North-South
Contradictions and Bridges at the World Social Forum*
Bamako Social Forum 2006
Chris Chase-Dunn, Ellen Reese,
Mark Herkenrath, Rebecca Giem,
Erika Gutierrez, Linda Kim and
Christine Petit
Forthcoming in Rafael
Reuveny and William R. Thompson (eds.) NORTH
AND SOUTH IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY. Blackwell.
v.
12-11-06 8452 words.
*Thanks
to Richard Niemeyer for producing the GIS map of WSF05 participant home places
in Figure 1 and to Toi Carter and Matt Kaneshiro for providing population data
broken down by age and gender.
This is IROWS Working Paper #
31 available at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows31/irows31.htm
University
of California-Riverside
Abstract:
This chapter uses the
results of a survey of participants at the World Social Forum that was held in
Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2005 to examine North-South differences within the
progressive sector of global civil society. We find significant differences in
both the characteristics and preferred strategies for social change among WSF
participants that reside in the core, semi-periphery, and periphery.
Understanding and overcoming such contradictions would help to promote more
effective cooperation among transnational social activists in global social
justice projects.
Keywords: North-South relations, global
inequality, transnational social movements, World Social Forum, semiperipheral
development, global social change
The World Social Forum (WSF) is both an open meeting
space and a movement of movements that are explicitly acting to oppose
neoliberal global capitalism and to address issues of global social justice and
environmental sustainability. It is also an organization governed by a charter
of principles and two leadership bodies: an International Council and a local
Organizing Committee. Because it is widely recognized that countries in the global
South are especially at risk of exploitation and domination, the world-level
meetings of the World Social Forum have all been held in the global South
(Porto Alegre, Brazil; Mumbai, India; and Nairobi, Kenya).[1] Overcoming global inequalities and injustices is
a major goal of those who are participating in the Social Forum process. This
paper focuses on North-South differences and complementarities among the people
and the movements that are participating in the World Social Forum using the
results from our survey of participants at the meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil
in January of 2005 (WSF05).
Civil society is a residual category of social organizations
that are not encompassed by either the state or the market (for a history of
the concept, see Calhoun 2001; Islamoglu 2001). It includes the family,
informal networks, social clubs and voluntary associations, non-state religious
organizations, and social movement organizations. We use the term transnational
civil society to mean those in civil society who are consciously
communicating, cooperating, and organizing across national boundaries (Amoore
and Langley 2004). In this chapter we are studying a particular portion of
transnational civil society – that segment that actively participates in, or is
allied to, the global justice movement and other progressive social movements.
The terminology of “North-South relations” has come to
refer to the relations between wealthy
powerful countries with poor and less developed ones (Reuveny and Thompson 2007
[forthcoming]). It is fair to say that most social science approaches to global
social change are core-centric, focusing mainly or only on the “great powers”
or the “advanced countries.” Our theoretical approach is the comparative
world-systems perspective that analyzes global inequalities as a
world-historically constructed hierarchy – an intersocietal stratification
system (Chase-Dunn 1998). This global
intersocietal hierarchy evolved out of the rise of European societies to power
over the rest of the world and it continues to exist despite the decolonization
of the Americas, Asia and Africa.[2]
This hierarchy is socially constituted and institutionally reproduced but it is
also repeatedly challenged by the organized and unorganized resistance of the
dominated and exploited peoples. The structure of global governance has evolved
in response to these challenges.
The terms we prefer are core, periphery and semiperiphery
defined as structural positions in a global hierarchy that is economic,
political-military and cultural. The core-periphery hierarchy at the global
level is organized spatially, but it is not a simple matter of latitude as
implied by the North-South terminology. It is a complex and multidimensional
hierarchy of different kinds of interrelated power and dependence relations.
The world-systems perspective also asserts that capitalism as a system is
dependent on successful exploitation and domination of the periphery and the
semiperiphery by competing core states and firms (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn
1985; Chase-Dunn 1998).[3]
The world-systems perspective holds that this global
hierarchy is a centrally important structure for understanding and explaining
world history and the trajectories of individual countries and regions. The
global hierarchy is reproduced over time in the sense that it is hard to move
up or down, although there is some vertical mobility. The semiperiphery,
composed of large states and national societies with intermediate levels of
development, is an important zone because innovations that transform
technologies and forms of organization tend to get implemented (and sometimes
invented) in the semiperiphery. It is a fertile location that produces
structural and evolutionary change. This is the hypothesis of “semiperipheral
development” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Chapter 5). Both the hypothesis of
semiperipheral development and the notion of the “necessity of imperialism” are
the main justifications for the assertion that core-periphery relations are a
key factor in the explanation of world historical social change.
The struggle of the elites to move up the hierarchy and
to stay on top requires hegemonic strategies that incorporate some of the
non-elites into developmental projects, but the resistance of those below to
domination and exploitation challenges hegemonic projects with new
counter-hegemonic strategies of protection and democratization. This systemic
core-periphery struggle is a major engine of world historical social change.
Efforts by local and national groups to come together in
transnational and international coalitions and organizations are not new. There
has been a series of world revolutions in which transnational and international
political alliances and organizations have played important roles for centuries
(Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1998). The
contemporary efforts by activists to overcome North-South cultural differences
and to deal with potential and actual contradictory interests between workers,
women, environmentalists, consumers, indigenous peoples etc. of the North and
the South need to be informed by both the failures and the successes of these
earlier struggles.
In the analyses that follow we use both the North-South distinction
and the core-semiperiphery-periphery distinction in order to compare the two.
The North-South breakdown we use is based on the World Bank’s classification of
countries into high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low
income countries, with the group of high income countries designated as the
global North. For the core-semiperiphery-periphery breakdown we use Jeffrey Kentor’s
(2000, 2005) measure, which includes indicators of military power and
international economic dependency along with indicators of national income (see
Appendix A). The “North” category is quite similar to the “core” as we have
trichotomized Kentor’s measure, except for eight countries that the World Bank
includes in its “high income” group (Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, New Zealand,
Portugal, Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel). We designate these as
semiperipheral.
We find that participants from countries in the periphery
are under-represented at WSF05, which is not surprising given the poverty
within that region and the location of the host country. Moreover, our results show
that a greater share of respondents from the periphery are affiliated with
externally sponsored non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which tend to have
greater financial resources to cover their members’ travel than self-funded
social movement organizations (SMOs) and unions. We also find that, despite
significant differences in the characteristics of participants from the
periphery, semi-periphery, and core, there are not significant differences in
terms of their opinions on a number of political issues. However, we did find
that, controlling for the effects of other factors, participants from the
semiperiphery (mostly Brazilians) are significantly less likely, compared to
other participants, to favor strategies that involve the creation of democratic
global governance institutions, but are more likely to favor the transformation
of the WSF into a global political actor.
How Inclusive is the
World Social Forum?
The
World Social Forum, despite official statements that decry the effort to represent
humanity as a whole[4],
tries to be broadly inclusive. Here and in other papers[5]
we present results that shed light on the extent to which this endeavor has
been successful.
Our survey is not a based
on a random sample of the participants, though we tried to make it as
representative as possible given the limitations of collecting responses during
the meetings. Toward that aim, we conducted our survey in three languages
(English, Spanish, and Portuguese) and surveyed participants at multiple types of
events and venues at the WSF meeting. To our knowledge, there have only been a
few surveys of WSF participants besides our own: Fundacao Perseu Abramo’s (FPA)
survey of participants at the 2001 meeting (Schönleitner 2003) and IBASE’s
(Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses) survey of participants at
the 2003, 2004, and 2005 meetings. In another paper (Reese et al. 2006), we compare some of our findings described below to
FPA’s findings about 2001 WSF participants and IBASE’s findings about 2005 WSF
participants, in order to get a better sense of how representative our sample
was to the total WSF participant population.[6]
In a nutshell, our findings about the demographic and social characteristics of
WSF participants are similar to those reported by FPA and IBASE, even though our
sample was more international compared to IBASE’s sample. About 54% of our
sample were Brazilian, compared to 80% of IBASE’s sample. We also found a
higher share (43%) of our respondents attended the Forum on behalf of a NGO
(FPA: 25%; IBASE: 34%) and that more of our respondents (49%) were attending on
behalf of a SMO (FPA: 13%; IBASE: 29%).
From whence did the participants in the 2005 WSF in Porto
Alegre come? Based on the 520 survey responses for which we were able to
ascertain the respondent’s home city, Figure 1 shows a global map of where they
came from. There were 163 cities plotted on this GIS map.
Figure 1: Residences of
participants in the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre
Obviously the “tyranny of distance,” despite the
long-term declining costs of long-distance transportation, continues to be a
major factor in shaping the geographical nature of participation in the WSF.
This can even be seen within South America. Fifty-six percent of the
participants came from Brazil.[7]
None of our respondents were from the Peoples Republic of China, except for the
five from Hong Kong, and none were from Russia.[8]
Table 1 shows the home region of the respondents of our survey.
|
|
Number of
WSF participants |
Percentage of WSF participants |
Percentage of
world population in 2004 |
| South America |
439 |
69% |
6% |
| Western Europe |
67 |
10.5% |
12% |
| North America (w/out Mexico) |
53 |
8% |
5% |
| Asia |
48 |
7.5% |
61% |
| Africa |
9 |
1.4% |
12% |
| Central American and Caribbean |
7 |
1.1% |
3% |
| Oceania (Australia & NZL) |
2 |
.3% |
1% |
| Total |
625 |
|
6,269,900,000 |
Asia and Africa are the most seriously under-represented
world regions. Of course it is not just the tyranny of distance that skews the
participation in an event such as the World Social Forum. People from
different regions also have very different financial and organizational resources
and different degrees of connectivity to transnational civil society. Table 2
shows the number and percentages of WSF2005 respondents from the core,
periphery and semiperiphery and compares these with percentages of the world’s
population in the countries in these categories.[9]
|
|
Number of WSF participants |
Percentage of WSF participants |
Percentage of world population in 2005 |
| Core |
125 |
20.0% |
13.3% |
| Semiperiphery |
451 |
72.2% |
54.6% |
| Periphery |
49 |
7.8% |
32.1% |
| Total |
625 |
|
6,451,392,455 |
The core is slightly over-represented; the periphery,
which contains 32 percent of the world’s population, is seriously under-represented.
That is one reason why the 2007 World Social Forum will be held in Nairobi,
Kenya.
North-South Differences in Demographic and
Social Characteristics
In the analysis of demographic, social, and political
differences that follows we present the results broken down both by
world-system zone categories and by the North-South categorization shown in
Appendix A. As mentioned above, fifty-six (55.5%) of our respondents were
from Brazil. In this paper, we are particularly interested in comparing the views
of politically active participants of the WSF05, those who consciously
participating in transnational civil society.
We worried that some of the respondents were “drop-ins” who were
attracted to the atmosphere of the Forum but are not active within social
movements, and that this might be distorting our efforts to examine
North-South differences within the progressive sector of global civil
society. We addressed this concern by constructing a measure that we call
“activists.” These are people who participated
in at least one political protest in the last year, or who report that they
are actively involved in a least one of the social movements listed in our
survey, or who have attended the WSF05 meeting on behalf of a social movement
organization. Only 31 of our 639 respondents (4.9%) did not do at least one
of these things. Although some of these respondents may be emergent
activists, many are likely to be “drop-ins” who attended the WSF05 for
non-political reasons, and so we excluded them from our analyses of
North-South differences among WSF participants. The tables below include only
those who qualify as social activists.
First, we will present and discuss the results of
cross-tabulations of North-South differences among attendees and then we will
further test the findings with multivariate logistic regressions. Table 3
shows the gender breakdown by North-South and core, semiperiphery and
periphery categories.
Total WSF WSF North WSF South World Population
Male 52% (309) 55% (74) 51% (235) 49%
Female 48% (282) 45% (60) 49%
(222) 51%
Core Semiperiphery
Periphery
Male 56%
(65) 50% (215) 66% (29)
Female 44%
(52) 50% (215) 34% (15)
(Numbers of respondents are in parentheses) Chi-Square=
4.675, sig. =.10
Table 3: Gender
distribution among Social Forum Respondents in Porto Alegre, 2005[10]
Based on our sample of participants it is likely that
slightly more men (52%) than women (48%) attended the World Social Forum in
Porto Alegre in 2005. When the gender
numbers are broken down by North-South and core-semiperiphery-periphery
categories the story is similar, except for the periphery, where there is a
greater preponderance of men in attendance. [11] The differences were not large for any of
the categories except that of the periphery, where 66% of those attending
were men and only 34% were women. Recall that only 49 of our 625 respondents
came from countries that are categorized as being in the periphery. Nevertheless, this is nearly a
statistically significant difference between the gender breakdown among those
from the periphery and that of the whole group of attendees that answered our
survey (sig.=10%).
There are a number of plausible explanations for the
rather larger gender difference found for the attendees from countries of the
periphery. It could be that men are more likely to travel long distances than
are women, especially from countries in the periphery, or it could be due to
differences in income or education. Women from countries of the periphery
still typically do not have as many years of schooling as do men, and this
affects income, literacy, involvement in politics, etc. They also have higher
fertility rates and less access to child care services compared to women in
the core, making it more difficult for them to travel long distances.
Total WSF WSF WSF In Population of
Sample North South Countries from
Which
Attendees
Came
Under 26 years 42%
22% (30.5%) 47% (52%) 0-24= 46.6%
26-35 years 29%
38% (14%) 26%
(16%) 25-34= 15.4%
Over 35
years 29% 40% (55.5%) 26%
(32%) 35+= 38%
(Country
age percentages in parentheses)
Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Under 26 years
23% (30.5%) 49% (50%) 24%(58%)
26-35 years 36%(14%) 26%
(16%) 37% (15%)
Over 35
years 42%(55.5%) 25%(34%) 39% (27%)
(Country age percentages in parentheses)
Chi-Square= 32.782 sig. = .000
Table 4: Age breakdown
of WSF05 Respondents and global population
Table 4 shows the age composition of WSF05 attendees
and compares this across respondents’ world system position. In the last column,
we report the average population share in each age group for all of the
countries from which respondents came. Forty-two percent of the whole group
of attendees were under the age of 26, and 49% of those from the
semiperiphery were under 26. Brazil is in the semiperiphery and so a large
number of the young people in attendance were locals. But those who are
included in this table have passed the “activists” test mentioned above. The
WSF attracts young activists and this is also indicated by the fact that 23%
of those who came from the core and 24% of those who came from countries of
the periphery were under 26 years of age. But we should also recall that 47%
of the population in countries from which all attendees came are less than 25
years of age. The largest age differences among attendees shown in Table 4
have to do with the larger numbers of young people who come from the
semiperiphery and older people who come from both the core and the periphery.
This is related to the different age structures within the world-system
zones. Peripheral countries have only
27% of their populations that are over 35, while in core countries it is
55.5%, so older people from the periphery are over-represented while those
from the core are under-represented. The percentage of young attendees from
the semiperiphery (49%) was almost equal to the percentage of that age group
in the general population of the semiperipheral countries from which our
respondents came (50%).
It may be that some of the same factors that explain
why significantly more of the attendees who come from countries of the
periphery are men also explain why attendees from the periphery tend to be
older -- e.g. income.
Table 5 shows the core-semiperiphery-periphery
breakdown by racial identification. These racial classifications were based
on an open-ended question in which respondents were asked to identify their
race or ethnicity; respondents’ answers were later recoded in terms of being
“white” or “non-white.”
|
|
White |
Non-white |
Total |
|
Core |
70% (49) |
30% (21) |
70 |
|
Semiperiphery |
51% (158) |
49% (153) |
311 |
|
Periphery |
15% (5) |
85% (29) |
34 |
|
Total |
212 |
203 |
415 |
(Numbers of attendees
in parenthesis) ChiSquare = 28.040 sig. = .000
Table 5: World-system
position breakdown by racial identification
The racial self-identification question was not
popular, particularly among people from Brazil, where silences about race and
racism have a long history, and in Western Europe, where discussions about
“race” are often considered to be “racist” (Telles 2004; Darder, Torres, and
Miles 2004). Only 438 of our 639 respondents answered the question in a way
that could be easily classified. The remaining 201 gave no answer or answered
by naming their religion or nationality. Those who responded in terms of
their nationality or failed to answer the question mainly came from Western
Europe and South America, namely Brazil; surveyors noted that these types of
responses seemed to be more common among lighter-skinned people whose lack of
“race consciousness” may reflect their position of racial privilege (Reese et
al. 2007).[12]
Global racial stratification is reflected in the attendees at the World
Social Forum. Seventy percent of those from the core (of those who chose to
answer the question) were self-identified as white, while only 51% of those
from the semiperiphery and 15% of those from the periphery were
self-identified as white. The differences shown in Table 5 are statistically
significant. Race and racism are North-South issues that must be addressed by
all the counter-hegemonic movements (Starr 2004; Reese et al. 2007
(forthcoming)).
Our results also show significant differences in terms
of respondents’ educational background. We found that 60% of the “activist”
attendees from the semiperiphery were currently students, while only 29% of
those from the core and 24% of those from the periphery were students (Chi-Square
= 47.286 sig. = .000). We also found that a significantly higher percentage
of attendees from the semiperiphery had less than sixteen years of education
(54%), while only 36% of those from the core and 43% of those from the
periphery had less than sixteen years. And an amazing 69% of the attendees
from the periphery had a degree in social sciences, while for those from the
core it was 56% and from the semiperiphery it was 48%. These differences are statistically
significant (Chi-Square = 6.289, sig. = .043). Social scientists are far more
frequently found among the progressive sector of global civil society than
their proportion in the larger world.[13]
Thirty-two percent of the surveyed attendees speak
three or more languages, and among those from the core it is an astounding 50%.
Thirty-three percent of the attendees from the periphery speak three or more
languages, while of those from the semiperiphery only 27% speak three or
more. These differences are statistically significant. These results show the
cosmopolitan nature of the attendees, and also that there are significant
differences in language ability among those from the different zones. The
lower percentage of respondents from the semiperiphery that speak three or
more languages is probably due to the large number of politically active
locals from Brazil who attended, who tend to be younger and have lower levels
of formal education than other WSF participants.
In sum, our analysis of respondents’ socio-demographic
characteristics suggests that WSF participants tend to be relatively young,
highly educated, and mainly Caucasian. Moreover, most respondents are from
Brazil and other (Latin American) countries at the world-system’s
semiperiphery. In fact, people from the semiperiphery turn out to be
overrepresented at the WSF when compared to its share in world population,
while there seems to be a strong presence of participants from North America
and Europe and a clear under-representation of people from the global
periphery. These findings corroborate the results found in the surveys of FPA
and IBASE (see Reese et al. 2006).
Political and
Organizational Involvements
The degree of political involvement also seems to
differ by world-system zone. We removed the non-political attendees from the
analysis, but the remaining activists differ amongst themselves in their
level of political activity. Twenty-nine percent of those from the
semiperiphery indicate that they participated in five or more political
protests in the previous year, while from the core it is 39% and from the
periphery it is 38%. This difference is statistically significant, and may
reflect the large number of Brazilian attendees and the fact that non-local
participation in the Social Forum requires a greater investment of time and
resources than local participation. Such costs tend to weed out those with
lower levels of political commitment. There may be other causes of the higher
involvement of those from the core. Political activity is correlated with
income and education, and these are relatively higher in the core.
A similar pattern is found in the responses to the
question about whether or not the person is attending on behalf of a social
movement organization. Twenty-six percent of those from the core said yes, as
did 28% of those from the periphery, while only 20% of those from the
semiperiphery said yes.[14]
These differences do not achieve statistical significance, and a somewhat
different pattern was revealed by the question about attending on behalf of
an NGO. Twenty-one percent of those from the core and 15% of those from the
semiperiphery said yes, while 40% of those from the periphery answered this
question in the affirmative (Chi-Square = 18.202 sig. = .000).[15]
The relatively higher proportion of those from the periphery who are
attending on behalf of an NGO may reflect NGOs’ greater access to
organizational funds compared to other kinds of political organizations as
well as the efforts of NGOs who support the WSF to help overcome the global
inequalities that make it difficult for people from the periphery to attend
international meetings. These differences are statistically significant.
Interestingly, affiliation with a union is highest
among core attendees (29%) and lowest among those from the periphery (23%),
while 25% of those from the semiperiphery are affiliated with unions. These
differences are not statistically significant. A different question about
reporting to a union finds the same pattern (15% in core, 11% in the
semiperiphery and 5% in the periphery), but these differences are also not
statistically significant. The low
level of union involvement among attendees from the periphery is probably not
related to the higher level of NGO involvement because respondents were
allowed to “check all that apply.” One
could easily be affiliated with both a union and an NGO. It is likely that
union members in the periphery have lower incomes and that their unions,
which in some cases operate under conditions of severe state repression, have
fewer financial resources to use for world travel than those in other world
system zones. However, it may also be that union members from the periphery
are less sanguine about the benefits of participation in transnational social
movements than those in the core and the semiperiphery.
Similarities and
Differences in Political Views
Is
there a growing convergence of political views among social activists from
the North and South? Valentine Moghadam (2005) has studied the global
feminist movement especially over the past three decades with an eye to understanding
how feminists have made progress in overcoming North-South differences.
During the 1960s and 1970s, transnational feminist organizing was largely
dominated by feminists from the global North, but there has been growing
participation by feminists from the global South. In these early years, there
were significant divisions between feminists from the global North and South
in terms of their priorities. Northern feminists focused more on gaining
legal equality and on expanding women’s reproductive rights, whereas Southern
feminists focused on issues associated with underdevelopment and colonialism.
Such North-South divisions were evident in the first and second United
Nations conference on women in Mexico City and Coppenhagen (Moghadam 2005: 5-6;
Stienstra 2000). At the third UN conference in 1985 in Nairobi, feminists
focused on building bridges among women and establishing a consensus.
Three
historical shifts facilitated a growing convergence among Northern and
Southern feminists in terms of their goals and priorities. First, global
restructuring and the rise of neoliberalism contributed to the decline of
Keynesian welfare state, creating new concerns among Northern feminists about
economic rights. Second, the new international division of labor relying
heavily on cheap female labor contributed to the international growth of
unionization among women; it also raised Northern feminists’ concerns about
women’s labor rights. Finally, the rise of fundamentalist movements in the global
South increased Southern feminists’ concerns about reproductive rights and
legal equality. The international diffusion of feminist ideas also contributed
to the growing convergence of views among Northern and Southern feminists
(Moghadam 2005: 5-6). These developments led to a convergence between
Northern and Southern feminists that allowed them to better cooperate on
common projects. Tensions between Northern and Southern feminists remain
however, over issues of leadership and participation that are related to
Northern feminists’ greater access to resources (Stienstra 2000).
Research on other social movements indicates that
although transnational social movement cooperation tends to be concentrated
within regions, there is growing cooperation across the North-South divide
among organizations involved in various social movements; this may help to
reduce North-South differences in social activists’ political views over time
(Smith 2004a, 2005; Smith and Wiest 2004; see also, Aguirre and Reese 2004;
Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2002 [2000]; Glasius and Timms 2006; Herkenrath
2006; Smith 2004b; Smith and Johnston 2002; Starr 2000; Tarrow 2005). To what
extent do North-South differences still exist for social activists in our
sample, who are active in a number of different social movements? If there
has been a growing convergence among activists in movements besides the
feminist movement, we would expect to find few differences in their political
views. We find significant differences in participants’ views across world
system position with regard to global governance issues, but do find
similarities in their views on other issues.
Attendees were asked whether they thought that capitalism
should be reformed or if it should be abolished and replaced. While 42% of
the activist attendees indicated that they were in favor of reforms, 58% indicated
that they were in favor of abolition and replacement. Those from both the
core and the semiperiphery were very close to this average percentage (with
58.4% and 58.3%, respectively, favoring abolition), but only 56% of those
from the periphery chose abolition and replacement. This might indicate that
attendees from the periphery are slightly less radical, but the difference is
very small and not statistically significant. It is interesting to note,
however, that when we exclude Brazilian respondents from the analysis,
participants from the rest of the semi-periphery turn out to be significantly
more radical than all others, with a vast majority of 72% favoring abolition.
Another
interesting finding is that over half (58%) of our respondents agreed with
the proposition that the world needs less economic growth. Understandably a
smaller percentage of the attendees from the periphery agree with this, but
it is still widely held. Sixty-two percent of the respondents from core
countries agree that the world needs less economic growth, whereas 59% from
the semiperiphery and 49% from the periphery hold this view. These differences do not attain statistical
significance however, perhaps because of the small number of respondents from
the periphery.
Attendees were also given three options for
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. The three
options were: reform; abolish; abolish and replace. As shown in table 6, 62% of
all activist attendees favored abolition and replacement, while 25% were in
favor of abolition alone, and only 13% were in favor of reform. This result
indicates that the activist attendees are radical and that a very large
number (87%) see a need to get rid of existing global financial institutions.
But these numbers differ significantly across world-system zones.
Participants from the periphery appear to be less radical than those from the
core. Eighteen percent of those from the periphery favor reform, while for
the core it is 11% and for the semi-periphery it is 13%. Although our sample
of participants from the periphery is small and might not be truly
representative of all participants from this zone, their greater propensity
towards reform seems to be related to their strong connection to NGOs; six
out of the eight reformists from the periphery in our sample are affiliated
with NGOs. Seventy-four percent of respondents from the core favor abolition
and replacement, while for the semiperiphery it is 58% and for the periphery
it is 59%. This indicates that support for new kinds of global financial
institutions is much stronger among attendees from the core, although it is
also supported by a majority of those from the non-core. The pure
abolitionists (without replacement) are more frequently found in the
semiperiphery (28%) than in the core (15%) or in the periphery (25%). These
differences are significant at the .038 level.
Reform
Abolish Abolish and replace
Core 11%
(12) 15% (17)
74% (82)
Semiperiphery 13%
(54) 28% (113) 59% (235)
Periphery 18%
(7) 25% (10) 58% (23)
All
respondents 13% (73) 25% (140) 62% (340)
(Numbers of attendees
in parenthesis) ChiSquare = 10.156 sig. = .038
Table 6: Attitudes
toward international financial institutions by world-system position
Attendees were also given three options regarding a
future democratic world government: good idea and plausible; good idea but
not plausible; bad idea. Thirty-two percent of the activist attendees think
that democratic world government is a bad idea, while 39% think it is a good
idea but not plausible, and 29% think it is a good idea and is plausible (see
table 7). Among those from the core only 16% say that democratic world
government is a bad idea, while in the periphery it is 23% and in the semiperiphery
it is 37%. At first, we suspected that this higher skepticism about
democratic world government in the semiperiphery was due to the large
presence of locally oriented activists from Brazil. However, when we exclude
Brazilian attendees from the analyses, the percentage of semiperipheral respondents
opposing the idea of a world government rises to 39% (results not shown in
table 7). Thirty-nine percent of those from the core think democratic world
government is a good idea and it is plausible, while 45% say that it is a
good idea but not plausible. The more sanguine core attitude toward global
institutions found here and in the question about international financial
institutions may be related to the fact that existing global institutions
have been core controlled and that democracy has been mainly
institutionalized based on the cultural assumptions that emerged from the
European Enlightenment. These facts of world history are likely to make
non-core peoples skeptical about the possibility and desirability of
so-called democratic global governance. But even in the core there is
considerable skepticism about the real possibility of a democratic world
government. The interstate system is still strongly institutionalized despite
the rise of discourses about globalization.
Good
idea Good idea Bad idea
and
plausible but not
plausible
Core 39%
(40) 45% (47)
16% (17)
Semiperiphery 26%
(106) 37% (148) 37% (148)
Periphery 30%
(12) 48% (19) 23% (9)
All
respondents 29% (158) 39% (214) 32% (174)
(Numbers of attendees
in parenthesis) ChiSquare = 18.484 sig. = .001
Table 7: Attitudes
toward the idea of a global democratic goverment by world-system position
About half of the respondents agree that “The World
Social Forum should remain an open space for debate and should not itself
take public positions on political issues.”
But there is a notable difference among the respondents from the
semiperiphery; only 46% of the attendees from the semiperiphery agree with
this statement while 54% of attendees from the core and 57% of attendees from
the periphery do so. Since such a large share of respondents from the semiperiphery
reside in the host country of most of the WSF meetings, it is not surprising
that they feel more comfortable, compared to those traveling longer distances
to attend, with treating these meetings as representative bodies. Non-local
participants are more likely to have greater concerns that statements made by
WSF participants exclude the many voices of those unable to attend for
financial or other reasons.
Consistent with this
interpretation, when Brazilian participants are excluded from the analyses, the
share of respondents from the semiperiphery holding that the WSF must not
take political decisions rises to 52%. The debate between those who favor that
the “movement of movements” represented at the WSF become more of a global
political actor, and those who favor keeping the WSF an open space for public
debate continues.
Multivariate Results
Tables 8-11 show the results we obtained from
multivariate binomial logistic regression analyses; we performed these analyses
to see whether the effects of world system zone on social activists’ political
opinions persist when the effects of other explanatory variables are taken into
account. To use binomial logistic regression, we transformed the political
attitude questions discussed above into dichotomous dependent variables. In
the models below, we control for participants’ gender, generation, union
affiliation, NGO affiliation, affiliation with a social movement organization
(SMO), affiliation with at least one political organization, and Brazilian
residence. As above, all of the tables below report results only for
respondents who are social activists; we excluded the 31 “non-activists” in
our original sample from our logistic regression analyses. Because we did not
have full information for every variable for each respondent, we report the
number of cases included for each of our models below.
Multivariate logistic regressions revealed that there
are no statistically significant North-South (or world system position)
differences regarding attitudes toward economic growth or whether or not the
WSF should refrain from issuing collective political statements.
Table
8 indicates that, controlling for other factors, respondents from the
semi-periphery were significantly more likely than respondents from the core to
favor the abolition and replacement of capitalism. Respondents from the
periphery were also more likely than respondents from the core to favor the
abolition of capitalism, although this relationship was not statistically
significant. This lack of statistical significance might be an artifact of
the small number of respondents form the periphery, but it could also be a
result of these respondents’ privileged status within their societies or
close affiliation with NGOs, which tend to be more reformist than other kinds
of political organizations. Nevertheless, the direction of this relationship
is consistent with the idea that the problems of global capitalism are more
keenly felt by people in the global South than the global North. Respondents
from Brazil were significantly less likely than participants from the core to
express anti-capitalist sentiments however. This latter finding may be
related to the fact that Brazilians reported lower levels of protest activity;
the site of the WSF in Porto Alegre made it more accessible to Brazilian
activists, allowing a wider range of activists in terms of their levels of
political experience, commitment, and radicalism. In contrast, the greater
cost of traveling to Porto Alegre for non-local activists may have deterred
many local activists who were less radical and less involved in social
movements. Table 8 also shows that, controlling for other factors, respondents
that came of age during the 1960s, when there was a wave of international
protest among youth, were significantly more likely than other respondents to
express anti-capitalist views, as were respondents affiliated with unions and
social movement organizations. The relationship
between union membership and anti-capitalist views is only statistically
significant at the 0.10 level however.
Table 8: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors, and
Odds for Favoring the Abolition and Replacement of Capitalism
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
0.663** 0.342 1.941 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
0.206 0.425 1.229 |
|
Female |
-0.026 0.201 0.974 |
|
1960s generation |
1.046** 0.535 2.846 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.449* 0.257 1.567 |
|
NGO affiliated |
-0.328 0.214 0.720 |
|
SMO affiliated |
1.299*** 0.215 3.667 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
0.317 0.467 1.373 |
|
Brazilian |
-0.620** 0.282 0.538 |
|
Constant |
-0.555 0.502 0.574 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
481 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05
level; ***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table
9 shows the multivariate results when the responses to the question about what
should be done with the IMF and WTO are divided between those who favor their
replacement or reform versus those who favor their abolition. A negative
logit regression coefficient in this table indicates a greater likelihood to
oppose reform or replacement and to favor abolition. The table shows that
those respondents from the semiperiphery are more likely than those from the
core to favor abolition when the effects of the other variables are
controlled, and this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01
level. Respondents from the periphery are also more likely than respondents
from the core to favor abolition, but that coefficient is not statistically
significant. The only other coefficients that demonstrates statistical
significance in this table shows that those respondents who are affiliated
with NGOs and who are Brazilian are more likely than respondents without those
characteristics to oppose abolition and be in favor of either reform or
replacement.
Table 9: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors,
and Odds for Favoring the Replacement of, or Reform of, the IMF and WTO
(Rather than Abolishing Them)
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-1.129*** 0.362 0.324 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.701 0.484 0.496 |
|
Female |
0.057 0.218 1.058 |
|
1960s generation |
-0.270 0.453 0.763 |
|
Union affiliated |
-0.202 0.261 0.817 |
|
NGO affiliated |
0.988*** 0.238 2.687 |
|
SMO affiliated |
-0.292 0.225 0.747 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
-0.312 0.520 0.732 |
|
Brazilian |
0.555** 0.277 1.743 |
|
Constant |
1.679*** 0.570 5.360 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
481 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
***statistically significant at the .01 level
Also recall from our discussion of the bivariate table
above that 62% of the respondents chose to abolish and replace the
international financial institutions while only 25% chose to abolish them and
not replace them. There are more pure abolitionists from the semiperiphery,
but even there it is only 29% of the respondents.
Table 10 shows the multivariate results for those who
hold that global problems need to be addressed not by means of local or
“national” responses, but by global ones. The question was “Which of the
following approaches would best solve the problems created by global
capitalism?” and the possible answers were: strengthen local communities,
strengthen nation states, or create democratic global institutions. Fourteen
per cent of the respondents chose more than one of these options. To use
binary logistic regression, we put those favoring local or national responses
to global social problems into a single “non-global” category so that we
could compare the characteristics of respondents favoring “global” and
“non-global” strategies for social change.
Table 10: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors,
and Odds for the Regression of Favoring Global Democratic Institutions to
Solve Global Social Problems
|
Variable |
Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-1.463*** 0.403 0.232 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.736* 0.455 0.479 |
|
Female |
-0.016 0.220 0.984 |
|
1960s generation |
-0.114 0.515 0.892 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.198 0.270 1.219 |
|
NGO affiliated |
-0.031 0.231 0.970 |
|
SMO affiliated |
-0.275 0.228 0.760 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
0.317 0.558 1.373 |
|
Brazilian |
0.952*** 0.359 2.592 |
|
Constant |
-0.489 0.577 0.613 |
|
Cases included in the
analysis |
422 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05
level; ***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 10 shows that
respondents from the semiperiphery are significantly more likely than
respondents from the core to favor non-global responses to social problems;
those from the periphery are also more likely than respondents from the core to
favor non-global responses, although this relationship is only statistically
significant at the 0.10 level. By contrast, Brazilian respondents appear to
be more favorable than respondents from the core toward the creation of
global democratic institutions to resolve social problems. None of the other
variables show a significant effect on responses to this question. This table
supports the notion mentioned above that non-local WSF activists from the
semiperiphery are less likely than those from the core to support global strategies
for social change.
Table 11 shows the multivariate results for the
question “Do you think it is a good or a bad idea to have a democratic world
government. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents chose “good idea, but not
plausible.” Thirty-two percent chose “bad idea.” And twenty-nine percent
chose “good idea and it’s plausible.”
Table 11: Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors,
and Odds for the Regression of Support for a Democratic World Government
|
Variable |
Model 2 Coefficient S.E. Odds |
|
Semi-periphery
(reference category=core) |
-0.839** 0.364 0.432 |
|
Periphery (reference
category=core) |
-0.329 0.491 0.720 |
|
Female |
-0.035 0.205 0.966 |
|
1960s generation |
0.441 0.493 1.553 |
|
Union affiliated |
0.054 0.260 1.055 |
|
NGO affiliated |
0.253 0.219 1.288 |
|
SMO affiliated |
0.290 0.214 1.336 |
|
Affiliated with at
least one political organization |
0.013 0.454 1.013 |
|
Brazilian |
-0.164 0.272 0.849 |
|
Constant |
1.270** 0.505 3.559 |
|
Cases included in
analysis |
474 |
*statistically
significant at the 0.10 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.05
level; ***statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 11 shows that those from the semiperiphery are
more likely than respondents from the core to oppose the idea of a democratic
world government and this result is statistically significant. Peripheral
attendees are also more likely to be against this than those from the core,
but that difference is not statistically significant. But it should be recalled that 31% of those
from the periphery and 26% of those from the semiperiphery endorsed the
response that a democratic world government is a good idea and is
plausible. Nevertheless the overall
finding of greater non-core skepticism toward global institutions is upheld
by the results in Table 11.
Conclusions
The results so far show that there are some
North-South demographic differences among World Social Forum attendees. Those
from the periphery are few, older, and more likely to be men. In addition,
participants from the periphery are more likely to be associated with
externally sponsored NGOs, rather than with self-funded SMOs and unions, as
NGOs have greater access to travel funds. In summary, our survey finds
participation at the World Social Forum to be reflective of the global
inequalities that WSF participants are opposed to. Since most
intercontinental passenger flights departing from the global periphery cost
more than the annual per capita income in this zone (cf. Herkenrath 2006),
the notable underrepresentation of WSF attendees from Subsaharan African and
other peripheral countries is hardly surprising. International and
intercontinental traveling is affordable only to activists with a very
privileged social background and activists affiliated with well-funded
organizations.
Having
said this, political differences between WSF participants from the global
South and those from the global North seem to be fairly modest. While a clear
majority of all respondents from the global South hold that capitalism needs
to be abolished, the same is true for respondents from the global North. Only
when the effects of local residence are controlled, do we find that
semiperipheral attendees are significantly more likely to take radical
anti-capitalist stances than attendees from the core. In a similar vein,
Southern activists are not significantly more inclined than their Northern
counterparts to object to further global economic growth or to favor the WSF
remaining an “open space” for political debate. Although opinions on these
latter two questions divide the sample into two parts of almost equal size,
the dividing line is not between the global North and the South.
On
the other hand, Southern respondents, especially non-local participants from
the semi-periphery, are significantly more likely to be skeptical toward
creating or reforming global-level political institutions. Those who favor
reforming or abolishing and replacing global institutions in order to resolve
social problems need to squarely face these facts. This skepticism probably
stems from the historical experience of peoples from the non-core with
global-level institutions that claim to be operating on universal principles
of fairness but whose actions have either not solved problems or have made
them worse. The new abolitionists are posing a strong challenge to both
existing global institutions and to those who want to abolish and replace these
institutions. These realities must be addressed, not ignored.
Appendix A: Classifications of
countries from which WSF05 respondents came
World Bank classification[16] World-system position[17]
Global “North:
High income
Australia Core
Austria
Core
Belgium Core
Canada Core
Denmark Core
Finland Core
France Core
Germany Core
Greece Semiperiphery
Hong Kong
(China) Semiperiphery
Ireland Core
Israel Semiperiphery
Italy Core
Japan Core
Korea (Rep.) Semiperiphery
Netherlands Core
Norway Core
New Zealand Semiperiphery
Portugal Semiperiphery
Spain Core
Sweden Core
Switzerland Core
Taiwan (excluded from all sources) Semiperiphery
United Kingdom Core
United States Core
Global “South”:
Upper-middle income
Argentina Semiperiphery
Chile Semiperiphery
Costa Rica Semiperiphery
Lebanon Periphery
Mexico Semiperiphery
Malaysia Semiperiphery
Panama Semiperiphery
South Africa Semiperiphery
Uruguay Semiperiphery
Venezuela Semiperiphery
Lower-middle income
Armenia Periphery
Bolivia Periphery
Brazil Semiperiphery
Colombia Semiperiphery
Dominican Republic Periphery
Ecuador Periphery
El Salvador Periphery
Iraq Periphery
Paraguay Periphery
Peru Periphery
Philippines Periphery
Low income
Bangladesh Periphery
India Semiperiphery
Kenya Periphery
Nepal Periphery
Pakistan Periphery
Sudan Periphery
Senegal Periphery
Vietnam Periphery
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