Upward Sweeps in The
Historical Evolution
of World-Systems*
Christopher
Chase-Dunn
Sociology
University
of California-Riverside
v.
9-22-05 9512 words
New
systems theories in international relations should study human interaction
networks over very long periods of time (since the Paleolithic) and the
interactions between the human systems and biological and geological systems in
order to comprehend and explain the patterned changes of the past and the
possible futures for humanity. World-systems are whole important human
interaction networks including relations among polities, trade and
communications networks. Human social evolution is about the rise of larger and
more hierarchical and more complex societies and the growth and intensification
of long-distance interaction networks. This paper outlines a research project
on the growth/decline phases of cities and states since the Iron Age in order
to comprehend the possibilities for future global state formation.
*Thanks
to Peter Turchin and E. N. Anderson for their contributions to this paper.
IROWS Working Paper #20
available at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows20/irows20.htm
Paper to be presented at
the Mershon Center Conference on NEW SYSTEMS THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS, Ohio State
University, September 31-October 1, 2005. The modeling and testing proposed here is
supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation’s Human Social
Dynamics (HSD) Program.
Patterns of expanding state formation constitute a long-term
evolutionary trend that will probably eventually result in the emergence of a
single world state. The very nature of the expansion of political integration
has itself evolved because new institutions that facilitate regional integration,
cooperation and conflict have emerged.
Military conquest and the long-term interaction between sedentary
agrarian empires and confederations of pastoral nomads came eventually to be
replaced by a process of geopolitical and economic competition among states in
a world that has increasingly been integrated by market exchange. In the last
200 years international governmental and transnational non-governmental
organizations have emerged to constitute the first beginnings of world state
formation, and the national states have been partially reconfigured as
instruments of an increasingly integrated global elite. World state formation
may be desirable because the problems created by human technological and social
change are increasingly global in scope. But a world state will need to be
legitimated in the eyes of a majority of the human population of the Earth and
this means that democracy must be constructed on a global scale. Evolutionary world-systems ecology examines
several probable future trajectories of global political integration based on
models of growth, decline and systemic transformation by studying patterns of
political integration over the past 100,000 years.
The term “evolution” needs to be cleansed of its non-scientific
baggage to be useful for scientific studies of social change (Sanderson 1990).
Ideas about progress, inevitability, and teleological explanations in which
things are explained by their purposes, and claims about “ultimate reality” are
out of place in science because they are either based on value assumptions or
are scientifically unknowable.[1]
Scientifically knowable evolution is only about patterned change and its more
or less proximate causes. Social evolution is importantly different from
biological evolution because it is mainly based on culturally constructed
symbolic systems rather than on genetic adaptation.[2]
It is the study of social evolution that is proposed in this paper.
The word “system” also has some unfortunate connotations. As
used by biologists and economists it often involves assumptions about
homeostatic processes and functionalist accounts that are often falsely applied
to human institutional change. Human social change is often contingent,
path-dependent and conjunctural. To signify this recognition we prefer the
terms “historical systems” and “historical evolution.”
In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries expansion and intensification of intercontinental
interactions has been called globalization. But earlier regional systems also
exhibited similar waves of “globalization,” albeit on a smaller spatial scale,
and these waves of network expansion and contraction, punctuated by occasional
huge jumps in the scale of networks, eventually led to the formation of the
modern global social system. Evolutionary world-systems ecology studies the
spatial nature of human interaction networks over time and the relationship
between these networks and the growth decline/phases of cities and states.
This paper presents a new theoretical synthesis
based on Peter Turchin's (2003) model of the dynamics of agrarian state growth
and decline, network theory, a population pressure iteration model and
explanations of the rise and fall of modern hegemons. It proposes to test the
hypothesis of “semiperipheral development” – the idea that that it has mainly
been semiperipheral societies that have expanded networks, made larger states,
and innovated and implemented new techniques of power and new productive
technologies that have transformed the very logic of social change. The elaboration of cooperative and coordinated
global policies for dealing with the emergent problems of the twenty-first
century will be usefully informed by understanding the probable trajectories of
international political integration.
I begin with a demographic
and ecological model of the growth and decline of land-based “tellurocratic”
states followed by a model of the growth of “thalassocratic” maritime
capitalist city-states. These models are then combined to simulate the
transition to the “modern” pattern of the rise and fall of capitalist hegemonic
nation-states. We also propose to test a model of the interactions among world
regions that can account for the East/West synchrony of growth/decline phases
of cities and states discovered in earlier research. These models will help us
to explain the human past and will have important implications for the future
of global governance because the long-term causes of past political expansion
and of future state formation will be modeled.
Using city and regional population sizes
and the territorial sizes of states and empires as the main
indices of civilizational rise and fall, we will model the interacting effects of population
growth, environmental degradation, resource use, migration, and the growth and
decline of cities and empires and the interactions of regional systems
with one another. Interregional trade, warfare, incursions and disease vectors
are important factors that have affected social change in regional interaction
networks.
World-Systems
World-systems are systems of
societies (international systems) that are strongly linked to one another by
interaction networks (trade, alliances, warfare, migration and information
flows). Thousands of years ago these were small regional affairs, but they have
gotten larger, merged with one another and the big ones have engulfed smaller
ones. This process of network expansions has eventuated in the single global
macrosocial system of today. One important meaning of the globalization is the
expansion and intensification of large-scale interaction networks. At the same
time that macrosystems have become spatially larger, the societies and
intersocietal systems that make them up have become more complex and
hierarchical. And the dynamics of systemic expansion may have qualitatively
changed as new institutions, especially markets and financial systems, have
emerged and become predominant.
The patterns of expansion and
incorporation can be traced by examining changes in the spatial extent of human
interaction networks (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Figure 1 illustrates the spatiotemporal history of the
political/military network (PMN) [interpolity system] that emerged first in
Mesopotamia 5000 years ago.
Figure 1: 5000 Year Emergence of the Central System
(adapted from Wilkinson 1987)
The processes of expansion and increasing complexity have not produced a
smooth upward trend in which the originally less complex and hierarchical areas
became increasingly more complex. Rather social change has been characterized
by uneven development in both space and time. Original areas where leading edge
developments have emerged eventually lost out to new regions where
unprecedented levels of complexity and hierarchy developed. Temporal cycles of
expansion and political centralization were punctuated by occasional upward
sweeps to new higher levels – a stair-step pattern.
All hierarchical macrosystems, even including those based on chiefdoms
(Anderson 1994) and early states (Marcus 1998) experience a sequence of the rise and fall of large
polities – a cycle of centralization and decentralization of political power.
This is known in state-based systems as the rise and fall of empires. In the
modern macrosystem of the last few centuries a similar (but also different)
phenomenon can be seen in the rise and fall of hegemonic core states such as
Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth
century. Interaction networks also
expand and contract in a pattern that we can call pulsation. This
expansion and intensification of large interaction networks corresponds to one
important aspect of what is called “globalization” in the modern
world-system. The recent wave of global
trade and investment integration since World War II was preceded by a
globalization phase during the last half of the nineteenth century that
attained nearly the same degree of worldwide connectedness (Chase-Dunn, Kawano
and Brewer 2000).
These cyclical processes (rise and fall; pulsation) must be modeled in order to understand the more rare instances in
which new higher levels of integration and hierarchy have emerged. Both cities
and empires in Eastern and Western Asia have been found to grow and decline
synchronously from 500 BCE until 1500 CE, but South Asia did not follow this
pattern (Chase-Dunn, Manning and Hall 2000; Chase-Dunn and Manning 2002).
The dynamics of agrarian
states
The primary resources in
agrarian economies are land and people. Geopolitical models, such as those
developed by Randall Collins and Robert Hanneman (Collins 1995, Hanneman et al. 1995), postulate that state power is directly related to the amount of
territory and population that the state controls. This causal dependence leads
to positive-feedback dynamic: a state that expands territory increases its
power, which in turn enables it to expand more, and so on (a classical example
is the Roman expansion under the late republic). However, eventually the
ability of the state to extend its territorial control becomes limited by the
difficulty and expense of projecting power across space. This connection
between the state size and “logistical loads” is sometimes referred to as the imperial overstretch principle (Kennedy 1987).
Spatial location is important
for explaining the geopolitical trajectories of states. Historians noticed long
ago that new, aggressive states that have an excellent chance to grow into a
large empire tend to arise on the marches (edges) of old empires (e.g. McNeill 1963). Within the comparative
world-systems perspective, this phenomenon is termed semiperipheral marcher conquest, in which a new state from out on
the edge of the circle of old states conquers all (or most) of the states in
the old core region to form a “core-wide empire” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). The geopolitical theory explains this empirical pattern by invoking
the marchland position principle:
states with enemies on fewer fronts expand at the expense of states surrounded
by enemies (Collins 1995). However, a comprehensive
empirical test on the European material during the first two millennia CE
indicates that there is no statistical association between protected position
of a region and the size of polity emerging from it (Turchin 2003).
An alternative explanation is
suggested by the observation that not all imperial marchlands or
semiperipheries give birth to aggressively growing polities. It appears that
incipient empires arise primarily in locations where pre-existing imperial
boundaries coincide with intense cultural, or ethnic, frontiers. During the
last two millennia the most common symbolic markers demarcating such metaethnic frontiers (the prefix meta indicates the intensity of ethnic
difference across the frontier) have been based on world religions (thus, the
most common variety in the European context are the Christian-Muslim
frontiers). Metaethnic frontiers are zones where groups come under enormous
pressure, and where ethnocide or even genocide, but also ethnogenesis, commonly
occur (Hall 2000). Intense intergroup
competition eventually results in one group with high internal cohesion
absorbing other ethnically similar groups, and in the process constructing the
core of a rising empire (Turchin 2003).
An implicit assumption of the
geopolitical model discussed above is that geopolitical resources, land and
people, come as a package. In reality, however, the population of a state can
grow (or decline) without corresponding addition or loss of territory. Growing
population density initially increases geopolitical power of the state, because
there are more taxpayers and recruits for the army. However, population growth
in excess of the productivity gains of the land has deleterious effects on
social institutions (Goldstone 1991). It leads to persistent price
inflation, falling real wages, rural misery, and urban migration; an increased
number of aspirants for elite positions and intense intra-elite competition;
and spiraling state expenses due to inflation and expanding real costs, since
armies and bureaucracies grow together with population. As all these trends
intensify, the state goes into bankruptcy and loses military control. Elite
movements of regional and national rebellion and a combination of
elite-mobilized and popular uprisings lead to the complete breakdown of central
authority (Goldstone 1991). In turn, state collapse and
ensuing sociopolitical instability cause higher death and emigration rates,
lower birth rates, and negative effects on the productive infrastructure such
as irrigation canals and flood-control dams.[3]
Models incorporating both the effect of population growth on state stability,
and the feedback from state instability to population decline suggest that we
should observe long-term demographic-political cycles, with periods of roughly
two-three centuries (Turchin 2003).
Theories of Rise and Fall
Complex interchiefdom systems
experienced a cycle in which a single paramount chiefdom became hegemonic
within a system of competing polities by conquering adjacent chiefdoms (D.G.
Anderson 1994; Kirch 1984).[4]
Once states emerged within a region they went through an analogous cycle of
rise and fall in which a single state became hegemonic and then declined.
Eventually most of these systems of states (interstate systems), experienced
the phenomenon of semiperipheral marcher conquest in which a new state
from out on the edge of the circle of old states conquered all (or most) of the
states in the old core region to form a “core-wide empire”.[5]
These patterns repeated
themselves in several world regions for thousands of years, with occasional
leaps in which a semiperipheral marcher state conquered larger regions than had
ever before been subjected to a single power (e.g. Assyrian Empire, Achaemenid
Persia, Alexandrian Empires, the Chin and Han Dynasties, Roman Empire, the
Islamic Caliphates, the Aztec and Inca Empires, the Manchu Dynasty in China).
During the Bronze and Iron Age expansions of the tributary empires a new niche
emerged for states that specialized in the carrying trade among the empires and
adjacent regions. These semiperipheral capitalist city states were usually
“thalassocratic” entities that used naval power to protect sea-going trade
(e.g. the Phoenician city-states, Venice, Genoa, Malacca), but Assur on the
Tigris, the Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies, was a land-based example
of this phenomenon that relied mainly upon donkey caravans for transportation (Larsen
1976). The semiperipheral capitalist city-states did not typically conquer
other states[6] to construct
large empires, but their trading and production activities promoted regional
commerce and the emergence of markets within and between the tributary states.
With the eventual rise of
Europe and intensified capitalism a modification of the old pattern of
semiperipheral marcher conquest appeared. In the European interstate system the
semiperipheral marcher states were outdone by a new breed of capitalist
nation-states. These capitalist hegemons established primacy in the larger
system without conquering adjacent core states, and so the core remained
multicentric despite the continued rise and fall of hegemonic core powers.
Imperialism over adjacent states was reorganized as colonial empires in which
each core state had its own distant peripheral colonies – the European
domination of peoples in Africa, Asia and the Americas. The efforts by some
modern core powers to conquer their neighbors were defeated by coalitions that
sought to reproduce a multistate structure among core states. Thus the
oscillation between “core-wide empire” and an “interstate system” came to end
and was replaced by the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers. The hegemonic
sequence of the modern interstate system alternates between two structural
situations as hegemonic core powers rise and fall: hegemony and hegemonic
rivalry. This was a new form of the process of rise and fall.
The
Westphalian interstate system, in which the sovereignty of separate and
competing states is institutionalized by the right of states to make war to
protect their independence, has become a taken for granted institution in the
modern world-system. Historians of international relations (e.g. Kennedy 1987) and
theorists of international relations (e.g. Waltz 1979) have come to define this
situation as a natural state of being. Authors with greater temporal depth
(e.g. Wilkinson 1988, 1999) have argued that the peculiar resistance of the
modern interstate system to the emergence of a universal state by means of
conquest has been the result of an evolutionary learning process unique to
modern Europe in which states realized that in order to protect their own
sovereignty they should band together and engage in “general war” whenever a
“rogue state” threatens to conquer another state.
A rather different
explanation of the modern transition from the pattern of semiperipheral marcher
state conquest to the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers points to the
emergent predominance of capitalist accumulation in the European-centered
interstate system. Once capitalism had
become the predominant strategy for the accumulation of wealth and power it
partially supplanted the geopolitical logic of institutionalized political
coercion as a means to accumulation. Powerful capitalist core states emerged
that could effectively prevent semiperipheral marcher states from conquering
whole core regions to erect a core-wide empire. The first capitalist-nation
state to successfully do this was the Dutch republic of the seventeenth
century.
There are several important
ways in which explanations of modern rise and fall are different from one
another. One important distinction is between the functionalists (who see
emergent global hierarchies as serving a “need for global order,”) and conflict
theorists (who dwell more intently on the ways in which hierarchies serve the
privileged, the powerful and the wealthy). The term “hegemony” usually
corresponds with the conflict approach, while the functionalists tend to employ
the idea of “leadership,” though several analysts occasionally use both of
these terms (e.g. Arrighi and Silver 1999). Another difference is between those
who stress the importance of political/military power vs. what we shall call
“economic power.” This issue is confused by disciplinary traditions (e.g.
differences between economics, political science and sociology). Most
economists entirely reject the notion of economic power, assuming that market
exchanges occur among equals. Most political scientists and sociologists would
agree that economic power has become more important than it formerly was. Some of the literature on recent
globalization goes so far as to argue that states and military organizations
have been largely subsumed by the power of transnational corporations and
global market dynamics (e.g. Ross 1995).
The three most
important approaches to theorizing modern hegemony are those of Wallerstein
(1984, 2002), Modelski and Thompson (1994); and Arrighi (1994). Wallerstein
defines hegemony as comparative advantages in profitable types of production.
This economic advantage is what serves as the basis of the hegemon’s political
and cultural influence and military power. Hegemonic production is the most
profitable kind of core production, and hegemony is just the top end of the
global hierarchy that constitutes the modern core/periphery division of labor.
Hegemonies are unstable and tend to devolve into hegemonic rivalry.
Wallerstein sees a Dutch
seventeenth century hegemony, a British hegemony in the nineteenth century and
U.S. hegemony in the twentieth century.
He perceives three stages within each hegemony. The first is based on
success in the production of consumer goods; the second is a matter of success
in the production of capital goods; and the third is rooted in success in
financial services and foreign investment stemming from the institutionalized
centrality of the hegemon in the larger world-system.
George
Modelski and William R. Thompson (1994) contend that the world needs order, and
world powers rise to fill this need.
Global leaders rise on the basis of economic comparative advantage in
newly leading industries, which allow them to acquire the resources needed to
win wars among the great powers and to mobilize coalitions that keep the peace.
World wars are the arbiters that function as selection mechanisms for global
leadership. But the comparative
advantages of the leaders diffuse to competitors and new challengers emerge.
Successful challengers are those that ally with the declining world leader
against another challenger (e.g. the U.S. and Britain against Germany).
Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) The
Long Twentieth Century employs a Braudelian approach to the analysis of
what he terms “systemic cycles of accumulation.” Arrighi sees hegemonies as
successful collaborations between finance capitalists and wielders of state
power. His tour of the hegemonies begins with Genoese financiers who allied
with Spanish and Portuguese statesmen to perform the role of hegemon in the
fifteenth century. In Arrighi’s approach the role of hegemon itself evolves,
becoming more deeply entwined with the organizational and economic
institutional spheres that allow for successful capitalist accumulation. He
sees a Dutch hegemony of the seventeenth century, then a period of contention
between Britain and France in the eighteenth century, and a British hegemony in
the nineteenth century, followed by U.S. hegemony in the twentieth century.
A distinctive element of
Arrighi’s approach is his contention that profit making from trade and
production becomes less profitable toward the end of a ‘systemic cycle of
accumulation” and so big capital increasingly focuses on financial
manipulations. Arrighi’s approach is
compatible with the idea that new lead industries are important for the rise of
a hegemon, but he sees the economic activities of big capital during the
declining years in terms of speculative financial activities. These latter
often correspond with a period of “growth” in which incomes are rising during a
latter-day belle époque of the systemic cycle of accumulation. But this
period of accumulation is based on the economic power of haute finance
and the centering of world markets in the global cities of the hegemons rather
than on their ability to produce real products that people will buy, and so
these belle époques are unsustainable bubbles that are followed by
decline.
The main task of the
HSD-funded project will be to develop dynamical models of the rise and fall of
states and the occasional upward sweeps in which newly emergent states break
through the extant ceiling of state size to produce a much larger polity than
has ever existed before (See Figure 2). We will begin with a demographic and
ecological model of the growth and decline of land-based “tellurocratic”
states. Then we will develop a model of the growth of “thalassocratic” maritime
capitalist city-states. These models will then be combined to model the
transition to the “modern” pattern of the rise and fall of capitalist hegemonic
nation-states (e.g. from Genoa to Amsterdam to London to New York).
Figure
2: Rise and Fall with Upward Sweeps of State Size
The basic
model
Figure 3 (below) illustrates our several hypotheses about the causal relations
among the main variables that cause city and empire growth. At the top of
Figure 3 is Population Growth.
Procreation is socially regulated in all human societies, but despite this
there has been a long-run tendency for population to grow. Population
Growth leads to Intensification,
defined by Marvin Harris (1977:5) as “the investment of more soil, water,
minerals, or energy per unit of time or area.”
Intensification leads to Environmental
Degradation as raw material inputs become scarcer and the unwanted
byproducts of human activity (pollution, etc.) modify the surrounding
environment. Together Intensification and Environmental Degradation lead to
rising costs in terms of labor time needed to produce the food and raw
materials that people need, and this condition is called Population Pressure. In order to feed more people, farmers must use more marginal land
because the best soils have become degraded. Or deer hunters must travel
farther to find their quarry once deer have become depleted in nearby
districts. Thus the cost in time and effort of producing a given amount of food
increases (Boserup 1965; 1981). Some resources are less subject to depletion
than others (e.g. fish compared to big game), but increased use usually causes
rising costs. Other types of environmental degradation are due to the side
effects of production, such as the build-up of wastes and pollution of water
sources. These also increase the costs of continued production or cause other
problems.
As long as there were available lands to occupy, the consequences of
population pressure led to Migration.
And so humans populated the whole Earth. The costs of Migration are a function of the availability of desirable
alternative locations, moving costs, and the effective resistance to immigration
that is mounted by those who already live in these alternative locations.
Circumscription (Carneiro 1970) occurs when
the costs of leaving are higher than the costs of staying. This is a function
of available lands, but lands are differentially desirable depending on the
technologies that the migrants employ. Generally people have preferred to live
in the way that they have lived in the past, but Population Pressure or other push factors can cause them to adopt
new technologies in order to occupy new lands.
Figure
3: Demographic and Environmental Causes of City and State Growth[7]
The factor of resistance from
extant occupants is also a complex matter of similarities and differences in
technology, social organization and military techniques between the occupants
and the groups seeking to immigrate. Circumscription
increases the likelihood of higher levels of Conflict in a situation of Population
Pressure because, though the costs of staying are great, the exit option is
closed off. This can lead to several
different kinds of warfare, but also to increasing intrasocietal struggles and
conflicts (civil war, class antagonisms, etc.)
A period of intense conflict tends to reduce Population Pressure if significant numbers of people are killed
off. And some systems get stuck in a vicious cycle in which warfare,
cannibalism and other forms of conflict operate as a demographic regulator,
e.g. the Marquesas Islands (Kirch 1991). This cycle corresponds to the path
that goes from Population Pressure
to Migration to Circumscription to Conflict,
and then a negative arrow back to Population
Pressure. When population again builds up another round of heightened
conflict knocks it back down again. This is the “nasty bottom” of the iteration
model. [8]
Under the right conditions a
circumscribed situation in which the level of conflict has been high will be
the locus of the emergence of more hierarchical institutions, larger states and
larger cities. Carneiro (1970) and Mann (1986) reasonably contend that people will
be inclined to run away from state-formation if they can in order to maintain
autonomy and equality. But circumscription prevents exit, and exhaustion from
prolonged or extreme conflict may make subservience to a new state the lesser
evil. It is often better to accept a king than to continue fighting. And so
kings (and big men, chiefs and emperors) emerged out of situations in which
conflict had reduced the resistance to centralized power. This is quite
different from the usual portrayal of those who hold to the functional theory
of stratification. The world-system
insight here is that the newly emergent elites most often come from regions
that have been semiperipheral. These larger states build new (or expand existing)
cities.
Intersocietal systems are often structured
as hierarchies in which powerful core states dominate and/or exploit less
powerful semiperipheral and peripheral peoples. And yet some semiperipheral
agents of change are unusually able to put together effective campaigns for
erecting new levels of hierarchy.[9]
This may involve both innovations in the “techniques of power” and innovations
in productive technology (Technological
Change). Newly emergent elites often implement new production technologies
as well as new waves of intensification. This, along with the more peaceful
regulation of access to resources structured as legal regulation of property,
creates the conditions for a new round of Population
Growth, which brings us around to the top of Figure 3 again. Female
education and involvement in the world of work outside the household lowers the
birth rate, and many countries in the contemporary world have stable population
sizes, but the world as a whole has not yet reached that point and so the
iteration model is still working. In about 50 or 75 years humans are likely to
reach a stable population maximum, and the iteration model will need to be
greatly modified to explain subsequent development.
The emergence of regional market exchange
and states specializing in trade articulated changes in intensification,
environmental degradation and population pressure with technological change,
and so the mechanisms at the bottom of the model in Figure 2 were by-passed (at
least temporarily) until population growth became so great that these articulations
were overwhelmed. Then the process once again shifts toward greater conflict.
City growth.
The growth of cities, a major component of the anthropogenic built
environment, is affected by multiple factors.
One important factor is demographic change. In the agrarian era cities were population sinks, and relied on
immigration from rural areas to sustain themselves. Rural population growth
exacerbated this “sink” effect. When rural population increased beyond a
certain threshold, rural areas suffered from an excess of labor, prompting
migration to the cities. Such periods were usually accompanied by a flowering
of crafts, because labor was cheap, and elites, enjoying greater returns from
agriculture (due to high rents), tended to spend some of their wealth on the
products of artisan labor. On the other hand, low real wages meant that an
increasing proportion of the urban population was living below the subsistence
level. As a result, urban mortality rates tended to rise, and birth rates to
decline.
Another
important factor affecting city growth is technological development, which
leads to greater agricultural productivity and a larger proportion of
population living in the cities.
Improvements in sanitation and health did not greatly affect the urban mortality
rate until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Imperial expansion.
So far we have addressed the nonspatial aspects of the modeled
system – either acting in a local
fashion (population growth, agricultural intensification) or, conversely, in a
global fashion (global climate change, millennial growth of technological
knowledge). What makes a model explicitly spatial, however, are processes that
connect various localities, and whose strength declines with distance. One such
mechanism is the spatial expansion of empires resulting from conquest of
adjacent territories. The first, and obvious, factor is the size of the
population controlled by the empire. However, the effect of population size on
military strength is nonlinear. One of
the important factors affecting imperial conquest is the strength of the state
(S), since wealthy empires can raise
large armies, purchase expensive equipment, and sustain armies in the field for
lengthy periods of time. Thus, an empire during the unfavorable phase of the
demographic cycle (when it suffers from fiscal crisis) has great difficulties
in financing war operations. These are periods when empires are extremely
vulnerable to adversary empires, or to barbarians. Other mechanisms affecting
warfare that we will investigate are changes in military technology and the
military advantages developed by Central Asian steppe nomads.
An important spatial process affecting
imperial growth is the logistical aspect of the ability of the state to project
its power over distance. This theory has been well developed as a result of
work by Randall Collins (1999) on geopolitics (see also Hanneman 1995 and
Turchin 2003b). We will model geopolitical processes by focusing on spatial
units located on or near the boundary between adjacent states, and calculating
the power that each state can bring to bear on these spaces. In the simplest
formulation, the power of State 1 delivered to square with coordinate x,y is:
P1(x,y,t)
= S1 exp[-d1(x,y)/h]
where S1 is the resources of State 1 and d1 is the distance from the center of State 1 to the
spatial unit x,y. Parameter h modulates how fast power diminishes
with distance (and its units are km). P2(x,y,t)
is calculated analogously. The relative values of P1 and P2
determine whether State 1 or State 2 will conquer the unit. For example, a
simple rule is that the probability of the square going to State1 is equal to P1/(P1+P2),
and vice versa.
The
logistics parameter h can be made a
function of the local geography. It is easier to project power across flat
space than across mountains. We will also investigate the effect of a
multiplier that will reflect the military technology available to each state,
or reflect the difference between, say, nomads and settled polities.
Core/periphery status. Examination of the
hypothesis that semiperipheral societies are frequently the loci of change
agents that expand and transform institutional structures requires coding the
positions of societies in core/periphery hierarchies. Fortunately David
Wilkinson (1991) has already produced a coding of sedentary societies into
core, peripheral and semiperipheral categories. We will improve upon
Wilkinson’s work by distinguishing between different kinds of semiperipheries
and by including nomadic peoples.
Causes of East/West Synchrony
One important product of our modeling project will be to determine the
causes of a fascinating synchrony that emerged between East Asia and the
distant West Asian/Mediterranean region in the growth/decline phases of cities
and empires, but did not involve the intermediate South Asian region. Studies
have used data on both city sizes and the territorial sizes of empires to
examine the hypothesis that regions distant from one another were experiencing
synchronous cycles of growth and decline (e.g. Chase-Dunn, Manning and Hall
2000; Chase-Dunn and Manning 2002).
Frederick Teggart’s (1939)
path-breaking world historical study of temporal correlations between events on
the edges of the Roman and Han Empires argued the thesis that incursions by
Central Asian steppe nomads were the key to East/West synchrony. A study of
city-size distributions in Afroeurasia (Chase-Dunn and Willard 1993; see also
Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 222-223) found an apparent synchrony between changes
in city size distributions and the growth of largest cities in East Asia and
West Asia-North Africa over the period from 500 BCE to 1500 CE. That finding led to a study of the
territorial sizes of empires, which found a similar synchrony (Chase-Dunn,
Manning and Hall 1999). [10]
Plausible causes of these synchronies are climate change, epidemics, trade
cycles, and the incursions of Central Asian steppe nomads.
Global State Formation
The scientific literature on
future global state formation has mainly consisted of linear or quadratic
extrapolations of several different cross-temporal empirical indicators. Robert
Carneiro’s (1978) original study quantified the long-term decline in the number
of autonomous polities on Earth to predict an emergent world state in about
1000 years from the present. Earlier studies by Raul Naroll (1967) and Louis
Marano (1973) had used the territorial sizes of states for a similar purpose.
Peter Peregrine, Melvin Ember and Carol R. Ember (2004) employ a similar
extrapolation approach that uses indicators based on codings of archaeological
evidence. Based on an indicated
quadratic curve over the past 12,000 years, they predict the emergence of a
global state by CE 5000.
The careful study of the
territorial sizes of the largest empires over the past 3000 years by Rein
Taagepera (1978, 1997) shows that the largest states in different regions
tended to rise and fall with occasional radical upward swings. Taagepera
observes that the median duration of large polities at more than half their
peak size has been around 130 years. He also notes that polities that expand
fast are somewhat shorter-lived than polities that expand more slowly. And he
reports that three sudden increases in polity sizes occurred around 3000 BCE,
600 BCE and CE 1600. [11]
Upward Sweeps
The question of the timing of
upward sweeps to new levels is entirely germane to the problem of modeling
global state formation. So also is the issue of how unusually large states have
been formed in the past. Upward sweeps have mainly been instances of a
semiperipheral marcher state conquering and unifying adjacent older core states
and nearby peripheral areas. So conquest has been the main mechanism of
large-scale political integration. But the pattern of hegemonic rise and fall
in the modern world-system has been different. The most powerful states, the
hegemons (the Dutch, the British and the United States), have fought
semiperipheral challengers (e.g. Napoleonic France and Germany) to prevent the
emergence of a core-wide empire. We contend that this is because the hegemons
are the most capitalist states in the system, the ones for whom economic
success is most closely tied to the ability to make superprofits on the
technological rents that return from new lead technologies.
Only
during hegemonic decline have the modern capitalist hegemons shown a tendency
toward “imperial overreach” in which their military power is employed in a last
ditch effort to prop up a declining economic hegemony. These efforts have not
been successful, and a new hegemon only emerges after a period of hegemonic
rivalry and world war. This is a method of choosing “global leadership” that we
can no longer afford to employ, and so the issue of institutions that can
peacefully resolve the struggle for hegemony is of the first importance for our
very survival as a species.
The approach that we propose
is to model the main causes of state formation and upward sweeps taking into
account the ways in which the basic processes have been altered by the
emergence of new institutions. We will
elaborate and improve upon the recent work of Robert Bates Graber (2004). Graber develops both an ahistorical and an
historical population pressure model of political integration. His ahistorical
model is a very simplified version of the iteration model displayed in Figure 3
above that includes population growth rates and the number of independent
polities. Graber’s historical model takes account of the emergence of the
League of Nations and the United Nations as our approach will do. But we add
the rise and fall cycle, the emergence of markets and capitalism, and the
growth of other international political organizations and non-governmental
organizations to our model of political globalization.
The main political structure
of the modern world-system has been, and remains, the international system of
states as theorized and constituted in the Peace of Westphalia. This
international system of competing and allying national states was extended to
the periphery of the modern world-system in two large waves of decolonization
of the colonial empires of core powers. The modern system already differed from
earlier imperial systems in that its core remained multicentric rather than
being occasionally conquered and turned into a core-wide empire. Instead, empires
were organized as distant peripheral colonies rather than as conquered adjacent
territories. Earlier instances of this type of colonial empire were produced by
thallasocratic states, mainly semiperipheral capitalist city-states that
specialized in trade. In the modern system this form of colonial empire became
the norm, and the European core states rose to global hegemony by conquering
and colonizing the Americas, Asia and Africa in a series of expansions (see
Figure 4). The international system of sovereign states was extended to the
colonized periphery in two large waves of decolonization (see Figure 4). After
a long-term trend in which the number of independent states on Earth had been
decreasing, that number rose again with decolonization and the core states
decreased in size when they lost their colonial empires.
Extension of the State System to the Periphery
The decolonization waves were
part of the formation of a global polity of states. And one of the decolonized
regions became “the first new nation,” and eventually rose to hegemony to
become the largest hegemon the modern system has seen – the United States. The doctrine of the national
self-determination, long a principle of the European state system, was extended
to the periphery.
Figure 4: Waves of colonization and decolonization
based on Henige (1970)
This multistate system has also experienced waves of international
political integration that began after the Napoleonic Wars early in the
nineteenth century. Britain organized a “Concert of Europe” (Jervis 1985) that
was intended to prevent future French revolutions and Napoleonic adventures.
During the middle of the nineteenth century a large number of specialized
international organizations emerged such as the International Postal Union (Murphy
1994) that underwrote the beginnings of a global civil society that included
more than elites, and this network of transnational voluntary associations grew
much larger during the most recent wave of economic globalization since World
War II. After World War I the League
of Nations was intended to provide collective security, though it was weakened
by the failure of the United States to join. After World War II the United
Nations became a proto-world-state, the efficacy of which has waned and waxed since
then. The system of national states is being slowly overlain by global and
regional transnational political organizations that blossom after periods of
war and during periods of economic globalization.
Our historical model will add
marketization, decolonization, new lead technologies, the rise and fall of
hegemons, and the rise of international political organizations to the
population pressure model in order to forecast future trajectories of global
state formation. And we will assemble empirical data for the last two hundred
years on the trend toward global political integration in order to parameterize
our models. This will allow us to examine how changing assumptions about the
relationships among variables will affect probable future trajectories of
international political integration. Our conceptualization of the cyclical
nature of many processes will allow us to consider how downward plunges and
possible collapses might affect the probable trajectories of global state
formation.
We will also take into
account the structural differences between recent and earlier periods. For
example, the period of British hegemonic decline moved rather quickly toward
conflictive hegemonic rivalry because economic competitors such as Germany were
able to develop powerful military capabilities. The U.S. hegemony has been
different in that the United States ended up as the single superpower after the
decline of the Soviet Union. Economic challengers (Japan and Germany) cannot
easily use the military card because they are stuck with the consequences of
having lost the last World War. This, and the immense size of the U.S. economy,
will probably slow the process of hegemonic decline down relative to the speed
of the British decline (Chase-Dunn, Jorgensen, Reifer and Lio, Forthcoming). [12]
Our modeling of the global
future will also consider changes that have occurred in labor relations,
urban-rural relations, the nature of emergent city regions, and the shrinking
of the global reserve army of labor (Silver 2003).
TheTrajectory of Political
Globalization
We conceptualize political
globalization analogously to our understanding of economic globalization as the
relative strength and density of larger versus smaller interaction networks and
organizational structures. Much has
been written about the emergence and development of global governance and many
see an uneven and halting upward trend in the transitions from the Concert of
Europe to the League of Nations and the United Nations toward the formation of
a proto-world state. The emergence of the Bretton Woods institutions (the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the more recent
restructuring of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade as the World Trade
Organization, and the visibility of other international fora (the Trilateral
Commission, The Group of Seven [Eight]; the World Economic Forum, the World
Social Forum meetings, etc.) support the idea of emerging global
governance. The geometric growth of
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) is also an important
phenomenon of global governance and the emergence of global civil society
(Murphy 1994; Boli and Thomas 1999).
As we have discussed above,
all world-systems go through cycles of political centralization and
decentralization with occasional leaps toward new and higher levels of
political integration (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). In the modern world-system
the cycle for the last 400 years has taken the form of the rise and fall of
hegemonic core states. Some claim that the hegemonic
sequence is now morphing into a new structure of core condominium
(Goldfrank 1999). We intend to study
both the hegemonic sequence and emerging global governance. While these might
be combined into a more general concept of political globalization, we contend
that it is important to keep them separate because hegemonic rise and fall is
an old feature of the world-system, whereas political globalization is arguably
much more recent. Political
globalization can be analytically reduced to the question of the relative
strength of larger vs. smaller political and military organizations (including
also the functionally “economic” ones (IMF, World Bank, WTO) mentioned above.[13]
The proposed research will
expand our understanding of systemic processes of polity formation and better
allow us to comprehend the possible futures for humanity by systematically
comparing recent times with the past millennia.
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