Beyond the Long Twentieth
Century:
China
in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Changing Dynamics of the
World-System
Marilyn Grell-Brisk
Institute for Research on World-Systems
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA. 92521
v. 2-24-16, 9103 words
This is IROWS Working Paper #106 at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows106/irows106.htm
Abstract
The
growing influence and role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) in
the modern world-economy is the basis of ongoing polemics in world-systems
analysis and in other academic and non-academic fields of study. Twenty years
ago, in The Long Twentieth Century,
Giovanni Arrighi (1994) astutely theorized that the
bifurcation of financial and military power that occurred during the financial
expansion of the late twentieth century was not only anomalous of all other
such expansions but it paved the way for a possible Sino-centered world-system.
In, Adam Smith In Beijing, he went a step further and outlined the rise
of China in light of the United States’ waning hegemonic rule (2007). While the
growing Chinese economy and a complementary expanding role in the global
economy, propelled Arrighi’s to contemplate a
systemic shake-up, he saw the catalyst for the subversion of the modern
world-system ostensibly as China’s demographic size (Arrighi
2007; 1994, p. 371-386). It is true that population size has been shown to have
impacts on economic growth and development. However, this paper asserts that
China has the potential to transform
the logic of the modern capitalist world-system not only because of its
demography but also its distinctive approach to its involvement in the
world-economy, particularly its interactions with those countries of the Global
South.
To
illustrate this point, we examine China’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
where it has spent billions of dollars on foreign direct investment and foreign
aid along with a growing trade relationship. I will demonstrate that demographic size alone cannot account for any substantive reorganization of the world-system; that China has taken specific actions, primarily
economic on the surface but with
political underpinnings that could potentially create rippling system-wide change. In providing
considerable economic aid to SSA with the only caveat being the adoption of a 'One China' policy, the PRC is influencing an entire continent’s economic outlook. So
far, initial empirical evidence shows positive growth patterns instead of
further peripheralization in the SSA countries where
China is heavily involved. In addition to
their economic outlook, China is impacting the foreign policy of a bloc of nations
that make up the second most populous
continent in the world, while
simultaneously undermining Western neoclassical ideas of development. Yet, despite
all of this, China appears to maintain and buttress the existing core-periphery
hierarchy and power structures of the world-system. Is this the case that
‘the more things change, the more they remain the same?’
Keywords:
China
in Africa, South-South relations, Sub-Saharan Africa, Development, Geopolitics
The
interplay between China’s demography and expanding economy can clearly bring
about changes in the world economy. This has been shown empirically (Hung,
2015). This paper contends that while China is gaining grounds in the world
economy, it is assisting other countries in the Global South in a way that the
West and those in the developed world had not done before. In the most recent
iteration of a world hegemon as understood by Immanuel Wallerstein, the United
States’ foreign relations including foreign aid, had an implicit ideological
component (a thrust toward democratization of governments and free market
economies) and more recently, with the aid of Bretton Woods institutions, an
explicit economic component (as epitomized by the structural adjustment
programs (SAPS) of the 1990s and the Millennial Development Goals (MDGs) of the
2000s). China’s development projects in the Global South post-reintegration
into the world economy have certainly not insisted on these
ideological-economic terms and China has made a point of not interfering with
the day to day governing practices of the governments in Global South with the
exception of the renunciation of the Republic of China, Taiwan as the sole representative
of China on the global stage. In so doing, China impacts the position of
varying countries in the Global South in the world economic structure. To see
how this plays out, we will now look at the specific case of China’s
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Brief
Modern History of China in Africa
The
legacy of Chinese involvement in Africa can be traced back to the Bandung
Conference of 1955. The conference goal was to promote Asian-African economic and
cultural cooperation, to oppose colonialism in all its manifestations, and to
promote world peace. China played a central role in the conference using it as
a platform to strengthen its ties with other Asian and African countries. This
was approximately the same time when the Sino-Soviet relationship was becoming
strained and a tangible rift between the two was becoming more and more
evident.[1]
China sought to present itself as the archetypal communist country and distance
itself from the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore, it was seeking
to garner influence within the Third World and Africa in particular.
Robert
Scalapino, writing for Foreign Affairs in 1964 saw China’s involvement in Africa as a
direct challenge to Soviet influence on the African continent. He notes,
“Soviet leaders are thus well aware of the fact that the outcome of this
struggle could be crucial to the ultimate balance of power both in the world
and in the Communist camp. They also know that this struggle cannot be won by
military means”[2]
(Scalapino 1964, p. 640). Despite
the fact that Russia had significantly more money and a stronger military
presence in the world than China; the Chinese believed that there were other
approaches to fostering strong lasting relationships with the developing world,
and Africa in particular.
Therefore,
in late 1963, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai attempted to
further cement Sino-African relations through a ten-country tour.[3]
His stated aims included supporting African and Arab struggle against
imperialism and colonialism in all their forms; their pursuit of neutrality and
non-alignment; their desire for unity and solidarity; their efforts to pursue
dispute settlements by peaceful means; and held that their sovereignty should
be respected by all. Furthermore, he wanted the African and Arab Countries to
know that China was committed to their independence; to their struggle against
backwardness and for economic development; that China would provide aid
projects that yielded quicker results; and that China would not attach
conditions to aid packages nor ask for privileges in return (Enlai 1963).
During
this period in Sino-African relations, China’s support and commitment to the
African liberation movement was epitomized by the Tanzam
Railway Project, which linked Tanzania and Zambia. Several assessments for
building the rail line had been performed between 1963 and 1966 and requests
for financing were solicited from but ultimately unapproved by Britain, the
Soviet Union, the United States, the World Bank, Canada, West Germany, and even
the African Development Bank. The Zambian and Tanzanian governments turned to
China and after much discussion, China stepped up to the challenge. The Tanzam project, which began in 1970 and ended in 1975,
created one single track for 1160 miles from Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia central province, to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Being a landlocked country, it
allowed Zambia to free itself from economic dependence on Zimbabwe (then
Rhodesia) and South Africa, both of which were ruled by white governments.
China’s
acknowledgement, response and assistance to the African and Arab struggles paid
off, with some of those countries acknowledging the government of the People’s
Republic of China as early as 1963. More importantly, the African continent
played a pivotal role in the PRC’s 1971 bid for a United Nations seat. The
Republic of China (ROC) – Taiwan – held a seat in the United Nations and on the
UN Security Council as the representative of China. However, in 1971, the
People’s Republic of China placed a bid for this seat. The UN election resulted
in 76 votes in favor of the PRC taking over the ROC seat, 35 opposed and 17
abstentions. Of those 76 positive votes, 26 came from African countries – a
total of 1/3 of the yes votes. Jinyuan Gao puts this
in perspective: “it goes without saying that they made the greatest
contribution to the recovery of China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations”
(Gao 1984, 250).
In the
Post-Mao period, withdrawing from international politics, China began a period
of self-examination and reflection, focusing on internal and domestic policies.
The Tiananmen Square Student Massacre occurs during this time in June 1989. In
1992, you have Deng Xiaoping beginning his economic reforms.[4]
These reforms are significant and helped usher in a new era of Chinese economic
advancement. Given its position on the UN Security Council, China always saw
itself as part of the developing world but also as its de facto leader. As
though presciently, in 1998, Ian Taylor writes, “this position enables Beijing
to project China onto the global stage as a major player in its own right. But,
if this image is to be sustained and carried off, Beijing feels compelled to
maintain an active and visible interest in areas such as Africa which act as a
support constituency to add political and numerical back-up to China’s claims”
(Taylor 1998, 458). In 2000, the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held
in Beijing.
Re-emergence
of China-Africa Relations
During
this first Forum, a Programme for China-Africa
Cooperation in Economic and Social Development was approved and was grounded on
the principles of equality and mutual benefit, diversity, practical results,
common progress, and amicable settlement of differences. This seemed to mirror
the objectives put forth by Enlai during his 1963
trip through Africa. Some of the same ideas reappeared - non-interference in
African countries’ domestic issues, economic aid without strings attached, and
settlement of disputes through peaceful negotiation. An essential change though, and an important
aspect of the Programme was the ‘One-China Policy,’[5]
which the Chinese government believe to be the political foundation for the
establishment of the China-Africa relations.
The
One-China Policy has been a staple of Chinese foreign policy with political,
and strategic implications for China. For its domestic policy, the continued
attempts at isolating the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the rest of the world
makes for political gains within the ruling China Communist Party. The
successful integration of Taiwan into the PRC would be a massive political
payload for any party leader. Militarily and from a maritime geostrategic point
of view, the payoff is just as huge. Taiwan is in the center of the East China
Sea, the Luzon Strait and the Philippine Sea. See Figure 2. It locks China in
through what is commonly referred to as the “first island chain.”[6]
Per The Science of Military Strategy,
“if Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, China will forever be locked
to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific, and… the
essential strategic space for China’s rejuvenation will be lost” (Guangqian and Youzhi 2005).
On the
other hand, for the African countries, the ramifications are different depending
on how they choose to look at this policy. It could be the means to an end (end
being economic growth); it could be a bargaining chip for improving the number
of options for foreign trade relations (India and Brazil are also investing,
although not as heavily as China, in the African continent), for foreign aid,
and for foreign direct investment. It could also mean that China would begin to
drive the formulation of the foreign policy of the countries on the African
continent with diplomatic, trade, and economic implications.
There
is a general agreement that Chinese foreign aid and foreign direct investment
to Sub-Saharan Africa keep increasing. However, the absolute figures vary
wildly in the literature. The need for a high-quality, and systematic record of
China’s aid and foreign investments efforts was made clear at the recent Researching China’s Overseas Finance and
Aid: What, Why, How, Where and How Much? held at the Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. As a non-Development Assistant Committee (DAC)
member country, China does not have to follow global development reporting
standards. Therefore, much of the aid packages remain underreported in the
World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
figures.
Accompanying
this are claims of inadequate transparency in aid packages given to SSA
countries by China. China AidData – a large project,
at William and Mary College – has undertaken the daunting task of tracking
Chinese foreign aid and development projects around the globe with some
success. It was originally created to track under-reported financial flows
(TUFF) at which time a methodology was developed – media based data collection
(MBDC). AidData claims that it is a systematic,
transparent, and replicable approach to gathering development finance data (AidData 2013).
Still,
AidData has been criticized for overestimating the
total aid amounts and for its very methodology.[7] AidData has since attempted to address the issues of data
reliability especially because of its MBDC methods. AidData
now relies heavily on academic case studies and research, and has engaged in
ground-truthing – verifying and updating existing
data with in-person interviews on Chinese development finance and site visits (Muchapondwar et al. 2014).
While
the issue of tracking China’s investment and aid to SSA can be problematic,
there is still the issue of effectiveness. Is FDI and foreign aid benefiting
these African countries and if so how? The existing literature is rich with
theoretical debates as to the impact of FDI and foreign aid on the host
countries (see Table 2 for a summary of the literature). For some, foreign
investment could destroy up-and-coming, new and even established local
businesses. An early study by Volker and Chase-Dunn suggested that FDI and
domestic investment generally promoted economic growth in the short run and was
a strong alternative to privatization as part of structural adjustment
requirements. However, they found that continued dependence on flows of foreign
investments over a long-term period was destructive to economic growth and was
associated with greater income inequality (Bornschier
and Chase-Dunn 1985). It was later shown that not only was FDI beneficial for
the host country but also a catalyst for economic growth (Firebaugh 1992; Onakoya 2012). For Firebaugh, the previous analyses simply
misinterpreted their findings (Firebaugh 1992).
Yet,
doubt associated with the positive link between FDI and economic growth seems
to persist (Curwin and Mahutga
2014; Ndikumana and Verick
2008). Using post-socialist countries (given their quick transition into
industrialized economies without FDI) to test this link, Curwin
and Mahutga found that FDI penetration reduced
economic growth both in the long and short term. That domestic investment was a
much more statistically significant correlate to economic growth is supported
both empirically and in theory (Curwin and Mahutga 2014). One
of the most interesting papers in the literature discussing the impact of
foreign investments, especially in the developing world, is by Jeffrey Kentor and Terry Boswell.
In Foreign Capital Dependence and Development:
A New Direction, the authors find that foreign investment concentration
does have a significant negative effect on economic growth but that is
primarily due to the structure of the investment concentration. That is, the
negative effect is completely dependent on whether there are numerous trade and
investment partners or a single one. If the foreign investment is concentrated
through one trade partner, the effects are extremely negative. The authors
claim that this “inhibits an LDC’s ability to construct and implement economic
policies that are in its own long-term interest. A lack of autonomy affects the
bargaining power of states in dealing with the transnational corporations they
host and in negotiating with foreign investors in global markets…” (Kentor and Boswell 2003, p. 310). However, with multiple
partners the negative effects diminish. Under the Kentor
and Boswell model, in the case of SSA, FDI would not be intrinsically bad. As
these countries continue to grow economically, expanding FDI partnerships with
other emerging economies like India and Brazil would the most beneficial in the
long run.
The
effect of foreign aid on the economy of developing nations is also a source of
major debate (See Table 2). Early studies showed that aid worked to the extent
that without it, economic growth would be much lower (Tsikata
1998). In their influential 1997 paper, on the impacts of foreign aid on
developing countries, Dollar and Burnside demonstrated that aid mostly grew the
recipient country’s economy but that for aid to remain effective, good quality
state institutions were of utmost necessity (Dollar and Burnside 1997).
McGillivray found similar results as Dollar and Burnside but also added to the
discourse by asserting that good policy regimes were needed for foreign aid to
have a positive impact on economic growth (McGillivray 2006).
On the
other hand, Doucouliagos and Paldam’s
2008 meta-analysis had inconclusive results when looking at aid effectiveness
on the economy (Doucouliagos and Paldam
2008). Still, the most recent empirical
study, while specific to the politically unstable and aid-dependent Sierra
Leone, demonstrated that over time, aid had a strong impact on economic growth
(Kargbo 2012).
In SSA, China has infused the economies with a large amount of foreign
aid and at the same time injected high amounts of FDI into the economy. As this
unfolds there has been significant impacts on infrastructure, exports and
general economic expansion (Kaplinsky and Morris
2009; Kpetigo and Tapsoba
2011; Ndambendia and Njoupouognigni
2010).
Chinese
Foreign Aid and Investment in SSA
As
part of this new cooperative development program, during the 2000 Forum, China
announced the cancellation of 1.2 Billion USD worth of debt from a total of 31
African countries and by 2005, tariff exemptions were applied to 400 items for
29 Sub-Saharan countries. In 2004, 9400 African were trained in China through
its African Human Resource Development Fund. In 2005, 15,600 scholarships were
distributed to 52 different countries. Since 2000 thousands of Chinese doctors
and teachers are working in SSA through development aid projects. At the most
recent Forum, China announced that it was issuing a 20 Billion USD line of
credit to Africa. Again, due to the lack
of transparency, these figures are thought to be underestimates.
One
thing is indisputably clear – China’s economic relations with SSA have
increased significantly since 2000. According to IMF DOT statistics, the
portion of China’s SSA imports increased from 3% in 2001 to 11% as of 2012. For
the same period, SSA’s imports from China increased from 15% to 20% as opposed
to decreasing imports from DAC members from 75% to 35%. Even though the
absolute percentage change in SSA’s imports from China is only a 5% increase,
the drop in imports from DAC members is 35%. There may be a number of reasons
for the drop in imports from DAC members but with SSA’s increasing trade with
China and other developing countries, this speaks volumes.
Furthermore,
the nature of the trade relations between SSA and China is striking as shown in
Figure 3. Trade relations between SSA and China is concentrated in Nigeria,
South Africa, Liberia, Ghana, Benin, and Angola accounting for more than 80% of
total imports from China. Angola,
South Africa, Dem. Rep. of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea account for
approximately 75% exports to China. Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris have written extensively on
why this particular group of countries (Kaplinsky,
McCormick and Morris 2010). So have Brautigam and
Kobayashi (Brautigam, 2011, 2010, 2008; Kobayashi
2008).
What all the authors seem to point to though, is the fact
that much of SSA’s exports to China involve the natural resource sector. See
Figure 4 and 5. UNCTAD and the Ministry of Commerce the People’s Republic of
China (MOFCOM) data show FDI to Africa growing faster than any other country’s
between 2004 and 2007 – 1 Billion USD to 4.5 Billion USD. Per Kaplinsky and Morris, Chinese FDI in SSA, this rapid
increase in FDI is used primarily to support resource-extraction projects in
SSA (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). Brautigam implies
that China’s venture into SSA has to do with China’s own self-awareness of its
growing need for natural resources, writing that the Chinese “were well aware
that resource scarcities, particularly in domestic energy, would soon become an
issue for domestic production, and they moved to position the country to
overcome that challenge” (Brautigam 2008, p.
11). This follows the same logic of Kaplinsky and Morris who noted that the increasing price of
commodities starting in 2001 led to increased demand for energy, minerals, and
food crops for China and India but also for other developing countries. This
precipitated the need to tap into underdeveloped natural resources and markets
on the African continent.
In
2006, Ron Sandrey documented the structure of China’s
import from Africa in 1995 as follows: 20% - oil, 10% - iron ore, and 10% -
cotton. However, by 2005, 60% - oil, 7% - ore, 5% - cotton (Sandrey
2006). A different and more recent
report shows that not much has changed in the structure of Chinese import from
Africa. UN Comtrade Statistics show that in 1995
China’s import from SSA was 50% fuel, 43% crude material, 5% chemicals. By 2011,
the figures had changed dramatically to 75% fuel, 15% crude material, and 15%
manufactured goods (excluding South Africa).
MOFCOM’s
Statistical Bulletin of Outward FDI document Chinese FDI to SSA increase
substantively between 2003 and 2010, peaking in 2008. This also confirms that
most of the FDI is to resource-rich SSA countries and most likely in support of
aid-based development and infrastructure projects or resource financed
infrastructure (RFI).
In a
recent paper, AidData indicated that the correlation
between official development assistant (ODA-type) aid provided by the Chinese
are not necessarily linked to natural resource extraction as previously
highlighted by other scholars and that Chinese aid was as policy-driven as aid
provided by DAC members (Muchapondwar et al.
2014). While this might be the case, the
fact remains that Chinese “aid” is a combination of ODA-type aid and other
official flows (OOF-type) aid but majority of this “aid” is made up of
OOF-type. So, the fact that Chinese ODA-type aid cannot be linked strongly to
their investments in the natural resource extraction sector does not mean much
if most of its aid is OOF-type.
The
case of the Angola is particularly insightful to our understanding of the links
between Chinese aid programs and FDI. In 2002 when Angola was at the height of
its economic and international disfavor – denounced for its domestic political
and social policies; suffering from inability to gain credit through the BWIs;
and a rejected attempt to gain access to funds by way of Japan and South Korea
– China stepped in and extended massive credit lines to Angola. The Chinese
government through the China Construction Bank (CCB) and Export Import Bank of
China (Exim-Bank) extended a 150 Billion USD loan to Angola for infrastructure
projects. The interest rate on the loan was extremely low and the loan was
guaranteed by Angola agreeing to provide China with 10,000 barrels of oil per
day. However, the Chinese government did not allow direct fund transfers to the
Angolan government. Instead, the money was given directly to those companies
that were to perform the infrastructure projects and while 30% of these
companies were supposed to be Angolan, the remaining companies were all Chinese
state owned enterprises (SOEs). This has led some to claim that China’s venture
into Africa and other countries of the Global South can be explained through
the theory of elite capture. It is essentially a means of distributing
government resources to members of the elite, which government officials
themselves belong to. Funds are transferred from the government to
pseudo-private state-owned enterprises that then gain access to funds and
resources even outside of China where certain rules and obligations may not apply.
SSA
economies have unmistakably experienced an upsurge since China’s
‘intervention’. According to the World Bank, at present, economic activity
continues to be robust in SSA. From 1995 to 2013, the region enjoyed an average
GDP growth rate of 4.5% (compounded weighted average of ‘developing SSA’[8]).
Average un-weighted growth rates across all SSA countries for the period is
2.4% translating into an increase of about 30% GDP per capita on average.
According to Drummond and Liu, China’s economic growth (which has been
remarkable) resulted in an increase in investment and aid to SSA and direct
trade expansion for its African partners. More dramatically they found that for
resource-rich SSA countries, one percentage point increase in China’s domestic
investment growth is accompanied by a 0.8% increase in export growth rate
(Drummond and Liu 2013).
Rosen
et al at the US Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, documented
that between 1980 and 2000, grain production in Africa, an indicator of food production,
was consistent with the rate of population growth. However, between 2000 and
2010, grain production growth accelerated to 4.1% per year, which translates to
1.6% annual growth rate per capita. They note that this represents significant
improvements over the two prior decades (Rosen et. al. 2012). In 2013, Vanessa Jacquelain an economist at the Agence
Française de Dévelopment
noted that SSA countries “now carry the lowest external debt burden in thirty
years” (Jacquelain 2013). The World Bank Data also show improvements in
the areas of health and education. Life expectancy in SSA cratered in the 1980s
at approximately 48.5 years and only started increasing around 2003. The
average life expectancy in SSA is now at 56.4 years. Primary school completion,
like life expectancy was consistently low since the 1980s and only started
increasing around 2001. It is highly probable that the cratering of world
development indicators in SSA like GDP growth, life expectancy and education
are correlated to the rise of neoliberalism and in particular, it’s instrument
- foreign aid driven by policy and adjustment strategies epitomized in the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Millennium Development Goals. China’s
venture in SSA can be understood as presenting a superior alternative to
SAP-driven economic aid and FDI.
Neoliberalism’s
Impact on SSA
Writing
for the re-launch of the New Left Review,
Perry Anderson claimed that the principle aspect of the past decade was the
“virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal diffusion, of
neo-liberalism” (Anderson 2000, p. 6).
The rise of the neoliberal agenda in the developed world was applied
without thought to the African continent beginning in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The World Bank’s 1981 Accelerated
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, commonly called The Berg Report, exemplified this. The
market being the driver of all socio-economic growth, and the only way to
reduce poverty meant that African economic, political and social institutions
were to be restructured so as to make the private sector front and center. This neoliberal project in Africa was
supposed to be inclusive and open Africa to the global economy; encouraging
growth by relying on agriculture and allowing complete control by market
mechanisms.
Yet,
in 1992, Paul Lubeck claimed that after “nearly a decade of submission to
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) administered by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), neither the promised “accelerated growth,”
nor market equilibrium, nor new foreign investment has been forthcoming”
(Lubeck 1992, p. 520). Per Lubeck, there
was some consensus amongst most scholars on the root causes of the African
non-development situation. These included random boundary drawing among the
colonial powers plus their patterns of export, harmful ecologically practices
that degraded the environment, along with the Third World debt crisis of the
1980s. However, neoliberal policies were the hammer that drove the nail into
the coffin. Hellinger et al.
acknowledged at the United Nations Civil-Society Hearings on Financing for
Development that global economic management dominated by the G7 finance
ministries in the form of structural adjustment programs engendered the
destruction of local businesses and farms, the reduction of employment and
incomes, and the increase in poverty and economic inequality. In short,
wherever its implementation was attempted, it produced general social, economic
and financial instability (Hellinger et al. 2001).
Padraig
Carmody in his book, Neoliberalism, Civil Society and Security raises interesting
questions about the contradictions inherent in neoliberalism as a policy in
Africa. He argues that the failure of market liberalization and structural
adjustment programs to grow the economies of African countries was met with
further requests for adjustment. The model for development itself was never
questioned. In the case of Zimbabwe, he notes that changes brought about by
neoliberal pressure on the Mugabe government only served to increase the
precariousness of the people of Zimbabwe (Carmody
2007). George Caffentzis questions the fervent
continuation of SAPs writing, “if African economies performed so poorly… then
one can only declare that its ruling economic policy is to blame, especially
when this policy was to get its legitimacy from its claim to reduce debt,
increase FDI and export shares” (Caffentzis 2002, p.
93).
Adesina, went
further than most in completely condemning neoliberalism as an intellectual
thought and tradition (Adesina 2004). He brought into
question the tenets of neoliberalism – the belief in the moral necessity of
market forces in the economy and entrepreneurs as a good and necessary social
group. For Adesina, neoliberalism relied on a ‘verbal
logic’ instead of complex mathematical modeling, in order to ensure its
accessibility and appeal to the masses. Furthermore, the advanced economies of
the world championed trade and market liberalization, requiring SSA to open its
markets, with sickening results. Adesina notes that,
“the elimination of the agricultural protection in the OECD countries would
have meant an estimated gain for the SSA economies of US$6 per capita or
US$3,857.4 million…” (Adesina 2004, p. 12).
The
impact of neoliberal mechanisms like SAPs and the opening of SSA markets
manifested themselves in the contraction of the economy and the mounting of
social development crisis. It also led to the incapacity of states to respond
to increasing global and financial crises. UNCTAD statistics from 2002 show
persistently declining terms of trade for SSA beginning around 1980 through
1998. Conditions imposed by World Bank and IMF during this period eroded
special differential treatments that some African countries had enjoyed previously.
Even more crushing is the fact that countries that were strong implementers of
the SAPs experienced negative annual GDP growth compared to “weak adjusting” or
“non-adjusting” who were either experiencing little, but positive growth rates.
New Structures and Change?
So we
come back to the question of how China is changing the world-economic system
especially in terms of how it is stratified; and how China’s rise is going to
affect SSA’s own station in the world-system and world-economy. In this
section, I look at systemic change from a more conceptual basis rather from a
micro-macro economic sense.
Creating
hegemony and geopolitics
In
this effort, we begin by examining the concept of hegemony as a process of
struggling for influence; perhaps in the pursuit of a version or new
idea/concept of “development” that may or may not conform to Western standards.
Maybe, then we can begin to understand the notion of hegemony as non-static and
specific to a particular vision of domination.
The idea of hegemony is complicated. In terms
of global influence, is it mostly economic? Is it mostly political? Is it
mostly military? Is it ideological? The $682 billion spent by the U.S. in 2012,
according to the Office of Management and Budget, was more than the combined
military spending of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Saudi
Arabia, India, Germany, Italy and Brazil — which spent $652 billion, according
to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Still, the US has yet to decisively
win a military intervention since the end of WWII not counting Grenada. And
while some talk of China’s economic rise, that is tied to and dependent on the
US’s economy for good or bad.
In
classic trimodal world-system analysis, a “core”
country exhibiting dominance over all others in areas of production, trade and
finance would be considered hegemonic. However, to understand the current
dynamics of global interaction amongst nations, it makes more sense to
understand the world-system, more as a fluid enough superstructure where
nations can create hegemony. By taking this approach that we can have a better
understanding of what China is doing in the Global South and in our case, SSA.
If China is engaging in ‘hegemony-making’, its economic assistance to SSA can
be seen as powerfully subversive and potentially destabilizing to the world
system, especially given its political implications. Conceptually, we can refer
to Gramsci’s apropos idea of hegemony that comes across not as static but
dynamic.
Hegemony
in Gramscian terms is more of a process – a wrangling
of sorts for influence but done in a
shrewd, restrained way. This type of hegemony largely suggests a dominant or
subordinate group leading through persuasion, with a hint of coercion. It is
not categorically embodied by one country with predetermined attributes. It is
achieved through exercising power over subordinate groups, but even with power
firmly in its grasp, leadership is equally important (Gramsci 1971).
Furthermore, gaining hegemony does not involve the total domination of all
competing potential replacements of the failing hegemon but rather, it is
aligning one’s interests (economic, political, social) with that of everyone
else. The consent of different
subordinate groups that allow themselves to be lead
by a dominant group is absolutely necessary. John Storey
explains that hegemony implies “a society in which there is a high degree of
consensus… in which subordinate classes appear to actively support and
subscribe to values… which bind them to, incorporate them into, the prevailing
power structure” (Storey 1993, p. 119). In a way,
this is similar to the idea of comparatively complementary regimes of
accumulation put forth by Astra Bonini. In the paper Complementary and Competitive Regimes of
Accumulation, she demonstrates that if the hegemonic regime of
accumulation, structures the economy in a way that is comparatively competitive
to raw-material producing countries, then those countries will be able to
effect upward economic mobility within the modern world system (Bonini 2012).
At the
first FOCAC, President Jiang Zemin reminded conference attendees that while
China was the largest development country, Africa was the continent with the largest number of developing countries. He
announced that the “Chinese
people and the African people both treasure independence, love peace and long
for development and that they are both important forces for world peace and
common development. It is the unremitting efforts made by the people throughout
the world including, the Chinese and African peoples, that forces for world
peace have kept growing and the world development cause has made considerable
progress” (Zemin 2000). He
went on to further state that the root cause of unequal development that marks
today’s world is due to
“many irrational and inequitable factors in the current international political
and economic order… [that] are detrimental not only to world peace and
development, but also to the stability and development of the vast number of
developing countries” (Zemin 2000).
President Jiang
Zemin then outlined the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, characterizing a more positive approach to
world cooperation and existence. Leaving aside any debate about the
effectiveness of China’s foreign direct investment and foreign aid to Africa,
it appears that China has made serious headway in terms of the acceptance of
its view on development and coexistence in much of the Global South.
Gramsci writes, “undoubtedly the fact
of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the
tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a
certain compromise equilibrium should be formed -- in other words, that the
leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there
is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the
essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic,
must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading
group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci 1934, p. 161).
That is to say, the period during which there is a struggle for hegemony,
compromises and alliances will be made with subordinate groups to bring them
all together under a hegemonic umbrella.
Writing for the Financial Times in 2008, President of Sengal,
Abdoulaye Wade explains, “China’s approach to our needs is simply
better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronising
post-colonial approach of European investors… [That] economic relations are
based more on mutual need… [and that] China, which has fought its own battles
to modernise, has a much greater sense of the
personal urgency of development in Africa than many western nations” (Wade
2008). In 2009, Paul Kagame,
President of Rwanda, openly praised the Chinese form of business making and
investments in Africa (BBC News October 11, 2009). And in 2010, The Globe and Mail noted that South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma,
praised China as the example of economic policy success (Geoffrey August 25,
2010).
From a Gramscian
perspective, we can understand China as playing a type of ‘war of position’,
which is not so much about a cultural struggle in as much as it is a
politico-economic one. China provides an alternative mode of development for
SSA – one in which it refrains from interfering with the countries’ domestic
politics vis-à-vis its political and economic institutions and bureaucracy. It
is also setting an example for other South-South relations (India and Brazil’s
FDI and aid to SSA). This ‘war of position,’ is a long struggle that becomes
increasingly important during times of organic crisis. Post
2008, as the global recession became more intense, China had to be more willing
to play a larger role in the world-economy and in the less developed world. The
fact remains that China’s own upward mobility within the world system is
improved through its facilitation with the upward mobility of so-called
peripheral countries. Further, a Sino-centric world economic system is only
possible to the extent that China succeeds in creating a system of alliances,
which allows it to mobilize the majority, to its goals. This could produce what
Arrighi and Silver understood as a non-catastrophic
transition into a new world order (Arrighi and Silver
1999). In Chaos and Governance, the
authors note, “US adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power is
an essential condition for non-catastrophic transition… An important aspect of
this is the capacity and willingness of the East Asian economic expansion to
open up a new path of development for themselves and for the world that departs
radically from the one that is now at a dead-end” (Arrighi
and Silver 1999, 289).
Geopolitics
China
continues to claim and demonstrate that it has a method of development that is
non-intrusive yet effective. Many world leaders both in the Global North and
South are beginning to buy into that rhetoric (most likely for their own
reasons and for their own perceived advantage). March 28, 2014 was a big day
for the legitimization of China’s policies in the world economy. The United
Kingdom, going against the United States’ advice, officially voted to join the
Chinese-created and Chinese-led Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. The
response to the AIIB has been incredibly polarizing with some seeing it as an
aggressive blow at the US’s hegemonic position in the world as the Chinese
alternative to the World Bank while others see it more as a way to balance the
scales in favor of the weaker and emerging economies. Hung writes, “China, in other
words, is deliberately forgoing some of its leverage, including in the very
organization it is setting up. And it is doing so because it wants the cover
and the legitimacy that will come from the participation of other countries.
Creating the A.I.I.B. is not Beijing’s attempt at world domination; it is a
self-imposed constraint, and a retreat from more than a decade of aggressive
bilateral initiatives” (Hung 2015b).
So if
China is in fact playing a long ‘war of position,’ how is this playing out in
terms of its position in the stratified world system? First we turn to a
seminal piece of work – The
Stratification of the World-Economy: An exploration of the Semiperipheral
Zone. In it, using the population by state (as a percentage of total population)
and the log of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in 1970 USD, the authors
empirically demonstrate the long-term stability of the trimodal
structure of the world economy over a 45-year time period. In this paper, Arrighi and Drangel confirmed that
a trimodal world system was fully in place and that trimodality had persisted over time. Based on their data,
movement between the three zones were extremely limited and noted, “95% of the
states which we could find data (and 94% of total population) were in 1975/83
still on or within the boundaries of the zone in which they were in 1938/50” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986,
44). If we were to take the period, 2000
to 2010 and using the Arrighi Drangel
method, we notice significant changes happening in the structure of the world
economy especially in 2010 when the economies of both China and India are
growing and causing major shifts in the stratification process. The lines
between the semi-periphery and periphery become blurred and there is almost a
quad-modal distribution. However, what is not clear is whether the changes in
the distribution of the organization of the world economy are permanent or
simply an anomaly. Herein lies the difficulty of understanding global trends –
the need for retrospection. On the
African continent, the economies of the natural resource-rich countries are
clearly expanding in a positive way, but only time can tell how this will
translate in terms of improving the day-to-day lives of the average African.
Further, while we can empirically observe broad changes occurring in these
peripheral states, whether they are permanent or temporary remains to be seen.
For now, there are positive changes occurring that should be documented and
validated instead of being dismissed as yet another attempt of the Rest (in
this case China) imitating the West (their imperialist/colonialist past).
China could be
engaging in hegemony making but most likely what we are seeing is China playing
geopolitics. Its economic reforms have allowed it to compete successfully in
the world economy and it has expanded its trade networks throughout the Global
South. Some scholars such as Hung (2015b) and Karatasli
and Kumral (2015) made arguments to the effect that
China wants and needs to maintain the status quo/the current world economic
structure. Some have branded China’s engagement with SSA as some form of
neocolonialism or neo-imperialism.
However, one must be much more particular when applying these
concepts/terms to describe and define SSA’s relationship with other countries.
On the one hand, you have the Berlin Conference of 1884 where the supposed
world leaders officially agreed on how to separate a continent. A continent
already inhabited. There, you have formal colonial imperialism and
colonization. Not until the 1950s when de-colonization began to occur that you
have entire nations/peoples beginning to grab and demand their sovereignty. Of
course, one can argue that de-colonization occurred primarily because the costs
of colonialization outweighed the benefits to the colonialists. If we begin to
talk about neocolonialism and neoimperialism, China’s
involvement in SSA is qualitatively different.
China is engaging
in geopolitics in a multipolar world. For now, only time will tell the true
impact of China on SS; but so far, so good.
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