The Interface of Global Class
Formation
and Core-Peripheral Relations:
Toward a Synthetic Theory and Analysis of Global
Inequalities[i]
Anthony Roberts and
Jason Struna
Department of Sociology and
Institute for Research on World-Systems
(IROWS)
Draft v. 8/9/2010 Words= 11,962
To
be presented at the American Sociological Association annual meeting in
Abstract
Emergent transnational social formations
coupled with the persistence of structural inequalities, evidenced in the
core-periphery hierarchy, suggest the need for theoretical consilience between
the global capital school and world-systems perspectives. To this end, we draw upon Arrighi’s (1994)
systemic cycle of accumulation model to account for the novelty and continuity
of nascent transnational social structures such as the Transnational Capitalist
Class (Sklair 2001; Robinson 2004) and the global proletariat (Struna
2009). Empirically, the study employs a
series of panel regressions to estimate the effect of core-periphery
differentials and foreign capital investment on transnational working class
formation and major sector productivity.
Findings indicate a recent growth, 2001-2007, in inter-zonal transnational
capital-labor relations, via manufacturing employment in US, German, and
Japanese foreign affiliates, and the persistent unevenness of labor
productivity from 1980-2005. Preliminary
findings suggest the emergence of an objective, trans-zonal working class
structure, constructed through TNC capital-labor relations. However, the international division of labor
(core-periphery hierarchy) remains important for explaining differentials in
labor productivity. We concluded that
the emergence of a global proletariat is being contextualized by the endurance
of international inequality, thus, the composition of transnational social
formations will be determined by the continuity of international inequalities
in the transition to a new regime of accumulation.
This paper seeks
to reconcile, at least partially, the
theoretical divide between specific variants of what has come to be called the
“global capitalism school” (Robinson 2004; Sklair 1999) and world-systems perspectives (Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Wallerstein and
Hopkins 2000; Chase-Dunn 1998; Arrighi 2001; Arrighi and Moore 2001) by assessing empirical indicators that
may offer evidence for the former, as well as confirm the enduring significance
of aspects of the latter. Specifically,
we seek to explain the ways extant and emergent transnational labor-capital
relations suggest that we are indeed in the midst of an “epochal shift” based
on the enlargement of global circuits of productive capital (Robinson 2004: 4),
and may be poised to enter a new systemic cycle of accumulation (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi
and Moore 2001). Preliminary empirical analysis, using proxy data to estimate
cross-national trends in transnational working class formation, confirms a
trans-zonal distribution of global workers integrated in vertical regimes of
accumulation (transnational corporations).
Additional analysis of cross-national variations in labor productivity
for major economic sectors shows persistence of core-periphery inequalities in
production processes between world-system zones. Therefore, while the
distribution in transnational capital-labor relations, as measured by foreign
affiliate employment, is moving beyond international inequalities, the
persistence of differential production systems indicates the endurance of the
international division of labor.
Although we endeavor to understand
broad structural-conjunctural changes in the main attributes of the
contemporary world-economy, the nature of available cross-national data
concerning employment, productivity, and capital intensiveness partially
restricts our quantitative analysis to what amounts to proxy measures of global
labor-capital relations (inward FDI from US, Japanese, and German investors per
worker in national labor force) and transnational class formation
(manufacturing employment in US, Japanese, and German foreign TNC affiliates). The measures discussed below serve as
important indicators of relations that constitute the emergent qualities
proposed by adherents to the global capitalism perspective, and persistent
tendencies overdetermined by world-systemic hierarchies. Essentially, the relations on the ground,
represented by the data used in this study, reflect favorably on the strengths
of both theoretical traditions used herein, and therefore indicate the need for
a synthetic theoretical approach to contemporary global social relations.
The focal point of our synthetic
theory is the formation of transnational working class, in context of
persistent international inequalities.
From a historical materialist perspective, the global capitalism school
orients the epochal shift of capitalism, i.e. the transnationalization of
production, toward the development of a division of labor based on property
ownership and transnational capital-labor relations (c.f. Sprague 2009,
P.500-501). The purpose of adopting a
class-based analysis, in a synthesis of global capitalism and world-systems
perspectives, is to understand how transnational bodies are articulated by
international inequalities and other structural constants of the
world-system. From a class-based
perspective, we argue that changes in the nature of capital-labor relations
represent the fundamental changes in capitalist accumulation from international
circuits of production to global circuits of production (c.f. Robinson 2004,
Ch.2). Further, we stress that the transformation
of the world-economy, from a system centered on national modes of accumulation
to a transnational mode of accumulation is accompanied with a transition from a
global class system defined by linkages between national classes to a true
global class system composed of a transnational capitalist class and a
transnational working class.
In
a world-historic context, based on Arrighi’s (1994) framework of systemic
cycles of accumulation, we argue that global class formation is the development
of a transnational regime of accumulation and we conceptualize the emergence of
the transnational capitalist class (TCC), as a class-for-itself (Robinson
2004), as the nexus of new territorial and economic powers, namely the TNC and
TNS actors, driving the formation of new systemic logics. The implementation of the TCC project
(Robinson 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010) and the global financial collapse in
world-system, according to our perspective, indicates the ‘terminal crisis’
(Arrigh 1994, P. 215) of
From
a class-based analysis, the formation of a conscious transnational capitalist
class and the emergence of new modes of accumulation are resulting in the
formation of a transnational working class (Robinson 2010; Struna 2009). Our empirical analysis is directed at
understanding how the transnational working class, as a newly forming social
body of the emerging regime of accumulation, is developing and how the
international division of labor is shaping the properties of an objective
transnational working class structure.
At the intersection of transnational
class formations and core-periphery inequalities, we find how transnational
bodies, specifically, a segment of the transnational working class, are being
reproduced relative to extant structures of international inequality in the
short-term. In all major sectors, labor
productivity remains highly differentiated along core-periphery dimensions,
yet, in manufacturing, inter-zonal differences are reducing. According to our analysis, the incorporation
of the periphery into industrial transnational production circuits has
integrated peripheral labor into an objective transnational working class at an
increasing rate, as measured by TNC Employment, while, at the same time,
foreign capital structures peripheral labor into low-capital, low-value
production. As studies on world income
inequality that emphasize the role of industrialization suggest (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Firebaugh
2003; Milanovic 2005)
non-core nation-states are indeed industrializing in the contemporary
period. Insofar as industrialization
incorporates segments of populations previously excluded from capitalist
relations of production into labor-capital relations, proletarianization – and
embourgeoisement for those articulated into fractions of the dominant class –
by definition occurs (Goldthorpe 1969; Robinson 2004;
Wallerstein 2000). When those
relations are embodied in contractual agreements and social circumstances that
operate in cross-border contexts they exhibit transnational attributes as well (Robinson 2004; Sklair 2001; Struna 2009). Again, evidence
presented herein relating to the proliferation of TNC employment in
manufacturing between the core and the periphery empirically verifies increases
in transnational labor-capital relations.
The empirical basis of our analysis utilizes
two outcomes: cross-national manufacturing employment in US, German, and Japanese
foreign affiliates and cross-national labor productivity by major sector
(agriculture, industry, and service).
Two panel datasets and country-year samples are analyzed for each
outcome. A key limitation of our study
is the availability of data on transnational actors and macroeconomic
variables. Therefore, the temporal scope
of our study is limited. Foreign
affiliate employment is analyzed over the period of 2001 to 2007. Labor productivity is analyzed over the
period of 1980 to 2005. Using random-effects
models (REM), four independent regressions form the empirical foundation of the
study. Findings of the models suggest a trans-zonal
formation of the global working class, while, simultaneously, global and
national labor is distributed into differential production systems associated
with world-system zones.
Globalization and Transnational
Formations
The contemporary
phase of world economic integration, commonly referred to as globalization (Bhagwati 2004; Brenner 1999; Chase-Dunn
1998; Cox 1996a; Dicken 1998), is part of a recurrent pattern of systemic pulsation
(Chase-Dunn and Gills 2003; Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000). During phases of integration, national
societies become more interconnected through economic, military, and
socio-cultural linkages. During phases
of disintegration, national societies deconstruct prior networks of integration
and erect barriers to interaction. The
current phase of economic globalization is one of three waves of globalization
since 1795 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000) to exhibit such integrative
tendencies. However, while the modern
world-system experiences pulsations up and downward, the secular trend is a
constant increase in the scale and magnitude of transnational economic
forces. The implication of this
structural trend is the increasing intensification of global class
relations. Therefore, we claim
transnational class formation is connected to previous phases of systemic
integration, however, each new phase has generated a qualitative shift towards
more enduring transnational capital-labor relations. In simple, graphical terms, transnational
class formation can be understood as a step function paralleling the upward
trend towards greater economic integration in the capitalist world-system.
Dispute over the novelty of
globalization and global class formation has been a central theme in the
developing body of globalization literature (c.f., Arrighi 2001; Embong 2000; Moore
2001; Robinson 2001; Van Der Pijl 2001; Went 2001). On the one hand,
globalization theoretically and practically represents a continuation of centuries old processes of alternating expansion
and contraction of the world-system, like the pulsation suggested above, with
an acknowledged deepening and intensification of inter-linkages between elites
evidenced in the current (30-40 year or so) period (Arrighi 2001).
On the other hand, globalization is posited as a qualitatively new phase
or epoch in the development of world capitalism marked by transformations in
the international division of labor that have led to diverse transnational
social formations including the transnational capitalist class (TCC), the
transnational working class, (TWC), and the transnational state apparatus (TNS)
especially as they relate to transnational corporations as the primary
institutional actors around which these formations crystallize (Cox 1996b; Robinson 2004; Robinson and
Harris 2000; Sklair 2001).
Much of this paper will concern the
latter school of thought, broad-based and not without its own internal debates
about the contours of capitalist globalization.
Often referred to as the ‘global capitalism school,’ the perspective
begins with the premise that “transnational practices” (Sklair 1999: 157) associated especially with transnational
corporations, form the primary basis for other social shifts and
transformations in the world system (Robinson 1996; Sklair 2001; Sprague
2009; Struna 2009). Robinson (2000,
2004, 2008) in particular develops a theoretical perspective of globalization,
which defines contemporary world-economy restructuring as a new epoch of world
capitalism. Specifically, Robinson
(2010) argues:
Since the 1970s, the
emergence of globally mobile transnational capital increasingly divorced from
specific countries has facilitated the globalization of production (I include
services here); the fragmentation and decentralization of complex production
processes, the worldwide dispersal of the different segments in these chains,
and their functional integration into vast global chains of production and
distribution. World production is thus reorganized into new transnational, or
global, circuits of accumulation through which values move instantaneously. (P. 5)
This re-articulation
of national factors of production into a more seamlessly interconnected global
production structure with patterns of accumulation distinct from those
identified by world-systems perspectives (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Wallerstein
1979) is a fundamental
transformation of world capitalism that constitutes an “epochal shift” (Burbach and Robinson 1999).
From Robinson’s (1996; 2004) perspective the contemporary phase of
economic globalization is historically unique because the transnationalization
of capital has eroded the power of nation-states to function as containers of
production and dominant economic decision-makers privileging instead
transnational social formations based on transnational corporations (TNCs) that
operate at the behest of the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) (Robinson and Harris 2000; Sklair 2001).
It is argued that these new
actors/containers of power move beyond the scope of nation-states and require
the constitution of institutions that exist at a specifically transnational
level (Robinson 1998; Robinson 2002).
According to Robinson (2008), transnational circuits of production, and
transnational labor-capital relations require the development of an emergent
transnational state (TNS) apparatus: “a loose network comprised of inter- and
supranational political and economic institutions together with national state apparatuses” that arise in an effort
to manage to the various contradictions that evidence themselves at the many
levels of the global social order (P.34).
Robinson (2004) states “in highly simplified terms, [that] the global
mobility of capital alters the relationship of nation-states to capital
accumulation” and that such a changed relation reflexively implicates power
structures and social classes in a process that cuts “across national
boundaries, and has brought [institutional] changes in the relationship between
dominant and subordinate” groups globally (Robinson 2004: 43).
While theorists like Robinson (2004)
and Robinson and Harris (2000) advance relatively convincing
perspectives on the development of a transnational state apparatus and provide
historical-conjunctural evidence to support their claims, conventional empirical
work that tests the effects of institutional factors that may or may not
indicate policy or ideological convergence, broadly conceived, is relatively
sparse (Beckfield 2006; Solt 2008). For the purposes of
our analysis, we utilize the K.O.F Globalization Index – Restrictions Index (Dreher
2006; Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008) as a proxy measure of institutional
convergence. Where national policy is
amenable to FDI penetration and product/ surplus extraction, the potential for
integration into transnational production circuits, ceteris paribus, is relatively high. While we cannot know from this data the
precise mechanism inducing national policies that facilitate capital
investment, the ability of TNCs to influence policy (Cox 1996b; Gill and Law 1989;
Ietto-Gillies 2002; Robinson 1996) is well documented.
Thus, insofar as we can expect low barriers to economic activity to be
associated with the agents for whom the policies are enacted – TNCs, and
therefore the TCC itself – and can observe effects of these policies on
patterns of TNC employment and productivity, we can assume that institutional
convergence is at least nominally occurring, and that a rough network of transnationally
oriented policies exist. Deregulation
serves as a prime indicator of the reconfiguration of national economic policy
into a singular framework (TNS) facilitating the expansion of transnational
capital across the globe.
Without belaboring the point, it is
worth emphasizing the contingent nature of the TNS (and of the constituent
relations that require TNS formation): these “new structures and relations …
are emergent rather than
accomplished” (Robinson 2004: 43 emphasis in original).
Far from sounding the death knell of nation-states in general, and from
suggesting a transcendence of the social conditions that allow national states
and cultures to make sense, strong versions of the global capital perspective
acknowledge that global social formations like the TNS, the TCC, and the
transnational working class (TWC) – especially the latter – continue to be
influenced by “old and new social hierarchies” demarcated by the north and
south, and the core and periphery “that cut across national boundaries”
(Robinson 2004: 43). Insofar as the
global capitalism perspective has Marxian roots, it can be assumed that
capitalist practices in the distant and not so distant past – the international
and nation-state-centric conditions that characterized previous epochs – will
continue to exert a great deal of influence on the emergent social conditions
of the current period. To paraphrase
Marx (1959 [1852]), agents – transnational or otherwise
– make their own history, but not as
they please.
Transnational Class Formation
To be sure, the
notion of cross-border class relations is not new: even if Arrighi, Hopkins,
and Wallerstein (1985) fail to identify a specific objective
theoretical mechanism responsible for the formation of classes, they
nonetheless state that “by effecting the socialization of labor on a world scale,
the world market [determines] the most general context of the class
contradictions, and therefore of class struggles of capitalist society” (Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1985:
142). From the beginning
of interstate capitalist relations, then, the world-systemic environment
overdetermines class relations in at least a ‘basic’ way. Here, however, the likely class-based outcome
is a world-systemic division of labor centered on differentials of control and
remuneration of workers in commodity chains (Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1985;
Wallerstein and Hopkins 2000) relative to their national-cultural
origins. In a sense, the relations of
exploitation operant across political frontiers hinge more on opportunities
essentially beyond the control of the dominant class, than on differential
conditions something like a TCC consciously constructed.
Again, in contrast, the global
capitalism perspective is based on the identification of transnational
processes linked especially to global circuits of production, and the
concomitant constitution of social formations implicated in those
processes. Without denying the
complexity of social stratification within societies, let alone between them,
that arises from relations in the marketplace (Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1985;
Wallerstein 1979; Weber 1978 [1925]), a production-centered approach to class
formation (Marx 1906 [1867]; Marx 2006 [1933];
Poulantzas 1975; Robinson 2004; Struna 2009) provides both an analytically manageable method of
determining objective class boundaries, and a means of assessing a wide range
of exploitation relations not captured by market-centered approaches. In the latter, the ‘life chances’ (Weber 1978
[1925]) of similar and disparate groups provide the impetus for locating
individuals along a continuum of income distributions within and between
societies (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Firebaugh
2003; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997; Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009), and therefore eschews differentials in exploitation that
are present regardless of relative incomes and rates of remuneration. Production-centered approaches, instead,
while acknowledging heterogeneous experiences of class-life within and between
classes locally and globally (Cox 1996a; Robinson 2002; Struna 2009), allow for a more systemically holistic assessment of conditions
determined by labor-capital relations observable across national and zonal
contexts.
Regardless of the geographic
derivation or destination of FDI that results in fixed capital formation,
ownership and control, on the one hand, of the means of production as well as
the rights to the products and surpluses created by workers engaged with that
capital on the other are the primary determinants of the labor-capital
relation. Likewise, the variable
component of FDI devoted to the payment of wages indicates direct relations
between capitalists and workers regardless of the distance between the payer
and the recipient, and/ or the existence of political boundaries that have
proven particularly porous to these kinds of value flows – as well as
remittances home. Finally, in respect to
the types of capital FDI may engender, relations between owners of FDI and
workers who interact with their capital are not the only direct relations that
obtain: constant circulating capital in the form of to-be-finished commodities
creates relations between workers located at different points in the production
process. The incremental completion of
commodities in value chains that cross borders therefore provides the material
basis for transnational class formation both in terms of the antagonistic
(labor-capital) aspect, and the constitution of class in-itself (i.e., a global
working class in this instance) as it relates to FDI.
Our subsequent tests of the relation
between FDI and rates of productivity in recipient nations, as well as TNC
employment in subsidiaries seeks to understand the ways these labor-capital
relations and relations within the global working class are differentially
distributed relative to the core-periphery hierarchy. While they do not directly measure the
qualitative shifts in labor-capital relations, they do provide a glimpse into
the ways that value is extracted in different regions of the global system of
production by TNCs. If indeed systemic
convergence is occurring, and transnational processes are causing the
constitution of transnational classes, from the perspective of the global
capitalism school we should observe trends in productivity rates and employment
that suggest gaps between zones of the world-system and nation-states are
diminishing in the long run. In
addition, from the global capitalism perspective, as flows and stocks of FDI
controlled by TNCs penetrate into areas formerly excluded or marginally
articulated into the world-system increase, workers confronting the various
embodiments of capital should begin to exhibit similar tendencies along value
chains.
However, the overwhelming force of
structures persistent for so long in the world-system – namely the power of the
core to dominate the periphery and semiperiphery economically, socially, and
institutionally – should also be expected, from a strong world-systems
perspective to exert a great deal of influence in the contemporary period
despite the quantitative increases in cross-border relations. In terms of the ways these structures
overdetermine differentials in productivity and TNC employment, we should
expect to see a great deal of continuity in the international division of labor
from a world-systems approach.
In contrast to the respective
expectations of the supposedly competing theories, our synthetic theoretical
approach contends that transnational class formation is occurring – that there
are indeed objective indicators of relations between (and within) labor and
capital that are extant transnationally – but, that the emergence of these
relations will be tempered and constrained by the core-periphery hierarchy and
the attendant social from which the class relations emerged. Formal expectations of the theory would
predict the emergence of a trans-zone structure of class, while the structure
of the international division of labor continues to contextualize the value and
surplus in the world-system. In the
transition phase from an international production system to a global production
system, we expect, over time, a convergence in value-adding processes across
world-system zones. Therefore, in the
formative period of transnationalization, while workers are being fused into
cross-zone circuits, the valorization of production is still differentiated
along core-periphery dimensions.
Transnational Class Formation and the World-Historical
Perspective
Robinson and
Harris (2000) view class formation in contemporary globalization as
transitioning from international processes with national agents acting through
national states like those described above, to transnational processes wherein
transnational agents function along extra-state institutions. Robinson (2004; 2008; 2010) and others
(Robinson and Harris 2000; Sklair 1999; Sklair 2001; Cox 1996) have developed
an extensive body of literature dedicated to discussing the emergence of a
transnational capitalist class as a class-for-itself, and the emergence of a
transnational working class (TWC), as a growing class-in-itself. In addition, Robinson’s conceptualization is
consistent with prior approaches to class fractionation of the transnational
capitalist class (c.f. Sklair 2001).
According to Robinson (2010):
The TCC is a class group
grounded in global markets and circuits of accumulation. The globally-integrated
production and financial system underscores the increasing interpenetration on
multiple levels of capital in all parts of the world, organized around
transnational capital and the giant TNCs. (P. 7)
Further, his
conceptualization of the TWC defines the group has more fractured and as more
of an objective class:
A global working class
has emerged that runs the factories, offices, and farms of the global economy,
a stratified and heterogeneous class, to be sure, with numerous hierarchies and
cleavages internal to it – gender, ethnicity, nationality, and so on. (P. 7)
Recent
theoretical developments (Struna 2009) have attempted to further conceptualize
and flesh out the contours of the global proletariat via a “spatial-productive”
perspective that fractionates members of the global proletariat on the basis of
both where they expend their labor-power, and their connections to one another
(and the TCC) as a result of their participation in transnational circuits of
production (Struna 2009). However,
empirical theoretical work that tests these assumptions has not yet been
undertaken. In part, the current work
attempts to lay some groundwork for such an undertaking.
Empirical bodies of research on the
TCC have confirmed the presence and growth of the transnational capitalist
class in the world-economy (Kentor 2005; Kentor and Jang 2004; Staples 2006;
Carroll and Carson 2003; Sklair 2001).
General findings suggest the TCC is a growing class-in-itself as ownership
and control over foreign assets become more dispersed across national
boundaries and more concentrated into a select corporate groups. Little to no evidence suggests a growing
consciousness among transnational business elites beyond factors like “global
vision,” “global best practice,” and certain aspects of transnational forums
like Davos which limits the empirical confirmation of Robinson’s core thesis of
contemporary globalization as a political and economic project of the TCC. In addition to TCC class subjectivity,
little to no empirical work has been directed at estimating the objective class
structure of the TWC.
The
transnational forces of globalization, according to Robinson’s perspective, can
be conceptualized as a project of the TCC.
Further, as a project of the TCC, the transnationalization of capital,
and its accompanying transformations of global structures, have resulted in the
increasingly irrelevancy of the North-South divide. For Robinson (2004), transnational class formation
has become the central global stratification system, where global proletariats
in the global South have a shared experience and social location with the
global proletariats in the global North.
Outside of Robinson’s historical analysis, the question of global
inequalities remain to be empirically tested and confirmed by other
research.
A contrasting perspective to
Robinson is the world-historical perspective on globalization, who states that
globalization has been a consistent since the inception of capitalism and the
European-centered world-system (Wallerstein 1974; Arrighi 1994; Chase-Dunn
1998; Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000).
The internationalization of capital and the mediation of capitalist
expansion, according to this perspective, have been in development since Dutch
hegemony (or the Genoese-Iberian complex).
Traditionally, core hegemonies have facilitated the expansion of the
capitalist project through successive regimes of accumulation (Arrighi 1994). The contemporary phase of globalization,
from the world-historical perspective, is embedded in historical dynamics of
world capitalism, where contemporary integration can be interpreted as a
function of the decline of the intensive,
Barr et al. (2006), in line with the
world-historical perspective, analyzes a series of qualitative case studies of
emerging elites in different core zones of the modern world-systems. The specific processes of elite integration,
during the 19th and 20th century, and emerging structures
remains unclear. Preliminary
conclusions have suggests a growth in the global elite prior to the 1970s,
however, more substantive research is required to explore and empirically embed
historical analysis. Further, similar
to the global capitalism scholars, there has been a general neglect toward
empirically and quantitatively analyzing the emergence of a global working
class.
The Core-Periphery Hierarchy and Global
Class Relations
In the
world-systems perspective, global inequalities are conceptualized as a series
of nested social structures stratified along dimensions of economic, political,
and social power. Our analysis focuses
on the intersection of two enduring structures of inequalities embedded in
global networks of inter-societal connections – the core-periphery hierarchy
and global class relations. On the
international scale, the core-periphery hierarchy is a tri-modal partitioning
of national societies into hierarchical ordering. According to Wallerstein (1974), the
world-economy is organized into a tri-modal international division of labor:
the core, semiperiphery, and periphery.
Core nation-states are defined by strong, effective states on the
national and international scale, which specializes in high-value,
capital-intensive production. Periphery
nation-states are defined by weak, ineffective states and low-value,
labor-intensive production.
Core-periphery
relations are defined primarily as exploitive for the purpose of reproducing
power differentials in the world-system.
The exploitive nature of core-periphery relations is the central
mechanism in reproducing the hierarchical distribution of national societies.
Income-based
measures of the core-periphery hierarchy (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones
2005) confirm the long-term endurance of a tri-modal distribution in value
(national income, measured by GNP).
Network measures of world-system (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Mahutga
2006; and Snyder and Kick 1979) offer the advantage of measuring world-system
position in relative terms based on international connectivity. Snyder and Kick (1979), utilize four
international networks to construct a block measure of world-system
position. Based on networks for trade
flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges, and conjoint treaty
memberships, they find countries are organized into ten block groups, however
the similarity between groups constitute a tri-modal distribution of
countries. The empirical confirmation
of the core-periphery hierarchy lends substantive support to the notion of
class formation being articulated through the international division of labor
because the differentiation of production processes in the world-system would
suggest differential capital-labor relations in global circuits of production.
In
regard to labor and class relations, the core-periphery hierarchy
contextualizes workers and capitalists along its structural dimensions. In the core, workers experience a high
degree of political protection, higher wages, and produce greater value. In the periphery, workers experience a high
degree of coercion, low wages, poor working conditions, and produce little
value (Chase-Dunn 1998). In terms of
inter-zonal connections, the higher exploitation of peripheral workers has
contributed to the formation of class alliances between core and peripheral
capitalists (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985).
The operation and reproduction of the core-periphery hierarchy tends to
moderate the formation of class relations, which reproduces class fractionation
on the basis of the hierarchal ordering of national societies. From a world-historic perspective, in
networks of commodity production, nodes of capital-labor relations contained in
the core are formed and reproduced through wage employment; however,
capital-labor relations in the periphery show a higher degree of coerced labor
(Wallerstein and Hopkins 2000). Further,
production linkages connecting inter-zonal nodes are managed and serviced by
core capital, especially in high-value production (Arrighi and Drangel
1986). Therefore, according to the
world-system perspective, class relations are embedded and contextualized by
the geopolitical and geoeconomic structure of the world-system (core-periphery
hierarchy).
The
recent transition in regimes of accumulation is accompanied with
transformations in the global class structures.
Current globalization, as a structural transformation of the
world-economy, and the transition into new modes of accumulation has generated
the conditions for the emergence of an objective global class structure
(Robinson 2004). From a world-historic
perspective, however, the formative process of global class structure has been
a persistent, adjacent process to larger structural trends of systemic
pulsation (Chase-Dunn and Lio 2010; on pulsation, see Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997,
P. 204). The recent wave of intensified
economic integration marks the transition into a new regime of accumulation,
however, which would suggest the development of a new set of class relations
(Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000).
As a transnational regime of accumulation (c.f. Robinson 2004), we
argue, class relations are reflective of the transnational circuit of
production emerging in the world-economy.
Therefore, while an objective global class structure has been a
persistent structural feature of the world-economy, the current phase of
capitalist accumulation, defined by transnational relations, represents a
unique moment in the realization of an objective global working class
structure.
The Intersection of Global Inequalities:
A Synthetic Theory
The main focus
of the paper is to offer at least a preliminary analysis of the
political-economic conditions that refute or support claims of the apparently
competing schools of thought represented by world-systems and global capitalism
perspectives. Much of the world-historic
tenor of the global capitalism perspective emanates from world-systems research
contextually, logically, and substantively, and therefore exhibits a great deal
of consilience with the tradition than many of its promulgators suggest (c.f.
Brown et. al 2010). On the other hand,
many of the tendencies identified by the global capitalism school represent the
logical theoretical extension of world-systems research, and may be properly
situated not in terms of a successor to the perspective, but as a contribution
to the field. However, there are some
important differences, many of which are identified above, that indicate at
least a nominal break between the perspectives concerning periodization,
structural-agentic features, and emergent tendencies.
Thus far, we have discussed the
emergent qualities of transnational labor-capital relations and class formation
generally from the standpoints of the both the global capitalism school and the
world-systems perspective relative to the core-periphery hierarchy and previous
moments of the inter/transnational division of labor. Even if we assent to the assertion that the
TCC is a dominant class in some spheres (Sklair 2001), the persistence of a
trimodal structure of accumulation suggests that the TCC will remain affected
by the core-periphery hierarchy as it continues its ascendance worldwide. Concomitantly, the formation of an objective
global proletariat with transnational fractions operating on the basis
labor-capital relations created by TNC employment will continue to coalesce
relative to zonal positions and regional articulations as well even as
transnational labor-capital relations continue to grow in magnitude and
complexity.
One of the primary attributes of our
synthetic approach to the sociology of globalization, then, concerns the use of
the production-centered approach to class formation advanced by the global
capitalism school, coupled with the world-historical conceptualization of the
world-economy advanced by the world-systems perspective. Thus, while global labor interacts with
capital in its various forms within TNC productive structures via subsidiary
employment at increasing rates across zones, the types of labor-power
expenditure and qualities of labor inputs will continue to be determined by
zone-specific historical circumstances that effect rates of productivity. While there is evidence for a growing
constellation of TCC actors (Carroll and Sapinski 2010; Wall et al
2010), a pronounced paucity of empirical research on
transnational working class formation and structure indicates the necessity of
the current study.
As for the TNS, an absence of
empirical investigations that move beyond structural-conjunctural approaches
also points to the academic gap this study hopes to fill. By assessing the relation between TNC
employment and restrictions to economic activity, or rather the absence of
restrictions to direct investment and commodity/ surplus extraction, we believe
that we observe a proxy measure of institutional convergence, or at least the
outlines of policies that indicate the emergence of governance structures amenable
to the needs of TNCs and other TCC actors.
While the agential aspects of the nascent TNS (Robinson 2004) are not
apparent in policy measures of restrictions or incentives, the outcomes
relative to employment and investment would suggest that at least a skeleton of
transnational state structures have been erected. In the very least, the culture-ideology of
consumerism (Sklair 2001) that is responsible for institutional convergence
across zones and regions can be expected in the long run to crystallize in
legal and juridical terms. While we can
offer only theoretical support for this claim, it is on the basis of such
crystallizations that we expect the TNS to act in the capacity of hegemon in
the next systemic cycle of accumulation (Arrighi 2001).
The empirical tests identified below
have been designed to assess, again at least preliminarily, to what degree
international structures like the core-periphery hierarchy, and so called
nation-state-centric geographic structures and locations continue to persist and exert pressures on the world
division of labor; and the degree to which emergent
transnational social formations, specifically, the transnational working class,
have significantly altered the structural conditions on which world-systems
theory is based. Here, in short, we hope
to show patterns of persistence and
emergence that more perfectly reflect extant social relations than either
of the contrasted and sometimes divergent perspectives can explicate on their
own.
As
may be expected, we also intend to assess the impact of inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) on TNC affiliate employment.
As a primary measure among diverse literatures and perspectives of
globalization and transnational capital’s world-systemic reach (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Arrighi and
Drangel 1986; Dicken 1998; Firebaugh 2003; Robinson 2004), we expect to see an increase in foreign affiliate
employment where higher rates of inward FDI exist. Foreign capital penetration has persistently
been associated with the maintenance of international inequality (Dixon and
Boswell 1996; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn
1985). Our theoretical interpretation
of foreign capital penetration on transnational working class formation is
primarily derived from the perspectives of transnational class formation
associated with the global capitalism perspective (Struna 2009; Robinson 2004;
Sklair 2001). In the formation of a
global production system, the transnational capital-labor relations are
constructed from the vast linkages developed by global capital. The circuitry of global capital is the
primary mechanism developing transnational capitalist-proletariat relations,
where transnational capitalists integrate labor into transnational circuits of
production (Robinson 2004).
Consistent
with world-system perspectives on income inequality (Dixon and Boswell 1996;
Beer and Boswell 2002), we conceptualize the impact foreign direct investment
as a form sectoral disarticulation[1] (Amin
1974; Stokes and Anderson 1990). Labor
in foreign-controlled production are becoming more engaged with transnational
capital than national capital; productivity differentials persist between
international geographies of inequality (the core-periphery hierarchy) while
capital-labor relations becomes augmented by transnational circuits. As an
extension of sectoral disarticulation, we argue that international inequality
is causing a class disarticulation by
augmenting national class structures, where segments of the formerly national
proletariat are engaged in transnational production circuits, thus, resulting
in an uneven and fractional development of the transnational working
class. The pattern of this unevenness,
in its current form, is primarily along dimensions of the core-periphery hierarchy,
where core transnational workers are producing greater value than transnational
periphery workers.
In an effort to specifically assess
the impact of the core-periphery hierarchy on current patterns of transnational
labor-capital relations, we intend to test the degree to which employment by a
transnational firm through foreign affiliates is determined by the world-system
position (Snyder and Kick 1979). We
assume that the core-periphery hierarchy will influence to a great degree the
absolute level of employment by foreign affiliates. A central argument in the
world-system literature discussion on global class formation (c.f. Chase-Dunn
1998) has been the fractioning of class structures along dimensions of the
core-periphery hierarchy. However current
research on the transnational capitalist class (Carroll and Sapinksi 2010;
Carroll 2009; Kentor 2005) has found preliminary support for the formation of
transnational capitalists, but, also, a high degree of regionalization in TCC
and TNC connections (Carroll 2009; Wall et al 2010). However, transnational elite connections
between core-based TNCs and their agents maybe stronger (Carroll and Sapinski 2010), but periphery TNC employment rates
could be higher than core because of efforts to extract higher values from
‘cheaper’ labor, thus transnational capital-labor connections, and the
formation of the transnational working class maybe located in the
periphery.
In
the formation of the transnational mode of accumulation, constellations between
transnational elites are expected to emerge from the core of the world-economy
(Arrighi 1994). Prior moments of
hegemony and transformations in the capitalist mode of accumulation developed
with the creation of political-economic alliances (Ibid). In our perception, the emergent properties
of the current and previous regimes accumulation are articulated through the
international division of labor. As a
point of reconciliation between global capital and world-historical
perspectives (c.f. Robinson 2001; Arrighi 2001), we embedded
transnationalization in world-historical trends, specifically, the systemic
cycle of accumulation. Our
conceptualization of the emergence of a global production system is the
resolution to previous systemic crises.
The impact of economic globalization
on the formation of a global working class in-itself is expected to be strongly
positively associated insofar as institutional structures that foster
transnational or cross-border transactions relative to production are likelier
to produce transnational labor-capital relations by definition. According Robinson (2004), the emergence of a
transnational mode of production, has eroded national production systems as
containers of capital. Transnational
corporations, as central actors in the formative process, have structured
national economies into transnational production circuitry. The institutional congruence between the
institutional environments of TNC headquarters and the host countries of
foreign affiliates is indicative of transnational class formation.
It is assumed that variations in
productivity will be observed in the major sectors of economic activity –
agriculture, manufacturing, and services – as well as in geographic regions,
and world-system zones. Here, both the
persistence of the core-periphery hierarchy and the North-South divide (Arrighi 2001) are expected to have major impacts on
the rates and levels of exploitation experienced by workers in different
industries, locations, and zones of the capitalist world economy/ global
economic system. Further the inter-zonal
differences in capital-intensities in production, from long run, systemic
uneven development explains a substantial divergence in sectoral labor
productivity. Production inputs in the
core are often composed of substantially more capital, are technologically
advanced, and organized by corporate producers with high organizational
efficacy. However, we can assume in the
long run that the homogenization of production processes that are likely to
accompany the transnationalization of circuits of production – especially in
manufacturing and services, and capital intensive agriculture – will generate
convergences in rates of productivity within sectors and between regions and
zones. In essence, we should expect
similar productive structures experienced by workers in transnational chains to
create similarities in production relations measured by productivity
itself. In the short-term, however,
residual effects of international production differentials and the
international division of labor should persist in the world-economy.
All of these measures represent a
preliminary effort to assess the degree to which transnational class relations
are either extant or developing. As an
indicator of global relations of exploitation and a marker of the world
division of labor, rates of foreign affiliate employment, and productivity per
worker in major sectors represented in the samples, predicted by world-system
position, foreign direct investment, and degree of cross-border regulation,
seeks to demonstrate the power of a synthetic world-systems/ global capitalism
model of global economic tendencies.
Again, patterns of persistence and emergence that verify and refute
elements of each of the disparate approaches to world economy are expected in
general. As measures of
transnationalization of production circuits and therefore of production
relations (read, class relations),
employment by TNCs and labor productivity are essentially untapped resources
for empirical estimation. We hope the
measurement of these factors can shed some light on transnational labor-capital
relations.
Analytical Strategy
In order to
indirectly test the propositions of the synthetic theory, we employ four
multivariate regression models for total manufacturing employment in a US,
Japanese, and German foreign affiliate; agriculture labor productivity;
industrial labor productivity; and service labor productivity. Two datasets and samples were generated from
secondary sources for country-year observations. The purpose of the regression analysis is to
offer insight into the primary mechanisms causing transnational capital-labor
relations (employment in transnational firms) and production differentials
across representative samples of countries in the contemporary world-economy
and the international division of labor.
Data
Table 1 provides
an overview of the variables included in the analysis[2]. Data for total foreign affiliate employment
in manufacturing comes from Measuring
Globalisation database (OECD 2010) and several other secondary
databases. The OECD database offers
data on both outward and inward activities of multinationals by parent company
country location. The data for foreign
affiliate employment forms an unbalanced panel with 252 observations for 47
countries over the period of 2001 to 2007.
The employment sample is composed of 18 highly developed countries
(core); 18 developed countries (semiperiphery); and 11 developing countries
(periphery).
Data
for the labor productivity dataset is decomposed into three major economic
sectors. Data for the measures in the
database were drawn from several secondary sources. Productivity data forms an unbalanced panel
252 observations for 62 countries over the period 1980 to 2005 (measured at
five year intervals). The productivity
sample is composed of 15 high developed countries (core); 21 developed
countries; and 26 developing countries (periphery).
Dependent Variables
The models are
organized around four dependent variables: aggregated multinational employment
in US, German, and Japanese foreign affiliates; agriculture labor productivity;
industrial labor productivity; and service labor productivity.
Aggregated
multinational employment measures the absolute number of manufacturing
employees in foreign affiliates weighted by national total labor force. Foreign affiliate manufacturing employment is
the ratio of total full-time and part-time employment in a firm where at least
10% of ownership (direct or indirect) belongs to a US, German, or Japanese
parent company (OECD 2010) to size of the total labor force. Recent research shows over 93% of outgoing
transnational corporate connections (parent-foreign affiliate connections) are
concentrated in the
Sector
labor productivity is the average value-added by the sector (in current US
dollars) per sector worker. Sector labor
productivity is calculated by dividing value-added by the size of the sector
labor force. The number of workers in a
sector was calculated by the percentage of total labor force in sector times
total labor force. The measures were
transformed (log(x) because of univariate outliers and severe positive skew.
Independent Variables – Employment Model
The baseline
model for the multinational employment analysis contains six control variables:
share of manufacturing (% GDP); secondary education enrollment (gross % of
total population); total labor force (as % of total population); economic
freedom index; regional location; and OECD membership. The controls are based on conventional mechanisms
explaining cross-national variation in manufacturing employment in foreign
affiliates.
The
size of the manufacturing sector, measured as percentage of GDP, is drawn from
WDI data (World Bank 2008). National
economies with larger manufacturing sectors are expected to attract a higher
number of multinational manufacturing firms (Kim 2006).
Secondary
education enrollment, as a percentage of gross total population (all ages), is
drawn from WDI data (World Bank 2008).
For capital-intensive and skill-intensive production, an educated labor
force is one of several necessary conditions to establish facilities (Shatz and
Venebles 2000). Secondary enrollment is
expected to have a positive association with foreign affiliate employment in
manufacturing.
Total
labor force, as a percentage of the total population, is included in the
baseline model to control for the condition of labor surplus. National economies with greater surpluses of
labor are predicted to have a positive association with foreign affiliate
employment because of the favor labor market conditions and lower effective
bargaining power of national labor.
Data for total labor force and population is from WDI data (World Bank
2008).
A
central consideration in the investment and cultivation of a foreign affiliate
is the extent of regulation imposed by national governments, which create
administrative costs on firms. One
major factor in multinational location decisions are the costs associated with
operation (Shatz and Venables 2000; Becker et al 2005). To measure the
regulatory environment of a country, we used the Heritage Foundation Economic
Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation 2008).
The index is calculated from 10 sub-indices measuring specific
dimensions of regulation, from business freedom to labor freedom. The index is scored from 0 to 100, with 100
indicating absolute economic freedom and 0 indicating complete regulation. The expectation is a positive association
between regulation and employment.
In
addition to the previous variables, two dichotomous variables are included in
the baseline model to control for geographic location and institutional
similarity. Dichotomous variables were
constructed to indicate a country’s location in a United Nations Region (North
America, Oceana, Europe, Asia, Africa, and
According to the synthetic theory,
three mechanisms are identified as primary articulators of transnational
employment relations. World-system
position is measured as a series of binomial variables indicated a country’s
status in the core, semiperiphery, or periphery. Data on world-system position is drawn from
an updated version of Snyder and Kick (1979) in Bollen (1983) and Bollen and
Appold (1993), which uses a multiple network block modeling methodology for
assigning world-system position.
The other mechanisms causing the
formation of transnational capital-labor linkages, is the capital itself,
measured as the total inward FDI from the United States, Germany, and Japan,
and the degree of global economic integration.
Total outward FDI from reporting country to partner country is drawn
from the OECD database (OECD 2010) weighted by national total labor force
(World Bank 2008). The purpose of the
measure is to quantify the extent of foreign capital-labor relations forming
through transnational investment abroad and its influence on foreign affiliate
employment. FDI controls were excluded from the model due to data
unavailability for country-specific FDI and limited sample size. The measure
for total inward FDI is a summation of FDI from US, German, and Japanese
investors. The variable was transformed
(loge(x)) because of univariate outliers and non-normality.
Economic
policy is measured by a sub-index in the K.O.F. Economic Globalization Index
(Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gastons, and Martens 2008). The restrictions index is calculated from
four variables: hidden import barriers;
mean tariff rate; taxes on international trade; and capital account
restrictions. Higher values indicate a
less restrictive regime and less regulation of capital and trade flows.
Independent Variables –
Productivity Models
All three
productivity models share the same baseline model of four control
variables: secondary education
enrollment (% of gross population); urban population (% of total population);
trade openness (trade as % of GDP); and UN region. In addition to a dichotomous measure for
geographic location, we included a time dummy variable for the year 1990 in the
analysis to control for effects associated with historical changes after 1990,
specifically, the collapse of the
Secondary education enrollment, as a
percentage of gross total population (all ages), is drawn from WDI data (World
Bank 2008). Human capital theories of
labor productivity (Schultz 1961; Welch 1970; Black and Lynch 1996; Aggregy,
Eliab, and Joesph 2010) argue that greater human capital, in particular
education, increases labor productivity.
The expected association between secondary education and sector
productivity is a positive, linear relationship.
Urbanization, as percentage of total
population in urban settings, is drawn from the WDI database (World Bank
2008). The expected association between
urbanization and sector labor productivity is positive.
Trade openness is calculated by
total exports plus total imports divided by GDP. Data for trade openness comes from the WDI
database. The log of trade openness
was used in the analysis because of univariate outliers and non-normality. The
predicted association between trade openness and sector productivity is
positive – as countries engaged the global economy more, international
competition and standards requires an increase in labor productivity in order
to compete in world markets (Krugman 1981; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Alcala
and Ciccone 2004) .
Similar to the employment model, two
variables are used to indirectly test the propositions of the synthetic theory:
world-system position and foreign direct investment penetration (Dixon and
Boswell 1996; Alderson and Nielson 1999; Beer and Boswell 2002). In addition to FDI penetration, two
additional controls are used – foreign direct investment rate (the ratio of
inward FDI flow to inward FDI stocks) and domestic investment (gross capital
formation). World-system position is
based on an updated measure of Snyder and Kick (1979) in Bollen (1983) and
Bollen and Appold (1993). FDI data are from UNCTAD FDI Online Database (UNCTAD
2009).
Methodology
Time-series,
cross-sectional data renders ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
inefficient because of autocorrelation.
All of the models included in the
analysis utilize panel data, where observations are measured at multiple time
points, which violate a key assumption of OLS – errors with no serial
correlation (
To determine the effect of serial
correlation on the efficiency of the productivity model covariates, the
productivity full models were estimated using Prais-Winsten (PW) regression
(Prais and Winsten 1950). Prais-Winsten
regression estimates a linear model that is corrected for serially correlated
residuals. The estimations of the PW
models only differed in magnitude, where both significance and direction were
consistent between random-effects models and PW models, except for the FDI
controls in the service and agriculture models. According to the results of the PW models,
in the service model, both domestic investment and FDI are significant and, in
the agriculture model, domestic investment is significant.
In
estimating the REM models, we used Huber-White standard errors (White 1980) in
order to adjust for heteroscedastiscity and spatial auto-correlation present in
both datasets. Both models contain
highly unbalanced panels, therefore, we assumed the presence of spatial
auto-correlation. Due to unbalanced
panels, we are unable to perform any diagnostic tests confirming the presence
of spatial auto correlation.
Results
[Insert Table 3]
Table 3 reports
the results of the REMs for foreign affiliate employment. Model 1 includes the baseline model estimations
for employment. The positive,
significant association between manufacturing sector development (share of GDP
from manufacturing) and foreign affiliate employment is expected. Highly developed manufacturing sectors should
attract foreign companies. Further, OECD
members are expected to have significantly more foreign affiliate employment in
US, German, and Japanese firms than non-OECD members. Lastly, the degree of regulation of a
national economy is negatively associated with foreign affiliate
employment. Based on the Economic
Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation 2008), a one-point increase in the index for
a country is associated with a 3% increase in foreign affiliate employment. .
Model
2 introduces logged inward foreign direct investment from the
[Insert Figure 1]
Model
3 tests world-system position controlling for the baseline model. The insignificance of world-system position
is an unexpected result. Neither the
core or non-core account for a significant proportion of foreign affiliate
manufacturing employment, which is interpreted as a relatively equal
inter-zonal distribution of transnational employment. However, by introducing
world-system position to the model, OECD membership no longer has any significance,
which means the significance of membership in the OECD is contingent on being
in the core. Figure 1 shows the time
trends in foreign affiliate employment for core, semiperiphery, and periphery
countries from 2001 to 2007. The
apparent trend in core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral employment is a growing
divergence between world-system zones.
Starting in 2001, the gap was significantly smaller compared to
2007. In the short time-span, peripheral
employment has rapidly grown, however, the difference appears to be
insignificant when controlling for manufacturing sector development and
geographic region.
Model
4 tests the extent of cross-border regulation, controlling for the baseline
model. Consistent with the theory,
restriction has a statistically significant association with manufacturing
employment. The degree of economic
international/global regulation is a main attraction for US, German, and
Japanese manufacturing firms. States
with less regulation of trade and capital flows are significantly more likely
to attract corporations producing at the global scale because of the reduction
administrative costs and institutional similarities between home and affiliate
countries.
The
KOF globalization index has been criticized for being an invalid measure of
globalization (Caselli 2008). However,
the justification for including the measure in our model is the need for a
multiple indicator measure of economic restrictions and flows indicative of a
transnational economy controlled by global capital. In light of the robustness of foreign direct
investment, FDI capital flows and restrictions on capital, in general, are
shaping the contours of the world-economy; property acquisition, in all
varieties on a global scale, is becoming the mechanism causing transnational
class formation.
Model
5 includes economic globalization, world-system position, and logged FDI,
controlling for the baseline variables.
Examination of the regression coefficients reveals that the central
parameters for predicting cross-national variation in foreign affiliate
manufacturing employment in
[Insert Table 4]
Table
4 reports the results of the agriculture productivity models. Model 1 provides
estimates for the baseline model. Five
of the eight parameters specified in the model are statistically significant.
The negative coefficient for Asia and
Including
foreign direct investment penetration, secondary education is no longer
significant, while logged trade openness, Asia, and
Model
3 tests the effect of world-system position on agriculture labor
productivity. Controlling for the
baseline model, agriculture workers in core countries generate 2 percent more
value than workers in non-core countries.
Further, the introduction of core into model renders logged trade
openness insignificant. In addition to
trade openness, the introduction of world-system position reduces the magnitude
of being located in
Model
4 estimates the full model for agriculture labor productivity. Controlling for the baseline model, both
world-system position and foreign direct investment penetration remain
significant. Since both variables are
significant in the same model, additional mechanisms to foreign direct
investment penetration are central for explaining core-periphery differences in
labor productivity. The most robust
parameter across all of the models has been urbanization, which consistently
has a positive association with agriculture labor productivity. A high concentration of national populations
in urban centers necessitates a greater productive capacity in the agriculture
sector.
[Insert Table 5]
Table
5 provides the results of the industrial productivity model. Industrial production, compared to
agricultural production, requires a high amount of capital inputs, thus,
cross-national variation is expected to indicate a higher level of capital-intensive
production. Model 1 provides limited
empirical support to this argument with the baseline model. Both secondary educational enrollment and
urbanization have positive association with industrial labor productivity. Additionally, compared to
Models
2 through 4 in Table 5 estimates the same models specified for agriculture
labor productivity. The only major
differences are the lack of regional significance and the robustness of
secondary school enrollment. Both
world-systems position and foreign direct investment penetration remain
significant for predicting cross-national variation in industrial labor
productivity. The capital and
production differential between the core and periphery is one of the central
explanations for a lack of regional significance. Similar to agriculture labor productivity,
urbanization is a significant predictor.
Another important difference between Model 1 and Model 4-5 is the
significant decrease in magnitude of the regional variables. The spatial differential of industrial labor
productivity seems to be, at least partially, the result of core-periphery differentiation.
[Insert Table 6]
Table
6 gives the results of REMs for service labor productivity. The growth of the service economy has been a
central theme in the development of a new international division of labor and
the expansion of manufacturing into the periphery. Model 1 shows the highly uneven regional
distribution of the global service sector, where service workers in
Models
2 through 4 estimate the same models for previous productivity models for
service productivity. Compared to
industrial productivity, geography is a significant predictor, controlling for
world-system position and other variables, for service labor productivity. Regional differentiation in productivity
demonstrates a clear regional dimension in the formation of the global economy,
especially for the service sector. Both
parameters specified by the synthetic model are positively associated with
service labor productivity, controlling for the baseline model. Compared to other sectors, the service
sector exhibits the highest difference between core-periphery, where the core
labor produces 92% more value than periphery labor in the global service
sector.
Overall,
the REMs for foreign affiliate employment and sector labor productivity present
a clear picture of the formation of the transnational working class and the
durable inequalities between world-system zones. The insignificance of world-system status
for predicting foreign affiliate manufacturing employment indicates a
substantial growth in inter-zonal capital-labor relations through globalizing
processes, like offshoring and outsourcing with third-party contractors, rather
than ‘in-house’ foreign affiliates.
World-system accounts of TNC operation (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985)
understand TNC – periphery relations as core exploitation of peripheral
economies in the pursuit of cheap labor and greater surplus extraction. However, in our empirical analysis, we found
no disproportional concentration of employment in the periphery. On average, US, German, and Japanese firms
employ a greater share of periphery labor than semiperiphery or core, but the
difference is insignificance. Mean
periphery employment in foreign affiliates is about 300,000, while mean core
employment is about 200,000. Given the
sample, this difference is not substantial, especially considering the amount
of unaccounted for employment in US, German, and Japanese parent
companies. The main argument to
extract from the employment model is the growth in inter-zonal linkages in
transnational circuits of production through vertical structures of
transnational corporations are not absolutely determined by the core-periphery
hierarchy, rather, other forces are contributing to the growth of transnational
corporate employment.
The
significance of world-system position for labor productivity in all major
sectors provides some empirical basis for the endurance of international
production differentials. The
transition toward a globalized production system is not associated with a
convergence in value-adding capability of labor in all regions of the
world. Both geography and
political-economic geography are relevant for accounting for production
difference. In the service sector, the
international difference is very pronounced and significant explanations for
cross-national variation in productivity.
The central point is, while inter-zonal capital-labor relations grow,
producing a primordial objective global class structure, there is a lack of
convergence in production, which indicates the persistence of an international
division of labor associated with greater productivity capacities and valuation
unevenly distributed in the world-economy.
Discussion and Conclusion
[Insert Figure 2]
Our analysis
provides preliminary support for our theoretical claims regarding the
intersection of persistent international inequality and the emergence of the
transnational working class. The
inter-zonal convergence in TNC manufacturing employment provides partial
support to the claim of an emergent global production system. Figure 2 shows trends in US TNC
manufacturing employment from 1998 to 2008 for core, periphery, and
semiperiphery countries. In line with
the findings of our regression analysis, over the last decade, there appears to
be, since 2004, a substantial convergence in total US TNC manufacturing
employment between core and peripheral countries. The intensified incorporation of the
periphery into the circuitry of global production represents both the outcome
of the
A
central disagreement in the world-historical and global capital discussion is
the periodization of the current phase of globalization, more specifically,
whether contemporary transnational transformations represent an epochal shift
in capitalism (Burbach and Robinson 1999).
According to our analysis, even if the emergence phase of capitalist
accumulation is a qualitative change, structural constants from previous
periods, like the core-periphery hierarchy (Chase-Dunn 1989), are enduring the
initial wave of transformations. From
the perspective of actually emerging transnational class formations, the
institutionalization of global capital-labor relations – via transnational
actors like the TNCs – must conform and react to established relations of
international inequality characterized by core-periphery hierarchy.
Applying
the world-historical framework of systemic cycles of accumulation (Arrighi
1994) to contemporary transformations, we argue that the emergence of
transnational social bodies is indicative of the formation of a new regime of
accumulation. However, this
transnational regime of accumulation, while following the continuity and
patterns of systemic cycles, is a unique rupture in the structural basis of the
world-system. The possibility of
fundamental changes in the composition and persistence in the international
division of labor requires more rigorous empirical investigation.
[Insert Figure 3]
The
most robust mechanism identified by our synthetic theory and empirically
established across both sets of analyses has been the flow of foreign direct
investment. In the transnational phase
of capitalist accumulation, the spatial scope of capital has transcended the
discrete boundaries of national economies.
Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between inward foreign direct
investment from Japanese, US, and
As evidenced by the significant
effect of economic restrictions on foreign affiliate employment, the growth of
transnational capital-labor relations, through vertical production regimes
(transnational corporations), is associated with the emergence of institutional
reconfiguration toward transnational state policies. In the formation of the TCC and TWC,
national political institutions, as indicated by capital and trade flow
restrictions, are experiencing an institutional isomorphism toward the
deregulation of transnational capitalist activity. We interpret this process as the emergence
of a primordial transnational state, directed by the interest of transnational
capital. In an era of increasing
restrictions on migration, the deregulation of capital and trade flow seems
indicative of a shift in political interest from safeguarding national labor to
privileging transnational capital. An
institutional convergence of deregulation suggests the possibility of TNS
formation as a political tool of the TCC.
[Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5]
While
manufacturing labor exhibits less stratification along core-periphery
dimensions, the question is: ‘does this hold for all sectors?’ Figures 4 and 5 display time trends in US TNC
employment for two sub-sectors: computer and electronic product manufacturing,
and professional services. In computer
and electronic manufacturing, since 2002, peripheral employment in US TNCs has
substantially increased relative to core and semi-peripheral employment. The medium to high capital-intensity of
computer and electronic manufacturing requires a substantial investment in
capital, skills, and monitoring in national economies traditionally associated
with labor-intensive production. In
professional services, however, there is substantial difference between core and
non-core employment. While US TNC professional
service employment is growing in the semiperiphery, the vast difference between
core and semiperiphery remains, with a limited probability of convergence. Accordingly, it appears the core is
specializing in the coordination of global production, while the periphery is
specializing in manufacturing products of declining value (Arrighi and Drangel
1986). Thus, while objective
transnational working class(es) are forming, there is a high degree of fragmentation
within that class along core-periphery dimensions.
In
addition to building capitalist class relations, generally through
circuit-related linkages and firm-level engagements, foreign direct investment
penetration has preserved the vast production differentials between
world-systems zones. Figure 4 shows the
bivariate relationship between FDI penetration and sector labor
productivity. The disarticulation of
national economies by foreign capital is associated with a growth in labor
productivity in all major sectors. As
labor becomes more engaged in global production circuits, labor productivity
increases at a substantial rate. From
our theoretical perspective, the increasing valorization by transnational labor
is indicative of the formation of a new regime of accumulation and a new phase
of material expansion (Arrighi 1994).
Further, while productivity grows with the diffusion of foreign capital,
the capital-labor linkages created by transnational actors have resulted in
incongruence between transnational workers, augmenting class structures along
core-periphery dimensions.
The endurance of the core-periphery hierarchy
of the world-economy is exhibited in the productivity differences between core,
semiperiphery, and periphery labor.
On average, in all major sectors, core labor productivity is over 70%
greater than semiperiphery and periphery labor productivity. This substantial gap in labor productivity
is suggestive of the persistent unevenness of economic development between
world-system zones. Even with the
dispersion of production to the global South, comparative industrial productive
capacity of labor is highly stratified between the global North and South,
which is reflected in differences in working conditions, protections, and labor
organization efficacy. Across major
sectors, the divergence in productivity, especially in the service sector,
suggests a restructuring of an international division of labor, where the core
specializes in professional service, logistics, and other governance-oriented
and supportive activities in global commodity chains and, where the periphery
specializes in production of low to medium value commodities. In the next phase of capitalist
accumulation, the international division of labor appears to be consistent,
however, from a class-based perspective, the objective capital-labor relations
of capitalist production seem more global in scale.
The
long-term transformations of the world-economy by transnational capital have
yet to be determined, but in the short-run, transnational capital has so far
made little to no progress in producing a convergence in labor
productivity. While, objectively, labor
inputs in manufacturing have multiplied across
world-system zones, other production inputs related to other sectors remained
concentrated within world-system zones.
The preservation of production differentials thus contextualizes our
discussion of the emergence of transnational capitalist classes by embedding
global class formation in structural constants, like the core-periphery
hierarchy.
Future research regarding
transnational class formation and the attendant social structures that emerge
from TNCs activities relative to the persistent attributes of the world-system
hinges on the availability of data that is thus far sparse. Ideally, firm level research that assesses
the linkages between the direct actors, the workers implicated in the TNCs and
the capitalists who exploit them, and geographic/ structural conditions would
be undertaken in order to provide a level of precision not available at the
nation-state level. While we have
demonstrated support for a synthetic approach to global sociology, a
finer-grained investigation of the attributes of the global class structure
determined by transnational processes and the core-periphery hierarchy is
necessary in order to better understand the novelty and tradition of the
present moment of capitalist globalization.
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Appendix
|
Table 2. Summary Statistics |
|||||
|
Variable |
N |
Mean |
SD |
Min |
Max |
|
Total
Foreign Affiliate Employment |
378 |
.012 |
.013 |
0 |
.081 |
|
Total
Outward FDI |
378 |
.002 |
.015 |
-.011 |
.231 |
|
Manufacturing |
371 |
19.151 |
6.005 |
3.215 |
35.008 |
|
Total
Labor Force |
378 |
.475 |
.086 |
0 |
.637 |
|
Economic
Restrictions Index |
364 |
77.482 |
15.709 |
26.328 |
97.614 |
|
Economic
Freedom Index |
373 |
66.909 |
9.836 |
43.502 |
89.968 |
|
Secondary
Education Enrollment |
349 |
97.258 |
19.865 |
38.091 |
161.781 |
|
Agriculture
Labor Productivity |
252 |
16108.55 |
23149.14 |
185.62 |
211995.6 |
|
Industrial
Labor Productivity |
252 |
24872.86 |
28910. |
638.249 |
225592. |
|
Service
Labor Productivity |
252 |
21511.82 |
23555.48 |
883.654 |
175337.5 |
|
Secondary
Education Enrollment |
252 |
78.736 |
27.408 |
17.038 |
161.781 |
|
Trade
Openness |
252 |
72.923 |
46.852 |
14.991 |
384.963 |
|
Gross
Capital Formation |
252 |
22.888 |
5.704 |
10.22 |
44.413 |
|
Foreign
Direct Investment Penetration |
252 |
15.278 |
89.914 |
0 |
1128.122 |
|
Urban
Population |
252 |
63.394 |
18.65 |
8.5 |
100 |
|
Foreign
Direct Investment Rate |
252 |
15.284 |
15.819 |
-19.378 |
100 |
|
Table 3.
Random-Effects Regressions of Foreign Affiliate Manufacturing
Employment in US, German, and Japanese Multinational Corporations. |
|||||
|
Variable |
Model 1 |
Model 2 |
Model 3 |
Model 4 |
Model 5 |
|
Manufacturing
|
.054*** |
.048*** |
.043*** |
.048*** |
.036*** |
|
|
(.012) |
(.01) |
(.009) |
(.011) |
(.008) |
|
OECD
Membership |
1.417*** |
1.298*** |
.826 |
1.351*** |
.596 |
|
|
(.282) |
(.267) |
(.496) |
(.278) |
(.521) |
|
Oceanaa |
-.305 |
-.156 |
-.391 |
-.134 |
-.286 |
|
|
(.242) |
(.212) |
(.287) |
(.226) |
(.300) |
|
|
-.074 |
-.057 |
-.029 |
.068 |
.081 |
|
|
(.48) |
(.433) |
(.464) |
(.489) |
(.478) |
|
Latin
Americaa |
.123 |
.105 |
-.468 |
.263 |
-.424 |
|
|
(.377) |
(.412) |
(.537) |
(.408) |
(.586) |
|
Africaa |
-.787 |
-.898 |
-1.617 |
-.547 |
-1.580 |
|
|
(1.216) |
(1.172) |
(1.281) |
(1.071) |
(1.200) |
|
Asiaa |
-1.065 |
-.997* |
-1.396** |
-.958 |
-1.233** |
|
|
(.541) |
(.516) |
(.443) |
(.540) |
(.422) |
|
Total
Labor Force |
.111 |
-1.588 |
-2.097 |
-.058 |
-2.964 |
|
|
(2.173) |
(1.534) |
(1.823) |
(1.978) |
(1.724) |
|
Secondary
Education |
-.0004 |
-.001 |
-.001 |
-.002 |
-.001 |
|
|
(.003) |
(.003) |
(.002) |
(.002) |
(.002) |
|
Economic
Freedom |
.031* |
.025** |
.015* |
.019* |
.015** |
|
|
(.014) |
(.010) |
(.006) |
(.010) |
(.005) |
|
Loge
Total Outward FDI |
. |
.085** |
. |
. |
.036** |
|
|
. |
(.036) |
. |
. |
(.012) |
|
Coreb |
. |
. |
.209 |
. |
.157 |
|
|
. |
. |
(.258) |
. |
(.248) |
|
Restrictions
|
. |
. |
. |
.012*** |
.011** |
|
|
. |
. |
. |
(.004) |
(.004) |
|
Constant |
-8.845*** |
-6.671*** |
-6.195*** |
-8.687*** |
-5.821*** |
|
|
(1.865) |
(1.111) |
(1.058) |
(1.712) |
(1.085) |
|
Note:
N=225. FDI= foreign direct
investment. Huber-White standard
errors are in parentheses. *
p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001 a:
Comparison Group – b:
Comparison Group – Semiperiphery and Periphery |
|||||
|
Table 4.
Random-Effects Regressions of Agriculture Labor Productivity. |
||||
|
Variable |
Model 1 |
Model 2 |
Model 3 |
Model 4 |
|
Secondary
Education Enrollment |
.004 |
.003 |
.003 |
.002 |
|
|
(.004) |
(.004) |
(.004) |
(.004) |
|
Urbanization |
.032*** |
.031*** |
.028*** |
.028*** |
|
|
(.007) |
(.007) |
(.008) |
(.007) |
|
Loge
Trade Openness |
-.449* |
-.535** |
-.420* |
-.456* |
|
|
(.193) |
(.203) |
(.192) |
(.200) |
|
Asiaa |
-1.554*** |
-1.587*** |
-1.220*** |
-1.258*** |
|
|
(.289) |
(.301) |
(.309) |
(.296) |
|
Africaa |
-1.199** |
-1.285** |
-.847 |
-.934* |
|
|
(.461) |
(.466) |
(.485) |
(.491) |
|
Latin
Americaa |
-.583 |
-.559 |
-.128 |
-.123 |
|
|
(.347) |
(.357) |
(.373) |
(.383) |
|
|
-.581 |
-.570 |
-.655 |
-.643 |
|
|
(.608) |
(.543) |
(.392) |
(.346) |
|
Oceanaa |
-.854 |
-.849 |
-.732 |
-.726 |
|
|
(.484) |
(.491) |
(.416) |
(.424) |
|
Loge
FDI Penetration |
|
.044* |
|
.040* |
|
|
|
(.023) |
|
(.022) |
|
Loge
Gross Capital Formation |
|
-.009 |
|
-.023 |
|
|
|
(.201) |
|
(.201) |
|
FDI
Rate |
|
-.003 |
|
-.002 |
|
|
|
(.004) |
|
(.004) |
|
Coreb |
|
|
.933*** |
.898*** |
|
|
|
|
(.269) |
(.277) |
|
1990 |
.372*** |
.361*** |
.410*** |
.394*** |
|
|
(.101) |
(.105) |
(.099) |
(.104) |
|
Constant |
8.76*** |
9.214*** |
8.259*** |
8.720*** |
|
|
(.911) |
(1.066) |
(.915) |
(1.068) |
|
Note:
N=246. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. FDI = foreign direct
investment. *p<.05;
**p<.01; ***p<.001 a: Comparison Group – b: Comparison Group – Semiperiphery and
Periphery |
||||
|
Table 5.
Random-Effects Regressions on Industrial Labor Productivity. |
||||
|
Variable |
Model 1 |
Model 2 |
Model 3 |
Model 4 |
|
Secondary
Education Enrollment |
.009*** |
.008** |
.009** |
.007** |
|
|
(.003) |
(.003) |
(.003) |
(.003) |
|
Urbanization |
.025*** |
.023*** |
.021*** |
.020*** |
|
|
(.006) |
(.006) |
(.006) |
(.006) |
|
Loge
Trade Openness |
.103 |
-.015 |
.155 |
.039 |
|
|
(.128) |
(.125) |
(.112) |
(.110) |
|
Asiaa |
-.662* |
-.756* |
-.305 |
-.432 |
|
|
(.321) |
(.321) |
(.306) |
(.314) |
|
Africaa |
-.707* |
-.873** |
-.321 |
-.521 |
|
|
(.237) |
(.333) |
(.327) |
(.344) |
|
Latin
Americaa |
-.710** |
-.711** |
-.243 |
-.299 |
|
|
(.237) |
(.229) |
(.263) |
(.257) |
|
|
.069 |
.019 |
-0.247 |
-.061 |
|
|
(.379) |
(.255) |
(.173) |
(.139) |
|
Oceanaa |
-.203 |
-.223 |
-.066 |
-.097 |
|
|
(.211) |
(.213) |
(.248) |
(.236) |
|
Loge
FDI Penetration |
|
.070*** |
|
.066*** |
|
|
|
(.016) |
|
(.016) |
|
Loge
Gross Capital Formation |
|
-.026 |
|
-.036 |
|
|
|
(.132) |
|
(.132) |
|
FDI
Rate |
|
-.003 |
|
-.002 |
|
|
|
(.002) |
|
(.002) |
|
Coreb |
|
|
.958*** |
.845*** |
|
|
|
|
(.224) |
(.234) |
|
1990 |
.411*** |
.388*** |
.437*** |
.410*** |
|
|
(.072) |
(.072) |
(.072) |
(.072) |
|
Constant |
6.753*** |
7.771*** |
6.305*** |
7.341*** |
|
|
(.605) |
(.648) |
(.540) |
(.611) |
|
Note:
N=246. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. FDI = foreign direct
investment. *p<.05;
**p<.01; ***p<.001 a: Comparison Group – b: Comparison Group – Semiperiphery and
Periphery |
||||
|
Table 6.
Random-Effects Regression on Service Labor Productivity. |
||||
|
Variable |
Model 1 |
Model 2 |
Model 3 |
Model 4 |
|
Secondary
Education Enrollment |
.010*** |
.009*** |
.010*** |
.008*** |
|
|
(.003) |
(.002) |
(.003) |
(.002) |
|
Urbanization |
.020*** |
.019*** |
.016** |
.016** |
|
|
(.006) |
(.006) |
(.006) |
(.006) |
|
Loge
Trade Openness |
-.005 |
-.069 |
.064 |
-.006 |
|
|
(.135) |
(.142) |
(.121) |
(.131) |
|
Asiaa |
-1.015*** |
-1.075*** |
-.666* |
-.745* |
|
|
(.305) |
(.302) |
(.298) |
(.300) |
|
Africaa |
-1.000*** |
-1.093*** |
-.627* |
-.738* |
|
|
(.293) |
(.307) |
(.305) |
(.318) |
|
Latin
Americaa |
-1.111*** |
-1.040*** |
-.653* |
-.615* |
|
|
(.232) |
(.231) |
(.261) |
(.259) |
|
|
-.141 |
-.119 |
-.215 |
-.193 |
|
|
(.286) |
(.189) |
(.187) |
(.191) |
|
Oceanaa |
-.824** |
-.853** |
-.687** |
-.724** |
|
|
(.314) |
(.312) |
(.261) |
(.255) |
|
Loge
FDI Penetration |
|
.060*** |
|
.056*** |
|
|
|
(.017) |
|
(.015) |
|
Loge
Gross Capital Formation |
|
.215 |
|
.208 |
|
|
|
(.119) |
|
(.121) |
|
FDI
Rate |
|
-.004* |
|
-.004 |
|
|
|
(.002) |
|
(.002) |
|
Coreb |
|
|
.922*** |
.862*** |
|
|
|
|
(.216) |
(.231) |
|
1990 |
.414*** |
.394*** |
.437*** |
.417*** |
|
|
(.071) |
(.074) |
(.071) |
(.074) |
|
Constant |
7.550*** |
7.490*** |
7.048*** |
7.021*** |
|
|
(.600) |
(.784) |
(.571) |
(.766) |
|
Note:
N=246. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. FDI = foreign direct
investment. *p<.05;
**p<.01; ***p<.001 a: Comparison Group – b: Comparison Group – Semiperiphery and
Periphery |
||||
Figure 1. Manufacturing
Employment in Foreign Affiliates, 2001-2007
Figure 2.
Manufacturing Employment in US TNCs, 1998 to 2008
Figure 3. Manufacturing Employment and FDI from Parent
Country (US,
Figure 4. US TNC Manufacturing Employment (in
thousands) in Computer and Electronic Products Sector, 1998-2008.
Figure 5. US TNC Service Employment (in thousands) in
Professional Service Sector, 1998-2008.
|
Table 1. Description of Variables |
|||||
|
Variable |
Transformations |
IV/DV/C |
Hypothesis |
Description |
Source |
|
Total Foreign
Affiliate Employment |
Loge(Y) |
DV |
. |
Total Employment in
Japanese, German, and US Foreign Affiliates divided by total labor force. |
OECD
(2010) |
|
Core |
. |
IV |
+ |
Binary variable
indicating core status in the world-system |
Snyder
and Kick (1979) Updated |
|
Total Outward Foreign
Direct Investment Flow |
Loge(X) |
IV |
+ |
Total outward FDI flows
(in $ |
OECD
(2010) |
|
Manufacturing Share of
GDP |
. |
C |
+ |
Percentage of GDP from
Manufacturing Sector |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Secondary Education
Enrollment |
. |
C |
+ |
Gross percentage of
population enrolled in secondary education |
World
Bank(2008) |
|
Total Labor Force (%
of Population) |
. |
C |
+ |
Total Labor Force as %
of total population |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Economic Freedom Index |
. |
C |
+ |
Multi-dimensional index
measuring the degree of economic regulation |
Heritage
Foundation |
|
KOF Economic
Globalization Index-Restrictions |
. |
IV |
+ |
Multi-dimensional index
measuring the degree of regulation for capital and trade flows. Higher values indicate less regulation. |
Dreher
(2006) |
|
OECD Membership |
. |
C |
+ |
Binary Variable
indicating OECD membership |
N/A |
|
UN Region |
. |
C |
- |
Series of binary
variables indicating location of country according to UN Regions |
N/A |
|
Agriculture Labor
Productivity |
Loge(Y) |
DV |
. |
Total value added by
agriculture per agricultural worker (current $US) |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Industrial Labor
Productivity |
Loge(Y) |
DV |
. |
Total value added in
industry per industrial worker (Current $US) |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Service Labor
Productivity |
Loge(Y) |
DV |
. |
Total value added in
service per service worker (current $US) |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Urbanization |
. |
C |
+ |
Urban Residency as a
percent of total population |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
Trade Openness |
Loge(X) |
C |
+ |
Total exports plus
imports as a percentage of GDP |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
FDI Penetration |
Loge(X) |
IV |
- |
Ratio of Inward FDI
Stock to GDP (Current $US) |
UNCTAD
(2009) |
|
Domestic Investment |
Loge(X) |
C |
+ |
Gross Capital Formation
as Percentage of GDP |
World
Bank (2008) |
|
FDI Rate |
. |
C |
. |
FDI Flow/FDI Stock *
100 (Current $US) |
UNCTAD
(2009) |