The Global Right in the World Revolutions of 1917 and 20xx[1]
Chris Chase-Dunn, Jennifer S.K. Dudley and Peter Grimes
Institute for Research on World-Systems; University
of California-Riverside
v. 10-12-18 9407 words
This is IROWS Working Paper #118 at https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows118/irows118.htm
Abstract: An understanding of the current global resurgence of
right-wing national and transnational “neo-fascist” social movements can best
be understood by comparing the recent movements with the global political
circumstances happening in the first half of the 20th century. Such a
comparison can help us understand the similarities and differences between then
and now to gain insights about what could be the consequences of the
reemergence of populist nationalism and fascist movements. This paper uses the
comparative evolutionary world-systems perspective to study the global right
from 1900 to the present. We see fascism as a hybrid of capitalism and a tributary
mode of accumulation that co-evolves with capitalism and socialism. The point
is to develop a better understanding of 21st century fascism, populist
nationalism and authoritarian practices and to help construct a praxis for the
New Global Left.
The world-system
literature on world revolutions has tended to focus on the rebellions and
social movements of the Left to see how these clustered assemblages of
collective behavior from below have been related to changes in the larger
structural and institutional context of world politics and capitalist
development. The constellations of social movements from below have been
analyzed and compared with one another in order to understand their political
ideologies and social constituencies and the effects that they have had on the
evolution of global institutions and regimes. But reactionary and right-wing
movements have largely been left out of this analysis.
The exception is W.L. Goldfrank’s
(1978; 1990) analysis of fascism in world historical perspective, a valuable
review of the theories and comparative literature on 20th century
fascism that builds on the approach developed by Karl Polanyi to flesh out an
analysis at the level of the global system. Goldfrank sees 20th
century fascism as a reaction to the crises of the capitalist world-economy,
employing Polanyi’s idea of the double-movement in which societies become
over-commodified and then react against commodification. But the rise of
right-wing sects, movements and parties in the last few decades and obvious
similarities between populist nationalisms and the use of symbols and tactics
taken from the playbook of 20th century fascism require an update
and rethinking of Goldfrank’s seminal work that also
takes more recent scholarship into account.
The comparative evolutionary world-systems perspective
The world-systems
perspective presents a structural interpretation of the cycles and trends that
have constituted the expansion and evolution of global capitalism (Arrighi 1994; Wallerstein 2011; Chase-Dunn and Lerro 2016). It focuses on the global core/periphery
hierarchy and global class relations (Amin 1980).[2] This holistic structural
approach in which the whole global system is the unit of analysis allows us to
see both the similarities and differences between the contemporary world
historical period and earlier similar periods. The expansion and deepening of
capitalism have created the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers; waves of
colonization in which European powers subjugated most of Asia, the Americas and
Africa using military and economic power to mobilize peripheral capitalism
based on coerced labor (slavery and serfdom); and the reactive waves of
decolonization leading to the juridical incorporation of these former colonies into
the original European system as sovereign states. The expansion and deepening
of capitalist production and the increasing size of the nation-states that
played the role of hegemons were driven by movements of resistance that were
located both within core polities and in the periphery and the semiperiphery.
Each of the capitalist hegemons
(the Dutch in the l7th century, the British in the 19th century
and the United States in the 20th century) were themselves once
formerly semiperipheral states that rose to core status in struggles with
contending great powers. Their successes were partly based on their abilities
to deal with resistance from below more effectively than their competitors, as
well as on comparative advantages in production and institutional innovations (Wallerstein
1984).
It
is important to accurately grasp both the structural similarities and the differences
between the current world historical period and earlier periods that were
similar but also dissimilar. The United States has been in decline in terms of
hegemony in economic production since 1945 and this has been similar in many
respects to the decline of British hegemony in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries (Chase-Dunn et al 2011).
Giovanni Arrighi (2006) noted that the period of British hegemonic
decline (1870-1914) moved rather quickly toward military interimperial rivalry
because economic challengers such as Germany and Japan were developing powerful
military capabilities that were used to contest the Pax Britannica. The U.S.
hegemony differed because the post WWII United States ended up as the single military
superpower, a status that was amplified by the demise of the Soviet Union. After
World War II, Japan and Germany could not play the military card because they
were stuck with the consequences of having lost the last World War. And they
benefited economically by allowing the U.S. to provide security. This, and the
immense size of the U.S. economy, slowed the process of hegemonic decline
compared to the British, but the decline of U.S. hegemony has itself invigorated
counter-hegemonic movements of both the Left and the Right that
are opposed to the contemporary world order.
The declining power of
the U.S. poses huge challenges for global governance. Newly emergent national
economies such as India and China need to be integrated into the global
structure of power but, as in the 19th century with Germany and
Japan, this is a complicated and conflictive process. The unilateral use of
military force by the Bush administration and America-Firstism
of the Trump administration have further delegitimized the
institutions of global governance and increased the possibility of serious interimperial rivalry.
These developments
parallel, to some extent, what happened a century ago, increasing the likelihood
of another Malthusian correction such as what occurred in the first half of the
20th Century. At the beginning of the 20th Century the global
population was 1.65 billion, whereas in 2018 there are 7.7 billion humans on
Earth. At the beginning of the 20th century fossil fuels were
becoming less expensive as oil was replacing coal as the major source of energy
(Grimes 1999, 2003; Podobnik 2006). It was this use
of inexpensive non-renewable energy that facilitated the abolition of slavery
and serfdom and made the geometric expansion and industrialization of humanity
possible.
Now we are facing global
warming as a consequence of the spread and rapid expansion of industrial
production and energy-intensive consumption. None of the existing alternative
technologies offer low cost energy of the kind that made the past expansion
possible. Many believe that overshoot has already occurred in terms of how many
humans are alive, and how much energy is being used by some of them, especially
those in the Global North. Global climate change is already increasing the
problems of global governance and inequalities in ways radically different than
during the decline of British Hegemony in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. And this contextual
difference is likely to produce altered forms of counter-hegemonic movements. For
example, the New Global Left has seen the rise of an important climate justice
movement (Bond 2012). And right-wing populist politicians have denied the
existence of anthropomorphic (human-caused) global warming and have advocated
the dismantling of those environmental regulations that have been intended to
reduce global warming and pollution.
World Revolutions
The rise and fall of the
hegemonic core powers over the past four centuries have produced institutional changes
that have made possible the successive global waves of capitalist accumulation
(Arrighi 1994). One example is the expansion of
global production, which required accessing raw materials to feed the new
industries, and food to feed the expanding populations, each already adding to global
warming (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). Hegemonic
core powers knew that coercion is a very inefficient means of domination, so
they sought legitimacy by proclaiming leadership in advancing civilization and
democracy. But the ideals contained in these claims were also appropriated by
those below who sought to protect themselves from exploitation and domination.
So, the contending core powers had to adapt to and address the claims of
challengers within their home societies and in the Global South. World orders
are not just coercive; they also require normative and institutional legitimacy
(Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000: 53-64; Linebaugh and Redicker 2000).
There has been an ideological and political struggle in both the
Europe-centered world-system and in the East Asian world-system[3] for centuries, sometimes
fueling strong social movements, regime changes and wars of national liberation
from colonialism.
Most histories have led us to define revolutions
as a national scale events in which new social forces came to state power and
restructured social relations (Goldstone 1997; 2014). Yet at the world-system
level this concept does not easily apply. There is no global state to take
over. But there is a global polity, a world order composed of competing and
cooperating states and other actors. exists. It is that world polity or world
order that is the arena of contestation within which world revolutions have
occurred and that world revolutions have restructured.[4]
Boswell and
Chase-Dunn (2000) designated periods of global rebellions that had long-term
consequences for changing world orders in the Europe-centered system. Years
that symbolize these major world revolutions (after the Protestant Reformation)
are 1789, 1848, 1917, 1954, 1968 and 1989. Arrighi, Hopkins and
Wallerstein (1989) analyzed the world revolutions of 1848, 1917, 1968 and 1989.
[5] They observed that the
demands put forth in a world revolution did not usually become
institutionalized until a later consolidating revolt had occurred. So, the
revolutionaries appeared to have lost in the failure of their most radical
demands, but later enlightened conservatives managing hegemony incorporated some
of these demands as reforms to cool out resistance from below and to legitimate
their own leadership claims.
This view of the modern
world-system as having constituted a single arena of political struggle and
economic competition since the long sixteenth century implies that there has
been an evolving global civil society since then (Kaldor 2003). Global
civil society includes all the actors who
consciously participate in world politics. In the past, it consisted
primarily of statesmen, religious leaders, scientists, financiers, cosmopolitan
literary figures[6]
and the owners and top managers of chartered companies such as the Dutch and
British East India Companies. These elites saw the global arena of political,
economic, military and ideological struggle as one unit (Braudel,
1984). They promoted religious and secular social movements in which
masses were sometimes mobilized, as in the Protestant Reformation. In turn, reactions
such as the Catholic Restoration constituted part of the Global Right. The
Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was an early instance of a consciously transnational
political party (Chase-Dunn and Reese 2007). Since the world revolution of 1789 non-elites
began consciously participating in world politics. A series of “global left”
transnational social movements arose. Though the Haitian
revolution of 1804 was mainly a revolt of slaves on the sugar plantations in
Haiti, some of the leaders were literate former slaves that had been inspired
by the ideas of the French and American revolutions (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000; Dubois 2004).
While global civil
society is still a small minority of the total population of the earth, the
falling costs of communication and transportation have enabled more non-elites
to become transnational political actors and increased the extent to which
local revolts have been able to communicate and coordinate with one another.
But local revolts have always played a role in world revolutions because colonial
powers reacted to them. Global consciousness is not necessary for global
consequences. An objective global interaction network of indirect connections
existed long before most people became aware of it. But the spread of global consciousness
has made globalization an increasingly contentious aspect of world politics.
Our earlier research
focused on what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2006) called the “new global left” and compared it with earlier
incarnations of the global left (Chase-Dunn and Kaneshiro 2009; Chase-Dunn and Niemeyer 2009; Smith et
al 2014). This movement of movements
includes environmentalists, feminists, workers organizations, the peace
movement and many smaller movements. The global left is part, but not all, of
global civil society. Other important contemporary transnational political actors
are the forces organized around the World Economic Forum, and the new reactionary
populist and neo-fascist movements and the jihadists (Anderson, 2005; Zuquete and Lindblom 2005; Moghadam 2009; Bond 2013).
Another world revolution
has been brewing since the last decades of the 20th century. Chase-Dunn and Niemeyer (2009) have called it
the world revolution of 20xx (because it is not yet clear what the key symbolic
year should be). They claim that it began with the anti-International Monetary
Fund riots in the 1980s and the Zapatista revolt in Southern Mexico in 1994.
World revolutions are
hard to study and difficult to compare with one another because they are very complex
“events”. The time periods and places to include (and exclude) are hard to
judge. They each have had different mixes of social movements,
rebellions and revolutions, and counter-movements. And they have occurred unevenly in time and
space. What have been the bases for cooperation and competition uniting
these diverse movements? How did they influence each other?[7] How did the revolts
and resistances affect the struggles among the elites in their efforts to
maintain their positions or gain new advantages? The scientific study of world revolutions is
yet in its infancy but in this article, we are raising a new issue: what has been the nature of the global right
in the 20th and 21st centuries, and how was the 20th
century version similar or different from what is emerging now in the 21st
century?
Evolutionary Logics of Accumulation
The comparative evolutionary world-systems
perspective sees human prehistory and history as having evolved from a
kin-based mode of accumulation that regulates interaction by means of
consensually held norms to tributary modes that add institutionalized and
organized coercion over the top of kin-based forms, to the capitalist mode that
is based on accumulation of profits from commodity production and financial
services.
The tributary modes of accumulation have directly
used state power (institutionalized coercion based on the law and its
enforcement) to extract surplus product from populations through taxes,
tribute, serfdom and slavery. States that mainly employ tributary accumulation have
usually been controlled by military, priestly and land-owning elites whose
wealth in mainly based on this form of accumulation. The tributary states emerged
during the Bronze Age out of kin-based chiefdoms. They engaged in military
competition with one another for territorial conquest and tribute. In contrast, capitalism accumulates surplus
value by making profits on the production of commodities and financial
services. Although early capitalism grew in areas beyond tributary control, the
growth of system-wide trade in the Iron Age, promoted by semiperipheral
capitalist city-states, encouraged the internal commercialization of tributary
empires (Sanderson 1995). Since the 16th
century CE capitalism has become the predominant logic of the Europe-centered
(modern) world-system in a series of waves in which nation-states have increasingly
come to be controlled by capitalists and market forces and money have deepened and
geographically expanded their influence. But the tributary modes have continued
to reassert themselves during periods of crisis and have co-evolved with capitalism. The Hapsburg Empire, the
Napoleonic episode, 20th century state communism (the Soviet Union
and the Chinese Peoples Republic) and the fascist movements and regimes of the
1930s and 1940s were all resurgences of the tributary modes in which
institutionalized coercion in different forms was the main backbone of
accumulation.
We
can now see Fascism in the larger view of world history, as a hybrid of
capitalism and the tributary mode of production that emerged after economic
institutions had evolved high levels of commodification. Twentieth century
fascism emerged as a reactionary populist-nationalist movement in a context of
economic and political crises, which was then joined by big capitalist
land-owners and industrialists who sought to use it to counter the radical
challenges coming from the left. It became authoritarian state control of the
economy and the polity at the behest of privately-owned large corporations. Fascism
is the latest hybrid form that the tributary modes have taken, and it continues
to evolve, as seen in the differences between 20th and 21st
century fascism discussed below.
Definitions of Fascism and World Historical
Comparisons
It is important to review the
efforts of social scientists to define fascism to go beyond the use of this
term as an expletive. W. L. Goldfrank (1978) and Michael
Mann (2004) noted that fascism as a unitary phenomenon is difficult to define because
it was not uniform but varied greatly by location and context and it evolved
over time. It is particularly hard to define fascist ideology because the
leaders were often extremely pragmatic and inconsistent in their choice of
ideologies. One of the key features of fascism – hypernationalism—
was constructed differently in dissimilar locations, which produced locally specific
internal and external enemies.[8] Definitions of fascism in the scholarly
literature vary in width, choice of characteristics and in emphasis on
different characteristics. Some
emphasize the nature of deeds (e.g. Paxton 2004) while others focus more on
ideology (e.g. Griffin 1991). Michael Mann (2004: 13) strikes a good balance
between these:
I define fascism in terms of the key values,
actions and power organizations of fascists. Most concisely, fascism is the
pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism
through paramilitarism.
Both Mann’s (2004) and
Robert Paxton’s (2004) excellent studies realize that this definition may not exactly
fit somewhat similar phenomena that have emerged since 1945, but they are both
willing to examine the nature of late 20th and early 21st
century fascisms to tease out the similarities and the differences. A working
definition of fascism and its traits helps both researchers and opponents to
identify emergent contemporary fascist and similar threats. One or two of the characteristic
features may not be present in a contemporary right-wing movement but it may
still be accurate to designate it as neo-fascist.
Our studies of the new global left have
used survey research to study the network of linked movements that have emerged
as the global justice movement in the World Social Forum process (Smith et al 2014; Chase-Dunn and Kaneshiro
2009; Chase-Dunn et al 2014; Almeida
and Chase-Dunn 2018; 2019). The
assumption that the participants in the Social Forum process were
representative of the transnational social movements of the Left in the whole
world is somewhat problematic (see Reese et
al 2015). But trying to locate a single venue for the global right is even
harder. The only venues that might help such a study would be the World
Economic Forum (WEF) or the Bilderberger Group. But researchers are not allowed
to carry out surveys at these gatherings, precluding research. Nevertheless, we
will try to prehend the structure of the contemporary global right and to estimate its
structure and nature in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
We use Mary Kaldor’s (2003)
definition of global civil society: all the actors who are consciously engaged
in contesting power and ideology on a global scale, though our definition
includes groups that go beyond most definitions of civility (e.g. terrorists). Our view of the global polity is organized
around Immanuel Wallerstein’s (2012) study of the rise of centrist liberalism
in the 19th century.[9] We see the neoliberal
globalization project that emerged in the 1970 as a recent expression of the
centrist liberalism that emerged in the 19th century.[10]
Neoconservatism
emerged in the last decade of the 20th century as a response to the
decline of U.S. economic hegemony. So,
neoliberalism is in the center with the global right and the global left on
each flank. Inspired by Kaldor, our conception of the contemporary global right
includes neo-conservatives, conservative and reactionary think-tanks and media
outlets, populist nationalists, anti-immigrant movements, neo-fascists, male
supremacists, racial supremacists, and reactionary religious fundamentalisms
(radical jihadists, Hindu nationalists and Christian identity groups). This broad constellation of contemporary
counter-hegemonic far right groups suggests comparisons with analogously
diverse players in the world revolution of 1917 (WR1917). We know from studies
of fascism that in some countries fascism was posed as secular national
socialism and syndicalism, whereas in others it was formulated in religious
terms. Italian
and German fascisms were anticlerical. However, religion-based fascism did
exist. A perceived “ideological crisis
within the state” was tied to the rise of fascism in Turkey. Paxton (2004: 203)
cites examples of religious fascism such as the “Falange Española, Belgian Rexism, the Finnish Lapua
Movement, and the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael”. [11] But how did other
religious fundamentalisms (Islam, Christianity, etc.) interact with the social
movements of the right and the left in WR1917?
Immanuel Wallerstein
(2017) explains the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to the
economic downturn of the 1970s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
failure of the movements of the world revolution of 1917 to produce a more
humane and sustainable global society, and so their loss of popular support. He
contends out that religious identities became less and less important in
politics from the Protestant Reformation until 1970.[12] He also points out
the ambiguous relationship that religious fundamentalism has had with states. God’s
law is higher than state law, but the fundamentalists try to take state power
to impose god’s law.
Religious fundamentalism since
the 1970s has also been a reaction against the world revolution of 1968, further
commodification of traditional functions formerly handled by families or
communities, gains for gender and racial equality and individual freedom
(disempowering traditional tribal authority). Religion plays an important role
in contemporary right-wing social movements as a force for mobilization,
cohesion-building and the effort to restore the authority of patriarchal
families and religious leaders. Religions provide frames and imagined golden
ages that are used by many right-wing movements to build their ideologies (Whittier
2014). One reason why religious fundamentalism
became counter-hegemonic after 1970, but was not very important in the world
revolution of 1917, is that fundamentalism became a functional
counter-hegemonic substitute for revolutionary Marxism and related Leftist
ideologies that had been the basis of the Global Left in the 20th
century (Grimes, 2003). Wallerstein contends
that one of the causes of the recent rise of political/religious fundamentalism
was the perceived failure of secular counter-hegemonic movements. It is as if there is an ideological menu
embedded in the geoculture from which individuals and
groups take frames, and when one appears to have been discredited others are selected.
In the U.S., Bible
study groups provided the backdrop for recruitment to right-wing groups, while
right-wing rhetoric “mourns” the movement away from white, Christian roots (Polletta and Callahan 2017: 6). A conquest narrative and
premillennial apocalypticism are bound together by a blood rhetoric, all tied
directly to religious sources in Hebrew, Islamic and Christian scriptures (Gorski
2017). Religious boundaries are transformed into racial ones, synthesizing
religious and ethnic nationalism. These narratives have come to life, sometimes
literally as in the Puritan conquest of the native peoples of North America,
and sometimes allegorically as a way to reinforce racial boundaries and harken
back to a day of white, Christian primacy (Gorski 2017). Islamic
neo-fundamentalism mirrors its Christian counterpart. A global rise in militant
Islam, tied to calls for a return to strict adherence to religions tenets, has emerged
as a reaction to the neoliberal globalization project. Reactionary movements reject
traditional Muslim and modern Western culture, globalization, and
universalizing secular modernism and commodification.
Fascist movements and regimes in the 20th century
were authoritarian attacks on democracy and the rule of law, but their
hyper-nationalism further institutionalized nationalism as an important form of
modern collective solidarity, and they served to provoke a cosmopolitan
reaction against extreme forms of nationalism that became embedded in the geoculture and the international institutions that emerged
after World War II (the United Nations and the international financial
institutions).
Comparing the Global Right with the Global
Left
Our construction of the geoculture as an evolving constellation of contending
ideologies of the right, center and left notes that these assemblages interact
with one another as well as reflecting the changing contexts formed by the institutional
structure of the modern world-system (Nagy 2017). One obvious difference between much of the
global right and the global left is with respect to nationalism. The global
left in the World Revolution of 1917 was explicitly internationalist. Most socialists, communists and anarchists
believed in proletarian internationalism and condemned nationalism as false
consciousness that was promoted by capitalists to undermine the class struggle
and to get workers to go to war. This was an important instance of secular
global humanism and cosmopolitanism, though it was mainly understood as
international class solidarity. It came to grief when the German state tricked
the German socialists into voting for war credits at the outbreak of World War
I, thus abrogating an agreement among the national parties of the Second
International to not go to war and kill each other at the behest of their
national capitalists. It was this development that sealed Vladimir Lenin’s
disgust with the labor movements of the core and provoked his turn to the “Third
Worldism” of the Third International (Claudin, 1975).
Internationalism,
transnational humanism and Global Southism (formerly
Third Worldism) continue to be important
characteristics of the New Global Left in the World Revolution of 20xx (Steger,
Goodman and Wilson 2013; Carroll 2016).
Fascist movements before and after World War I attacked
the workers movements and socialist parties both because the fascists opposed
class struggle in favor of organic nationalism and because they opposed the
internationalism and pacifism of the Left (Paxton 2004). Attacking peasant
unions and labor unions also gained the fascists the support of land owners and
some large capitalists, and this became an important source of powerful elite
support and finance for those fascist sects that were able to move on to become
mass movements and to take over national regimes. But hypernationalism
was also an obstacle to transnational and international cooperation and
organization. The fascists did try to
organize a fascist international during the late 1920s and the 1930s (Laqueur and Mosse 1966), but their own commitment to the myths of nationalism
stood in the way (Paxton 2004: 20, Fn. 83).
This was, and still is, an important difference and conflict between the
global right and the global left.[13]
Dani Rodrik (2018) contends that two kinds of populism have
arisen to contest the neoliberal globalization project. In Latin America in the
1980 and the 1990s the structural adjustment policies of the International
Monetary Fund that required austerity and privatization were supported by
neoliberal national politicians who attacked the labor unions and parties of
formal sector workers, but this produced a populist reaction in many countries in
which progressive politicians were able to gain election by campaigning against
these policies and by mobilizing the residents of the “planet of slums” (Chase-Dunn
et al 2015). This phenomenon was
called the “Pink Tide.” Regimes based on
left-wing populism emerged in most Latin American countries, and Rodrik rightly
sees this as a reaction against the neoliberal globalization project. Right
wind populism emerged, and is still emerging, in countries of the Global North
in which neoliberal globalization produced deindustrialization and many workers
lost their jobs. This occurred in
contexts in which it was easier for politicians to blame immigrants and minorities
than to point the finger at the big winners of global capitalism. And some of
the big winners provided support for the politics of hypernationalism,
zenophobia, racism and sexism that are the working
muscles of right-wing populism and neofascism.
Right-wing populist politicians exploit cleavages along
cultural lines, rallying individuals against foreigners and minorities.
Left-wing populist movements, on the other hand tended to garner support based
on economic cleavages. They pointed to the wealthy and large corporations as
responsible for economic shocks. The ease of mobilization around these
cleavages depends on the salience of the issue for constituents. Individuals
who feel their jobs and public services have been threatened by immigrants and
minorities are easier to mobilize along ethno-national and cultural cleavages.
The cultural cleavages Rodrik describes are becoming
easier to exploit in areas impacted most by massive migrations and economic relocation
and divestment. Global warming has led to declining agricultural output, declining
peripheral state revenue to purchase the loyalties of competing local
constituencies, natural disasters, and the collapse of peripheral states
leading desperate people to flee local conflicts and poverty by seeking refuge
elsewhere. In the north, automation has led to unemployment among skilled and
unskilled workers (Grimes,1999). Right-wing politicians have been able to prey
on the fears of the economically insecure individuals in the Global North, who
see waves of migrants as threats to their social and economic way of life.
Comparing the Contemporary Global Right with
the Global Right in WR1917
The global right in WR1917 was
composed of reactionary conservatives still resisting the rise of centrist
liberalism and the remains of a few far-right sects that had emerged in the
late 19th century, especially during economic downturns. The fin de siècle intellectual climate was
tired of parliamentary debates and stalemates among contending parties.
Romanticism and transcendent ideologies were becoming more popular. Countries
that were new to mass politics had relatively weak regimes that could not
effectively deal with the problems caused by World War I or the problems that
came along with the global financial collapse of 1929. These crises were
opportunities for anarchists, socialists, communists and fascist sects to
become mass parties, especially in locations in which the left was becoming
powerful and threatening. The important
point here is that fascism was itself a popular movement at first and that it
was only later that it was supported by traditional agrarian and capitalist
elites who saw it as preferable to dispossession by communists. Michael Mann (2004: 21) contends that the
elites often overreacted to perceived threats to their interests from leftist
movements that were not actually powerful enough to dispossess them. But the
result was that fascist parties were embraced by some of the old conservatives
and were enabled to take state power in Italy and Germany. These, and the
militarist authoritarian regime in Japan, mounted a global challenge to liberal
capitalism from the right.
One feature common to the German,
Japanese, and Italian attempts to build domestic support was in their
respective efforts to create new empires.
The Germans sought to conquer Europe, the Italians sought colonies in Africa,
and the Japanese attempted to conquer all of East Asia
and the Pacific. The U.S. hegemony that emerged after World War II was justified
as a centralist liberal “free world” regime that had been formed in the
struggle against colonialism, communism, fascism and Japanese imperialism.
The second world war shows that fascists need enemies to attack,
but the internal and external enemies they chose varied depending on their
national and international context. Many
20th century fascists were anti-Semitic, yet Mussolini only accepted
anti-Semitism as a condition for his alliance with the Nazis. Nazism was racial, but Italian fascism was a
form of cultural hypernationalism that did not
require racial purity. The global right of the first half of the 20th
century also contained movements and regimes that were authoritarian, but not
fascist.
The difference between the two that matters here was described
by Goldfrank (1978). There he defined a truly fascist
regime as one emerging from, and expressing, a genuine popular movement from
below, in contrast to an authoritarian regime that is imposed upon the populace
by the elites. According to this distinction
the Vargas regime in Brazil and the Peron regime in Argentina were not fascist,
and nor was the militaristic authoritarian regime in Japan. These are instead better
understood to have been non-democratic coups from above in which state power was used to mobilize development,
expansion and resistance to the economic domination of the Great Powers in the
core (Goldfrank 1978). These were non-fascist, but
authoritarian statist responses to the crises of global capitalism and should
be considered to have been part of the global right. They sometimes made use of
fascist symbols and ideas, but they were not mainly based on ultranationalist
movements from below.
The contemporary global right is
composed of rather different reactionary groups. Jihadists (and Muslims in
general) are a favorite enemy of the neo-fascists who have announced that
sharia law will be enacted in the United States because decadent liberals and
multiculturalists are encouraging Muslims to take over. Jihadists attack
commercialized global youth culture, which they see as individualist,
consumerist and sexually immoral. The good news here is that the jihadists and
the neo-fascists are unlikely allies. So, the contemporary global right is far
from unified.
Neo-Fascist Movements
Most
neo-fascist movements do not simply regurgitate the rhetoric of the early 20th
century fascist movements. They are shaped by the contemporary socio-political-economic
context (Paxton 2004; Alvarez 2019)). Neo-fascist movements have not (yet) been
as violent, and nor have they glorified violence, as much their 20th
century predecessors. They are generally covert and adaptive, attempting to capture public
spaces. In the old days that meant
streets, villages and newspapers. In recent decades it has meant cheap rural television
and radio venues, the internet and online social networks.
Harris et al (2017) claim that the leadership
of neo-fascist movements relies on misdirection, and on their supporters’
comfort with alternative facts so that they can survive in a globalized economy
while pushing isolationist and racist agendas. As with the New Global Left,
they are a reaction to the neoliberal globalization project, but instead of
proposing an alternative form of democratic and multicultural globalization
they propose reactive nationalism, he-tooism, xenophobia,
protectionism and making x great again.
Paxton
(2004) recognized a series of events that presaged the growing popularity of contemporary
right-wing movements:
…ethnic cleansing
in the Balkans; the sharpening of exclusionary nationalisms in postcommunist eastern Europe; spreading ‘skinhead’ violence
against immigrants in Britain, Germany, Scandinavia, and Italy; the first
participation of a neofascist party in a European government in 1994, when the
Italian Alleanza Nazionale, direct descendant of the
principal Italian neofascist party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), joined
the first government of Silvio Berlusconi; the entry of Jörg
Haider’s Freiheitspartei (Freedom Party), with its
winks of approval at Nazi veterans, into the Austrian government in February
2000; the astonishing arrival of the leader of the French far Right, Jean-Marie
Le Pen, in second place in the first round of the French presidential elections
in May 2002; and the meteoric rise of an anti-immigrant but nonconformist
outsider, Pym Fortuyn, in the Netherlands in the same month. Finally, a whole
universe of fragmented radical Right ‘grouplets’ proliferated, keeping alive a
great variety of far-Right themes and practices (2004:173)
Another difference between the
earlier and more recent versions of fascism is the attitude toward the national
state. Most of the earlier versions glorified the state as an instrument of the
purified nation. The realities of state control were more complicated in both
Italy and Germany, but at the level of ideology “statism”
was an important fascist value.
Contemporary neo-fascist movements do not glorify the state. They favor
more authoritarian and interventionist state actions, but they do not glorify
the state as such. This difference is one reason why some scholars prefer the
term “populist nationalism” over “neo-fascism.” Another important difference is
about military expansionism. Glorification of military expansionism was an
important part of both Italian and German fascism, Japanese authoritarianism,
Argentinian efforts to reclaim the Malvinas, and current Russian military
annexation of the portions of Ukraine required to access the strategic port of
Sevastopol. But no neo-fascist movement or party has endorsed such a policy, at
least so far. The decolonization of the
whole periphery and the establishment of international organizations such as
the United Nations that oppose conquests and support the sovereignty of member
states has effectively delegitimized formal colonialism. Clientelism and covert interventions continue
to be the main modes of exercising power in geopolitics. It is likely that neo-fascist
regimes would not hesitate to employ these, but a return to military conquest
seems unlikely.
Though many of the earlier fascist
movements embraced syndicalism and were anti-capitalist in their early phases,
most neo-fascists and right-wing populists now strongly support capitalism and
oppose state intervention into the economy (Hochschild 2016; Skocpol and
Williamson 2012).[14] This appears to be part
of a continuing reaction against the welfare state that was pioneered by the
rise of neoliberalism in 1970s and 1980s and continues to be an important theme
in right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements.
Pro-capitalist popular
authoritarianism, and even fascism, are experiencing growing popularity in some
Asian and Latin American countries. Docena (2018) cites
three inter-related crises as the catalyst for this growth—crises of neoliberal
capitalism, liberal democracy, and anti-systemic or leftist radical-democratic
movements. These conditions are found more in areas deeply penetrated by global
capitalism and where liberal-democratic elites have already replaced
dictatorships. These elites have continued the policies of their predecessors,
such as export-oriented development, loosened business restrictions, attacks on
labor, reduced social spending, and stalled redistribution. As unemployment and
poverty increase, people see symbols of unattainable wealth spring up around
them in the form of shopping malls and luxury condominiums. In response to the
ineffective leftist anti-systemic movements and perceived corruption of the Pink
Tide populist regimes, the people in these areas are turning towards an
authoritarian solution as opposed to an anti-elite, anti-neoliberal response.
Reactions to Globalization and the Future of
the Global Right
At present an “interlocking
set of new enemies” is are seen as tearing at the status quo, including
“globalization, foreigners, multiculturalism, environmental regulation, high
taxes, and the incompetent politicians” (Paxton 2004: 181). The neoliberal globalization project has led
to a transformation of the world economy, thereby providing “a new fertile
terrain for far-right mobilizations” (Saull 2013:
631). The fragmented, insecure precariat no longer gathers in membership-based
collective organizations (Standing 2011). A globalized economy provides
opportunities to blame immigrant labor, finance capital, foreign investment,
labor-outsourcing, and ineffective politicians for local economic dislocations
(Saull 2013).
Spektorowski (2016) claims
that racial ethno-regionalism is supplanting nationalism in the global
political-economy. He argues that post-national European fascism may be the
next stage in the evolution of fascism in transnational regions with a focus on
preserving an “ethnic federation of European people” in the form of a “strong,
dominant, and productive conglomeration” (Spektorowski
2016: 126). But this vision of transnational racial struggle is undermined by
the rise of hypernationalism.
Classical
fascist rhetoric claimed to transcend class struggle (Mann 2004). But a divide now
exists between those qualified for open sector, internationally competitive
jobs and those stuck in sectors that are unable to compete globally (Kriesi et al
2006). Globally-minded liberals and progressives have become the enemy of
locally-focused traditionalists (Hochschild 2016). Individuals can only vote in
their local and national elections. The European Parliament is a partial
exception, but international organizations such the United Nations are lacking
in their institutional ability to directly represent citizens (Monbiot 2003).
New Right movements seek to demonize
characteristics of centrist liberalism such as “materialism, individualism, the
universality of human rights, egalitarianism and multiculturalism” (Griffin
2004: 295). These movements claim to restore the primacy and purity of
ethno-national groups, now threatened by globalization and immigration. The
immigration issue is not likely to go away soon. Population continues to grow
in eight countries in the Global South in which prospects for economic
development and job growth are bleak. The peak wave of 2015 has receded, but
economic forces, political disruptions, and civil wars are likely to continue
to make South/North immigration a contentious issue for the next few decades
(Mason 2015).
Western Europeans and Americans have known
mostly “peace, prosperity, functioning democracy, and domestic order” (Paxton
2004: 187) since World War II. Right-wing populist politicians who are trying
to build a mass movement usually distance themselves from the political
violence of their most ardent supporters.[15] The neo-fascist fringe groups do use forceful
confrontation as a tactic and this is reminiscent of the fascists of the 20th
century, but, at least so far, lethal violence appears to have been restricted
to mentally challenged individuals inspired by the rhetoric of others.
Some neo-fascist organized actions have
displayed considerable political savvy in framing and coordinating their street
tactics. The demonstrations against “sharia law” claimed that it legalizes
female genital mutilation, thereby attempting to mobilize women and feminists
to support anti-Moslem and anti-immigrant causes.
The energy that some neo-fascist
groups have shown and the apparent rapid spread of authoritarian rightist
populism and neofascist movements across the globe is disturbing. The currently
low unemployment rate, the revival of housing construction and the real estate
market and the Trump-induced stock market bump slowed these movements down. But
a new financial crisis and/or an economic slowdown will increase the level of
frustration and support for these neo-fascist sects and movements. This,
combined with a global ecological crisis, could lead to the “perfect storm”
theorized by Glenn Kuecker (2007).
Conclusions and Speculations
This project is yet incomplete. Our
effort to reconstruct the constellation of right wing
reactionary movements that were players in the World Revolution of 1917 needs more
work. We surmised that religious
fundamentalism was not as big a force in but this
issue needs more thought and historical study for purposes of comparing 20th
and 21st centuries global rights. We also see a need to look more
closely at the issue of fascist international coordination and organization
both in the first half of the 20th century and in the late 20th
and early 21st centuries. And we are also interested in the role of finance
capital in the rise of fascism in the 20th century and its potential
involvement in the 21st century. Because the story is unfolding before
our eyes, our efforts to characterize the nature of 21st century neo-fascism
and its similarities and differences with earlier incarnations remains provisional,
but our characterization of similarities and differences suggest what to keep
an eye on. An ironic hypothesis is suggested by our comparisons so far. Fascism
in the Age of Extremes [the first half of the 20th century] was
importantly a reaction against the strength of the rising international labor
movement and socialist, anarchist, and communist organizations that were
promoting proletarian internationalism and threatening the property of the rich.
Now the Left is decidedly weak, but it might gain new strength and more
articulation and organization in response to the threat posed by 21st
century neo-fascism. Something like this occurred in the 1930s when anarchists,
socialists, and communists were driven to organize united fronts to combat
fascism. A democratic eco-socialist
movement network with an articulated global organizational instrument might yet
emerge to take up the job of confronting the rise of neo-fascism (Amin 2018). Regarding
the future of fascism, our observation that fascism has come in waves and what
we said about the co-evolution of tributary modes, capitalism, and socialism
implies that new forms of fascism and authoritarianism are likely to emerge in
the 21st and 22nd centuries as humanity struggles to
implement a sustainable and humane form of global society.
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