperiphery holding that the WSF must not take political
decisions rises to 52%. The debate between those who favor that the “movement
of movements” represented at the WSF become more of a global political actor,
and those who favor keeping the WSF an open space for public debate continues.
Multivariate Results
Tables 8-11 show the results we obtained from
multivariate binomial logistic regression analyses; we performed these analyses
to see whether the effects of world system zone on social activists’ political
opinions persist when the effects of other explanatory variables are taken into
account. To use binomial logistic regression, we transformed the political
attitude questions discussed above into dichotomous dependent variables. In the
models below, we control for participants’ gender, generation, union
affiliation, NGO affiliation, affiliation with a social movement organization
(SMO), affiliation with at least one political organization, and Brazilian
residence. As above, all of the tables below report results only for
respondents who are social activists; we excluded the 31 “non-activists” in our
original sample from our logistic regression analyses. Because we did not have
full information for every variable for each respondent, we report the number
of cases included for each of our models below.
Multivariate logistic regressions revealed that there are
no statistically significant North-South (or world system position) differences
regarding attitudes toward economic growth or whether or not the WSF should
refrain from issuing collective political statements.
Table
8 indicates that, controlling for other factors, respondents from the
semi-periphery were significantly more likely than respondents from the core to
favor the abolition and replacement of capitalism. Respondents from the
periphery were also more likely than respondents from the core to favor the
abolition of capitalism, although this relationship was not statistically
significant. This lack of statistical significance might be an artifact of the
small number of respondents form the periphery, but it could also be a result
of these respondents’ privileged status within their societies or close
affiliation with NGOs, which tend to be more reformist than other kinds of
political organizations. Nevertheless, the direction of this relationship is consistent
with the idea that the problems of global capitalism are more keenly felt by
people in the global South than the global North. Respondents from Brazil were
significantly less likely than participants from the core to express
anti-capitalist sentiments however. This latter finding may be related to the
fact that Brazilians reported lower levels of protest activity; the site of the
WSF in Porto Alegre made it more accessible to Brazilian activists, allowing a
wider range of activists in terms of their levels of political experience,
commitment, and radicalism. In contrast, the greater cost of traveling to Porto
Alegre for non-local activists may have deterred many local activists who were
less radical and less involved in social movements. Table 8 also shows that,
controlling for other factors, respondents that came of age during the 1960s,
when there was a wave of international protest among youth, were significantly
more likely than other respondents to express anti-capitalist views, as were
respondents affiliated with unions and social movement organizations. The relationship between union membership and
anti-capitalist views is only statistically significant at the 0.10 level
however.
Table 8: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors, and
Odds for Favoring the Abolition and Replacement of Capitalism
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
0.663** 0.342 1.941 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
0.206 0.425 1.229 |
|
Female |
-0.026 0.201 0.974 |
|
1960s generation |
1.046** 0.535 2.846 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.449* 0.257 1.567 |
|
NGO affiliated |
-0.328 0.214 0.720 |
|
SMO affiliated |
1.299*** 0.215 3.667 |
|
Affiliated with at least
one political organization |
0.317 0.467 1.373 |
|
Brazilian |
-0.620** 0.282 0.538 |
|
Constant |
-0.555 0.502 0.574 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
481 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table
9 shows the multivariate results when the responses to the question about what
should be done with the IMF and WTO are divided between those who favor their replacement
or reform versus those who favor their abolition. A negative logit regression
coefficient in this table indicates a greater likelihood to oppose reform or
replacement and to favor abolition. The table shows that those respondents from
the semiperiphery are more likely than those from the core to favor abolition
when the effects of the other variables are controlled, and this relationship
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Respondents from the periphery
are also more likely than respondents from the core to favor abolition, but
that coefficient is not statistically significant. The only other coefficients
that demonstrates statistical significance in this table shows that those
respondents who are affiliated with NGOs and who are Brazilian are more likely
than respondents without those characteristics to oppose abolition and be in
favor of either reform or replacement.
Table 9: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors, and
Odds for Favoring the Replacement of, or Reform of, the IMF and WTO (Rather
than Abolishing Them)
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-1.129*** 0.362 0.324 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.701 0.484 0.496 |
|
Female |
0.057 0.218 1.058 |
|
1960s generation |
-0.270 0.453 0.763 |
|
Union affiliated |
-0.202 0.261 0.817 |
|
NGO affiliated |
0.988*** 0.238 2.687 |
|
SMO affiliated |
-0.292 0.225 0.747 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
-0.312 0.520 0.732 |
|
Brazilian |
0.555** 0.277 1.743 |
|
Constant |
1.679*** 0.570 5.360 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
481 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
***statistically significant at the .01 level
Also recall from our discussion of the bivariate table
above that 62% of the respondents chose to abolish and replace the
international financial institutions while only 25% chose to abolish them and
not replace them. There are more pure abolitionists from the semiperiphery, but
even there it is only 29% of the respondents.
Table 10 shows the multivariate results for those who
hold that global problems need to be addressed not by means of local or
“national” responses, but by global ones. The question was “Which of the
following approaches would best solve the problems created by global
capitalism?” and the possible answers were: strengthen local communities,
strengthen nation states, or create democratic global institutions. Fourteen
per cent of the respondents chose more than one of these options. To use binary
logistic regression, we put those favoring local or national responses to
global social problems into a single “non-global” category so that we could
compare the characteristics of respondents favoring “global” and “non-global”
strategies for social change.
Table 10: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors, and
Odds for the Regression of Favoring Global Democratic Institutions to Solve
Global Social Problems
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-1.463*** 0.403 0.232 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.736* 0.455 0.479 |
|
Female |
-0.016 0.220 0.984 |
|
1960s generation |
-0.114 0.515 0.892 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.198 0.270 1.219 |
|
NGO affiliated |
-0.031 0.231 0.970 |
|
SMO affiliated |
-0.275 0.228 0.760 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
0.317 0.558 1.373 |
|
Brazilian |
0.952*** 0.359 2.592 |
|
Constant |
-0.489 0.577 0.613 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
422 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 10 shows that
respondents from the semiperiphery are significantly more likely than
respondents from the core to favor non-global responses to social problems;
those from the periphery are also more likely than respondents from the core to
favor non-global responses, although this relationship is only statistically
significant at the 0.10 level. By contrast, Brazilian respondents appear to be
more favorable than respondents from the core toward the creation of global democratic
institutions to resolve social problems. None of the other variables show a
significant effect on responses to this question. This table supports the
notion mentioned above that non-local WSF activists from the semiperiphery are
less likely than those from the core to support global strategies for social
change.
Table 11 shows the multivariate results for the question
“Do you think it is a good or a bad idea to have a democratic world government.
Thirty-nine percent of the respondents chose “good idea, but not plausible.”
Thirty-two percent chose “bad idea.” And twenty-nine percent chose “good idea
and it’s plausible.”
Table 11: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors, and
Odds for the Regression of Support for a Democratic World Government
|
Variable |
Model 2 Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-0.839** 0.364 0.432 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.329 0.491 0.720 |
|
Female |
-0.035 0.205 0.966 |
|
1960s generation |
0.441 0.493 1.553 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.054 0.260 1.055 |
|
NGO affiliated |
0.253 0.219 1.288 |
|
SMO affiliated |
0.290 0.214 1.336 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
0.013 0.454 1.013 |
|
Brazilian |
-0.164 0.272 0.849 |
|
Constant |
1.270** 0.505 3.559 |
|
Cases included in
analysis |
474 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 11 shows that those from the semiperiphery are more
likely than respondents from the core to oppose the idea of a democratic world
government and this result is statistically significant. Peripheral attendees
are also more likely to be against this than those from the core, but that
difference is not statistically significant.
But it should be recalled that 31% of those from the periphery and 26%
of those from the semiperiphery endorsed the response that a democratic world
government is a good idea and is plausible.
Nevertheless the overall finding of greater non-core skepticism toward
global institutions is upheld by the results in Table 11.
Conclusions
The results so far show that there are some
North-South demographic differences among World Social Forum attendees. Those
from the periphery are few, older, and more likely to be men. In addition,
participants from the periphery are more likely to be associated with
externally sponsored NGOs, rather than with self-funded SMOs and unions, as
NGOs have greater access to travel funds. In summary, our survey finds
participation at the World Social Forum to be reflective of the global
inequalities that WSF participants are opposed to. Since most intercontinental
passenger flights departing from the global periphery cost more than the annual
per capita income in this zone (cf. Herkenrath 2006), the notable
underrepresentation of WSF attendees from Subsaharan African and other peripheral
countries is hardly surprising. International and intercontinental traveling is
affordable only to activists with a very privileged social background and
activists affiliated with well-funded organizations.
Having
said this, political differences between WSF participants from the global South
and those from the global North seem to be fairly modest. While a clear
majority of all respondents from the global South hold that capitalism needs to
be abolished, the same is true for respondents from the global North. Only when
the effects of local residence are controlled, do we find that semiperipheral
attendees are significantly more likely to take radical anti-capitalist stances
than attendees from the core. In a similar vein, Southern activists are not
significantly more inclined than their Northern counterparts to object to
further global economic growth or to favor the WSF remaining an “open space”
for political debate. Although opinions on these latter two questions divide
the sample into two parts of almost equal size, the dividing line is not
between the global North and the South.
On
the other hand, Southern respondents, especially non-local participants from
the semi-periphery, are significantly more likely to be skeptical toward
creating or reforming global-level political institutions. Those who favor
reforming or abolishing and replacing global institutions in order to resolve
social problems need to squarely face these facts. This skepticism probably
stems from the historical experience of peoples from the non-core with
global-level institutions that claim to be operating on universal principles of
fairness but whose actions have either not solved problems or have made them
worse. The new abolitionists are posing a strong challenge to both existing
global institutions and to those who want to abolish and replace these
institutions. These realities must be addressed, not ignored.
Appendix A: Classifications of countries
from which WSF05 respondents came
World Bank classification[16] World-system position[17]
Global “North:
High income
Australia Core
Austria Core
Belgium Core
Canada Core
Denmark Core
Finland Core
France Core
Germany Core
Greece Semiperiphery
Hong Kong (China) Semiperiphery
Ireland Core
Israel Semiperiphery
Italy Core
Japan Core
Korea (Rep.) Semiperiphery
Netherlands Core
Norway Core
New Zealand Semiperiphery
Portugal Semiperiphery
Spain Core
Sweden Core
Switzerland Core
Taiwan (excluded from all sources) Semiperiphery
United Kingdom Core
United States Core
Global “South”:
Upper-middle income
Argentina Semiperiphery
Chile Semiperiphery
Costa Rica Semiperiphery
Lebanon Periphery
Mexico Semiperiphery
Malaysia Semiperiphery
Panama Semiperiphery
South Africa Semiperiphery
Uruguay Semiperiphery
Venezuela Semiperiphery
Lower-middle income
Armenia Periphery
Bolivia Periphery
Brazil Semiperiphery
Colombia Semiperiphery
Dominican Republic Periphery
Ecuador Periphery
El Salvador Periphery
Iraq Periphery
Paraguay Periphery
Peru Periphery
Philippines Periphery
Low income
Bangladesh Periphery
India Semiperiphery
Kenya Periphery
Nepal Periphery
Pakistan Periphery
Sudan Periphery
Senegal Periphery
Vietnam Periphery
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