Historical
and Contemporary Processes of Global Party Formation From Above and Below
Christopher Chase-Dunn
Ellen Reese
Transnational Social Movement Research Working Group
University of California-Riverside
The new abolitionists
Keywords: political parties, world revolutions, global party
formation, transnational social movements, globalization, hegemony, global
social change, global democracy, World Economic Forum, World Social Forum,
north-south relations
This paper will be presented at the
session on Global Party Formation From Above and Below to be held at the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Thursday, March 1,
1:45-3:30 pm.
This is IROWS Working Paper # 33 available at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows33/irows33.htm
v. 2-27-07
7660 words
Abstract: This paper
outlines an approach to the evolution of global governance in the modern
world-system. We discuss the extension of the Westphalian interstate system to
the periphery and the transformations in the institutions and capabilities that
have occurred with the rise and fall of three hegemonies. We also consider the
emergence of international political organizations since the Concert of Europe,
the development of global parties among both elites and non-elites, a series of
world revolutions since the Protestant Reformation and recent developments in
global civil society, the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum. We
also address recent debates about
All
human societies have polities – authoritative institutions for making group
decisions, regulating conflict and access to scarce resources and for engaging
in relations with other polities. Human polities were originally quite small,
consisting of nomadic hunter-gatherer bands. But polities have gotten larger
and more hierarchical in the course of socio-cultural evolution, and they have
sometimes merged, but most frequently some have engulfed others, such that the
total number has decreased. The long-term rise in size and the decrease in
number suggests an evolutionary trend toward an eventual Earth-wide state,
though the processes of cyclical rise and fall, and only occasional upward
sweeps in the size of largest polities makes it clear that the evolutionary
process is anything but simple and inevitable. Elsewhere we have studied and
theorized about this long-term trend (Chase-Dunn, Inoue, Alvarez Niemeyer and
Sheikh-Mohamed 2007). Here we will focus primarily on the institutional and
structural developments of global governance that have occurred in the modern
world-system during the last 600 years.
The Trajectory of Global Governance and Political Globalization
Global
governance refers to the nature of power institutions in a world-system – a
system of multiple societies. So by this definition there has been global
governance all along. It has not emerged. But it has changed its nature. The
modern world-system was originally politically organized as a European
interstate system in which states allied and fought with one another for
territory, control of trade routes, and other resources. As
The interstate system that emerged
in
The emergence of colonial empires corresponded
with the reproduction of a multicentric core in which several European states
allied with and fought each other. This system came to be taken for granted by
international relations theorists as the natural mode of global governance.
Despite that earlier systems had repeatedly seen the emergence of “universal
states” such as the
The oscillation of earlier systems morphed
into the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers in the modern system. A series
of hegemons emerged from the semiperiphery -- the Dutch, the British and the
The evolution that occurred with the rise and fall of the hegemonic core powers needs to be seen as a sequence of forms of world order that evolved to solve the political, economic and technical problems of successively more global waves of capitalist accumulation. The expansion of global production involved accessing raw materials to feed the new industries, and food to feed the expanding populations (Bunker and Ciccantell 2004). As in any hierarchy, coercion is a very inefficient means of domination, and so the hegemons sought legitimacy by proclaiming leadership in advancing civilization and democracy. But the terms of these claims were also employed by those below who sought to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. And so the evolution of hegemony was a dynamic interaction between the global elites and the global masses. World orders were challenged and reconstructed in a series of world revolutions (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1984; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000)
Political Globalization and Global Party Formation
The nineteenth century saw the beginning of what we shall
call political globalization – the emergence and growth of an overlayer of
regional and increasingly global formal organizational structures on top of the
interstate system. We conceptualize
political globalization analogously to our understanding of economic
globalization -- the relative strength and density of larger versus smaller
interaction networks and organizational structures (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and
Brewer 2000). The most obvious indication of political globalization is
the evolution of the uneven and halting upward trend in the transitions from
the Concert of Europe to the
The
trend toward political globalization can also be seen in the emergence of the
Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank)
and the more recent restructuring of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
as the World Trade Organization, and the heightened visibility of other
international fora (the Trilateral Commission, the Group of Seven [Eight].
Some of
the proponents of a recent stage of global capitalism contend that strong
transnational capitalist firms and their political operatives working within
national states have combined with existing international organizations to
constitute an emerging transnational capitalist state (e.g. Robinson 2004).
This version of the global state formation hypothesis claims that a rather
integrated transnational capitalist class has emerged since the 1970s, and that
this global class uses both international organizations and existing national
state apparatuses as coordinated instruments of its rule. A related perspective
holds that the
An internationally
integrated global capitalist class was also in formation in the second half of
the nineteenth century, but this did not prevent the world polity from
descending into the violent interimperial rivalry of the two twentieth century
World Wars (Barr et al 2006). The
degree of integration of both elites and masses is undoubtedly greater in the
current round of globalization, but will it be strongly integrated enough to
allow for readjustments without descent into a repetition of the Age of
Extremes? That is the question.
In addition to the formation of regional and global
international organizations, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also saw
the emergence of transnational social movements and the enlargement of what has
come to be known as global civil society.[1]
These have also altered the form of global governance by providing expanded
arenas in which individuals and organizations participate directly in world
politics rather than through the mediating shell of national states.
Specialized international and transnational non-governmental organizations
(e.g. the International Postal Union) exploded in the middle of the 19th
century (Murphy 1994). Abolitionism, feminism and the labor movement became
increasingly transnational in nature.
Earlier local movements had also had a transnational aspect because
sailors, pirates, slaves and indentured servants carried ideas and
sentiments back and forth across the
Atlantic (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000), but the large global consequences of
these movements resulted when many mainly local developments (e.g. slave
revolts) occurred synchronously or within the same time period.
The
Black Jacobins of the Haitian revolution, by depriving Napoleonic France of
important sources of food and wealth, played a role in the rise of British
hegemony (Santiago-Valles 2005). These kinds of effects of resistance from
below became stronger in the middle decades of the 19th century –
the years around the world revolution of 1848.
This is usually thought of in terms of developments in Europe, but
millenarian and revolutionary ideas traveled to the New World to play a role in
the “burned over district” in upstate
These developments ramped up during the Age of Extremes,
the first half of the twentieth century.
Internationalism in the labor movement had emerged in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Global political
parties were becoming active in world politics, especially during and after the
world revolution of 1917. The Communist International (Comintern) convened
large conferences of representative from all over the globe in
The Comintern was abolished in 1943, though the
The Bandung Conference in 1954 was an important forum in
which the leaders of the emerging nations explicated
Contemporary
Contestation in World Politics
While
transnational social movements date back to at least the Protestant
Reformation, the scope and scale of international ties among social activists
have risen dramatically over the past few decades, as they have increasingly
shared information, conceptual frameworks and other resources, and coordinated
actions across borders and continents (Moghadam 2005). In the 1980s and 1990s,
the number of formal transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) rose
by nearly 200 percent. While TSMOs are
still largely housed in the global north, a rising portion are located in, and
have ties to, the global south; the number of TSMOs with multi-issue agendas
increased significantly, from 43 in 1983 to 161 in 2000 (Smith 2004). This rise in transnational organizing
contributed to, and helped to produce the global justice movement. The global justice movement is a “movement
of movements,” that includes all those who are engaged in sustained and
contentious challenges to neoliberal global capitalism, propose alternative
political and economic structures, and mobilize poor and relatively powerless
peoples. While this movement resorts to non-institutional forms of collective
action, it often collaborates with institutional “insiders,” such as NGOs that
lobby and provide services to people, as well as policy-makers (Tarrow 2005;
Keck and Sikkink 1998). The global justice movement includes a variety of
social actors and groups: unions, NGOs, SMOs, transnational advocacy networks,
as well as policy-makers, scholars, artists, journalists, entertainers and
other individuals.
Two important sections of
global civil society and transnational activism are: (1) The participants in
the World Economic Forum (WEF), who tend to see neo-liberal corporate
globalization as a positive development, and (2) those that identify with the
global justice movement and attend the World Social Forum (WSF). The WSF and
the WEF represent two rather different slices of global civil society and may
presage a new era in global party formation and political contention over the
future of world society (Carroll 2006a,2006b; Chase-Dunn and Reese forthcoming).[2]
The organizational forms, discourses, and goals are intentionally different,
with the WSF being a popular alternative to the “leadership” focus of the
WEF. And yet some of the discourse and
goals of the two forums overlap, and some individuals and organizations
participate in both.
The
WEF was established in 1971 as a non-partisan independent international
organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders
in partnerships to shape global, regional and industry agendas.[3]
The WEF maintains a headquarters in
Ulrich
Beck’s (2005) effort to rethink the nature of power in a globalized world makes
the claim that the power of global capitalist corporations is based mainly on
the threat of the withdrawal of capital investment, and thus it does not need
to be legitimated. Beck further argues that the transnational capitalist class
does not need to form political parties, because its power is translegal and
does not need legitimation. While this may be true to some extent, it is still
the case that one may discern an evolution of political ideology that is
promulgated by the lords of capital and the states that represent them. The Keynesian national development project
that was the hegemonic ideology of the West from World War II to the 1970s was
replaced by neoliberalism, a rather different set of claims and policies.
William Carroll (2006a, 2006b) traces the history liberalism and neoliberalism
as it emerges from the eighteenth century, takes hiding in monastery-like think
tanks during the heyday of Keynesianism, and then reemerges as
Reaganism-Thatcherism in the 1970s and 1980s. The further evolution can be seen
in the rise of the neoconservatives in the 1990s, and concerns for dealing with
those pockets of poverty that seem impervious to market magic in the writings
of such neoliberals as Jeffrey Sachs (2005). Stephen Gill’s (2000) suggestive
discussion of “the post-modern prince” – a left global political party emerging
out of the global justice movement, also proposes an analysis of corporate
media, think-tanks, and institutions such as the World Economic Forum as
participants in a process of global political contestation. Necessary or not,
the transnational capitalist class and its organic intellectuals engage in
efforts to legitimate its own power, and this can be seen to interact with
popular forces. Thus did the advertised concerns of the World Economic Forum
shifted considerably after the rise of the World Social Forum.
The World Social Forum (WSF)
was established in 2001 as a counter-hegemonic popular project focusing on
issues of global justice and democracy.[5]
Initially organized by the Brazilian labor movement and the landless peasant
movement, the WSF was intended to be a forum for the participants in, and
supporters of, grass roots movements from all over the world rather than a
conference of representatives of political parties or governments. The WSF was
organized as the popular alternative to the WEF. The WSF has been supported by
the Brazilian Workers Party, and has been most frequently held in
Some have claimed that the pattern of hegemonic rise and fall is now morphing into a new
structure of core condominium (Goldfrank 1999) while others see the rise of the
neoconservatives in the United States as a repetition of the pattern of
“imperial overstretch” that may portend another period of contentious
interimperial rivalry. Several outcomes are possible, including a repeat
of what happened after the last decline of a hegemon -- another world war among
core states (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995). The current crisis of the
world-system seems fraught with several possible, and potentially interactive,
dangers of collapse – huge international and growing within-nation
inequalities, ecological disaster, what would appear to be an unsustainable
trade and investment imbalance, and a huge mountain of debt structured as
“secure” claims on future profit streams.
Manifestos
Galore in the World Revolution of 20xx
It is in this context that a new world revolution is brewing.
The movement of movements at the World Social Forum is in the midst of a
manifesto/charter writing frenzy as those who seek a more organized approach to
confronting global capitalism and neoliberalism attempt to put workable
coalitions together (Wallerstein 2007).
One issue is whether or not the World Social Forum itself
should formulate a political program and take formal stances on issues. The
Charter of the WSF explicitly forbids this and a significant group of
participants strongly supports maintaining the WSF as an “open space” for
debate and organizing. A survey of 625 attendees at the World Social Forum
meeting in
But this is not necessary. The WSF Charter also
encourages the formation of new political organizations. So those participants
who want to form a new global political organization are free to act, as long
as they do not do so in the name of the WSF as a whole.
In recent Social Forum meetings, “Assemblies of Social Movements”
and other groups have issued calls for global action and other political
statements. At the end of the 2005 meeting in
At present there is an impasse between those who are willing
to risk charges of Napoleonism and those who want proposals and totemic texts
to bubble up from the movements. And there are also important disagreements
about both goals and tactics. Such political statements, particularly those
issued by the 19 notables in 2005 and the Bamako Appeal, have generated
considerable controversy about process and legitimacy, since they were issued
by socially privileged and unelected leaders, mainly intellectuals, who claim
to speak on behalf of the “masses.” Creating democratic mechanisms of
accountability through which WSF participants can engage in global collective
action and move towards greater political unity remains an important political
task.
The
issue of process is strongly raised in several of the critiques of the Bamako
Appeal in a collection of documents published just before the World Social
Forum meeting in Nairobi in January of 2007 (Sen et al 2007). This
collection includes the Communist Manifesto, documents that came out of the
Bandung Conference, recent communiqués from the Zapatistas in
The
Multicentric Network of Movements
Just as world revolutions
in the past have resulted in restructuring world orders, it can be presumed
that the current one will also do this. But do the activists themselves agree
on the nature of the most important problems, visions of a desirable future or
notions of appropriate tactics and forms of movement organization? We performed
a network analysis of movement ties based on the responses to the 2005 WSF
Survey.[6] Our
study of the structure of overlapping links among movements as represented by
attendees of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2005 who identify with
and/or are actively involved in a long list of movements shows that the
structure of movement overlaps is a multicentric network (Chase-Dunn, Petit,
Niemeyer, Hanneman, Alvarez, Gutierrez and Reese 2006). Human rights, anti-war,
alternative media, anti-globalization and environmental movements are strongly
linked with one another and are bridges to almost all the other movements (See
Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The network of WSF
movement linkages
Figure 1 shows the network structure produced by
examining the patterns of those who say they are actively involved in
movements. All the movements have some people who are actively involved in
other movements. In order to compare the relative sizes of linkages among
movements we eliminate connections that are below the average number of
linkages.
The overall structure of the network of movement linkages
shows a multicentric network organized around four main movements that serve as
bridges that link other movements to one another” peace, global justice, human
rights and environmental. While no single movement is so central that it could
call the shots, neither is the network structure characterized by separate
cliques of movements that might be easily separated from one another. Remember
that Figure 1 does not show all the connections in the network but rather shows
those connections that are significant in size relative to all the connections
in the network.
This structure means that
the transnational activists who participate in the World Social Forum process
share goals and support the general global justice framework asserted in the
World Social Forum Charter. It also means that this group is relatively
integrated and is not prone to splits. A Third Worldist and cosmopolitan united
front approach that pays attention to the nature of this network structure can
have reasonable hope for mobilizing a strong force for collective action in
world politics, though solutions need to be found to address the issues of
process that have become apparent in the first wave of manifesto-writing.
North-South Issues
The
focus on global justice and north/south inequalities and the critique of
neoliberalism provide strong orienting frames for the transnational activists
of the World Social Forum. But there are difficult issues for collective action
that are heavily structured by the huge international inequalities that exist
in the contemporary world-system and these issues must be directly confronted.
A survey of the attendees of the 2005 World Social Forum found several
important differences between activists from the core, the periphery and the
semiperiphery (Chase-Dunn, Reese, Herkenrath,
Alvarez, Gutierrez, Kim, and Petit. Forthcoming).
Those
from the periphery were fewer, older, and more likely to be men. In addition,
participants from the periphery were more likely to be associated with
externally sponsored NGOs, rather than with self-funded SMOs and unions, as
NGOs have greater access to travel funds. Southern respondents were significantly
more likely than those from the global
north to be skeptical toward creating and
strengtheningor reforming global-level political
institutions and to favor the abolition of global institutions.
Those
who favor reforming or replacing global institutions in order to resolve global
problems (see discussion of Monbiot below) need to squarely face these facts.
This skepticism probably stems from the historical experience of peoples from
the non-core with colonialism and global-level institutions that claim to be
operating on universal principles of fairness, but whose actions have either
not solved problems or have made them worse. These new abolitionists are posing
a strong challenge to both existing global institutions and to those who want
to reform or replace these institutions. These realities must be addressed, not
ignored.
Democratizing
Global Governance
Ideas
of democracy that are deeply institutionalized in modern societies are being
increasingly applied at the global level, raising issues about the democratic
nature of existing institutions of global governance. Why are some countries
allowed to have weapons of mass destruction while others are not? How have
these decisions been made? Are the institutions and actors that made them
legitimate in the eyes of the peoples of the world?
Ann Florini (2004) acknowledges the need for
democratic global governance processes to address global issues that simply
cannot be dealt with by separate national states. Florini contends that global
state formation is impossible, undesirable and would engender huge opposition
from all quarters. Instead she sees a huge potential for democratizing global
governance through uses of the Internet for mobilizing global civil society.
Florini and many others point out that existing institutions of global
governance have a huge democratic deficit. The most important and powerful
elective office in the world is that of the U.S. presidency, but only citizens
of the United States can vote for contenders for this office. Thus is existing
global governance illegitimate even by its own rules..
George Monbiot’s Manifesto
for a New World Order (2003) is a reasoned and insightful call for
radically democratizing the existing institutions of global governance and for
establishing a global peoples’ parliament that would be directly elected by the
whole population of the Earth. Ulrich Beck’s (2005) call for “cosmopolitan
realism” also ends up supporting the formation of global democratic
institutions. Monbiot also advocates the establishment of a trade clearinghouse
(first proposed by John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods) that would reward
national economies with balanced trade, and that would use some of the
surpluses generated by those with trade surpluses to invest in those with trade
deficits. He also proposes a radical reversal of the World Trade Organization
regime, which imposes free trade on the non-core but allows core economies to
engage in protectionism – a “fair trade organization” that would help to reduce
global development inequalities. Monbiot also advocates abolition of the U.N.
Security Council, and shifting its power over peace-keeping to a General
Assembly in which representatives’ votes would be weighted by the population
size of their country.
And Monbiot advocates global enforcement of a carbon
tax and a carbon swap structure that would reduce environmental degradation and
reward those who utilize green technologies.
Monbiot also points out that the current level of indebtedness of
non-core countries could be used as formidable leverage over the world’s
largest banks if all the debtors acted in concert. This could provide the
muscle behind a significant wave of global democratization. But in order for
this to happen the global justice movement would have to organize a strong
coalition of the non-core countries that can overcome the splits that tend to
occur between the periphery and the semiperiphery. This is far from being a utopian
fantasy. It is a practical program for
global democracy.
Upward
sweeps of city and polity growth have led to new levels of political
integration in the past (Chase-Dunn, Inoue, Alvarez, Niemeyer and
Sheikh-Mohamed 2007). What are the prospects for another upward sweep that
would result in the formation of a real global state? It is generally the case
that increases in organizational complexity and hierarchy require the
appropriation and control of greater amounts of energy (Christian 2003). The
last big upward sweep of city sizes and colonial empires was greatly
facilitated by the harvesting of fossil fuels that stored the sunlight and heat
of billions of years of photosynthesis and the storage of concentrated energy
below the surface of the Earth.
New energy
technologies will eventually emerge that can facilitate new levels of human
complexity, but in the mean time we will have to deal with the negative
anthropogenic environmental consequences of this colossal harvest of energy,
the coming of “peak oil” and the eventual exhaustion of the fossil fuel
stores. It would be reckless to bet on a
“technological fix” that will arrive in time to allow us to continue to rely on
the existing institutions of global governance. Thus the processes of political
globalization, the growth of transnational activism, and the potentials for
democratizing global governance that we have discussed above are needed to
manage the huge issues that are on the immediate horizon: the interimperial
rivalry between a declining U.S. economic hegemony and the rise of East Asia,
the timely achievement of demographic stability as the non-core moves on from
an industrial death rate and an agricultural birth rate to the demographic
transition, the transition to a sustainable relationship with the biosphere and
the geosphere, and the reduction of global inequalities.
The global
democracy movement is global state formation from below, whether or not it is
politic to say so. Perhaps it would be better to call it “multilateral global
governance.” Hopefully the
The European
Union process itself only creates a larger core state that can contend with the
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